CONSCIOUSNESS, MIND AND THE WORLD

AREA 1 EXPLORATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND MIND

Considerations on the Diffusion of Consciousness

It is convenient to start the circle with consideration of a simple but sufficiently complex creature. I have been living in Northwestern California for sixteen years - the home of the redwoods. It is also home to a yellow creature ariolomax columbianus, locally known as the banana slug¹ that invades local gardens and amuses me as it crosses the deck in front of my home. This slug can grow up to eight inches and weigh a quarter of a pound; a common coloration is lemon yellow. I ask: is the banana slug conscious? This question has intrinsic interest but my motivation for asking it here is an analysis of consciousness. The more “data points” that one has, the more one knows about consciousness. Knowledge of consciousness starts by our experience of it and this leads to the commonsense definition of consciousness as the state of mind in which one has subjective experience of the world…since there is a qualitative or subjective feeling to such states, they have been labeled “qualia.” However, I will argue that a reconceptualization of consciousness is necessary to be able to understand the relations between consciousness and the world. Inquiring about the consciousness of a slug, since we have minimal empathetic insight into it, requires consideration of how to recognize consciousness and, in turn, reconsideration of what consciousness is. Consideration of machine consciousness is interesting for the same reasons. Of course the question about the slug may lead to insights in biology…and consideration of the issue for the machine may lead to insights in computation and artificial intelligence

Is a banana slug conscious? A key to answering this is the reconceptualization of consciousness…or perhaps it is in the conceptualization of consciousness. I emphasize conceptualization because the idea of consciousness as qualia is somewhere in the gray area between concept and percept. Consciousness as qualia is an anthropic notion. Let us then examine another idea that started as anthropic and subsequently generalized to a concept - the idea of force in physics. The idea of force in physics is one that is scientific and of universal applicability in the realm of physics - at least in classical physics. Force is an anthropic percept that can be generalized as a concept to the universe of matter by the dual aspects of measurement and theory. Measurement of force is by its effect[s] and the theoretical aspect is Newtonian Mechanics. This generalization does not invalidate the anthropic and qualitative notion of force but provides context for it. Similarly, measurement or observation of consciousness is through behavior²…and the theory that provides integration and generalization is the dynamics of being. The dynamics of being is the theory that explains how an individual, often considered to be subject to or given in the real, can enter into the dynamics of the real…how a being enters reality as being without necessary mediation by “theory.” Since consciousness as qualia and the generalizations as orientation to the real would be involved in such a dynamics, the dynamics of being is a strong candidate. As a theory the dynamics relates behavior and entry into the real. It has predictive power in that it complements and bridges theory [science] and the categories of reality and intuition

It is ironic that behaviorism that had an intention to rule out mind from psychology, is a measure of consciousness and will show a slug - but not a thermostat - to be conscious

What is it about the behavior of a slug that makes it conscious? The conditions of its continued existence require it to negotiate in a complex environment. It has a perceptual system that is tied into its environment. This system evolved out of or with the environment. The creature is in the dynamics of the real. Although we do not sufficiently empathize with it to intuit its consciousness…we infer its consciousness from our mutual existence in dynamics of the real

Question: But surely, a slug is not really conscious?

Answer. We tend to assume that our form of consciousness - stark³ and reflexive - must define consciousness. There is no necessity to the requirement of starkness. But all consciousness must involve consciousness of consciousness. This follows from consideration of what it must be like to have single qualia in isolation. The having of qualia must involve memory and comparison. When I am aware that my feet are cold as I write, I am holding the memory of coldness in mind. Thus consciousness is necessarily reflexive. Our prejudice against the slug is due to equation of qualia with starkness. But there are also diffuse modes. And it is in these modes that the awareness of a “lower” creature is reflexive - involves conscious of consciousness. Thus consciousness of consciousness is intrinsic to consciousness…it is not necessary to say “consciousness of consciousness” for that is contained in consciousness…and there is no distinction between consciousness and awareness. Both consciousness and consciousness of consciousness or self-consciousness, though they have integral aspects, include the vague and diffuse - seen and not recognized…re-cognized by some other and or central agency of consciousness. It is in the same sense and with the same meaning that it can be said that consciousness necessarily includes knowledge of consciousness. The objections and arguments are the same including the generalization of the concept of knowledge. It is only in certain discrete, stark forms that this self-consciousness deserves to be mentioned. And it is only in these forms that there appears to be a distinction between consciousness and consciousness of consciousness

It will be interesting and useful to consider a gradation of species of various stages of organic development. This will permit correlation between nervous system and degree of consciousness. It will show that a nervous system is not necessary for consciousness…though, in animals, a nervous system significantly localizes and sharpens consciousness⁴. The gedanken application of the considerations discussed here to alien/machine consciousness will sharpen the analysis

Consciousness, Awareness and Attention

The three words have manifold meanings and consciousness and awareness are often used interchangeably. In the simplest sense consciousness is the having of subjective experience, of qualia…and does not necessarily involve self-consciousness or reflexivity. However, I argue[d] that consciousness necessarily involves reflexivity when all degrees of consciousness are included. This argument is not essential to the main argument in the “circle” of understanding. Awareness is sometimes considered to be similar to consciousness in that there is sentience but different in that the subjectivity is absent. The possible distinctions are subtle but I argue that there is no essential categorical difference. In this view there is no need for two fundamentally different concepts - consciousness with and awareness without subjectivity. There may be a need to distinguish the clear and central from the vague or the boundary…but, based on the various associations of the words a contrast between consciousness and awareness would not be the best way to do this

Attention is the assignment of differing degrees of clarity, centrality-boundary to elements in the conscious field. There, is in general, no well-defined boundary to the conscious field - it is dynamic and “fuzzy.”

More on conscious awareness

Assume that awareness includes but is not identical to conscious, i.e., that an organism may be aware but not conscious

I have already argued that “boundary” states are not non-conscious awareness. States of awareness on the boundary involve consciousness

Consider this point further. Consider bringing something in from the periphery of awareness into central consciousness. Someone says I was not conscious of it but I became conscious of it. Some argue that this means that there was awareness but not consciousness. Does not this imply a distinction between consciousness and awareness? No. It is my argument that there is no distinction in character. Insofar as peripheral awareness is not conscious it is not in the consciousness of a central system but it is in the consciousness - as re-conceptualized here - of a peripheral system

What then differentiates consciousness from the idea of awareness without consciousness? It must be the reflexive character of consciousness, of looping. Talking about consciousness: That the having of qualia necessarily involves these reflexive characteristics: That in the stark “advanced” case, the reflexivity involves explicit looping that may be seen as such; and that in the diffuse and elementary case the reflexivity is intrinsic in the fact of awareness/consciousness being in the character of a relation or binding

What then of non-consciousness awareness? Is there such a thing? Thermostats as thermostats do not qualify. The material components of the thermostat have relations: physical relations. I will be arguing that this is the singular and material case within the ontology that results from universalization of the concept of consciousness. The singular case may be regarded as “conscious” in the algebraic sense where zero is regarded as a quantity because of the algebraic simplicity that results. And from theoretical physics such algebraic conveniences may well turn out to have material significance. However the relations among the components of the thermostat as thermostat are named rather than basically physical. As such there is no consciousness or awareness. This is not the final word on this particular issue and even if we allow a thermostat as thermostat to partake of the physical its consciousness, if any, is of the character of zero consciousness. What about the possible argument that just as living organisms are built out of elements of the environment and this is the source of their consciousness, so there is a parallel argument for mechanisms… I will ignore the ontologically loaded character of the words and phrases such as “built”, “environment”, and “built out of”. Organisms are layered or hierarchical; each layer evolved in intimate relation with an environment; they are thus keyed in at all levels or their being; the environment is intimately and deeply interwoven; they are the expression of the world. Now we see thermostats, in this view, very cheap and degraded versions of expression. But on reflection the thermostat is not at all intrinsically tied in but is an expression of the tying in of the maker of the thermostat. I admit that this is not a knock out argument - these are not to be found in the world of the synthetic in a culture where we cultivate the glory of the analytic. But a synthetic being in a synthetic culture would leave alone the notion of a thermostat having consciousness, excepting the magical case, until the consciousness of the thermostat forced recognition

Then our friend the slug… What is the looping awareness when slugs meet? It is diffuse consciousness

So the difference between awareness that is not thought to be conscious and what is clearly conscious is not after all a lack of consciousness in the case of awareness. It is starkness, starkness of looping, degree of reflexivity, language, culture

There is no difference of kind among awareness and consciousness as reflexive awareness

But I already argued for essential but not stark reflexivity of all awareness-consciousness

There is no difference of kind among consciousness and awareness

There is a difference in degree which we may label consciousness vs. awareness but then consciousness loses its fundamental nature as qualia and awareness is fundamental

What about the unconscious? This is not a part of awareness but of potential awareness. Reconsider this

Criticisms of the Idea of Diffusion

...from the sense of separateness of the self

In psychoanalytic theory projection is a defense in which unwanted feelings are displaced onto another person. This is of course a very special case of knowledge by metaphor. Originally, at the start of individuation, distinction between a self and the world is not clear. In individuation the sense of one is replaced by a reflexive and many faceted looping from self to world to self…this idea does not require that self not be or not be seen as part of the world. A mistake that may arise in this process is “confusion” of elements or properties of self and world. This may be seen as projection

Thus in attributing consciousness to a slug or other creature, despite attempts at reconceptualization of consciousness and conceptualization of the position of a creature in the world, I may still be guilty of projection. Of course projection is not necessarily mere projection. Therefore the work of criticism is to show that such projection is mere projection

That this is the work of the critic - including the internal critic - does not relieve me of an obligation to show that such projection is real. At the same time I recognize that projection is also a source of knowledge…especially as part of dialog. So the real task is to embrace projection as part of the dialog of creation, criticism and experience. That is a phase of this work

This same analysis can be applied to all positions including materialism…which appears to be the opposite of projection. Materialism itself may be a projection…a power paradigm…but this neither validates nor invalidates materialism. Relative to this my program should include rather than reject materialism…and to find its place and appropriate interpretation within a larger scheme. That larger scheme may find its place through dialog and in history

Awareness and Consciousness: Summary

There is a meaning of consciousness that is identical to awareness…and another in which conscious is a kind of awareness. There is no awareness that is not consciousness in its general sense. What defines the special meaning of consciousness? Some considerations are given here: reflexive awareness, heightened awareness, awareness informed and cultivated by a sense of self, by social groups through language and culture…which are in turn nurtured through the sense of being that includes awareness

Diffusion of Consciousness in the Individual

...some Explorations, Objections and Responses

In analogy between the components or organs of a compound organism, and simpler organisms…the components are themselves conscious

Objection: Individuals note no consciousness to their fingers or organs. Response: no consciousness is expected to be noted. There are levels of clarity or starkness to consciousness…and degrees of connection…and a second individual or one’s organs may be intrinsically “on” but “off” to the individual - to the “I” or the “me.” So “other” consciousness is on and off - in an approximate or metaphorical sense. The yogi can feel the consciousness of the organs and the saint can feel the consciousness of the other. I can look and feel, too, but the yogi and the saint see deeper…Other ways of seeing that these centers of consciousness are distant from the central, stark “I” are [i] in the seen but not recognized - which follows from the conditions of development of the individual and the association of the stark discrete forms with language and spatio-temporal perception…what the yogi and the saint see and recognize through training, initiation and empathy is also seen but not recognized by others - by the “uninitiated”…and [ii] in the unconscious or potentially conscious which too may be - or have an aspect of - the seen and not recognized

Objection: consciousness is either on or off. Response: consciousness is either present or not present. On off means there is a threshold below which there is awareness but not consciousness. If consciousness is present at all levels of intensity of awareness…then it is not on off but merely present or not present. The generalization of consciousness considered here includes awareness [by the behavior in organic context argument]. All cases can be considered under one category of consciousness with the limiting case assigned the value “zero.” Threshold is not negated; nor is this contradictory of the present arguments for in introduction of a reconceptualization there are going to be some points of difference between the old and the new versions of the concept…and, as argued above, the new system is to be judged by other criteria such as prediction and test…This is recognized in science but the ideas are not at all limited to science

Objections: but these arguments are not at all rigorous…are plausibility and heuristic arguments

Plausibility proof: introspection

Material proof: the reflex arc. Review; modify the argument for consciousness of simpler organisms

The issue of proof considered. The plausibility and heuristic considerations of the circle of issues has a number of functions: [i] plausibility and motivation, [ii] creation of a conceptual framework in which the issues can be seen in a new, generalized or universalized way…so that discussion may be held, explanations given, predictions made and tested, and ideas sharpened. The final criterion of proof in the world cannot be deduction alone but must also involve hypothesis [speculation] prediction and testing. There are, of course, other criteria of various types. Universalization, understanding, generalization, consistency and simplicity are all guiding “criteria”…consistency is also required. The discussion here and below shows the reconceptualization to have universalization, understanding, and generalization. It has simplicity in the following senses: the actual number of categories is reduced, the field of application is universalized, dualism is eliminated, and dynamics is introduced thereby to a degree eliminating description in favor of prediction. It points the way to development of the concepts, to application for utility and testing and rigor and consistency

An individual is conscious but a finger and viscera are also conscious. The violation of the “brain image” of the body is only apparent - consider the reflex arc and the vestiges of communication in organisms without nervous systems

The consciousness of the individual is discrete and central…and there is also a non-stark form of central consciousness. However, the consciousness of components is non-central or diffuse and non-stark

These considerations lead to the idea that an individual has multiple centers of consciousness. This is formalized in the following section