JOURNEY IN BEING
IDEAS
OUTLINE
Principles of thought and transformation… Philosophy and metaphysics… Modern and recent philosophy… Problems of metaphysics… A system of human knowledge
Criticism and construction… Understanding, charisma and patriarchalism… Outline of the principles… Reflexivity… Attention to Meaning… Integration of the psyche… Thought and action
Analytic Philosophy… Continental Philosophy… Western Philosophy in the context of the Theory of Being… In modern academic philosophy, philosophy as it is possible—and necessary to fullness—has been abandoned… Metaphysics is the discipline whose concern is the outer limits of Being… The possibility of metaphysics. The question of ‘grand narratives’… Philosophy is the discipline whose limits are the outer limits of Being and Understanding… Temptations of the analytic approach
Issues and problems of metaphysics addressed and resolved in this narrative… What is metaphysics? Some possibilities… Ultimate versus conservative metaphysics… Classical, scholastic, modern and recent issues in metaphysics. Indian metaphysics
Some details of the following sections may be in Journey in Being-New World II-concepts
See discussion in First things
Discuss ‘What is philosophy?’ and ‘What is metaphysics?’ from history and first principles – first principles are significant because they shed light on whether the answers over or under-claim scope and power
Establish:
… the essential concern of metaphysics is with the outer limits of being
… the limits of philosophy in its ideal form are the outer limits of Being and Understanding
The view from history; the varieties e.g. analytic and continental philosophy, and Indian philosophy; analysis of the status and prospect of philosophy
That modern philosophy is bound up in a variety of parochial issues such as micro-analysis, nihilism and, in the case of Indian philosophy, living in the shadow of the past; that while it is important for philosophy to attend to immediate concerns the degrees of the focus are excessive though understandable
These foci tend to have a number of sources. One source is conceptual. The rejection of the grand vision of speculative idealistic European philosophies is one factor in the analytic emphasis on piece-meal analysis and the essential nihilism (sometimes dressed in bright colors) of continental thought. A second source is historical – the failure of European idealism both conceptual and political may be seen to give impetus on the one hand to piece-meal thought and on the other to nihilism. Additionally, the ascent of science has resulted in a loss confidence with which philosophy may presume to speak about the real. A third source is the modern academic system that encourages early, rapid and frequent publication (it is clear that these sources have causal interdependence;) this academic system also encourages separation of the disciplines even though being itself is not subject to the distinctions (that there are practical distinctions is not questioned;) the economic success of modern industry is often characterized by obsolescence – planned or otherwise: the academic ‘industry’ does not provide an exception to this idea
Prospect. It might appear from the recent history of (Western) thought that the future will be ever characterized by a mundane nihilism with regard to a coherent view of being, world, universe, and the place and possibilities of the individual in the world. The developments of this narrative show the absolute error of this nihilist view. That certain idealistic systems such as Hegel’s may have been highly speculative does not imply that all systematic thought must be speculative. The present Theory of being is a non-speculative system that is neither idealistic nor materialistic. Rather, the Theory rejects substances as fundamental altogether. The Theory has been developed logically from necessary empirical properties e.g. of being, all being, absence of being and part of (all) being. The rejection of substance is a consequence of the Theory. Thus the Metaphysics as developed has a necessary though highly general character. As a result of the general character, while ultimate conclusions or results are forthcoming, immediate application requires the interactive analysis of the Theory and particular aspects or disciplines of knowledge. This analysis is carried through in the chapters Being through Faith and in the chapter Transformation. Here, any limits on necessity originate in the limits of the specialized aspect. When the information is detailed and discretely factual, the specialized knowledge is contingent and subject to error. When the ‘information’ is at a high level of generality, it is shown that it may be both empirical and necessary. Regardless of necessity, the result is a broadening of perspectives, revision of concepts in the direction of their ultimate capability, a view of the special aspects or disciplines –of being– as an interactive unity, an illumination of the regions of being named in the disciplines, and a range of actual and potential advances –many fundamental– in the disciplines. Such developments are not at all restricted to academic interest; the implications for being in the world and the nature of that world are profound and are brought out, especially, in chapters Being, Metaphysics, Meaning, Mind, Cosmology, Human being, Journey, and Transformation. Transformation describes a practical approach to that ultimate realization whose necessary character has been established in Metaphysics and Cosmology… It may thus be seen that the mundane nihilism of modern secular thought is not at all necessary despite its ‘spectacular’ success in its areas of strength
An essential problem is the twin problem of substance and determinism. From this problem and its resolution flow the problems and resolutions of the fundamental problems of metaphysics – the fundamental problem of metaphysics – why there is something rather than nothing, the meaning and nature of the real and of mind –and matter– and consciousness, the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation, the questions of the nature of philosophy and the nature of metaphysics (recall that at the outer boundaries of philosophy and metaphysics are identical,) the problem of foundations – whether there is a non-relativist foundation without substance (such a foundation has here been shown,) the problem of variety and its resolution in the idea of Logic as the one law of the universe, the problem of the relative natures of particulars and universals such as properties and of concrete versus abstract objects such as universals and values (there is a practical distinction but a real and uniform framework may and has been developed in which any distinction is artificial,) the problems of the distinctions between the contingent and the necessary and of the empirical and the analytic (whose resolutions are tentatively similar to the resolution for particulars and universals,) the problem of the nature of human being and society – whether we are isolated and marginal and limited accidents (we are not at all so but in the Theory of being, this derives from there continuity with the variety of being –especially beings on earth– and not from any uniqueness or superiority although the human mode of appreciation that may have positive and neurotic expression and is manifest e.g. in art and literature appears to be distinct though without any meaning to any suggestion of superiority,) the problems of the status of traditional religious and mythic cosmologies, the problems of identity and of the relation of Atman and Brahman (here shown logically to be identical in the global perspective)…
… That draws from (a) the Theory of being and other developments of the narrative, (b) the system of academic disciplines – modern and past, and (c) the tradition of encyclopedic compilations of human knowledge. The resulting system is characterized by a finality with regard to fundamental ideas but may be temporal with regard to the disciplinary emphasis; regarding the disciplines, a retreat from the modern specialist foci, e.g. replacement of the sciences by science and replacement of any necessary distinction of science and philosophy by an at most contingent and practical distinction, may make the system (more) resistant to transience.
In their travels in knowledge, they discovered certain principles that led to originality of thought (and thought of a comprehensive and critical character.) They were inspired no doubt by the tradition of logic and reason
It is not a purpose of the inclusion of principles to review their traditions. The purposes include demonstration (1) of some principles that have made possible the advances in the understanding of being, object, and Value; (2) that ‘principles’ arise in the activity (thought) and are not (altogether) separated or separable from it (nor should they be;) it is a necessary consequence that the narration of ‘principles’ should be in the spirit of sharing rather than instruction
The inclusion of principles here is intended to illustrate and point to the value of their explicit recognition; the discussion is not intended to be complete
Rationality and criticism are well recognized as principles that may be thought of as included in Logic – see the earlier section ‘Logic;’ however, the intent here is to illustrate constructive as well as merely critical principles. An appeal of formal logic is its at least apparently deterministic character: deduction is definite. However, the formation of realistic thought is not deterministic; in the formation of a new idea, the process of thought includes indeterministic elements. Critical principles are (indirectly) constructive; the (intuitive) habit of criticism encourages realistic construction. Without criticism, construction is empty; without construction, criticism is sterile
Some attitudes encourage criticism and others encourage construction. In isolation, these attitudes are empty. That the attitudes are productive results from their mutual correction. I.e. even the critically oriented cannot live without construction (and vice versa.) Some combination (not constant but in ebb and flow) of construction and criticism, whether in the individual or in society, tends to an optimum (such optima are required to be estimated in process and perhaps at most roughly; however, the concept behind the optima is definite)
Criticism and construction are both intuitive and each has formal enhancements. Perhaps the following is true: in criticism, formal enhancement is (more) important; in construction, intuitive enhancement is important
The academic process, i.e. the continual shift and change in understanding and in knowledge, is an evolution in the human intellectual grasp of the world. Here, evolution is, simply, change whose outcome has roots in an earlier state. Use of the word ‘evolution’ does not imply deterministic change, change toward a final goal, linear change, growth or progress. There may, of course, be times when the ‘boundary of the known’ moves in the direction of the unknown but there are also times when the boundary contracts; and there are blind ends and times of backtracking. There are times of dogma: times when what counts as knowledge follows upon the pronouncement of an authority. Since, in dogma, ‘revelation’ is not open to all individuals, ‘proof’ must lie, at least implicitly, in force. There are times of fantasy and times of myth, of story and of legend. There are times when understanding and knowledge are a communal endeavor – what counts as knowledge, i.e. revelation, is, though its source may be the inspiration of a few, open to all individuals; in this case, ‘proof’ does not lie in the authority of a single voice – or any voice and, since it may have some measure of adaptation, it may come to pass that proof lies in faithfulness to the world, i.e. in reason (relations among truths) and experiment (relation between idea and world.) These descriptions are not intended to be complete; they are idealizations; the times and ‘functions’ of dogma, of myth, and of reason are not identical but may have overlap
There is a natural tendency for the modern academic process, e.g. in universities and among scholars at the advent of the twenty first century, to be incremental. The academic process is a communal endeavor. There is no single source of authority – but there is some authority; it lies in those principles that have been found to be productive; these, however, are open to review. This is the ideal case and, in fact, especially since the principles are not completely explicit or formalized and, somewhat, because certain individuals and groups come to exercise authority –sometimes beyond what their intellectual powers and personal integrity might warrant– a degree of implicit dogma may emerge; and in this case the ‘force’ is, under benign conditions, the twin of reward and threat – of recognition by and of exclusion from the academic community. Perhaps there is no rational alternative to the strong tendency to ‘communal academic incrementalism’ – perhaps the only (arational) alternative is to be found in myth and magic, in Art; however, the following thoughts may arise. Steady, incrementalism itself is not rational (nor is it irrational; its source is practice at least as much as it is in reason. An absolute insistence on communal incrementalism may, however, be irrational, or, at least, arational)
What, it may be wondered, if the incremental academic process, adapted though it is to certain real ends, sets a limit; what if it limits or blocks the (greater) possibility and potential of being? It is not irrational to think that this might be the case and, further, it has been shown in the Theory of Being and subsequent narrative that it is the case that the possibility of (human) being far exceeds the normal view. More precisely, there is a much larger possibility and potential (and on the global or supra-coordinate view a necessary actuality) but whether it is greater is a question of value. It may be thought that to value the larger possibility (and actuality) is to disvalue the well established and institutionalized academic process. This is not (at all) the case for it is not implied that, in devoting some energies to realization of the ends revealed in the Theory of Being as open to human being, that the traditional communal process should be abandoned. In modern parlance (the language of ‘game theory’) the enterprise is not a ‘zero sum game.’ Some combination of the two ‘kinds’ of enterprise (they are not truly distinct,) especially in interaction, should ‘maximize the expected outcome’
They sought an alternative –not other than but based in academic thought, beginning in academic rationality– that would not be bound by the natural but also self-imposed and paradigmatic (implicit) limits of academic rationality and would, perhaps, be guided by the vision of art, poetry and myth. At the outset there was no guarantee of success and though success was in doubt, ‘failure’ as well (they thought) was not given. These thoughts were instrumental in the evolution of the principles outlined below and their inclusion in the narrative is encouraged by the perception that they approximate the actual instruments that resulted in the success narrated in the previous division, ‘Foundation’
It should be clear from earlier discussions (e.g. the topic ‘Charisma’) that the distinctions being made regarding incrementalism correspond roughly to the distinction between charisma and patriarchalism. However, it is not suggested that communal academia is entirely patriarchal or that charisma is foreign to it
They collected together their experience under the following topics (1) Principle of reflexivity, (2) Paying careful attention to concept Meaning (and use,) (3) Acknowledging and cultivating essential integration the psyche – of feeling, intuition and cognition, (4) Balancing thought (reason and imagination) and action (of which experiment is a special case,) and (5) the Dynamics of Being
Items 1 and 2 have direct application in thought; the cultivation of items 3 and 4 enhances (productive) thought. Item 5, the ‘Dynamics of Being,’ is not a principle of thought but is (includes) an application of principles and theories to the transformation of Being and identity. The dynamics is listed here because it has parallels to the principles and may, as a ‘method,’ be seen as continuous with them. The development of the dynamics follows in the later section, ‘Transformation. Bases and Theory’
A primitive notion of reflexivity is the idea that a critical theory should satisfy its own criteria. This is not invariably necessary or relevant for a critical theory may apply to e.g. assertions of a certain kind but the assertions of the theory may be of another kind (this is a significant consideration for critical theories are often stated as if they should apply to all assertions.) However even the primitive idea of reflexivity is significant for, often, the critical thinker is not sufficiently reflexive; the reflexive critic will appreciate construction, the reflexive poet may appreciate criticism. There is a generalization of the principle that is extremely productive of useful (valid and comprehensive) thought: that in an entire system of criticism and construction all elements may have mutual application. A first application is the earlier observation that without criticism, construction is empty; without construction, criticism is sterile. Another application is the mutual correction of the attitudes of perception (being ever open to new information) and judgment (impatience in inference)
Perhaps more important then any particular application or kind of application of the idea of reflexivity (and other principles) is alertness to the idea; and to acquiring and developing a breadth of ideas and approaches (including principles) that provide a base for and suggest applications of the principles
Here are some further applications. (1) Thought and principles of thought grow in interaction, (2) The approach in which ‘definition’ follows analysis or stands in interaction with it: instead of defining ideas at outset, investigating first and then identifying (rather than defining) – by pointing and saying ‘That is philosophy,’ ‘that is being…’ This is the approach that has been so useful in establishing a metaphysics of depth, in systematically revealing ‘problems’ (of philosophy) as being artifacts of definition without trivializing the essential concerns e.g. the Possibility of Metaphysics, (3) Transcendental methods in which, instead of inferring ‘theory’ from data the necessary inference is from given ‘Theory’ to structure of data, (4) Criticism or doubt regarding what has been thought to be impossible (Impossibility of evolution, matter cannot give rise to attitude (intentionality,) the Void cannot give rise to being) leading to revaluation of ‘Possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ and to incisive resolution of such classic issues, (5) The fact that science may not have come to an end does not imply that it is unending, (6) Sharing, tradition, broad academic exposure and reflection, and broad experience are a source of the cultivation of reflexive thought, (7) Originality and realism in thought are not isolated and the factors that promote them include: patience, perseverance, idleness, analysis and synthesis i.e. atomism and holism, diversion, rest, exhaustion, reserve, boldness, dreaming, concrete and abstract thought, breaking routines and habits – even successful or productive ones, living out one’s dreams – or the dreams of a civilization… Abstraction is pivotal in transcending the removed quality of perception and in moving toward ‘objectivity’
The principles themselves have a variety of productive interactions. (1) It is possible to pay excessive attention to principles. Reflexivity applied to itself and to the other principles may help correct a tendency to such excess. (2) The application of reflexivity may become an automatic (intuitive) response as may attention to meaning and attention to the various aspects of the psyche
The developments of the ideas of ‘Being,’ ‘Void,’ ‘Logos,’ and ‘Universe’ are examples that show that (A) Attention to meaning clears up ‘metaphysical confusions’ (this is well understood in analytic thought,) but (B) Elucidation of meaning is not devoid of content for meaning incorporates experience and may be further tested on the individual’s body of experience (with or without actual experiment) and, therefore, (C) That Metaphysics that is rich in content may originate in analysis of ‘mere’ meaning, and, finally, (D) That meaning resides in systems of concepts i.e. the meanings of the individual concepts is determined in relation to a system of concepts whose meanings are dependent on one another. Therefore a full analysis of any given concept typically requires attention to the system (that contains the given concept) of concepts in interrelation… There are two (at least) sources of ‘freedom’ in concept meaning. The first is in the adjustment of the system of concepts to the total form or structure that is being investigated and the second is in the mutual adjustment among the individual concepts that leaves the net meaning unchanged
It is important to recognize that analysis of meaning is not merely elucidation of a concept whose meaning is given in some perfect dictionary or known or knowable to some perfect Being. Analysis of meaning is an original (creative) process in which ideas and world are brought into alignment. There is discovery in the ‘dual space of being and meaning.’ Although the importance of meaning is a part of the philosophical tradition (and explicitly important in analytic philosophy,) extended reflection on world and idea (metaphysics) almost forces the importance of meaning on the thinker. Whereas analysis of meaning has often been thought to be a critical tool it is seen, in the present narrative, to be a constructive instrument of immense power – capable even of revealing the depth of being. The importance of ‘use’ has been inherited by the analytic tradition. The tradition has not sufficiently emphasized that use refers not only to common use, to day-to-day use but also to use by the thinker. The divide between common and esoteric (and in process) use is an error whose source may be specialization – the separation of the world of action and events and the world of ideas and academics (and both grandiosity and self-negation of the academic.) Originally, ideas and action arose out of one…
When analysis of meaning is used as a critical instrument it may tend to analyze given use; when used as an instrument of discovery it becomes concerned with possible use, with extension of meaning as far as it may go – even ‘extension to the root’ (it may be necessary to show that, while the extension may be an expansion of meaning, that no contradiction with the ‘original’ meaning is introduced; and it is desirable to show that the extension is not merely formal but also has positive consequences e.g. a greater understanding of the world, improved explanatory power, resolution of paradox; the narrative has a number of examples of such extension including that of the concept of mind that provides a resolution of the mind-matter problem and the recognition that Being must include not only things but also –all– laws and patterns that is instrumental in development of the Theory of Being and in addressing the problem ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’) Here, then, is an extension of the meaning of ‘analysis of meaning’ to include ‘experiment with meaning’
Concern with meaning may arise because meaning is ‘in process:’ there is some meaning but it is incomplete – or shifting. In a world with fixed meanings discussion of meaning would be diminished in significance. That meaning is incomplete and shifting does not require eternal timidity in the use of ideas. That ideas may be used with confidence and in action does not mean that criticism should be abandoned. There is power, it has been seen, in naming the unknown and (almost) every act of naming partakes of known and unknown. This power led to ultimate depth and (implicit) breadth in the understanding of being. There is power in dual exercise of faith and doubt, of construction and criticism
The interactions among meanings of individual concepts may be seen as reflexivity
This narrative has variety of discussions of ‘meaning’ and the deployment of meaning in the development of (systems of) ideas and concepts. These are especially concentrated in the section ‘Being’ but are also distributed throughout. These discussions further exemplify and illustrate the fundamental significance, power, and broad application of attention to meaning. The reader may review the narrative (see the System of concepts) to see that many (the greater majority) concepts have received clarification and have been empowered (extended, often maximally) by analysis
The following considerations regarding integration of the psyche are significant to principles of thought because they are constitutive (in part) of integrity of thought and because they may be cultivated – to varying extents. The integration of feeling (emotion) and cognition and the nature of ‘intuition’ have been discussed under ‘Human being.’ Realistic thought is not merely thought that is bound to its objects; it consists in degrees of binding (from complete binding to freedom) that are appropriate to situation and kind of thought. The necessity of integration of emotion and cognition for realism was established. Intuition, in the sense used here, is constituted by the forms of psyche in their attunement to the forms of Being (and which come together in the object.) Without this intuition, realistic perception (of the immediate forms of the world) and cognition (of pattern and possibility) are practically impossible. I.e. emotion-cognition and intuition make for realistic knowledge and Understanding. More precisely, the intuitive forms of emotion-cognition are constitutive of realistic perception. Realistic perception is not merely seeing a fixed world but, also, adaptation of perception to a world in flux; and stability in the adequate adaptation of flux to flux. Without feeling and intuition there may be experience of perception and cognition but these would be chaotic with no integration as a world, no connection of Identity to world. These factors of integration affect realistic thought but how may they be regarded as being among the principles of thought? Since they affect realistic thought, they may be regarded as being among principles if they can be cultivated and affected, taught and learned
The factors of integration may be cultivated by the individual and in society. The individual may cultivate integration by allowing feeling and intuition to guide their thought simultaneously with formal and critical thought i.e. by cultivating an integrated form of thought that excludes, within bounds, no elements of psyche. There is no suggestion that results that have not as yet received critical treatment should be confused with thought that has. However, the progress of thought and action should not always be blocked for want of full critical treatment. This attitude will be found to empower thought in general and critical thought in particular: in the present narrative the approach has empowered forms of criticism and (perhaps fortunately) knowledge which may in its development contained critically tentative elements but attained critical status in the end. The factors of integration may be cultivated in education in a number of ways that include appropriate balance between the formal and the intuitive in instruction i.e. by excluding neither; and by encouraging independent thought and discovery as early as possible (the student will realize, of course, the importance of education in the traditions of ideas and methods)
The processes of construction –hypothesis formation, imagination, the use of suggestive ‘heuristic’ rather than strictly critical principles– and criticism have often been regarded as formally separable. It is true, of course, that after a theory has been formulated, even after it has become generally accepted, it will continue to be subject to criticism and of various kinds. However, the integration of criticism and construction in intuition is perhaps most potent and powerful in discovery. The integration of doubt and faith is crucial to exploration, discovery and life
There is a classical ideal in which the aim of thought is precision in knowing, in which thought is realization of Being. This ideal is limited. As has been seen, at least in the normal sense, thought is realization within the bounds of an Identity or body; becoming is Necessary for further realization. (Note, though, that distinction between thought and being is not absolute.) The variety of relations among thought and action has been considered earlier. What principle of thought is revealed? It lies in the recognition that thought of its own has limits whose constitution lies in the separation of thought from action and that resolution or defusion of the limits lies in integration of thought and action and in transformation of Individual and Identity. The ideal behind the integration of thought and action is one in which thought is secondary to realization; in this ideal, thought is not idealized as self-contained
The name ‘philosophy’ originated with Greek Civilization and is, therefore, a Western term; the original western philosophy is Greek philosophy. I.e. the meaning of ‘philosophy’ is bound together with the development of the discipline in the West. It is not suggested that philosophy is and has not been done in the East but there is an element of foreignness in applying the term to those endeavors of the East that are similar to western philosophy i.e. to the philosophy of the West. However, even in the West there is no single sense of ‘philosophy’ and there is no altogether universal agreement as to what subject matters and what methods may be called philosophical
In its origins, philosophy had perhaps two defining characteristics. With regard to subject matter it concerned the most general characteristics of the world. With regard to method, concern was not so much with methodology (such concerns came later) but with how and in what terms the world was understood. Very early, Thales of Miletus (born c. 600 BC) suggested that water was the essence of the world – Thales introduced a substance theory. (The idea of substance, that which lies under, as stuff came to dominate western metaphysics. Later it would be recognized that the prototype of substance need not be material but could be ideal, teleological, or any explanatory substratum e.g. fact or state of affairs. In the present narrative it has been shown that absence of Being –the void– may be thought of as the ultimate and final substance although it is better to not regard the void as a substance because of the deterministic connotations of the concept of substance.) Here, in the beginning of (recorded) philosophical thought is one characteristic of philosophy (and science) – the explanation (reduction) of Variety in terms of (unchanging, undifferentiated) simplicity. It is also significant that the foundation (the basis of explanation,) water, is of the world. The religious philosophies that explain the world in terms of the ‘supernatural’ e.g. God, are also metaphysical systems and God may be regarded as substance. However, relative to the standard that Thales introduced those religious metaphysics are unsatisfactory since they ‘explain’ the world in terms of something more complex or something that is unexplained and perhaps unexplainable (which of course does not demonstrate that there is no God but only that some of God’s assigned roles are untenable)
The general character of philosophy includes that it is reflexive. The questions ‘What is philosophy?’ and ‘What is physics?’ are questions of philosophy. ‘What is physics?’ is not a question of physics. (If physics were complete –which should include that the universe is physical, and that physics is calculable, and capable of full interpretation– it would contain the questions of philosophy)
Later, Socrates (born c. 470 BC, Athens, Greece,) Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with ‘method’ i.e. with criticism as a means of valid thought. Aristotle emphasized the importance of being as being i.e. not in terms of reduction to the definite sciences
In the modern era, philosophy gained momentum from developments in science. It was thought that, in analogy to science (it may be remembered that the great success of Newton’s system led it to be regarded as Necessary) philosophy could have basis in pure reason. However, reason turned inward and brought itself to scrutiny and was found wanting. The critique of reason had a culmination in Kant who (as noted earlier, based in a conception of the nature of knowledge and in an assumption the Necessity of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian science) showed that the structure of experience (ideas, intuition) is of the structure of the world; it is this that makes knowledge possible and it is this that, according to Kant, made the thing-in-itself thinkable but not knowable
Later, it was realized that neither Euclidean Geometry nor Newtonian Mechanics captured the nature of the entire world with precision. However, Kant’s understanding of the intuition as mirroring the local (approximate) nature of the world (-in-experience) and his reasoning remain intense insights. Much later they recognized that Kant’s picture (perhaps the dominant paradigm) of knowledge was incomplete and were able to show knowledge of Being
Kant’s thought marked perhaps the apex of a critical turning point in the relations between science and philosophy that had already begun with the rise of science. Earlier, science was (treated as part of) philosophy. Kant showed that the foundation of science does not lie in philosophy (reason;) meanwhile, the sciences began to acquire independent status as disciplines and in importance. Of course, the process did not begin with Kant but Kant was instrumental in the separation of science and metaphysics. Thus Kant founded the logic of the separation of science and philosophy. The consolidation of the separation required that the sciences develop their own methods of which experiment as testing (verification is partial) theory in which the fundamental entities are posited as concepts is essential. In speaking of the separation of science and philosophy it may be considered whether the separation is artifactual or necessary. It has been shown in above that the separation can be complete when science is limited to the domains in which it is factual. If science is regarded as a collection of theories of the entire universe it cannot be completely separated from metaphysics. (A similar case has been argued by Willard Van Orman Quine, b. 1908, Akron, Ohio, U.S. in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 1951)
Later, perhaps with Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore (b. 1873, London, England,) it came to pass that if philosophy is not science and if it does not found science then it is (includes as a result of its primary concern with meaning) perhaps an analysis of the meaning of the (primitive and undefined) terms of science. This is, of course, too severe a restriction and the idea became established that the concern of philosophy is with meaning (and therefore with Language)
More recently it has been recognized that the concern with language is perhaps too narrow and that the focus of philosophy with regard to method is ‘analysis.’ The precise meaning of analysis in the literature is defined more by a set of approaches and tools that has arisen in practice rather than by a single principle (except analysis as careful thought.) One tool is the analysis of use as a key to meaning. An assumption that tends to go along with the emphasis of use is a separation of use and analysis. While some thinkers such as G. E. Moore made the assumption explicit, it has entered implicitly and in practice into much of (analytic) philosophy
At this point it should be clear that the discussion has come to concern not philosophy as a whole but analytic philosophy – the dominant mode of philosophy as practiced in the English speaking countries and Scandinavia. While the guiding principle of analytic philosophy may be said to be analysis or careful thought, its actual conduct is also defined by a set of norms that has arisen in practice. These norms include the following. (1) Philosophy is distinct from science in its subject matter and in its methods. (2) It does not seek depth (as in science) but ‘lateral analysis’ i.e. laying bare meaning – or systems of meaning. However, care is required in use of the word ‘system’ for there is no definite set of paradigmatic forms of meaning. (3) Meaning is not analyzed by reflection but by use. Use is distinct from reflection on and creation of meaning. (4) Philosophy speaks of meaning and not (directly) of the world. (5) Metaphysics as knowledge of Being is eschewed (a natural consequence of other norms.) As a result, analysis tends to be piecemeal and, further, analysis, it is often thought, cannot be more than piecemeal and lateral… Note, of course, that these norms are tendencies; they are neither universal nor (always) explicitly prescribed. They are not altogether independent and, in significant degree, stand together
This discussion has two objectives. The first objective is an evaluation of philosophy relative to the needs of the present narrative. Early, in their search they turned to analytic philosophy for inspiration. While much was found that would be useful, there was a general sense of disappointment in analysis i.e. as practiced by the majority of analytic philosophers. The disappointment is not merely that what had been sought was not found but that analytic philosophy (as has been shown in the narrative) fell far short of the potential of philosophy… short even of its own potential. Reflection on the first objective leads into the second – assessment of the nature of philosophy. The discussion first takes up some critiques of analytic philosophy (and, briefly, of continental philosophy)
Analytic philosophy inherits and stands in the tradition of critical philosophy that may be thought to have begun with Hume and peaked with Kant and Wittgenstein. This critical tradition may be labeled the ‘post-enlightenment critical attitude.’ If Metaphysics (i.e. not merely metaphysics of experience) and philosophy in it original meaning in the West are Possible, then a function of criticism must be to secure that possibility. Here, a metaphysics has been shown i.e. constructed. The critical view that metaphysics is not possible is based in a picture of the nature of knowledge; which picture has, here, been identified and shown to be limited
Analysis of use taken to the extreme has the following limitation. Use is separated from reflection on the possibilities of meaning (which has here been shown to be essential.) Therefore, contingent limits on use (including those stemming from current paradigms) are or tend to be taken as Necessary limits
One motive to piecemeal analysis is a general move away from the unitary, speculative systems (typified by Hegel’s thought) of the past. The criticisms of such systems are twofold. There is the contingent criticism that they are (in large degree) merely speculative. In contrast, the system of the present narrative is not speculative in the old sense but is based in Necessity and founded in the most basic of facts. The second criticism is necessary in that knowledge of Being itself has been shown (e.g. by Kant) to be impossible. Here, however, such demonstrations have been shown to be based in views of knowledge that are not necessary and as complete views are unfounded and replaceable more realistic alternatives (founded in the nature of being.) Therefore any philosophy of piecemeal analysis is necessarily unfounded. Piecemeal analysis has a further contingent limit: in so far as each thinker analyses a small portion of the collection of concepts, all thinkers tend to assume the conceptual limits of all other investigations which include common paradigmatic assumptions such as materialism and impossibility of metaphysics (systematic or otherwise.) Therefore the paradigmatic assumptions continue to prevail while their own metaphysical character escapes scrutiny
The joint limitation to ‘use’ and ‘piecemeal’ analysis are crippling of thought: the former results (in practice though not of necessity) in severely limited concepts, the latter permits limits to escape scrutiny. Piecemeal analysis permits, even encourages, avoidance of mutual analysis; which avoidance is further encouraged by the modern academic emphasis on publication; and as noted in the previous paragraph, this results in certain errors never coming to the surface of thought
An example of these limitations that is well recognized by some writers occurs in the Education of the modern analytic philosopher in the philosophy of Mind. The case will provide not merely an example for ‘philosophy of mind’ has been regarded as central in analytic philosophy and, further, the case concerns education in a style of thought. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 1994, Samuel Guttenplan, editor and author, may be used as illustration. A central theme of Guttenplan’s introductory essay to the Companion is the difficulty of locating (understanding the phenomenon of) mind in a materialist perspective (which perspective is the ‘default’ and common position in the academic circles of analytic philosophy c. 2007.) Now there must be some subtlety to an accommodation of mind within materialism; however, Guttenplan deploys a number of (now) traditional artifices to raise the accommodation from needing care to the level of categorial chasm. Among these are the identification, by analysis, of difficulty without pushing the analysis far enough toward resolution of difficulty (perhaps a result of piecemeal analysis and the modern academic emphasis on publication.) This is done repeatedly so that the reader (student) is left with a ring of interlocking ‘problems’ that becomes part of his or her paradigmatic intellectual foundation. Since the student is the future teacher, the process is self-perpetuating. What is the ring of issues? There is the now common analytic map of mind as the tri-polar continuum: Experience, attitude, and action i.e. placement of experience as distinct from (an implicit or tacit Cartesian divide) yet on the same categorial level as attitude and action (an analysis of the status of these categories is given in the section ‘Human being.’) A second set of issues concerns the analysis of each of the three poles. In each case, traditional ‘difficulties’ are introduced and analyzed sufficiently to establish the issues but not analyzed further or analyzed in terms of standard ‘solutions’ that are themselves not pushed to limits and that do not fall within any (attempt at an) overarching framework of understanding. The ring is set up, perhaps unconsciously, without demonstrating necessity and without establishing the necessity of its presupposition of the three poles
Finally, Guttenplan addresses the question of the material base of mind. Here are two standard ‘problems’ from the account that traverses a number of problems and standard solution attempts. The first example is the over-determination that is thought to arise in thinking that actions are caused by attitude and by material or brain processes. Assuming a distinction between the mental and the material (rather than seeing them as aspects or, better, modes of description of the individual) leads to the thought that actions are over-determined. Having introduced a difficulty which it is assumed exists, Guttenplan is faced with the necessity of solving an artificial problem of which the traditional solutions include the identity, functionalist and eliminative ‘theories’ of mind. These are all bound to inadequacy or failure since they are trying to solve the artifactual problem of the introduction by definition of a divide or gulf that does not exist and whose solution approaches assume the problem. The second example is the problem of intentionality: how can mental states in which an individual has a thought about something (intentionality is precisely ‘aboutness’) be realized from Matter which is (assumed to be) constitutively devoid of aboutness. The doubt about the ability of matter, even in complex organization, to have intentionality makes sense, perhaps, in certain pictures such as the Newtonian picture but not, however, in the quantum (and even in the latter case a demonstration of a negative result would not be conclusive since it might be due to a limitation on the quantum theory.) The doubt regarding intentionality is often elevated to a principle of impossibility and, therefore, equates paucity in imagination or computation with a ‘property’ or the constitution of matter i.e. that it is incapable of intentionality. This style of thought is entirely analogous with the implicit fundamentalist (Creationist) argument regarding the theory of evolution which is equivalent to the assertion: ‘I cannot imagine how complexity can emerge from the variation and selection of material process, therefore (I know that) complexity cannot so arise’
The problems of the system are exaggerated by specialization of and within academic philosophy and by the modern academic emphasis on publication
A tacit obligation of professional (salaried) academics regardless of proclamations of independence is to justify the ways of their society. This not unreasonable obligation may become the end of the academic enterprise
They realized that anyone who would be heard may suffer a similar fate
Lateral analysis of Meaning, the impossibility of metaphysics and the divorce of philosophy from science stand together. Together they result in rejection of metaphysics, and provide an alternative. It is clear that (e.g. with Wittgenstein) the approach may result into much insight into ‘the world as found.’ It is unnecessary, here, to criticize the necessity of the approach since it has been shown to be founded in apparently reasonable but ultimately untenable critical assumptions. A metaphysics has been shown (not merely shown to be possible.) And the Necessity of that metaphysics has been shown. Lateral analysis as the necessary method of philosophy would make this development impossible
Some further confusions of analytic philosophy are exemplified in ‘ordinary language analysis,’ a movement within analytic philosophy that is no longer as influential as it had been and was largely due to the influence of Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore in the early twentieth century. (Even when a movement is thought to be abandoned, it may carry on in habits of thought and therefore exposition and criticism may remain pertinent.) ‘Ordinary language analysis’ has a number of connotations. Perhaps the most significant is that analysis of how language is used is a key to meaning (the language philosophers may have replaced the phrase ‘a key’ with ‘the key.’) Criticisms of ordinary language analysis include (1) That there is an absolute distinction between use and formulation, between the academic or philosopher and the common individual… that use of language and talk of language are distinct. Analysis of use is important in insight and in one approach to showing that meaning cannot be (generally) fixed. However, talk of use is not distinct from use. It is therefore a particularly miserable conception of use that is often taken as defining meaning. (2) That every use of a word has significance for its meaning in every setting – including philosophical ones; although this is not a necessary criticism, confusion of meanings do arise on account of neglect of the idea
Clearly, philosophy and science are not identical. However valuable the ‘methods’ of philosophy may be, there is no necessity to exclusion of the subject matters and methods of science. (Where science employs experiment, philosophy employs experience – at least because experience is encoded in meaning but also in the action oriented philosopher’s search for action and experience)
The tendency to all exclusion of science may be exaggerated by disciplinary specialization. The disciplinary categories of academic (university) practice do not exhaust or define the varieties of knowledge
Analytic philosophy labors also in the shadow of science and an unrealistic attitude to knowledge – its valuation and nature
In the present narrative, science provides metaphor and analogy. However, the arguments are not in any way dependent on science
Their criticisms of and reactions to modern philosophy shows more than disappointment. It shows, in fact, a significant indebtedness – that which has no worth is not worth criticizing
The following discussion is necessarily brief. They learned much from Continental Philosophy, especially from the thought of Martin Heidegger (b. 1889, Messkirch, Schwarzwald, Germany) in the English translations of Sein und Zeit, 1927. However, since it is not presently central to the development of this narrative, a longer discussion of continental philosophy would go further from center than is desirable in this version of the narrative. A criticism of continental philosophy is its focus on the ‘human predicament.’ (Even Heidegger, in parallel to the analytic emphasis on use, would exalt the particularly human as conceived by and as distinct from the philosopher in his re-introduction of Being to the center of philosophy.) In fact a criticism would be that it sees the state of Human being as that of a predicament (and that that predicament is a particularly European one – one that results in political, epistemic and ontological nihilism.) And another criticism: is Heidegger’s carpenter incapable of reflection; and would her or his reflections be necessarily distinct from daily practice; why is Heidegger capable of reflection while his carpenter remains unreflective? There is no objection to reflection and focus on human being. However, early continental philosophy tended to focus on human being as a problem and recent continental philosophy tends to be nihilistic with regard to values, politics and knowledge. Why? Perhaps these nihilisms occur in the shadow of past preoccupations with glory, unrealistic (glorious) conceptions of the nature of knowledge, excessive investment in political ideologies (and confusion of failure of political system with failure of ideology,) and a defense against resentful labor under the harsh glare of the policing of thought by science
It is peculiar to modern thought that it reflects a polarization between an ideal of human being and a low interpretation of actual human nature
The narrative here, of necessity extremely terse, serves to show the scope of the Theory of Being and to illuminate Western Philosophy
Western philosophy begins with Greek Civilization and continues to the present (2007) with analytic philosophy and post-modernism. Plato is (often regarded as) the apex of the philosophy of Greece. Although Aristotle developed the formal side of thought further, there may be a sense of disappointment in moving from Plato to Aristotle. This disappointment may be identified with the thought that when logic and reason in their traditional interpretations are regarded as the sole source –over poetry and imagination– of understanding and of the good life, the human place in the universe is seen with near necessity as accidental
The central theme of scholastic philosophy which flourished in a time of ascendance of the church may be seen as a preoccupation with dogma; the flourishing of science encouraged the enlightenment focus on reason
The apparent limits of pure reason against the background of the nihilism of the twentieth century may be seen as a source of modernism (which should not be confused with modernity which is roughly the period dominated by enlightenment ideals.) Modernism, which begins shortly before the war of 1914, rejects the singularity of the enlightenment ideal and moves toward pluralism; in its intellectual side the plurality of modernism is a plurality that includes a movement away from the possibility and ideal of objectivity, a rejection of the ‘grand narratives’ that constitute our world views, an emphasis on fragmented forms even in philosophical thought, an emphasis on the process of production of a work over emphasis on the outcome alone. As a result of its historical context, modernism is tinged with and, in part, the result of nihilism
The ideals of post-modernism are similar to those of modernism except that, instead of a sense of nihilism, the ideals are said to be celebrated. Post-modernism is sometimes seen as the organ of the ‘oppressed’ i.e. anything that is non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual, non-rational, non-hygienic
While the intellectual side of post-modernism has been criticized elitist and as obscurantist – dressing up simple, even trivial ideas in pseudoscientific terminology it is also true that while the rationalistic ideal remains alive it has sometimes been criticized as often practiced as a form of exclusive self-defining elitism (‘cronyism’ according to some sources) without any anchor in the world
‘Theory of Being’ straddles Western Philosophy. It carries metaphysics further than Plato, Aristotle, and the metaphysics of the enlightenment through analytic thought. It rejects the ‘impossible’ of modernism and critical thought by the ‘infeasible;’ it replaces the hope of the enlightenment by logic; it shows that the actual and the possible have the same magnitude and that the necessities of modern science are patterns of a local cosmos that is a moment in being; and celebration and poetry are implicit in the integration of the psyche that follows from the theory. Finally, the theory shows that philosophy is continuous with –though not identical to– science and owes science no apology in the field of an understanding of being and the universe
The foregoing reflections on modern and especially recent philosophy lead to the following conclusion:
What is philosophy? In order to answer such questions it is necessary but not sufficient to reflect on what ‘philosophers do’ (which includes reflections on philosophy.) It is also necessary to return reflection (as far as possible) to its root i.e. to primitive or underlying principles. The limits as prescribed in analytic philosophy have a variety of sources that include the impossibility of an old ideal (knowledge of Being,) separation of science from philosophy, and on use as arbiter of meaning. However, these limits have been shown in the present narrative to follow only upon certain pictures of knowledge; therefore, they are not necessary. Further, the Theory of Being and related topics of the narrative go beyond the ‘limits’ to ultimates (explicitly in depth, implicitly in breadth) in being and knowing (that the ultimate in breadth is implicit leaves a ‘universe’ open to discovery and realization.) As seen earlier, concepts are often taken as given in advance of investigation; this is not necessarily due to unawareness on the part of the investigator but may be due to accepting the burden of tradition or paradigm. As has been seen over and over, this condemns analysis to eternal paradox and limitation. An alternative approach is to Name whatever is fundamental and leave its Concept (or system of concepts) open to discovery – and, in this narrative, this approach has led to the ultimates just described and to resolution of classical paradoxes and problems of philosophy and, especially, metaphysics
This approach is not new for it is precisely what is done in developing axiomatic systems: a body of knowledge is formulated as an axiomatic system whose consequences (theorems) show up inadequacies whose resolution may involve redefining the concepts (and methods.) Aristotle placed Being at the outset of an investigation into what is most fundamental. What is perhaps new in the present analysis is the extent to which the fundamental concepts (while naturally inheriting some sense from previous thought) are regarded as being unknown at the outset of investigation. The approach may be described as the algebraic approach applied to conceptual systems (philosophy.) The same approach may be deployed to the concept of philosophy. Instead of saying ‘Philosophy is…’ at outset, review the system of ideas (knowledge) and at the end of review, say ‘That is philosophy…’ Guided by these thoughts and by the traditions (West, East and origins) it is possible to suggest
Philosophy is the discipline whose limits are the outer limits of Being
Although the justification of this position has been conceptual, it may also be ‘justified’ on grounds that knowledge and action are inseparable and on ethical grounds (these modes of justification have been considered earlier)
Since Being includes knowledge, it is not necessary to make reference to the ‘outer limits of Understanding.’ However, for explicitness, it may be practical to make that reference:
As the Theory of Possibility and Theory of Depth of Being, Logic and Metaphysics are identical
In a more inclusive meaning, metaphysics has been regarded as the discipline whose concern is the entire range of being. In this sense, Metaphysics and Philosophy are identical. Although the concern of Ethics is ‘freedom’ in general, without freedom there is no Being; Ethics is the entire significant aspect of Metaphysics; the Ethical is an origin of the Metaphysical
In another extension of meaning, recall the idea that knowledge (and therefore metaphysics) is continuous with action. That this action provides an extension of the concept of metaphysics has already been seen. This extension is contained within metaphysics (when properly understood and realized) as an academic discipline
The following is from chapter Being
Without a coherent metaphysical system, the study of metaphysics itself, the study of knowledge and object, of ethics, of mind, of logic, of cosmology and of other topics will ever flounder in uncertainty. On the other hand, if the metaphysical system is speculative, if it is too narrow, or if it harbors contradiction, the topics will suffer like deficiencies. Since the present metaphysics is ultimate with regard to being, depth and variety and since it is not a speculative system it is not a priori inadequate to the development of the topics. The development of the metaphysics shows that it may be a reasonable framework for the development and this is made precisely and explicitly clear in what follows. In addition to the metaphysics, an essential ingredient is careful development of the Theory of objects
To those who might object to working within the framework of a given metaphysics, the following suggestion may be made. It is to consider a variety of metaphysical systems and to work out the topics in the variety of contexts. While the results may be various, the comparison of the variety with what is given may suggest a best candidate. And while the sum of the results may lack total coherence, the thinker will have some understanding as to why. A final thought for this line of development is to inquire whether the traditional topics of metaphysics, objects, cosmology, logic, ethics, and perhaps the special disciplines do in any sense complete the range of possible and significant (philosophical) thought or whether some additional disciplines are necessary. In terms of having an articulated Theory of being and in terms of the utility of the theory, the completeness in question has obvious significance. There is another point to the question of completeness: the topics traditional ones and it may seem that, from a variety of perspectives, some fresh vision is necessary
Post-modernists say they eschew grand narratives altogether. It is perhaps true that the rational component of their doubt originates in the failure of the grand schemes such as Hegelianism and Marxism of the past, that the existential component of their doubt is the essentially European and nihilist response to the failure of the European Ideal of Man. The present Theory of being is modest in its pretensions and whatever part of it may be labeled ‘grand’ grows out of that modesty: being is nothing over and above experience of being; born of speculation, this approach sheds its speculative roots (this goes toward understanding why a crawling empiricism, despite its virtues, is conceptually nil.) Regarding freshness, although the words of the present narrative are taken from the common vocabulary, their sense is fresh – perhaps even infinitely so; it is initially but perhaps not finally surprising that this grows out of unpretentious ideas. How may such completeness be demonstrated? From the point of view of the self-selecting vision of human subjects, that completeness may be illusory and that it is therefore necessary to demonstrate completeness e.g. from Metaphysics and perhaps also from Object. Is the system complete from the point of view of breadth and depth, state and process or individual-choice and knowledge-discovery, concept and object or knowledge and world? It would seem to be so and what is needed is to show that these dimensions are the dimensions relative to which completeness should be measured and, if not, to supply further or alternative dimensions
The tradition of philosophy includes numerous inner disciplines that include metaphysics, logic and ethics. In the tradition, epistemology has been included among the foregoing but epistemology which has been seen since the enlightenment as the ‘queen of philosophy’ has here been seen as relegated to an aspect of metaphysics. It is perhaps a (peculiarly academic) aberration to think that ‘how one thinks’ is (eternally) above ‘what one thinks’ and ‘what is…’ Additionally recent philosophy has various special disciplines such as ‘philosophical psychology’ and cross-disciplines such as ‘philosophy of science’ (that have been considered in this narrative without mention of names)
An analytic approach to understanding the world is subject to a number of corrupting temptations. The first is to avoid the world itself, to assume or behave as though it is barred to talk of the world in any terms other than the formal and the critical. Thus the world of the analytic approach may be (and often is) impoverished and flat. The critical approach that bars talk of the world (of metaphysics) is itself based on models of knowledge (e.g. empiricism, i.e. reducibility to or construction –supervenience– upon experience) and values, e.g. certainty, in relation to knowledge. In a critical perspective, the burden of proof should be on the metaphysician but the critical-analytic approach tends to disallow talk to begin. If there were an absolute impossibility proof then metaphysical talk would be futile. However, as noted, proofs of impossibility (due, e.g., to Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, b. 1889, Vienna) are based on conceptions of knowledge (discussed e.g. in the later section ‘Objects’) and in order to address the possibility of metaphysics it may be desirable to develop a tentative metaphysics and to then subject it to criticism. The classic arguments against metaphysics appear reasonable but it will be seen that metaphysics by construction is Possible. The analyst turns the reasonable idea that thought cannot get outside itself into an absolute and must therefore focus only ‘within’ e.g. on ‘use.’ This focus has tended, even while it enhances insight, to also allow under-conceptualizing of ideas to match a tendency to their over-formalization. The resulting tendency to piecemeal analysis, even though not devoid of productivity, yields rings of concepts locked together in mutual error –each piece inherits and so absorbs and propagates errors of the other pieces– and shallowness while cloaked in sophistication i.e. presented in a language whose sophistication is merely formal, whose dress is in logical form but has no interior
These corruptions are not necessary; however when they are yielded to or practiced naïvely, analytic philosophy falls short of its own potential. Not all analytic philosophers succumb to the corruptions and the analyses of such thinkers may yield significant insight into such topics as ‘mind’ and ‘language.’ It remains true that the thrust of analysis trades the whole world for explicitness and (relative) security. This is not an endeavor without value. Still, two concerns remain. First, when this mode of philosophy is regarded as philosophy, philosophical thought tends to be isolated, cut off from human nature and possibility – and from human concerns. While analysis is important, it is not at all clear that it deserves the commitment of resources that it receives in modern academic philosophy…
These have been some initial thoughts on analysis and analytic philosophy is taken up again in greater detail in the later sections ‘Principles of thought’ and ‘Philosophy and Metaphysics.’ In this narrative there is no intent to suppress or abandon analysis but rather to see what a full and robust deployment, one without the standard paradigmatic limitations and distortions (identified in the narrative,) one that does not exclude (what analysts regard as ‘messy’) difficult topics such as the world itself, the whole world, the limits of the materialist or physicalist paradigm, emotion… As will be seen this approach allows a suggestion of paradise – a vision of the depth and variety of being as infinitely greater than that contained in the usual narratives of fact and fiction
Early, they turned to analytic philosophy for inspiration where they saw promise. Later, they found that the promise they had imagined was unrealized. They continued to value the principle of analysis but turned away from analysis as its own end; they became reflexively critical of the analytic criticism of other endeavors – the analysis of systems and of depth and the criticism of metaphysics based in restricted pictures and values of knowledge and in taking the self-indulgent metaphysical systems of the past as capturing the essence of any metaphysics of things – of the real (over experience)
The Possibility of metaphysics. The ultimate character of the possibility: explicit with regard to depth and implicit for breadth. The realization of these possibilities in the Theory of Being. The (seamless and integral) nature of Being and knowledge (objects.) The ‘fundamental problem’ of metaphysics, i.e. why absence of being must result in being (‘Why there is something rather than nothing!’) The nature and destiny of the Individual (in the Theory of Identity;) and the identity of the individual and all being. The Mind-Matter problem i.e. that there is (after fundamentals have been addressed) no mind-matter problem; and, more generally, the problem of substance i.e. that there are no ultimate substances. The problem of substance (detail) – there are no ultimate (deterministic) uniform and unchanging substances; there is, at root, only the (indeterministic) Void (absence of being) whose uniformity and constancy or otherwise are not defined into but derived from its constitution (concept.) Some problems of intentionality and mental causation. Identification and resolution of the conceptually illicit but practically useful distinction between experience on the one hand and attitude and action on the other. The void is the source of All Being; the concept of the void founds explanation of all being that terminates without regress, eliminates substance, and permits non relativist philosophy without substance. The meaning and nature of the Real. The nature of consciousness. The nature of Ethics and its relation to Metaphysics. The necessity of Metaphysics on Ethical grounds (rejection of Metaphysics on Ethical grounds is also conceivable; however, the argument here is for necessity. Further, a rejection of metaphysics on purely ethical grounds would miss the essence of the argument as an inclusive rather than an exclusive one.) The Real nature of Ethical concerns i.e. that issues of freedom are not peripheral but central to being (whose constitution may be seen as freedom in interaction with necessity.) That the concepts of Knowledge and Ethics (Morals) are not distinct – that knowledge is other than usually conceived or that it is of lesser value than usually thought (though not devoid of value altogether – its value would retain its practical but not its fundamental aspect.) The nature of human being and society
An identification of metaphysics as the discipline whose concern is the outer limits of being has been given reasonable foundation. Apparently origin of the term ‘metaphysics’ is etymologically unenlightening: it was used by early editors to refer to Aristotle’s treatise on First Philosophy that, in Aristotle’s program, came after what Aristotle labeled ‘physics.’ However, it may be useful and interesting to reflect on meanings of ‘metaphysics’ that reflect etymology and the variety of uses of the prefix ‘meta.’ One meaning of the prefix ‘meta’ (Greek) is ‘after.’ Thus metaphysics may be seen, suggestively, as that which transcends physics or, perhaps, that which transcends the –mere– empirical. Regardless of the origin of the term metaphysics, a consideration of the meanings of its parts ‘meta’ and ‘physics’ may be useful
The prefix ‘meta’ is not applied consistently to the different disciplines. Meta-mathematics includes the study of mathematics by studying the form of mathematical proofs i.e. in meta-mathematics, mathematics is the object of study. In their current meanings, physics may be seen as the study of the material (and energetic) aspects of the world and metaphysics may be seen as generalization of physics in which restriction to the material is not made – in which there is no restriction to kind or mode. However, regarding the restriction to matter as ad hoc (it has been shown that the modern use of the term ‘matter’ is not a definite one) the following reassignments could be made. What is currently called science would be re-labeled ‘empirical science;’ what currently called metaphysics could be relabeled physics or logic. It would then be possible to redefine metaphysics as the study of the form of logic i.e. as the form of what was previously labeled metaphysics. In the new meaning, would metaphysics have content? Perhaps the fundamental criticism of metaphysics (traditional meaning) is not that it has no subject matter but that, since it is not empirical, its content has no possibility of verification or negation. This criticism sees metaphysics as a scientific theory of the universe rather as physics is a scientific theory of matter and energy in the empirically known universe. Here, however, metaphysics (traditional) has been possible because it does have an empirical aspect – there is being, there is all being, there is absence of being, domains of being are characterized by their forms; further these empirical aspects are given
Thus meta-physics (new) would have content that would be about metaphysics (old.) The content would include that (1) Metaphysics (traditional) (e.g. as realized here) is possible and has an empirical content. (2) In combination with science (traditional,) metaphysics (traditional) are mutually enhancing (as realized here in numerous examples.) (3) It is possible to provide criteria of the breadth or variety of a metaphysics – roughly breadth is variety and one metaphysics is broader than another if the first includes but is not limited to all the objects of the second. Since the metaphysics developed in this essay is based in a careful analysis of the absence of being and its equivalence to all being, it may be labeled the metaphysics of absence or of the void or of all being. It has been seen that the metaphysics of the void is implicitly ultimate with regard to breadth its world contains all objects but analysis does not show the full variety of objects (analysis does, however, show an infinitely greater variety than often hitherto thought to obtain.) Finally, (4) It is possible to provide and implement criteria of depth (or fundamental or foundational) character of a metaphysics. One possibility is that, in absence of other criteria, breadth may be taken as a criterion of depth. This possibility does not address the issue of foundations. A second, one that addresses the issue of foundation, is that one substance metaphysics is deeper than a second if the substance of the first can be seen as generating the substance of the second. It has been seen that the void is not a substance in the classical sense because that sense regards substance (at least implicitly as deterministic in its behavior.) However, regardless of the substantial character of the void, it may be seen as generating all substances and all being. Therefore there can be no deeper metaphysics or ontology than the metaphysics of absence; the metaphysics of absence is explicitly ultimate with regard to depth. It has also been shown that while the breadth of the metaphysics of absence is infinite, its depth is finite in the sense that its explanation of the presence of (all) being does not require infinite regress – the metaphysics of absence is a non relativist philosophy without substance. In figurative speech, there is no fathoming of a depth beyond the metaphysics of absence
An interesting question to ask may be whether would some modern or ancient language other than English and similarly structured languages would have something to add by way of content or suggestion. Especially of interest may be languages that are highly variant with regard to subject-predicate form (object orientation) and the possibility of invention and coinage
…in summary
The prefix ‘meta’ is not used consistently from metamathematics to metaethics to metaphysics. Metamathematics is roughly formal theory of mathematics; metaphysics was so called by some writers because Aristotle’s writings on it came after his writings on physics
In a semantic use, what is now physics could be labeled theoretical and empirical science of matter-energy, what is now metaphysics could be labeled physics, and what is here called meta-metaphysics could be called metaphysics… and this would be talk including formal talk about what is now metaphysics… and the objective of this talk would include empowering what is now metaphysics. This practice is not taken up yet
Meta-metaphysics is talk, including formal talk about metaphysics so as to further empower metaphysics. What is the formal concept of metaphysics, question of its identity with or relations to logic and cosmology, what are some paradigms of thought in metaphysics, how are these paradigms –once noticed– cultivated, is metaphysics possible, does metaphysics have empirical content, given that the root terms are in the classical languages, how conducive to metaphysical reflection are the modern languages, especially English – and is this an issue and would some other modern or ancient language have something to add by way of content or suggestion and what of those languages that are highly variant with regard to subject-predicate form (object orientation) and what of the possibility of invention and coinage? These are some meta-metaphysical concerns and their identification immediately suggests an answer to the question ‘Why meta-metaphysics?’
It has been seen that the fact of being is given. In a local perspective (the terms local and global have been defined earlier) the fact of being is given at some –perhaps most– times; in the global view the fact of being is, simply, given
In every metaphysics the fact of being is given
A metaphysics that preserves, as necessary, features of this world or local cosmological system beyond the fact of being is conservative
An (the) ultimate metaphysics is one that does not a priori preserve specific features of this world. In ultimate metaphysics, as has been seen, possibility and actuality are identical. The that the possible is actual provides one ‘definition’ of ultimate metaphysics – for what is impossible must lie outside metaphysics (alternatively but equivalently, in the view of Meinong the world of the impossible may be said to occupy a null manifold)
It is inherent in the concept of metaphysics that any implementation of it should be ultimate
Most traditional metaphysics contain conservative elements. This is perhaps a result of an (unconscious) intent or expectation to see the character of this world reflected in the ultimate. That in the present metaphysics what is possible is actual shows its ultimate character. Here the fact and therefore the possibility of ultimate metaphysics has been shown
The purpose to the following lists is to show that the problems from the history of metaphysics have received either trivialization or solution in this narrative (the reader may wish to review the relevant portions of the narrative; and some of the more specialized concerns may require, for completeness, in the present version of the narrative, that the reader work out the details.) Mention of types of metaphysical theory is included to display (so that the reader who has become acquainted can see) the ‘placement’ or ‘context’ of the types within the Theory of Being
Classical: Being, substance, space, time, nature of metaphysics, forms, categories, atomism, change and constancy. Scholastic: universals and particulars, free will, existence and nature of God, soul and body. Modern: nature of the Real; mind and matter; identity, substance, ontology; identity over time, personal identity; causation and laws; probabilistic causation; laws of nature; Matter, space and time; objects as substances vs. mere bundles of properties; conception of spirit; nature and existence of the external world, what is Real – reality of material things, organizing principles of nature. Recent: modality and counterfactuals; causation, regularity and counterfactuals; identity and necessity, Kripke – identity statements are necessary but knowable only a posteriori. Being as journey or becoming; becoming as being. Indian metaphysics: there are points of contact between Indian thought and the Theory of Being. As a whole, Indian Philosophy recognizes the greatness of being (Brahman, the Real) and identity of the self (Atman, soul) with it; it stresses the immediate in karma (work) and moksa (salvation;) these ideas focus on what may be important to the Individual and to transformation; in ‘A History of Transformation’ below there is consideration of some schools of Indian thought that focus on these concerns
Types of metaphysical theory: Platonism – relationship between the ideal and the immediate; Aristotelianism – metaphysics is immanent; Thomism – reflection on everyday things and the everyday world reveals it as pointing beyond itself to God as its sustaining cause. Cartesianism – the main problem of Descartes was the divide between the determinate world of matter then being revealed by science and the world of mind that was free of material constraint… that were brought together by Design as the sign of God; Idealism; Materialism – two modern responses to the problem of Cartesianism. Argument in Metaphysics: metaphysics as an a priori science… and as an empirical science; metaphysical arguments – logical Form of metaphysical arguments; transcendental arguments – typical form and an example: q = knowledge is possible only if p = the world is according to the forms of intuition and q therefore p
The discoveries in Metaphysics of this essay make possible the following system (a significant enhancement and alteration of the system of the present –fifteenth as of 2007– edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica which is here chosen as an example with which to work with rather than as illustrative of authoritative character. The divisions of the Britannica system correspond roughly to the modern academic disciplines.) An intent to discuss all topics would be out of place in this narrative (they thought it valuable to the endeavor in understanding –All Being– and transformation to acquire some acquaintance with most topics.) Rather, the intent is to reveal how the Theory of Being and related topics make the enhancements possible and to allow the reader to see how the system may fit rationally or systematically within the framework of the present narrative
(A) Symbols and Knowledge (This division occurs at the end of Britannica and its Britannica numbering –10– is retained. A number of the following elements are included to provide continuity between the Britannica and the present narrative; their study in this essay falls under a variety of topics.)10a. Symbols and signs; semiotics – the study of signs and sign behavior. Symbolic Systems including language, logic, and mathematics. 10b. The Humanities and Philosophy; Study of Science and History. (B) The Universe 1a. Metaphysics and general cosmology, nature and varieties of Being, which includes Logic, Value or ethics and aesthetics, epistemology; nature and varieties of Knowledge, where, note, Belief is fundamental and the varieties of belief include Faith as (primarily) Belief-Action, Knowledge as Belief-Justification; 1b. Physical science, nature, behavior of energy and varieties of force and material object including physics, physical cosmology, and chemistry; 2. Geology; 3. Biology, life – its nature and variety and origins of life and variety; Medicine; 4. Mind as the study of psyche in its integration and its ‘functions;’ nature of mind; 5. Society, nature, institutions (groups) and change… and aspects including culture (institution of knowledge,) economics, political science and philosophy (and Law;) and 6. History. (C) Artifact 7. Art, nature and varieties of (literature, music, painting…;) 8. Technology (elements = energy, tools and machines… and fields = agriculture, transportation, information, earth and space exploration…; Engineering; and 9. Faith, literal and nature and varieties of non literal meaning and non meaning functions; religion, its nature and varieties: the religions of the world throughout history