JOURNEY IN BEING
BEING
OUTLINE
Introduction… Why being?… What is being?… First comments on meaning… Global and local modes of description… Forms of experience… What has being?
Use Journey in Being-New World-metaphysics
Ideas introduced. Being, verb to be (is,) existence, empirical, necessity, meaning, essence, substance, unknown, algebra, sense, reference, dual unknown, meaning of existence, description, concept, object, local, coordinate, global, supra-coordinate, patchwork
Primary meaning of being. That which is – which exists. (1) Its meaning necessarily contains empirical knowledge – that there is being is the essential fact that is integral with the meaning of being. (2) No essence or substance – although there is being, what has being is not specified in advance of investigation. The point will be seen as crucial. (3) Naming the unknown and so the power of being is similar to that of the use of the unknown in algebra. There is, however, dissimilarity between the natures of the unknowns. In algebra, the nature or meaning of the unknown is usually given; it is the value that is unknown. Regarding being, both character (sense) and what has being (reference) are unknown at the outset
The paradox of meaning – if, for example, unicorns do not exist then what is it that does not exist? Best resolution involves first noting that the locution ‘unicorn’ does not imply existence of an object and second analysis of meaning, concept and object in general and application to ‘existence’
Meaning and necessary empirical knowledge. Meaning – concept and object, sense and reference; use, dictionary theory, system and change
Picture, imagery, concept and description. Local (coordinate) and global (supra-coordinate, patchwork) description
Forms of experience. Experience—the ‘subjective’ side of being, feeling—of sense, knowledge…
Establish the nature of being and existence; the nature of the concept of being in contrast to dedicated concepts of e.g. mind and matter
The overriding goal of the narrative was introduced in First things. Show that the concept of being is adequate to that goal. (In this chapter the demonstration begins. Clarify the extent of its demonstration.) Explain the general significance of the idea of being and, briefly, the choice of the word ‘being’
Begin to answer the question ‘what has being?’ or ‘what things or entities have being?’ Full discussion is in Objects. Note already that there is being, that there is difference and form, that there is universe and…
The void exists and its essential property is that it contains no being or form
This assertion, shown in Metaphysics, is a fundamental assertion that is foundation for the Theory of being to be developed in the narrative
Clarify the concept of existence in relation to the apparent paradox that if e.g. unicorns do not exist then what is it that does not exist? Introduce concept and object
Develop preliminary thoughts on meaning leaving a more complete development to Meaning. Purposes of the preliminary development include (1) to deploy the opening provided by the clarification of concept and object and thus continue to show that rapid development of being, universe, void and other essential ideas is possible while accepting that difficulties remain to be addressed, and (2) to indicate to the reader some characteristics of meaning –that meaning lies in context and system and that as contexts shift and grow so does meaning– and that here, many meanings are extended to the root in such a way that when restricted to their ‘usual’ context the valid meaning is not essentially changed but that the extension involves an essential and necessary expansion… and that it is essential to focus on the meanings as used here and on no other meaning except of course for comparison, insight and inspiration
Discuss global and local modes of description, space-time continuum vs. general coordinate patches. Note that in any discussion, the appropriate mode of description may be implicit
The established reasons (following paragraphs) but especially the word ‘being’ and the importance of an active rather than passive use of the idea (of being) in which habits of context and substance (and so on) are actively and continually eliminated
I.e. why is being chosen as the cornerstone of a journey into ideas and transformation? Also, why use the word ‘being?’
The word ‘being’ is chosen for its sound, for its multiplicity of use – as verb and noun and qualifier, and for its connection to tradition. ‘Being’ results in direct rooting in the immediate (the verb to be in its forms ‘is’ and ‘are’) and the remote (all forms of the verb to be.) ‘Existence’ could be used but ‘being’ is the root form, is preferred on the basis of sound (thought Liz,) and connects to tradition mused Ravi
From ‘What is being?’ the idea is open and powerful unlike dedicated concepts such as mind and matter. It is not mediated by a concept such as matter that may be pictured discretely, simply, externally. It is simple, experienced directly and immediately. This is a source of its power and difficulty. Being is not mysterious but contains all mystery. Used in this way, ‘being’ helps focus on the immediate, focus away from mediating and limited concepts associated with limited experience, and focus away from tendencies to sophistication. Apprehension of being involves the entire individual in the global sense described below
To repeat from the previous paragraph
Being is not mysterious but contains all mystery
The power in ‘being’ is that of naming the unknown – as in algebra
Use of ‘being’ will be seen to stand against the twins of determinism and substance theory, against prejudice and premature commitment, i.e. against setting thought up for a fall even before it begins
At once, as is seen in the present section, the idea of being enables connection to the fundamental concepts of Metaphysics and its nature and possibility, language, objects (what has being,) concepts and objects (A clarification of ‘existence’,) and global and local descriptions (which consideration introduces great narrative simplicity and holds within it the idea of spatiotemporality…) Although mentioned in this section, the development of the concepts awaits the dedicated sections in what follows
Ultimately simple and direct, so direct as to escape notice, contains mystery but is not and cannot be mysterious but (of course) can be mystified – and its directness and
Existence
Being is that which exists
There is a sense of emptiness about the idea – surely everything exists! This, however will be seen to be a source of the power of the idea
Built into language at its root via the verb to be e.g. ‘is.’ Therefore, the concept of being is empirical
The empirical is built into the fact of perception and into the fact of content
Already, in being there is the root of a fundamental and empirical metaphysics
Further discussion of existence occurs in the topic A clarification of ‘existence’, and in Objects, below
So far, the meaning of ‘being’ has not been specified even though there is a connection with ‘existence’
Here, ‘Being’ shall be that which exists or has existence
What does it mean to exist? What ‘things’ exist? Defer these questions until the understanding that permits reasonable answers has been developed. I.e., in identifying being with existence nothing (except generality) has yet been specified
[The following acknowledges a familiar distinction. The verb to be indicates existence as in ‘I think therefore I am.’ However, some forms of the verb have other senses e.g. to show a property as in ‘grass is green’ rather than existence. The point also illustrates variant and family Meaning that are significant immediately below and subsequently. Variant meaning can also be understood by saying that the different symbols, corresponding to the variant meanings, have the same sign]
Typically, ‘is’ means ‘exists at the present.’ They found it convenient to use an alternative and extended connotation in which ‘is’ stands for ‘was,’ ‘is,’ or ‘will be.’ In English, ‘is’ does not distinguish ‘is here’ or ‘is there.’ The use of ‘is’ and ‘exists’ may be used to cover such variant connotations. It is not clear that space and Time –extension and duration– are appropriate to coordination of All Being. The terms phase or manifold may be used to refer to generalized coordination. Then, ‘exists’ may refer a point, a region, or to the entire manifold of being (universe.) These two uses of ‘is,’ ‘being,’ and ‘exist’ may be referred to as the temporal and the atemporal. However, more than time (and space) may be implicated in coordination of being; the uses of being shall therefore be referred to as coordinate (or local) and global (or supra-coordinate)
Consider unicorns exist…
There is a well known paradox regarding the meaning of ‘existence.’ If a unicorn does not exist what is it to which ‘unicorn’ refers? The resolution is to recognize that ‘horses exist’ means that there are actual entities or objects corresponding to the concept of the horse. Similarly, ‘unicorns do not exist’ means that there are no actual entities or objects corresponding to the concept (e.g. the mental picture or the artist’s rendition) of the unicorn
The distinction between concept and object is fundamental and will lend much clarity to the nature of objects and concepts. The distinction will allow careful definition of the nature of particular or concrete object and of abstract object and the distinction between abstract and particular object
Already in the resolution of this apparent paradox a powerful machinery of ‘concept’ and ‘object’ has been introduced
It is in the nature of perception to conflate concept and object (indeed from what follows, there is little ultimate choice but to do so.) However, in thinking of concept and object such conflation is not necessary. Yet, even while attempting to live outside that conflation, we fall into it. This is a potential source of confusion. Much sophistry has gone into overcoming the result of conflation where merely avoiding would suffice. A difficulty in stepping outside the conflation now follows – it is perhaps the essential difficulty
There is an issue regarding the analysis of the paradox. Since the concept and the object are not the same thing or kind of thing, what justification may there be, for example, in say that there is an object called an apple that corresponds to the concept of an apple? This may be stated roughly as follows. Suppose there is a concept of an apple. What does it mean, then, that there is an actual apple?
This and other concerns are deferred to analysis of concept and object in Objects for which some tools of analysis are developed first in Meaning and Metaphysics. It will be seen that the analytic tools are necessary to properly pose the concern raised here
Although this topic could be omitted without loss to the main development, it reveals some aspects of the conceptual character of being (existence)
[Analytically inclined thinkers have identified some problems with the idea of existence. Everything exists. But if everything exists then fictional characters such as unicorns exist. The source of the problem is that the same word may be used to refer to an entity –concrete or abstract– and the idea or concept of the entity… and, in English at least, the grammatical form in which there is talk of unicorns need not indicate that a unicorn is fictional. A consistent use could be obtained by regarding existence as a property of a Concept or an idea. Then ‘x exists’ would mean ‘there is an actual thing to which the idea x refers’ and ‘x does not exist’ would mean ‘there is no actual thing to which the idea x corresponds.’ However, such a usage is not necessary for the analytic contradiction is easy to avoid and the example suggests that over-formalization of incompletely determined concepts may be misleading as to depth of understanding]
[A unicorn may be thought of as a ‘non existent’ Object (on the assumption that there are no unicorns.) Since, in common use, an object is something that does exist, what could ‘non existent object’ mean? Is not the idea self-contradictory? Objects are seen – but what is it that is seen? What is seen is not the actual thing-as-it-is for the impression that an individual has, though of the thing is also of the Mind. It is not a copy but perhaps a reconstruction. Picture the world. Of all the combinations of its elements only some can be seen as objects (in vision the inside of the mountain is not seen even though it could be seen with special techniques and is known conceptually.) Of all the possible visible objects only some are seen as such (two birds may be seen as two objects or as one object e.g. when flying in unison but the feather of a bird and a blade of grass are not usually seen as an object.) Thus object-as-seen partakes of a perceptual-conceptual character. This is the meaning of ‘object’ used in this paragraph. Further, until it is established that the concept as object or concept-object corresponds faithfully to the external object it is the only significant meaning (if it were to be established that the correspondence were impossible, it would necessarily be the only meaning.) Here ‘non existent object’ means that there is no entity that corresponds to the idea or concept. There are, by usual definition and in typical geometries, no square circles. That is, a square circle is a self-contradictory concept. Can a square circle be considered to be a non existent object? In that the word-concept ‘square circle’ (an attempt to form a picture of a square circle would bend the imagination) refers to no object, it is not inconsistent to say that a square circle is a non existent object. Similarly a golden mountain is a non existent object. Whereas a square circle is necessarily non existent (everywhere except in unusual geometries,) a golden mountain is contingently non existent (e.g. non existent on earth but possibly existent.) The idea of non existent objects was introduced by the philosopher Alexius Meinong (b. 1853, Lemberg, Austrian Empire) in attempting to clarify the relation between ideas and things. It was Meinong who first suggested and formulated the idea of concept-object introduced earlier in this paragraph. It appears that the concept of the non existent object makes the concept of object more symmetric but not necessarily deeper. The purposes to inclusion of these thoughts here are (1) they encourage abstract or ‘algebraic’ thought regarding Being, (2) for possible post-narrative use in clarifying the meaning of the ‘Void’ (the term is introduced later) e.g. the void may be thought of as containing all non existent objects]
Note that unless reasonable care is taken it is likely that confusion among the various senses of object will occur. The common sense of object has not been shown to be tenable. These issues will receive further attention in the section, ‘Objects,’ where the object will be further analyzed and circumstances under which the concept-object and the common use of object coincide, at least as facsimiles, will be clarified
The discussion permits some comments on analytic philosophy which has been a source of clarification of the concepts of this narrative. The discussion of analytic philosophy is taken up below and continued in the later sections, ‘Principles of thought’ and ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
Meaning in general is deferred
Redistribute material among the present section and Meaning (Aims)
Aims of this section. (1) Comment on shift and extension of meaning. (2) Observe interdependence among meanings for a context, the importance of focusing on the specific often extended (sometimes to ground) meanings used here and the profit that accrues from attending to the relationships. (3) Note that meaning has empirical content; mention of sense and reference and their practical place in clarifying meaning; analysis of existence using the tools of sense and reference. (4) Observe that the words use here are often important terms from the history of ideas; that it is therefore important in understanding the text to fix on the present meanings and no other (other meanings may of course be suggestive and illuminating)
Here, ‘meaning’ is used in the linguistic sense of word and sentence meaning. A more complete, critical discussion of Meaning is possible in the context of the Object and is therefore deferred. However, the discussion of the paradox regarding the use of ‘existence’ sets up the following observations that may be immediately useful to readers
Objects are known by concepts (the general idea of the concept includes the percept)
Except at the beginning of a sentence, the lower case form refers to the concept, e.g. logic. In the narrative, if the first letter is capitalized, e.g. Logic and Form, reference is to the object that is immanent in the world. (When the existence of the immanent object is not obvious, e.g. as for Logic, its existence must be shown.) In an example of a second use capitalization of the first letter, logic will refer to the received notion and Logic will refer to its reconceptualization in this narrative. Since the goal of the narrative is to approach as far as possible to ultimate forms of objects, the two uses of capitalization have a high degree of coincidence. Llogic is the form used to refer to the object when the word occurs at the beginning of a sentence
That objects are known by concepts immediately raises the question of faithfulness of the concept and whether the object-in-itself is truly known or even has meaning. The issue is deferred to Objects and Meaning
As an illustration of the issue of faithfulness, insofar as matter is a dedicated concept and not another name for being, materialism has the possibility of incoherent
The idea of the concept itself has a variety of meanings. What is the significance of the concept? Start with an example. There are many wolves whose membership in the same class is recognized not because the individual has available a definition of the wolf but rather an intuitive concept of the wolf. In a world that contained just one wolf, would there be a concept of ‘wolf?’ There might not be a need for a distinct name but the concept would be possible as in ‘that animal is distinct from zebras, lions and so on and has characteristics that may be noted and recalled.’ Thus a ‘wolf’ could be a concept even if there was only one actual wolf (or even if there were no wolves but it would be improbable that in the absence of wolves the imagination would produce the wolf in all detail.) One idea of the concept is that it is a mental content – perhaps a definite and recognizable one; later it will be seen that the mental content may be referred to as the ‘concept-object.’ Generally, the named concepts are those that have significance. There are (at least) two kinds of significance in relation to concepts. A first is when the concept corresponds to many or common entities and a second is when there is only one entity (e.g. the universe) or few entities that have especial significance. Commonly when talking of concepts, concern is with the significant concept. The (significant) concept has the significance that it enables (is or encodes) recognition of patterns, repetition, significance, behavior and, so, makes organized perception and thought efficient. The significant concept is a common element of theories; however, recognition of facts also requires concepts and significance results in focus, attention and prominence. The mental content and the significant concept are not distinct in their fundamental kind
That (non human) animals recognize distinct entities shows first, that a percept is a concept and, second, that non human animals are capable of concepts
There is a classical theory of definition due to Aristotle that involves ‘genus’ and ‘difference’ and a variety of modern theories of definition that include definition as a part of the formalization of axiomatic systems
More illuminating to the present narrative is a concern with limits of clarity that may be achieved by definition
Human artifacts are generally difficult to define. Consider, ‘a table is an item of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs.’ Adopt (initially) an attitude that all objects and only those that satisfy the definition shall be tables. It follows then that a stool is a table, that a highway sign may be considered to be a table, and that a flat slab on a block is not a table. As an alternative approach an artifact may be defined in terms of its function e.g. a table is an elevated horizontal surface that is used to make objects more easily accessible. With this definition, a shelf is a table and if a ‘table’ is never used as a table it is not a table. This process of pinning down and finding exceptions could continue but it is soon recognized that artifacts have multiple and changing forms and uses, and that objects that are generally used for one function (or that have had no function) may be adapted to many others. In the realm of artifacts, then, it is clear that (variable) meaning lies in (variable) use and that definition has limited use or value. It seems that definition is contrary to the idea of artifact. Attention shall therefore shortly turn to ‘natural’ objects. Before taking up the natural object, consider a dramatization of the difficulty in defining artifacts – the story of a god creating a cosmos for her or his own pleasure. This god looks at an earlier creation, cosmos x, the one that human beings call home and has a number of thoughts. ‘Perhaps if I alter the values of some of the fundamental physical constants,’ thinks the god, ‘the place might last a little longer. Why stop at the constants… why not change the nature of the forces and particles to give the cosmos more color and variety? What shall I do about suffering? I think I’ll take language away from human beings so that they will lose malice and cunning; or perhaps I’ll just take feeling away so that beings may destroy one another but no one will feel hurt. Good!’ Aeons upon aeons later the god reflects ‘cosmos xi was disappointing. It brought me no real pleasure. Certainly it provided an improved physical display but human being xi was rather mechanical! I think I’ll revive cosmos x and experiment with it a little more…’ The god asks a philosophical acquaintance, ‘What’s a cosmos anyway? What is an electron if one cosmos has point electrons and another has ‘electrons’ with manifest structure? What should a human being be?’ The apprentice responds ‘You can’t really define the things you create when you know you can change the design and the uses to which you put your creations…’
The discussion now focuses on the difficulty in defining natural objects. It may be thought that the difficulty will be merely one of recognizing or conceptualizing given objects i.e. that the concept may change (shift and perhaps improve) while the object itself is definite. However, definitions of natural objects face difficulties that are similar to definitions of artifacts. First, as noted, the content of the definition regards the idea of the entity – the best knowledge that is had of the entity; this is in process which may be hoped to be ‘improvement.’ Second, as knowledge of the entire universe grows, i.e. as the boundary of the known changes, the context of understanding changes. Finally, it is usually thought that human being has no influence on the nature of the fundamental natural objects. One can affect an electron or a wolf, it is thought, but one cannot change the nature of the electron or a wolf. In fact, human being can affect the wolf and the outcome (not necessarily an improvement) is the dog. In anticipating what shall be called the normal view in the next section ‘Metaphysics: Theory of Being,’ it is true that human being does not normally affect the nature of the electron. The implication that there is a supra-normal circumstance in which the nature of nature can be affected by the denizens of nature and the quality of the possible effect (improbability rather than impossibility) is taken up in the subsequent sections
It is a common observation that entities that are easy to recognize (except boundary cases) may be difficult to define satisfactorily – may lack any satisfactory definition altogether. Why is this?
The conceptual-perceptual apparatus of human and other animals is adapted (attuned) to their world. In consequence, the recognition of common natural and social objects is, typically, effortless – for familiar objects the recognition itself does not occur at a conscious level. This adaptation covers not only the entities but the frameworks of perception including space and Time. ‘Intuition’ (which has other shades of Meaning – the sense here is that of Immanuel Kant, b. 1724, Königsberg, Prussia) is one name for these more or less automatic and pre-linguistic elements of cognition (which may require familiarization during development of the organism.) Translating the multi-dimensional, multi-faceted intuition into a linear definition in symbols (Language) is expected to be difficult and incomplete. Here, then, is one source of the incompleteness of definition. It becomes clear, however, that in common use there is no compelling need to definition – except perhaps in boundary cases; but what boundary cases show is that tight distinctions do not always obtain and are therefore unnatural to maintain
The concept of intuition is developed in the later section ‘Objects’
The intuition of an object may be clear but if there are no similar or alternative terms available for comparison, definition may be difficult. An example is the concept of consciousness that is discussed in the later section ‘Mind.’ Consciousness is so central to human experience –it may be said to be experience of the world– that there is in moment-to-moment experience no question of its being and quality. It is difficult, perhaps because it appears to occupy (is) all experience, to explain what it is except to indicate its presence – it is not the world but it is (the quality of the) experience of the world. It is relatively easy to talk of the varieties of conscious experience – of pleasure and pain, of color, of taste and so on. However, consciousness itself, though central and familiar appears to be like nothing else. Hence it is possible to talk around it but difficult to address its nature directly. If, however, it were possible and reasonable to identify a primitive and elementary consciousness among e.g. the elements of matter, human or animal consciousness might then be defined as combinations of the primitive or elementary forms at a number of levels and degrees of focus. These thoughts will be developed further in the discussion of ‘Mind’
Another source of difficulty in definition is in the fact that relative to human experience, the world (universe) is an ‘open system.’ This is true of day-to-day experience and of science. In physics, for example, the concept of ‘force’ has been central. The concept has origins in animal and human experience and has been adapted to quantitative use in mechanics – the branch of physics concerned with motion and causes of motion of material objects. The history of the concept of force dates back (at least) to Greek times and received interpretation and reinterpretation in the modern era before Isaac Newton (b. 1643, Woolsthorpe, England,) by Newton himself, in the abstract formalizations of Newton’s system, in the field theories of electromagnetism, in the quantum theories and in the relativistic theories of space, time and gravitation. The precise character and significance of the concept of force varies according to the theoretical context or environment. The case is similar with other common, scientific (and theological and philosophical) concepts
[The following brief historical information may provide context but its reading may be omitted as incidental to the progression of the narrative. The original relativistic theory of gravitation –the general theory of relativity of 1916– was the work of Albert Einstein, b. 1879, Ulm, Württemberg, Germany and, the German mathematician David Hilbert, b. 1862, Königsberg, Prussia. It is remarkable that Hilbert who was in communication with Einstein and other physicists was primarily a pure mathematician. There are disputed claims that Hilbert arrived at the field equations five days earlier than Einstein. The general or standard view gives Einstein priority for both general and special theories. There is also a dispute regarding the earlier (1905) special theory of relativity: the French mathematician Henri Poincaré, b. 1854, Nancy, France and the Dutch physicist Hendrik Antoon Lorentz, b. 1853, Arnhem, Netherlands both published results formally similar to Einstein’s special theory. Einstein is generally given priority for the ‘relativity of different frames of reference’ that enabled an understanding of the relative nature of simultaneity at different locations, a new geometry of space-time, the significance of the constancy of the speed of light, a writing of the equations in ‘covariant form’ that empowered understanding, and, generally, the physical significance of the theory. These views may be called the ‘standard position;’ acrimonious debate continues among specialists and partisans. The history of science has a number of famous priority debates: Newton versus Leibniz regarding the discovery (creation) of the differential calculus and Darwin versus Alfred Russell Wallace, b. 1823, Usk, Monmouthshire, Wales, regarding the Origin of the Species. Reasonable conclusions from such priority debates include: when dispute exists, priority is difficult to establish with precision; in addition to debate about content, disputes sometimes appear to concern the roles of ‘hero,’ ‘antihero’ and ‘destroyer of icons;’ there is sometimes a standard view that gives one individual priority which may be related to public image and to non-formal but important aspects of the work; in other cases, equal priority may be assigned as is the case regarding the discovery of calculus; that discovery is both communal and the work of ‘genius;’ and, perhaps most importantly, the often remarked thought there are times in the history of ideas where certain developments are natural… Quantum theory comes in a number of versions – the theories of particles and the theories of fields and in relativistic and non-relativistic versions. Although not associated with the discovery of quantum mechanics, the name of P. A. M. Dirac b. 1902, Bristol, Gloucestershire, England, for his introduction of relativity into quantum mechanics, for work in the field theories, for his interpretations, and for the introduction of powerful techniques and solution of important problems in quantum theory, lies at the convergence of the various threads in quantum theory… It is further remarkable that the work of Hilbert on certain kinds of ‘linear space of infinite dimension’ (hence the name ‘Hilbert space’) was also significant to the mathematical foundations and interpretation of quantum theory]
That an intuition may develop regarding formal (e.g. scientific) concepts and systems makes re-conceptualizing and re-definition difficult
Although closed theoretical systems may give concepts precise meaning, the world is open and as long as its Understanding is incomplete, the meanings of concepts remain in-process and definitions remain tentative. After a closed system has been developed, definitions may be placed at the beginning. In the open case, definition and investigation remain in interaction
Seeing a system (a text, a life) as closed may result in an impression of a (definite) beginning and end. ‘Beginnings’ and ‘endings’ are, perhaps, no more than stopping points…
This strand of thought is taken up again under ‘Mathematics’ in the section ‘Logic’
In any context, there is a system of meaning. There may be processes or actions, things or states of being. Thus concepts may come as verbs and nouns (among other kinds.) Among any kind, e.g. nouns, there is generally no unique way to related idea to world; some ways are more effective than others; and the system of things and therefore the system of ideas is not necessarily separable into fixed wholes that shall be constitutive of the things of the context. I.e. meaning comes, at least to some degree, as a whole. However, there must also be ‘atoms’ of meaning. Therefore, at outset at least, meaning must lie somewhere on the atomism-holism spectrum
Given that any word may have a variety of meanings or shades of meaning, it follows that actual meaning is dependent on context and to the extent that contexts are coherent and structured meaning will not be entirely ‘atomic’ but the meanings of terms in the language of the context will be interdependent. It will be seen that context is essential but that this does not logically restrict contexts and meanings to given contexts. As contexts shift and grow, so may meaning
In human growth, understanding of meaning is acquired primarily by growing into ‘context’ e.g. by immersion in a society. Acquisition of meaning is secondarily by instruction and definition
These considerations present multiple difficulties in the acquisition of meaning in a new or expanding context such as the system of ideas that follow. Whereas the evolution of an author’s system of ideas may have grown with experience and reflection, the reader does not have immediate access to that multiplicity of experience and reflection. In order to grow into the system, it will be essential for the reader to attend to the meanings as specified in what follows. It also follows that the meaning of any system to a reader will not be identical to that of an author and may ‘exceed’ that of the author
The system of concepts unfolds with the narrative. The reader who wishes to see the concepts collected together in one place may refer to the System of concepts
A number of words that are familiar from the history of human ideas are used in this narrative
It is essential to realize that the meanings of the words used to refer to the ideas are extended –often to the root of being– and, so, understanding of what is said and shown may be contingent upon seeing modified and extended meaning
Distribute between this and Meaning
It is in the nature of concepts that in deploying them in the Understanding (in the present case of all being,) their meaning shall continue to be revealed. Excepting final revelation of all things, meaning shall continue to shift and change
In actual situations, analysis of a concept does not occur in isolation – the comprehension of a context or domain of being typically requires a number of concepts. The entire meaning lies in a dynamic and mutually adjusting system or field of concepts whose understanding requires that all concepts be understood in relation to the context and to one another (since the aspects of the world are interwoven.) This is clearly seen in an axiomatic system even though it might not be so clear in common use because the sense of each common concept may seem to stand independently as a result of familiarity. Meaning is distributed non-uniquely among the system (which is distinct from incomplete determination of a system in relation to understanding the world.) It is commonly thought that such revelation must be unending. However, that is not necessarily the case. That growth in understanding has not ended does not imply that it is unending. A point may come when the understanding is recognizably complete
[‘Meaning’ may be regarded as being specified by ‘Sense’ and ‘Reference.’ This was emphasized by the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (b. 1848, Wismar, Germany.) The idea of sense (which is similar to connotation, intension) is conveyed by the intuitive grasp of its use and significance associated with a Concept; there are various ways in which the sense of a concept can be formalized but it is perhaps essential to have a fixed system of meaning. The idea of reference (similar to denotation, Extension) is conveyed by the collection of ‘things’ to which the concept refers. In a given system, e.g. an axiomatic system, reference is sufficient to specify meaning. However, in an open system (‘real life’) sense is required to supplement reference. There are a number of sources in the change or shift in the sense of a concept in use and over time, some of which have to do with interest and fashion; a primary and essential source of change in meaning is the growth of knowledge or ‘shifting knowledge contexts.’ As knowledge grows, the meaning of a concept may expand or shift even though the idea remains the same (similar.) The sense of a concept is required to effectively use it in varying contexts of reference. As will be seen in the section ‘Logic,’ an interpretation of mathematics is one of certain structures that axiomatic systems attempt to represent or capture. There is no guarantee that the structure that is needed will be captured even if the axiomatic system captures some structure with elegance. Here, too, the intuition (and Sense) of the concept is significant. There is a relation among intuition of Form, concept (Language,) and world. As noted later, the forms are as if Platonic but there is no separate Platonic world. In the developments that follow, it is seen that the depiction of Being in general is identical to the mathematical case except that the conceptual system is not always as neat as it is in mathematics. I.e. depiction of the world involves relations among form, intuition of form and concepts]
Above, the questions ‘What does it mean to exist?’ and ‘What things exist?’ were mentioned. These questions are equivalent to the question ‘What is the sense and reference of ‘to exist’ or ‘existence’?’
Relations between use and meaning are taken up later in the topic ‘Further analysis of being,’ below, and later in the section ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics’
In the conception (which includes perception) of something, is there any conception of its existence over and above the conception of the thing? No there is not
In a way, therefore, the concept of existence is trivial and empty – but what is the nature of the emptiness? Not that it applies to no thing but that it applies to everything
Another way of saying that there is no conception of the existence of an object over and above the conception of the object is that the sense of existence is empty. In effect, the concept of existence is defined by its reference – the range of objects to which it refers which is all objects
That the foregoing does not eliminate the sense that there is some sense to existence is interesting but it may be that that sense of sense is a conflation of the existence of the object with the conception of the object
Whether the foregoing makes the concept of existence and therefore of being useless, over and above its trivial character, should be the result of investigation. The metaphysics to be developed here shows that the concept is far from useless, that it is profoundly instrumental in the development of the ultimate character of the metaphysics (clarified in Metaphysics) and one source of this power that it avoids conception of all being in terms of any concept whose nature is restricted a priori to investigation
The first notion of the local mode of description is in terms of space and time. In the local mode, the trajectory of an entity through space and in time is given. In the first notion of the global mode, the trajectory is taken in its entirety
It is not at all clear at the outset of investigation that space and time are continuous and ubiquitous and connected through all being
It is necessary, therefore, at least at outset of study to relinquish description in terms of space-time, of continuum, of any uniform mode of description
It remains that there are two modes of description and understanding: the local and the global
In the local mode, ‘is’ means at a particular place or range of places and at a particular time (usually the present) or range of times that includes the present. In the global mode, ‘is’ means at some time and place. In both modes, in the general case, it is not assumed that time and space are the only descriptive parameters or that there is a continuous and globally connected network of such parameters
The form of experience and its significance are ideas that are implicit in the discussions so far of the facts and concepts of being and existence
What are the forms of experience? What is their general significance? How are they used in this narrative—in the journey? This section addresses these related concerns
The word ‘experience’ has a number of common uses. It is often said of someone who has worked for years and is consequently skilled at an occupation, that she or he is experienced. Such relatively specialized or derived senses are not the target of the present discussion. In the present sense, experience refers, roughly and to begin with, to the ways in which an individual may feel, sense and know the world. The world includes the individual and so experience includes experience of self and therefore emotion and experience of action and intention. The present use is not limited to direct experience and includes indirect kinds such as dreaming, thinking – whether in pictures or in words. A source of power –and inadequacy– of word symbols is that a single word or phrase that lacks intrinsic detail may associate with an immense variety of detail, color, form and feeling. The present idea of experience includes such variety. Experience includes the feeling of objectivity and the experience of confirming or disconfirming objectivity but objectivity itself is, at least initially, excluded from the meaning (sense) of experience. Experience refers to the subjective side of being—without any sense or suggestion that the subjective side is what it seems to be or is more or less real than the objective side or that it has or does not have reality
In the phrase ‘form of experience,’ form refers to shapes, sizes, colors, tones, fragrances, intensities—pains and joys, changes… and objectivity as experienced by a subject but not any actual objectivity
The idea of Form as a definite concept is introduced and clarified in Metaphysics and Objects. The uses of the forms of experience that are discussed in this section do not require further clarification of form which is therefore deferred to Metaphysics and Objects
One use of the forms of experience is in developing the Forms of metaphysics; however, there is no initial suggestion that the forms of experience are the Forms of metaphysics—such approaches to metaphysics are failed before they are begun. The idea that forms of experience may have use in developing a metaphysics has origin in the conclusion from the fact of experience to the fact of existence. The conclusion is not that whatever is experienced—the object of experience—exists but that experience itself is a mode of existence (additionally, and importantly, the forms of experience may and will be used to suggest for analysis, the Forms of existence or being.) The process of the ‘conclusion’ is not that experience implies its own existence but that the meaning of experience necessarily includes the fact of its being. That is, the set of experiences is contained within the set of beings. If someone asks, ‘How do I know I exist?’ there is a logical question—that of knowing whether there is a being that corresponds to the form of the experience of self (which could be an illusion) whereas this logical question does not apply to experience for experience of experience is experience. In other words there is no true conclusion from experience to being because experience is a fundamental mode of being (in some philosophies that are not held in this narrative it is the only mode of being and in other philosophies, subsequently shown to be pathological, it is not held to have being at all.) Such niceties may not be of immediate practical interest but they are of immense conceptual interest and, consequently, of immense derived practical interest
That experience is (a form of) being is similar to Descartes’ ‘I think therefore I am’ but does not depend on the existence of an ‘I’ and is not cast in the form derivation from premise to conclusion
It is essential that the ‘conclusion’ is necessary—in this case on account of the meaning of experience. Without being there is and can be no experience… The thought arises whether there are other aspects of experience from which conclusions of a metaphysical nature are possible. The response is that, in fact, there are—some conclusions have already been shown above and these and others will be further taken up in Metaphysics
A form of the general facts of experience—one that immediately leads to metaphysical conclusions—depends only on the being of experience and presenting or apparent form and not on reference to an object; therefore, such metaphysical conclusions are necessary—the idea of an object is, however, a form of experience as is the experience of object. The facts in question shall be deep and universal facts of being that may appear to be trivial and even obvious and it shall transpire that it is the very triviality that leads the pivotal character of the ‘facts’ in the secure development of the metaphysics (whose depth and breadth shall be subsequently be shown to be ultimate.) It is to be expected that if, in addition to the universal, significant particular (non-universal) conclusions are sought, such conclusions will not have logical necessity but may be practically firm. The narrative will distinguish universal and necessary from contextual or non-universal conclusions
The characteristic of the forms of experience alluded to so far is that the status of any objectivity of their content is not significant to their present metaphysical use. This idea may be generalized. There are other forms of experience whose objectivity is not significant simply because the forms are of interest in themselves. The varieties of experience—simple sensations and feelings, sadness and joy, human warmth and love, pain and pleasure, a sunset over an ocean, humiliation, conceptual thought, creation and experience of art, death and childbirth, seeking truth, war and peace, action and intention—may be regarded as constituting life. Such forms may be depicted in such a way that their objectivity is not in question because objectivity is not asserted—is not germane to the mode of depiction. Faithfulness to the original experience in recalling it may be in question, but the use of even remembered experience shall not depend on such faithfulness
There is an interest in faithfulness of objectivity and memory but, perhaps before that, there is an interest in the forms of experience without regard to faithfulness
A central motive to the idea of forms of experience is that while criticism is essential, its application too early or too often is counterproductive of valid constructive thought. This thought is formalized in the form of experience which lacks the form of thought that may be criticized. When objectivity is not part of the meaning (sense) of a concept, that concept does not belong to any realm of objective criticism. If thought to which the idea of criticism regarding objectivity is applicable constitutes a category, the form of experience does not lie within that category. Is this a subterfuge to avoid criticism? No, for the form of experience says nothing that is or should be construed as objective. How then is critical (and constructive) thought possible in relation to derivation of metaphysics from the forms of experience? Criticism may apply to the significance or meaning attached to those forms or to the process of deriving conclusions from them!
The idea of faithfulness in the depiction and cultivation of forms of experience has affinity to the idea of authenticity—but authenticity is not identical to any preconceived faithfulness
Authenticity may enrich experience and enhance the variety and quality of their objective consequences
The significance of the forms of experience may now be seen as manifold. At one extreme are the trivial yet deep forms that are dually empirical and metaphysical in their sense and significance—the ideas of being, of all, of part and of no part… At another apex of extremity are simple day-to-day experiences that constitute the life of the present. A third apex is art and culture—including humanities, science, and the idea of the institutions of culture. Another is the enterprise of human civilization…
The depiction of the forms of experience may be seen in the aspect of representation and cultivation of meaning
The discussion of the forms of experience so far may suggest that they are intended to be foundational to the Theory of being—the metaphysics, its elaboration and application—that is developed in the narrative. There are other foundational endeavors such as Husserl’s phenomenology in which the elaboration of mental content is used as foundational. Here, however, the intent not the provision of any direct and complete foundation. Rather, among their functions, the forms make explicit, clarify, and elaborate an idea already implicit and that has already been developed and made partially explicit. That idea—the dual character of empirical fact and meaning in some important metaphysical cases—and its development are not seen as fully foundational of the ideas and action (transformation) of this narrative. Instead, the foundation is casual—and insistence on maintaining this casual character is crucial to maintaining openness to further foundation and to the needs of action and transformation. A final and fully complete conceptual foundation regarding depth and variety of being might be initially experienced as exciting but would later be experienced as stultifying; a complete foundation regarding breadth shall be shown to be impossible. The present foundation, however, allows for ever freshness of discovery—and even though this may recommend it, it cannot be thought of as validating it. Its validation lies in the logic of Metaphysics. The foundation, then, is casual—it is what foundation has been seen or evoked along the way. The forms of experience assist in making clear that foundation and its nature. That was, roughly, the initial motive to the development of the idea of forms of experience. Along the way, it emerged that elaboration of the forms and clarification of their nature would be an approach to connecting the austere metaphysics to life—to other aspects of human endeavor
As form of experience, distinctions among the forms come after and not before experience—these occur in interaction. Therefore, the forms of experience bind thought to life, the depth of metaphysics to the particulars of a journey—the human journey—a journey in being
Being—that which exists—given fact of being but only some generic kinds of object. The existence of generic objects: sentience, all being—the universe, difference and change, part—domain, process, absence of being—the void
Objects in general—nature and kinds—deferred
What they found is completion that is possible in some directions e.g. depth but perhaps not in other directions e.g. variety – i.e. completion is explicitly Possible with regard to depth but its possibility appears to be at most implicit with regard to variety
It may immediately be said there is being – in the condition of presence to the world (the fundamental response which already entails the idea of mind)
There is being – else there would not even illusion (the sophist’s response) e.g. of writing or reading these words or illusion of illusion… ‘All is illusion’ is (logically) incoherent but may be thought because of its superficial similarity to all that we know is illusion which is not logically incoherent though unlikely (all that all beings know is illusion will be seen to be logically incoherent)
That there are appearances implies that there is being but does not imply that the form of being is the form of the appearance or that there is meaning to a comparison of form of being and form of appearance. Given the immersion of perceiver and perceived in being, that there is finally nothing outside perception, what it means that there is correspondence between perception and perceived is not clear. This question of meaning is taken up in Objects
‘All is illusion’ may have a source in the idea that knowledge of any contingent state (one whose being is a fact but not necessary) may be illusory
Because of its direct quality, being may be conceived but requires no conceptualization. In this sense the concept of being is unlike the usual conceptualizations of mind and matter
The world or universe is the collection of all that has being. The universe has being. As all being there is one and only one universe. Talk of universes or multi-verses must use another sense or concept of ‘universe.’ Even as definition, this concept of universe has consequences. That it is more than artifact is shown later where it is seen to be not merely factual but necessary
If a creator is distinct from what is created, the universe has and can have no creator (there is nothing outside all being)
Difference… without difference there could not be illusion of difference (sophistry,) without difference there would be no actual or manifest being (essential argument;) without form there could be no manifest form
There are domains or parts; this is given provided that it is not specified what they are
There are collections; in Metaphysics it will be seen that there are infinite collections
There are entities (why) but not (is this universal) permanent entities (except the universe…)
There is sentience. Sentience is the label for the given aspects of (animal, human) being that include and are related to awareness
The void is the absence of being. That void exists is not semantically paradoxical. The void exists as the complement of the universe in itself or every entity in itself
Tricky proofs. 1. As the void, there is no distinction between its being and non-being. Therefore, the void exists.
When form (clarified later,) pattern and law are read in the universe, they may be felt to be alien to it. However, the universe contains all being. While form, pattern, and law may be felt to be alien to the universe, may be regarded as ethereal as a result of feelings that ideas are not embodied, whatever Form makes it possible for form to be read is immanent in being, in the universe, whatever Pattern and Law make pattern and law possible are immanent in being and of being. Here, capitalization signifies what is rather than what is read and dropping the capitals it may be said that form and pattern and law are immanent in being
Therefore, in the void that is the absence of being, there is no form, no pattern, and no law
That the void exists and contains no form, pattern or law is a foundation of the metaphysics to be developed
It is seen again that, already, in being there is the root of a fundamental and empirical metaphysics
If matter (mind…) is a restricted concept not capable of modification by experience, the idea of matter as manifest is not even an illusion. Therefore, reference to an ‘illusion’ of matter does not prove the existence of matter. If the restrictions are lifted, the existence of matter and even that all is matter may follow from its conception; in this case matter is being and use of the idea of matter as other than being is empty and void
The idea that some ‘kind’ or ‘substance’ such as mind, matter, proposition, fact… is given a priori as the kind, may be expected to and has resulted in fundamentally incoherent metaphysics. This expectation is validated in what follows
That materialism is coherent may be a result of confusion or conflation of the two views of it. The conflation of the two views is encouraged by success of material interpretations of science
As the complement of the universe –or of any entity– relative to itself, the void must exist
The characterization of the void as the absence of particular being, Law, Pattern and Form, together with the existence of being is perhaps the foundation of the metaphysics that follows
What else has being? Matter, number, idea, substance, or form? Particular versus abstract objects? How is it determined what has being? These questions are deferred to what follows
What ‘things’ exist is taken up again under ‘Objects,’ below where consideration of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ objects is taken up – and distinction between the abstract and the concrete is clarified and it is seen that the distinction is not mental vs. non-mental (this is well recognized in the current literature) and, further, that it is not spatial or temporal vs. non spatiotemporal, causal vs. non-causal, empirical vs. non-empirical and, perhaps surprisingly, not even one (altogether) of abstraction vs. particularity (‘concreteness’)