JOURNEY IN BEING
OBJECTS
OUTLINE
The problem of the object. Conceptualization in terms of concept and object… From Metaphysics… The present approach: Form and Object. Aims… Particular objects… Abstract objects… What exists—categories of objects… Moral… What exists—particular objects… What exists—abstract objects… What exists—applications
Preliminary: from metaphysics… Preliminary: Form… Preliminary: revised thinking on the natures of and relation between concept and object since the ’06 version… Introduction… Outline and aims… Conceiving the concerns in terms of Objects and Concepts… Outline of the present approach… Status of the object in the present narrative… Knowledge as knowledge-of the entity from ‘06… The meaning of faithfulness… Identity and faithfulness from ‘06… The transcendental argument for and meaning of faithfulness. Full and sufficient faithfulness. Adequacy of sufficient faithfulness in practice from ‘06… Absolute objects from ‘06… What exists… All objects reside within the Universe… Particular objects… Theory of objects… Abstract objects… Is the study of abstract objects empirical?… Definition and properties of abstract objects… Theory of identity… The form of ‘ethics’… Ethics and objectivity from ‘06… Truth from ‘06… The Real from ‘06… Action, concept and object… On necessity… The number of fundamental concepts from ‘06
Join with details of previous treatment below—Objects
Concept and nature of faithfulness. Knowledge. Absolute faithfulness and absolute and practical objects. Transcendental meaning of faithfulness in the case of practical objects
Idea and kinds
This treatment is not uniform over the different (kinds of) abstract objects—it is now an older treatment. However, it is still useful and, in abbreviated form, may serve as motivation for the new treatment and, where it is correct, as foundation for certain parts of it e.g. that all objects exist as objects in the (one) universe
Objection to form defining abstract object. Particular objects may also be regarded as forms
The present interest. Metaphysics of immanence is explicitly ultimate in depth but implicitly ultimate in variety. The variety is not given but must remain in-process of discovery and being shown; hence the interest in kinds of object e.g. the particular and the abstract and their varieties
Origins of the idea. The abstract / concrete has origin, perhaps, in the grammatical distinction of concrete noun (red as in e.g. the color red) and abstract noun (redness.) In twentieth century the distinction came to be a metaphysical one. Why? It has been suggested that among the factors was the breakdown of the purportedly exhaustive distinction of the mental versus the material—and the rejection of a mental realm as vague. Since such things as number are apparently not material they must be something else—abstract
Ways to specify abstract objects. Abstract objects (a) lack features possessed by the concrete—negation, (b) are non-spatial, (c) do not have causal efficacy, (d) may be specified by paradigm examples, (e) are defined by functional expressions in which the functions of distinct objects are equal if and only if certain aspects of the objects are equal. Examples of functional expressions are ‘the father of Plato’ and ‘the direction of the line.’ Father is particular because for the father of A to be the father of B, A must be B. However, direction is abstract since distinct lines have the same direction if parallel. (A source for these ways, examples, further discussion and sources—especially Frege and David Lewis—may be found in http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/)
Here, already, they say, may be seen a breakdown in the particular-abstract distinction for (some) particular objects may be specified by the equivalence relation ‘equals’
In the article various objections are raised concerning each ‘way.’ While some abstract objects are clearly non-spatial and causally inefficacious, not all are… and the use of equivalence (e.g. being parallel) in specifying abstract objects comes up against the fact that there are objects that are both particular and abstract (thus suggesting that ‘particular’ is not altogether adequate but will be retained, at least temporarily, because ‘concrete’ is also inadequate)
A fundamental objection to all such ways is that the notion of ‘abstract’ as deployed in practice is vague and it is therefore erroneous to suppose that all objects deemed abstract by some imprecise or incompletely specified notion possess some common and explicit feature
The approach to be suggested below departs from the foregoing kind of approach which supposes in advance of investigation that (a) the abstract and the particular objects are (absolutely) distinct and that, therefore, (b) there is some feature or measure of distinction and it remains only to find it
Objects may be distinguished according to criteria that define polarities or continua
One categorization of objects is according to the particular-abstract distinction. Since some abstract objects are ‘abstracted’ from a particular object, the distinction may be thought to be according to ‘completeness’ of the object. The discussion starts from this supposition and finds a sharp distinction between the abstract and the particular—the idea that the abstract and the particular are metaphysical categories—to be in critical error and then finds a replacement for the metaphysical distinction that fits all the considered examples and argues the virtue and necessary validity of the replacement
Completeness of the object If a particular object, sometimes called concrete is completely defined by a set of attributes or properties, an object defined by a subset of the properties may be abstract—this is one way to specify an abstract object. Forms and patterns are abstract
Not all particular objects are ‘concrete.’ Therefore the term preferred here is particular object even though particular is often used in contrast to ‘universal’
It is sometimes taken that the particular object is unproblematic and that the concepts of particular and abstract object may be specified independently
The concept of an abstract object could be ‘not particular’ but that concept would not be illuminating or particularly helpful. Is a collection of apples abstract? That depends on the sense of ‘collection.’ Those who have studied collections or classes from a technical point of view will find it convenient ignore their knowledge—it is not pertinent to the point being made here. The sense of ‘collection’ could be simply whatever it is that makes for a collection; in that case five-apples and twenty-elephants would be the same object. The sense could be then extended to make a distinction according to the number of things in the collection; in this case five-apples and five-elephants would be the same collection which would be different from ten-apples. In everyday thinking and for many practical purposes, however, ‘five apples’ is distinct from ‘five elephants’ (regarding most properties)
It is sometimes taken that a particular object is material or physical while an abstract object is non-material. However this will not quite do for the common and scientific ideas of the physical do not define a fundamental substance—there are no ultimate substances—and therefore it is reasonable that there may be particular objects that are not physical. It is also further suggested (sometimes) that an abstract object is mental or psychical. This is subject to the same objection and to the further objection that even if the particular object as physical were founded—if matter were a substance—the mental e.g. the concept must also be material (in the brain)
The following are clear. (1) The particular and the abstract object should not be defined independently. (2) There is arbitrariness to the distinction—this view is certainly encouraged by the thought from the theory of being that all consistent conceptions have reference and that all things must lie in the universe. (3) Therefore, the weight attached to the distinction may not be as great or significant as hitherto thought to be the case. I.e. the abstract-particular distinction may be a matter of choice and way of seeing and what may matter more is that every object should, when careful evaluation of existence and nature is important, receive as precise a conceptual formulation as is necessary to that end
The ‘theory of abstract objects’ is interesting on two accounts—the first interest is the intrinsic one i.e. that there are such things as abstract objects and given their existence what is their nature
The second interest is the way in which they are treated in the literature. Here is the standard way. A list of purportedly abstract objects is given and it is then attempted to give a theory of such objects e.g. to answer the question ‘what is it that makes them abstract?’ However, in listing the abstract objects the only clear defining characteristic is that they are not particular. It is not to be expected that there will (or will not) be any affirmative characteristic of all objects that are not particular. This shows a deficiency in the standard thinking about abstract objects—however, it is not being suggested here that an affirmative characteristic will or will not be found but only that from the way in which the idea of abstract objects is set up such a characteristic is not to be expected and not finding one or demonstrating that one cannot be found should not be thought of as a deficiency
In the treatment Abstract objects above, a definition of ‘abstract’ was not sought. However, it was seen that the particular objects could be viewed as abstract and that, proceeding intuitively, the distinction between particular and abstract was not firm. The following observations are pertinent to the question of the natures of the abstract and the particular and any distinctions between them. (1) All objects have a concept side and an object side; this follows from the fundamental principle of the Metaphysics of immanence—together with the developments regarding Form as object. (This is true even for the non-existent objects whose object side may thought of as the void or something similar; this point is not particularly relevant to the present discussion but is made to show that the statement has no exceptions. It is not particularly relevant because the discussion would carry through even with the exception but might be somewhat more cumbersome.) (2) In all examples of abstract objects considered, the emphasis is the concept side. Without Metaphysics of immanence, the existence of the abstract object—whether there is an actual object that corresponds to the concept—may remain a question. From Metaphysics of immanence, the existence of the abstract object is given. (3) As one example that seems to be transitional between the particular consider collections. There is a sense in which a collection is particular—imagine being charged at by a herd of bison. This sense, though also conceptual, emphasizes the object side. The most abstract sense in which a collection of twenty elephants, a collection of fifteen apples, and a ‘collection’ of one bison are identical clearly emphasizes the concept side—even though there is an object side (guaranteed by Metaphysics of immanence.) (4) Earlier, an artifice was used to see that a particular object can be seen as abstract. Since a particular object has object and concept sides, it is clear that it may be regarded from the object side (typical, particular, even ‘concrete’) or the concept side—atypical, abstract
Hitherto, there has been no clear concept of the abstract and the particular. Therefore it is not to be expected that there should be any affirmative characteristic of either. It is not to be expected that there should be any distinction between the particular and the abstract. It is not to be expected that the affirmative characteristics of any list of particular (abstract) objects should extend to any extended list of such objects or should be regarded as definitive of the particular (abstract.) Here, it has just been seen there is no true distinction between the particular and the abstract
The distinction is, then, a practical one according to the mode of study or emphasis. The study of the abstract object emphasizes the concept side and the study of the particular object emphasizes the world or object side
Considering number and other abstract mathematical objects, since such may have had empirical origins but are subsequently studied conceptually there is no a priori reason to expect that such study should be fruitful. That such studies are immensely fruitful may be seen as the result of a combination of intelligence, industry and fortune. Focusing on ‘fortune,’ it may be asked whether the result is indeed fortuitous or whether it is the result of combination some or all of (a) simplicity of forms of the world, (b) mathematics as study of the simple forms of the world, and (c) power of (human) intuition of form, both iconic and symbolic
What determines the distinction? The preceding thoughts indicate an answer—the approach to study of an object or class of objects is the one that is most fruitful. Naturally, the status of objects with regard to the abstract-particular distinction is not fixes: the early study of number may have been empirical but once grounded in some primitive empirical data, the study of number would be extremely limited if it remained empirical (empirical computer study may, however, be fruitful as a result of sheer computational power.) Further abstraction from the symbolic treatment of number leads to extremely useful mathematical systems that would not be possible if study remained empirical. In some cases, factors foreign to quality of outcome may determine the nature of the study—thus modern advance of science resulted from philosophical enquiry into nature being complemented though not replaced by empirical study (the idea that science should be entirely empirical is extremely limited and limiting)
There should be no objection, however, to continue to think of particular and abstract objects. The practical distinction will be that the particular are those objects that it is usually natural to regard from the object side and the abstract shall be those that are naturally regarded from the concept side
Are abstract objects studied conceptually—axiomatically—or empirically? Coming from the concept side, it is natural to study such objects as number axiomatically and such objects as justice conceptually. However, these concepts do have an object side. If the study should remain ever conceptual it is not given that the extended study shall refer to the original object side (or in the case of inconsistency to any existent object side.) The utility of ‘number’ in referring to the object side is not expected to run into difficulty except in the case of the infinite; in the case of extension to the infinite there should be no a priori expectation that there will be an object precisely because while there may seem to be a concept the existence of the concept itself is not given. In the case of justice there is a different kind of concern. It is that, at least to some degree, the idea of justice creates justice and modification of the idea modifies the fact. It remains true however, that an entirely conceptual reflection on justice may fail to capture or to influence the fact
What may be said of the various suggested distinctions of the abstract and the particular? The idea that an abstract object is ‘mental’ verges on the incoherent. Its source appears to be the subjective difference assigned to ‘ideas’ and ‘things.’ However, even if not incoherent, the idea of the ‘mental’ lacks clear definition. It could be said that the abstract object is conceptual or symbolic. However, over and above the objection that the practical abstract emphasizes the conceptual, there is also the objection that there is no separate (Platonic) space of concepts; there is the ‘space’ of objects—the universe; as concept, the concept refers to this space; as object, the concept lies in this space (the concept as object is a special object that can refer to other objects including the concept as object.) Is the abstract object non-spatial, non-temporal, a-causal, to be defined symbolically? Not one of these ideas is necessary. Nor, given, the breakdown of the distinction, should they be necessary
It was noted above that the variety of objects may be studied according to criteria that define polarities or continua. The following table starts with study according to emphasis on object versus concept side and continues with other distinctions, some not hitherto considered
|
Practical
distinction according to emphasis on |
|
|
Particular |
Abstract |
|
Typically full |
Typically partial |
|
Distinctions that determine existence |
|
|
Actual |
Fictional |
|
Logical |
Contradictory |
|
Existent |
Non-existent |
|
Distinction according to definiteness of being |
|
|
Manifest |
Potential |
|
Determinate |
Indeterminate |
|
Distinction
according to quality of knowledge of the object |
|
|
Absolute |
Practical |
|
Definite |
Vague |
|
Entire |
Filtered |
Distinction according to emphasis on object versus concept side See the foregoing discussion. The suggestive distinction, full versus partial has been added as typically corresponding to the particular versus the abstract—a particular object is typically perceived as a whole while an abstract object may be conceived by conceptual operations on wholes, e.g. collection of wholes and abstraction from wholes
Distinctions that may appear to determine existence Unless the fiction entails a contradiction, a fictional object has been thought of as one that could exist but does not. From Metaphysics of immanence, it is clear that this notion of fictional object does not hold up if the ‘universe of discourse’ or context is the universe. In the universe, the classes of fictional, contradictory and non-existent objects are identical. The only non-existent objects are the contradictory objects that do not and cannot exist; these are the only truly fictional objects. If the ‘fiction’ is good, the object exists. All logical objects exist. Recall that this is shorthand for all logical concepts correspond to an object. A context that is not the universe may be defined symbolically e.g. a scientific theory or axiomatic system or ostensively e.g. this cosmological system—the ‘definition’ of this cosmos is partially ostensive since theory completes the definition which is therefore a function of theoretical progress. In a context that is not the entire universe, an object is actual if and only if it is existent but the class of such objects may be a sub class of the logical objects. The non-existent objects for such a context are the contingently non-existent that do not exist but ‘could’ e.g. logically exist and the necessarily non-existent that could not e.g. those whose existence would entail contradiction. Why introduce the concept of non-existent objects? The contingently non-existent object has been seen to sharpen the concept of existence by clarifying the meaning of assertions such as ‘unicorns do not exist.’ Why introduce the necessarily non-existent object? This concept is introduced for completeness—it introduces a technical symmetry into the discussion of ‘existence’ but appears to have little further practical significance. The idea has historical significance but no further significance to this narrative
Distinction according to definiteness of being There are indeterminate and potential objects because being is indeterministic. In a deterministic ‘universe’ there would be past and future objects but these would be as good as manifest. Freedom and choice make certain objects of human interest indeterminate or potential. The possibility and nature of such objects is discussed in the applications taken up in this section, in chapter Mind and in division Human World
Distinction according to quality of knowledge of the object—not a true distinction of kind of object This distinction is different from the previous ones in that it does not determine kind of object and it is proper to refer to absolute concept rather than absolute object and so on. An absolute concept has been seen to be faithful to the object while a practical concept is ‘sufficiently’ faithful. The definite-vague distinction is similar to the absolute but refers to the experience of the concept. The entire-filtered distinction is relative to some base object; given a base object, the object is entire but, if the object is regarded as made up of parts, the parts may be regarded as filtered. If a mountain is regarded as made of atoms and so on, the mountain as whole or mountain as rocks, grass and so on are filtered. Note that there is an ambiguity to mountain as whole for the whole may be regarded as the object of the unaided visual image or the aggregate of atoms and so on—here ‘mountain as whole’ is the object of the visual image; similarly rocks, grass and so on are also the objects of the visual images of rocks, grass… What determines a base object? Is it the concrete object or the object of intuition—that is not entirely adequate; is it the object that makes analysis simple—that is not fully adequate either. As for many distinctions that are determined by intuition or practice it is perhaps mistaken to expect a fixed and sharp divide and a corresponding explicit criterion that should determine the distinction—and it then follows that it is valid to question the absolute character of the distinction
If it is sought to characterize a semi-logical (semi-intuitive and specified as much by example as by principle) distinction such as the abstract-particular distinction, it is not given that the distinction is precise or that there is an formal affirmative characteristic that determines the distinction or the members of the classes that affirmative characterization defines
If a number of formalizations fail to completely characterize the (semi) intuitive distinction then it does not follow that the formalization is deficient. In general there may be a deficiency with the formal or the intuitive distinction or both—or perhaps neither
In general, when the formal and the intuitive remain in disagreement, it is good to seek further intuitive clarification by example and formal characterization by attempting to ferret out principles that determine the distinction
Sometimes, as in the case of the abstract-particular distinction, the kind of formal characteristic that has been sought is at fault. It has been thought that the distinction is actual and metaphysical. Instead, it has been found that the distinction is not absolute, is one of emphasis and convenience—according to the approach that emphasized in studying the object which is typically the one that is most suited to investigation. The selection, not necessarily explicit, of the approach may be a function of historical
In the abstract-particular distinction, the developments above that have a necessary basis in the Metaphysics of immanence, show that the distinction is not as significant as hitherto thought and is not a metaphysical distinction but is according to whether the object is studied—whether the interest in the object is best supported by study—from the object or the concept (typically symbolic) side
The moral, then, is the idea that presumed distinctions or kinds of distinction are not invariably distinctions or distinctions of the kind presumed and, therefore, that when principles or kinds are tested and found to not apply to the presumed distinction it is not necessarily either principle or presumption that is deficient
The moral and the ideas behind it are of wide ranging significance and will be taken up in different form in discussing Logic
Certain particular objects have been discussed in Being and in Metaphysics under the ideas of experience, being, forms of experience, all, difference and change, part, present and immediate past and future, absence or void… these objects were absolute. That in this cosmological system there is a field of sentient beings for whom there is an ‘internal world,’ experience, and an ‘external world,’ the objects of experience that include other organisms, was seen to constitute a practical object—or, perhaps, system of practical objects. The variety of particular objects is taken up in greater detail in Cosmology and in Human being
The systematic discussion of objects of the previous paragraph, though part of metaphysics, may also be regarded as part of cosmology. In Cosmology there is an ad hoc discussion of a miscellany of objects from myth, fiction and so on under Further results in general cosmology… This miscellany could be developed systematically in a number of ways under the topics ‘phases of the universe,’ ‘variety of fiction,’ ‘unending variety of being,’ ‘nature of creation,’ ‘recurrence,’ ‘there is one universe’ in the strong sense that it is shown to be an interactive universe… The remaining topics under Cosmology fall under general cosmology and physical cosmology and have manifestly systematic aspects
The discussion of categories of intuition under Human being delineates a system of particular objects. The commitments of a lifetime constitute a set of objects that have indeterminacy and although they may have system, indeterminism in their genesis is factual and desirable
What is the fundamental element or unit that constitutes the object? In classical metaphysics it is the thing or entity e.g. the tree or the tall tree; in some thinking it is the fact expressed, perhaps, in a sentence e.g. ‘The tall tree is swaying in the wind.’ The sentence has concept side—the words or perhaps the experience that goes along with the words or perhaps both—and an object side that is the state-process ‘described’ in the sentence. The object side of a factual sentence has been called an objective—a generalization or perhaps shifted version of the object. In further generalization, it may be imagined that an entire encyclopedia or drama or novel or scripture could, if consistent, define an existent objective
What is the objective of a symphony… of the emotion felt when a night on a mountain is recalled? What sense do such questions have?
Given that the abstract-particular or abstract-concrete is not metaphysical and is determined by the way in which the objects are seen or studied—by concept or by object or, perhaps by concept or by percept—there are bound to be intermediate or compound cases in which the object will be viewed or studied now one way and now another—according to convenience
If, as in the study of the categories of intuition in Human being, intuition is regarded with sufficient generality, the sentient being does not ‘escape’ intuition—such an escape is logically impossible and therefore without significance or desirability. It has just been noted that the boundary between the particular and the abstract is not well defined and, in any case, is a matter of convenience—what approach, particular-abstract-compound, fixed or varying enables best study—and even of practice: early in development of individual and civilization, number is studied empirically; it is later studied symbolically-conceptually and when, in certain directions, the limits of human intuition, computation and analysis may be encountered, number may be studied computationally and this incorporates both conceptual and empirical elements
As a result of the breakdown of the distinction between the abstract and the particular or concrete (both kinds of object have necessary realization and each may be studied in both aspects) the principle of enumeration of both kinds will be the same even if the inspiration is distinct. The primary source of a variety of abstract objects will therefore be the categories of intuition—provided that the categories are regarded with sufficient generality. The ‘product’ of the categories and the system of experience—cosmology and fiction—will ‘generate’ the variety
Here is the initial and standard ad hoc cosmology of abstract objects
Form (Shape, Pattern, Law, extension, football;) idea (Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar;) relation; universal (redness, properties as nouns;) signs e.g. the letter A; number and other mathematical objects—infinite numbers and other infinite objects, classes, collections—appropriately regarded; propositions; the form of sentience; moral, value, justice; feeling, percept, concept-as-object, belief, faith, knowledge
Symbolic definition or explanation will predispose the corresponding object to being abstract and ostensive marking to being particular—and for (precisely) this constitutive reason, definition is more effective in clarifying abstract objects
Theory of identity
The form of ‘ethics.’ Morals as objects. Ethics and objectivity
Action, concept and object… and knowledge
The number of fundamental concepts
Truth
The Real
From Metaphysics, the following are known without equivocation
All being lies in the universe, i.e. Form is immanent in being. That is, while the Metaphysics suggests Platonism, any Platonic features are immanent in Being in the sense that they are of Being rather than imported to or imposed upon Being. There is no separate ideal, formal or Platonic universe
There are: being, all being, absence of being, and part or domain
There is sentience but there is more than sentience. There is an ‘external’ world not in the sense of something outside the knower but in the sense of there being an object of experience (in which the constitution of the object will be seen to be a function of known and knower, of world and experience)
With appropriate understanding, the sentient field and the field of knowers and knowns are identical
Is it proper to regard the Universe as a sentient field? It was seen in Metaphysics that this depends on careful specification of the concept of sentience and that in the most inclusive senses of sentience and matter, the universe may be regarded equivalently a sentient and a material field. However, any thought that the field of sentience is as in animal being or that the field of matter is as in this cosmological system is untenable. Simultaneously, it was also seen that there is no a priori logical contradiction in this quality of matter or this quality of sentience reaching down to ground level. What would that field of sentience be but Atman and that field of ‘matter’ be but Brahman; and therein lies the identity of Atman and Brahman
Though crucial to Metaphysics, the objects established in its development do not come near to completing the variety of things that exist
In Metaphysics, the question of what things exist, of what is real, was deferred and is now taken up
An abstract object is a form that is common to more than one particular object
Generally, an abstract object does not specify the complete form of a particular object
Due to recurrence, particular objects can be interpreted as abstract
A Form can be interpreted as an abstract object
Abstract objects may, therefore, have the characteristics of particular objects
That an abstract object is not causal or dynamic, does not exist in time and space depends on the kind of abstract object that it is – on its kind and degree of abstraction
The celebration of the abstract character of abstract objects (non-causal, do not exist in time and space) is premature
The older thought that abstract objects are ‘mental’ objects i.e. that they reside in the mind is a confusion
The concept of an abstract object of course resides in mind and this is the source of the idea that an abstract object resides in mind. All concepts reside in minds (brains…) and may also be regarded as residing –at least to some extent– on paper, in theories and in machines such as computational machines. That the concept of a concept is sometimes regarded as insubstantial (which it is not) adds to the idea of the insubstantial character of abstract objects
In saying that an abstract object has causation and so on, it is being said that there is a consistent and in some ways better interpretation such that the claims are true
The interpretation is similar to the interpretation in which the re-interpretation of particular objects as abstract are causal and so on
In subscribing to this interpretation, the distinction between abstract and particular objects as a divide in kind is removed
Under this interpretation all objects may be regarded as immanent in the world. This immanence is nothing other than instance
Extend the following enumerations; reduce them in terms of categories
Being; all; void; domain or part; static entity (are there any); entity in process, becoming or decaying; sentient entity; identity
Particular or concrete objects as abstract objects
Universal (another name for abstract?); property e.g. Redness (a universal?); number; mathematical objects; infinite number (issue of infinity and reference); percept; concept; feeling; form; logic; pattern; law; sentient form; relation; moral; value
I reject the significance of all this. I would be (with Elliot) A pair of ragged claws…
Now a concept is generally not in any sense identical to the object and since, in general, there is no way to get altogether outside the relationship of conception, of perceiver to perceived, it is valid to question the faithfulness of concepts and the meaning or lack of meaning of such faithfulness. This is a general statement that may have exceptions in special cases – of which a number are considered in Objects. One case from the history of philosophy that is abandoned in this version of the narrative is that of the concept-object which should have been abandoned earlier since a separate Platonic world of ideas of which the concept-object is a special case had already been found to be empty. In the case of existence, since existence has no content (or sense of its own but rides along with the conception of the object) there is no distortion to which it is necessarily subject
This does not mean it is incapable of distortion and the essential distortion is to give sense or content to the idea of existence. The chief way of giving content and therefore distortion is to reduce existence to or to define it in terms of special kinds of being whether conceptual or actual e.g. mind, matter, proposition…
Although this chapter is peripheral to the main ambition of the journey, it may be crucial to certain formal developments of the ideas such as the idea of a or the consistent system of concepts or descriptions. The developments include a conceptualization of concept-object relations. This conceptualization is (part of) the apparatus that provides illumination of ‘consistent system of concepts.’ This (or these) same conceptualization(s) also show a way to illuminate and perhaps resolve a number of classic issues such as the nature of language, the nature of Logic, the linguistic and set-theoretic paradoxes that have had instrumental effect on the development of logic. These thoughts define a secondary though important aim to the study undertaken here. The realization of this aim is at most partial here and may be taken up in a later narrative
…
There are (or appear to be) appearances and things. The concerns of Objects are (1) what is the status of appearances and things, and (2) what things exist which includes the question of the existence or being status of things –concrete and abstract– that may appear or be thought to exist
Although natures of the ideas of the chapter are difficult to pin down the outcome is not crucial to the main objective of the narrative – the negotiation of being. With the object is regarded as what is known-as-known, the main purpose of this chapter will be to distinguish appearances (concepts) that provide a complete picture of the real and those that do not
The issues of this chapter have been an intense concern in history of philosophy and thought from the Greeks especially Parmenides, Socrates and Plato, and then, in modern philosophy, especially from Hume’s critical analysis of knowledge and Kant’s response to the present day in which period, in philosophy, focus on knowledge and related concerns outweigh focus on the world (metaphysics) in importance. Although perhaps an inevitable reaction to the rise of science and the self-criticism of philosophy (with the maturing of the enlightenment, ‘reason, which had leveled dogma and so many other endeavors, was now itself brought to the bar and was found wanting’ and, what is more it was the bar at which it had itself presided as supreme judge,) the importance of epistemology over that of metaphysics is not a good thing and reflects an impoverishment of modernity from which both culture and individual suffer for there has been no adequate replacement (till perhaps the metaphysics of immanence) of the old way (e.g. faith) but a return to that way is not possible either… and were it not for that metaphysics the impoverishment would be only an illusion or perhaps an allegation for what is necessary can be neither evil nor good but its appreciation is (must or should perhaps be) good
Humans and perhaps all animals perceive the world in a number of modes that include e.g. a tree, a storm, a planet, events such as the birth of a child or the collision of planets, and processes such as the flow of a river. It is typical that such things are experienced as real. However, what is in the organism (mind, brain) is not the thing and therefore the question of faithfulness of perception to thing arises
There are a number of ways in which the experience is not the thing. In seeing a mountain, the individual is seeing the mountain as a whole and especially from a distance not the trees and rocks and ice and snow and never, except by instrument andor on scientific theory, the atoms and so on
Perhaps, then, when perception is complemented by conception (thought, theory and so on,) the experience is the thing. However, scientific theories (apparently) may always be taken to deeper levels and, so, there is no final knowledge of the thing itself in this approach
Seeing a mountain range, one might have the experience of seeing the range as a whole, or from a close distance, an experience of seeing individual mountains. Generally, a mountain is seen as a mountain, two mountains are seen as two mountains but and the half of one mountain and the half of another are not seen as a thing. That certain things are experienced as wholes is part of what Kant labeled intuition – that the world is perceived in certain characteristic modes. The intuition is the form of the perception and not the perception itself. This intuition is extremely important and wide ranging. Kant thought that in the important categories of space, time, causation, the intuition had captured the essence of the world. His thought was based in the then current acceptance of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics as ‘a priori’ (i.e. prior to knowledge due to being of the world alone rather than also of knowledge even though appearing in knowledge via the intuition.) We now know that although Kant was mistaken in thinking of the sciences of his time as (precisely) of the world the intuition bears some degree of faithfulness – and though that faithfulness is not full, fullness is not necessary and the intuition itself is crucial to the life of sentient beings
The experience itself, even when supplemented by conception and theory, are different kinds of thing than the kind of what is experienced. Thus while a map is a representation of the area mapped, the experience is not a representation in the manner of a map. There is therefore a question as to the meaning of faithfulness
The concern with appearance and reality, the concern with the being status of e.g. a brick when a person has an impression of a brick and the concern with the being of abstract ‘entities’ such as numbers and redness make the this perhaps the most difficult chapter of this essay
Thus the full problem of knowledge as conceived so far involves the dual aspect (1) What is faithfulness? Does faithfulness have meaning? (2) If there is a meaning to faithfulness, what is the faithfulness of knowledge?
How may the problem of faithfulness and its meaning receive resolution. If the nature of the world (universe) is not fully known, there will always be some residue of doubt regarding resolutions. If the gap between knower and known is a necessary chasm, perhaps like the receding horizon, then there can be no spanning it and therefore no reasonable desire for the span of it. However, except perhaps in the desire for it, certainty is not given as a virtue. Uncertainty is openness to possibility. The Metaphysics provides such a picture of the universe that is full as far as it goes. How far can it go in conceiving the problem? The following includes some working out of this thought. Quantum theory has been used to conceive the relation between concept and conceived but that theory is, as revealed in Metaphysics, contingent to at most some local cosmos
There is a second difficulty. It has been seen in Being and in Metaphysics, that regarding the universe (all being) there is a necessary character to its events (including appearances.) When restriction is made to a local cosmos, a distinction between the contingent and the necessary arise. The concern with appearance and reality is a concern with the contingent. How significant is that concern? If appearance is not the complete story regarding the real – then what? That is the second difficulty. However, there is an immediate response. If that is the way it is then perhaps the way it is, as already suggested, is a good thing!
Perhaps the two difficulties cancel one another
Since we get along in the world, there is a problem of showing that the problems raised are real problems and not the mere or neurotic product of a thinker’s perhaps artificial desire for certainty or faithfulness
One way of seeing the problem of the problem is to think of the place of knowledge in the world of the human or organism in its environment which is ultimately though not immediately the universe of all being. Is knowledge an end in itself – or is it an instrument of action. That knowledge may be institutionalized and revered does not mean that, in the end, it is an instrument. The instrumental character could be practical i.e. knowledge may exist in itself but its significance could (mainly) derive from use. Alternatively, the instrumental character could be categorical i.e. knowledge exists only in relation to action… or, perhaps, knowledge and action exist only in relation to one another. Finally the instrumental character could be categorial but knowledge might for practical purposes assigned independent status. Then the problem of the problem is (a) Does the concern with the faithfulness of knowledge with regard to kind (what is faithfulness) and fact (is it faithful) improve or have the potential to improve knowledge? In some affairs, science for example, instrumental knowledge does pretty well without recourse to the traditional philosophical concerns. (b) Does the concern improve the human condition? The concern with faithfulness could perhaps improve knowledge (e.g. by reason) yet harm the human condition (knowledge is power that can be ‘used’ for good and for bad.) Of course, (c) the implied choices are easy to articulate but not simple to know or easy to implement
The concerns are complicated by the fact that knowledge occurs on many levels and that good and bad are not given (we may think we know what is good and what is bad and this may be valid in some instances but not in all and may be especially difficult to know when the concern is knowledge that occurs on many levels and that definitely has impacts but the distance between cause and effect is sufficient to make estimation of the relation difficult)
The multi-level layering of knowledge is itself not a simple layering. A branch of knowledge may have significant material impact; e.g. nuclear physics has been used for good and for harm. At another level the harm vs. value can be conceptualized and itself be instrumental. However, it is not the case that there is an easy resolution of any tension between representatives of the two levels… Another layering starts with the sciences and observes that science is subject (at least so far and when conceived as contingent) to revision. It may be thought, therefore, that no metaphysics is possible. But, as has been seen, metaphysics is possible and one way of seeing this has been shown in the recognition of a necessary realm concerning being, all being, absence of being and domain of being... and that contingency occurs primarily in relation to the distinguishing characteristics of specific domains
From ‘06
Here, the object is what is known – as known
I have now inverted ‘object’ and what was object in Journey in Being-New World is now ‘concept’ in Journey in Being-New World II
The problems of Objects
1. To analyze the relations between Concept and Object (Being)… this may be called the dual problem of concept and object (or concept or knowledge and being)
2. To identify the nature of the real and to see what objects are real
It is important to see the issues of being and object as dual rather than independent
Phenomenalism, view that ‘appearance is reality’ has been ruled out as has subjective idealism which is a case of phenomenalism
However the appeal of phenomenalism is clear for otherwise the infinite gap between appearance and reality. That this gap does not always imply lack of faithfulness and is otherwise ‘good’ will be shown thus removing the motivation to phenomenalism
A tentative conclusion of the discussion shall be that having being and objecthood are identical
…this too is irrelevant
3. There is experience of objects in the psyche i.e. in cognition, in emotion and so on. The experience of the object is labeled the concept
The sense or concept of the concept itself is that of experience or mental content and includes all aspects of experience including cognition, emotion and so on. This concept of the concept includes but is not limited to the significant concept
From Metaphysics, it is known that there is an external world not in the sense of outside but in the sense that the concept (experience) has and defines an object
I.e. objects are real but are known as or via concepts. Even when the naïve concept is extended by thought and measurement… it remains in concept. As having delayed reference or reference to aspects of objects, pure expression (a concept without an immediate object) is not free of conceptual content
(The pure expression or concept is an essential element of thought and of free concept formation)
There is no identity of concept and object for the object is in the external world and the concept is in experience (the formal concept is an extension of concept to include configurations that are not intrinsically mental.) Further the concept (experience) and object are not (given as) the same kind. However, because there is no getting out of the concept, it is easy to con-fuse concept and object. In day-to-day life and science, it is the norm to confuse concept and object… and when ‘primitives’ do this it is labeled ‘magic’
There is therefore a dual question of the meaning(s) of the faithfulness of concepts in general and the fact of the faithfulness of particular concepts
One approach to faithfulness is through corroboration – corroboration of an impression by action and measurement, by other concepts including significant concepts including laws, by other senses. This sets up coherence as a measure of faithfulness even though faithfulness is also a so far not clearly specified relation between concept and object. Thus the concept is not objective even though it may be object related. Still, since some aspects of experience (e.g. sense perception) are direct in experience, there is a sense of objectivity. In such corroboration faithfulness is invariably open to doubt and error and to improvement (from Theory of being quantum mechanical indeterminacy is not other than contingent.) However it was seen in Metaphysics that there is faithfulness of the core aspects of the Theory of being to aspects of the universe (an object)
That the concept is not the object follows from the discreteness of knower and known. This discreteness as absolute is an approximation to what obtains for there is flux between knower and known. Thus, assertion that the concept is not the object obtains in a certain view of discreteness of things or, perhaps more accurately, the assertion may suggest a complete separateness of concept and object that is itself an approximation to what obtains
That there is no objectivity, i.e. that objectivity of experience does not have meaning, does not mean that the concept (experience) is essentially or invariably unfaithful
In some conceptions of the nature of experience, the concept is the object and in others it is equivalent to the object. In one version of phenomenalism, direct experience or perception is equivalent to the object (thus the gap between idea and thing would be conceptual but not empirical.) In subjective idealism there is no object but experience. In these theories of cognition, concepts are objective (subjective idealism) or as good as objective i.e. perfectly faithful (phenomenalism.) This is one appeal of such theories; it should be noted however that the appeal is misleading for it is alienating and results in a false sense of perfect knowledge. This concern is further discussed below
However theories of an identity of concept and object are untenable for the Metaphysics has shown that concepts are not objective for there is an external world. Additionally, it is known from experience that not all concepts are known to be capable of being perfectly faithful i.e. of being perfectly objective in any sense. Therefore the position before further investigation must be that some concepts are perfectly faithful but that there is doubt whether all concepts are capable of being sharpened to the point of perfect faithfulness. Whether there are concepts that are incapable of such refinement and what those (kinds of) concepts may be is the subject of further study
If a concept is fully faithful, it may be called an absolute concept. If a concept is thought to be sufficiently faithful for some purpose, it may be called practical. Most working, common and scientific concepts regarding the immediate world including the local cosmological system are practical. Absolute concepts emerge when considering the ideas of all being, absence of being and so on and when considering the local system as an element in the population of being
Absence of objectivity is sometimes thought of as a loss. At other times it is celebrated
That objectivity is not given is not a loss except in relation to a belief or expectation that it is given. Sometimes what is rejoiced is the denial by some disciplines that the claims of other disciplines to superior objectivity are without foundation. The celebration, therefore, even if it is of liberation is not a celebration of the positive
Recognition of essential absence of objectivity is and must be placement (of human being inextricably in the stream of) being. I.e. human being is of essentially of being and is not alien to it. Recognition of any contingent lack in objectivity is occasion for celebration of mystery and wonder, is an occasion for discovery – for freshness in vision
Since, for certain absolute purposes and often for practical reasons, the concept may be taken to be the object, reference may be made to absolute and to practical objects. This terminology, in which ‘concept’ is conflated with ‘object’ aligns the discussion with one standard use that attempts to bring the philosophical terms regarding concept and object in line with the common conflation of concept and object. This terminology can be used consistently even though it may be confusing. It is particularly useful in understanding the idea of the non-existent object – such an ‘object’ is in fact a concept corresponding to which there is no object. It was seen in Metaphysics that the only concepts that have no object are those that contain or entail contradiction i.e. inconsistent concepts. However, there may be consistent concepts that have no object in a limited domain of the universe, e.g. this cosmological system. Often, strict verification that some consistent concept has no local object may be difficult or impossible. In that case all that may be said is that there is no known object or that given certain regularities such as the laws of physics, there can be no object
It is thus that the present chapter may be titled Objects or Theory of objects
4. A first aim of Objects is to analyze the concept of faithfulness and to set out ways in which faithfulness may be determined or evaluated
A realistic or direct account is a one based in the psyche and its functions while a transcendental account is an indirect one that argues from the fact of experience which entails the fact of being to the nature and realism of experience
A question that arises is whether, since concept and object are of different kinds, a realistic account of faithfulness is possible or whether a transcendental account is necessary. A transcendental account may form a framework for a realistic one
It may be noted that these concerns address the epistemological questions, ‘What is knowledge?’ and ‘How are knowledge claims verified?’
A related aim is to see whether further analysis of absolute faithfulness is indicated and to analyze distinctions between absolute and practical objects… to see whether the distinction is related to distinctions such as that of necessity versus contingency… to see what kinds of absolute object there may be in addition to those that emerge from Metaphysics
The first aim is to lay out a foundation for the study of the object
A second aim is to study and establish a broad system of kinds of objects. There seem to be particular or ‘concrete’ objects such as bricks, the wind, becomings, outcomes… and non-concrete or ‘abstract’ objects such as number, property, value… What are particular objects and what are abstract objects? What is their nature? What is their relation? Are they truly distinct? Is the concrete object studied empirically and is the abstract object studied conceptually? Is the concrete object causal and does it reside in time and space while the abstract object does not? What is abstract about abstract objects? What other kind(s) of object may there be? Are objects static entities? Is there a distinction between the ideas of object and object-in-process, e.g. in-becoming, in-equilibrium, and in-dissolution? May such considerations unify actual and ethical object? Finally, is there a perspective that may be labeled objective in that it encompasses both knower and known and in that, in special cases, concept and object fall out of analysis?
Why is it or should it be important that the world is the way it is experienced? Why should perfect faithfulness be important? Is not simple being in the world enough? The question is too simple for there are times when such simplicity is sufficient and times when it is not… Knowledge and knowing are an aspect of being in the world! It has been seen that for some very special objects (being, all being and so on) perfect faithfulness is assured and for other objects there may be at most practical or sufficient faithfulness. Knowledge may be conceived as the sufficiently faithful concept. The conception appears to be simple but it is not altogether so for what is sufficiently faithful is dependent on situation or context. A piece of information may be sufficiently accurate for some particular situation. In an endeavor such as science whose purpose includes general application, it is be desirable to be as accurate as (reasonably) possible because the demands of accuracy are not known in advance
Thus in the idea of knowledge as sufficiently faithful both economics and value are implicit. Economics affects what accuracy is reasonably possible because greater accuracy requires greater resources. Value is implicit in the idea of desirable accuracy because importance depends on context. It is also clear that value and economics are not independent because different value contexts may draw from the same resource and because a (otherwise) significant value may remain unfulfilled if it requires a disproportionate amount of resources
It is clear that notions such as ‘justified true belief’ are criteria of knowledge that are intended to satisfy certain conceptions of knowledge
One intention to the selection of particular objects above is to show that even while the term ‘concrete’ is used metaphorically, the metaphor applies to some but not all particular objects. The suggestion, verified in what follows, that some abstract objects are located in space and time and are causal, implies that the distinction between the abstract and the concrete is partial. The selection of abstract objects is intended to suggest a variety of kinds of abstract object including the universal (discussed later) and mathematical object
Abstract and particular objects will placed on the same basis, i.e. will not be seen to be essentially distinct. That is, abstract objects may have being in time and space, may be causal. This will follow from the metaphysical truth that all things (objects) lie in the universe
The question regarding unification of actual and ethical object will be answered affirmatively and the affirmation will bring (a more) complete unity to the modes of being. Perspectives that encompass knower and known will provide further unification and context
Given the external character of the object relative to the concept, what is the logical limit of unity of concept and object? As a result of flux and flow of being and boundary (difference,) full and universal discreteness of concept and object must be an approximation. Does the limit in the non-discrete case lie in some unitary Brahman?
A third aim in the study of objects is to list and classify objects and their properties and to address the issue of the coherence and completeness of the classification and listing. This aim provides a system that is built around the scaffolding provided in the second aim
These three aims define a program of study for the Object. The study is not conceived as linear; what is learned in later aims may condition the study of earlier ones
5. A final aim of the chapter is to show the nature of the real. This study may already be implicit in the foregoing
There is a limited though important use of ‘realism’ according to which universals are real. Here, realism shall be the idea that objects have a reality that has independence from the concept
…
Address the dual problem of being and object. Equivalently, address the problem of thing and knowledge, of reality and appearance. This issue has already been brought up as being and concept
Resolve the concern that the actual form in which the issue had been brought up in Being was object and concept. The resolution is perhaps that object is playing a dual role that perhaps / in the ideal merge as one. This perhaps is the dual problem
Discuss the general nature of knowledge and lack of general meaning to conformation between concept and object; simultaneous insignificance to general conformation; essential relation between non-conformation and possibility (therefore sometime necessity) of ability to be in what may be described as a process of ‘coming to conform’ i.e. ability to discover; possibility of confirmation in special cases e.g. the symbolic case – and its meaning and significance; action and the general case
Establish the kinds of objects – ‘concrete’ or particular and abstract objects. Observe that the words ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ function metaphorically and that concrete objects are or can be seen as possessed of abstractness and vice versa
Observing that all things reside within the universe, clarify the being and nature of objects – especially abstract objects (note that concepts too reside in the universe but are not identical to the object)
Mention the concept-object as a case of concept and object; mention the Meinongian objective; reject not as invalid but as unnecessary
What has being? Establish a logical index of kinds of objects – concrete and abstract (universal, value, mathematics, concept, idea…)
What has being? The real… Although the meaning i.e. the concepts of the real and of being are or may be different, the reference is necessarily identical. What is the source of the possible difference in meaning? It has to do with the real nature of abstract objects which on the account of scholastic realism exist but which on nominalism do not exist but are mere names. Here, however, it has been shown that both particular and abstract objects reside in the one universe. Further that identity of residence is necessary. Therefore, the old difference in meanings has sense only some conception of the world (universe) as other than its necessary conception. I.e., in light of the true nature of the universe, the real and being are identical with regard to sense and reference or concept and object
Establish the form of ethics as (an already implicit) generalization of object; that it is implicit follows from the indefiniteness of the object i.e. what is named; synthesis of morals and things
Develop a Theory of Identity (The Theory?)
It is possible to have some precise resolution of the concerns, without regard to the meaning or nature of faithfulness, as follows
The experience of things is labeled the concept. That concepts may bear some kind of faithfulness to the world and to things is without question (in the view that the appearance is the thing the relation is one of identity and this is of course an easy solution that is also of course perhaps very difficult to conceptualize.) ‘Thing’ is understood in the enhanced sense that it includes things (in the usual sense,) events, processes… The ‘thing’ to which the concept bears some kind and degree of faithfulness is labeled the object
…
The present section on objects is perhaps the most difficult one in the present narrative even though it is not perhaps as important as the other fundamental sections. Among the great thinkers who labored with some success to approach the problem are Plato and Kant. Other thinkers who achieved lesser success are Wittgenstein and the British Empiricists from Locke to Russell
The problem is concerned with the fact that concept and object are distinct as entities and as kinds. Therefore, the faithfulness of concept to object is a theoretical concern (regarding the meaning of such faithfulness) in addition to the obvious empirical concern
It may be noted that these problems are not those of hallucination, illusion, delusion and so on. What is under scrutiny is, first, the cases in which the concept is usually regarded as adequate and, second, the entire range of concept-object relations
Any solution to the problem that is excessively naïve e.g. the concept is the object or excessively dependent on sophistry will be immediately suspect. Further, solution that finds that all kinds of knowledge (as relation between concept and object) can be treated uniformly and any system of solutions that finds that that there are no kinds at all will also be suspect
In this narrative it has been found that there are cases of absolute object which means that absolute knowledge is to be had. An example is the metaphysics-general cosmology. Other cases may be seen as absolute in context or limited relative to the universe. Yet others afford an object only in holist-implicit meaning. Then there are the classic cases of hope for object that fail but whose failure may be seen as a virtue (with a shift in perspective and value.) Still other cases are those persistent cases of marginal if any object and include reactionary fundamentalism. The difficulty that remains despite the clear success of the metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth… is carefully mapping the variety of contingent cases into classes and evaluating those cases with regard to the dual concerns of object and value (although there is a unification here of fact and value into object, the unification does not imply lack of distinction or completeness especially in the contingent or actual context)
…
The problems of Objects are as follows
When is the concept adequate to the object i.e. when can we say that the concept is equivalent to the Object? And when not (as suggested but not in finality this will include and perhaps be restricted to the case –a significant and immediate but by no means the universal case– of distinguishing characteristics of specific domains… but note that their existential status is significant –even though often suppressed or disregarded– but not distinguishing)
Demonstrate and illustrate the conclusions
Is this important / not important and why
Demonstrate the conclusion
To continue the idea that the quest or requirement for faithfulness has artificiality to it. The analysis would not argue that the idea of the concept as faithful to the object has no realization or usefulness. However, thinking of primitive organisms perhaps without dedicated sense organs there appears to be no apprehension or sense of an object even when sense is present. This case underlies all other cases and is elaborate in the table below
To consider what things exist. I.e. to develop a catalog of Objects
Examples of extreme cases are the verificationism of Logical Positivism and Husserl’s phenomenology
When freed from the hope of certain and precise knowledge in contingent cases such as science, everyday affairs, particular or contextual and therefore contingent knowledge within a normal domain, there is potential for return to, first, what may be labeled the perfection of the immediate and realization of the identity Atman = Brahman
Rousseau may have intended ‘Man is born free but is everywhere in chains’ to refer to the social context but also applies to knowledge of and being in the world. Also, since the strongest bondage is one that is not seen or is seen as a virtue, the way out is often slow and labored
An outline of the approach adopted here is to admit at outset that the concept is not invariably faithful to the object and that the meaning of faithfulness at least as an explicit knowledge relation is not always possible. The possibilities of the meaning of faithfulness require some degrees of atomism – of world and meaning. However, the fact of being in and negotiating a world with some success implies a degree of faithfulness in some sense. The objective of the analysis is to identify areas in which the correspondence may fail and areas in which it may have some degree of success. The success of symbolic knowledge in day-to-day endeavor, in science, and in Metaphysics, may be surprising. How is this success possible?
The range of endeavors to be considered and or brought under the umbrella of concept and object shall include not only the entire range of knowledge and its kinds, the nature of knowledge and its place in being e.g. its relation to action, but also the concerns of faith (including religion) and morals. It has been attempted to ‘unify’ this entire range under the Object
Given that such a unification stands against the stream that bifurcates object and morals, knowledge and value, to claim certain success in the endeavor has little significance. Instead, a better approach may be to make the case as strongly as possible, to present concepts, arguments and proofs and to point out potential weaknesses and doubts – perhaps in the form of objection (and counter-objection…)
Regarding the general case, absolute faithfulness is not to be had. However, what is not to be had i.e. what is logically impossible, is not to be desired unless to desire the logically impossible is a good thing (it cannot be a good thing to desire the logically impossible, however it is possible to incorrect assessment of what is logically impossible.) The impossibility of absolute faithfulness may be seen as a virtue of being in that it opens up possibilities and, perhaps more significantly, shows humankind to be firmly grounded in being – that it is not ignorance or suffering or death or fear or animal nature that are sources of alienation but, instead, the attempt to transcend these by escape or denial
There are classic (contingent) cases where hopes for absolute knowledge of the object fail
Certainly in the general case, absolute knowledge fails
This is a disappointment relative to the hopes and expectations of the past especially perhaps the hopes raised first by Christian Theology and then by Science
However, when knowledge of the object is logically impossible there can be no reasonable desire for it
Even when atomism and explicit reference do not obtain, implicit and holist ‘reference’ may be had and while precision may not obtain or even have significance the implicit and holist case may be adequate perhaps with restriction to context
The impossibility of absolute knowledge in the contingent case is a virtue
The objective therefore is neither establishment nor destruction of the idea of the object. Rather it is a case analysis of objects into classes of knowability and an identification (which may be coarse grained with regard to class and kind of class) of (a) absolute symbolic knowledge, (b) adequate knowledge perhaps holist, intuitive, implicit and contextual and (c) inadequate cases
The (normal?) forms of knowledge are related to the normal (!) forms; it is a categorial error to think that all knowledge is of the external form alone even though sharp focus and symbol encourage that thought
A first, naïve, concept of knowledge is knowledge as knowledge-of the entity
Here, ‘entity’ encompasses not only ‘things’ but also states of affairs (and will be later extended to patterns, laws, Forms and other ‘abstract’ objects)
Although it is at first going to be seen that, naïvely, there is no knowledge-of the entity it will be seen to what extent this negative claim may be revised
Faithfulness is immanent in being – i.e. in the world or universe and specifically in the composite of knower and known (in context)
Experience cannot be other than ‘effect of one element of being in another.’ Therefore, the experience is not the thing, the concept not the object
Full faithfulness is not universal. When it is actual or practical the object and concept form a dual and either or dual may be labeled Object
In the important contingent case, the structure and degree of faithfulness is a contingent i.e. scientific problem and capable of some degree of scientific resolution. Full resolution is in principle possible only under some theory e.g. a quantum representation of knower and known. However, a rough resolution may be all that is desirable…
Here, identity has the sense of ‘sameness’ and is different from though related to the sense in the later topic ‘Identity’ that discusses the enduring identity and sense of identity of objects and the enduring sense of self-identity of individuals
However, even though naïve identity and faithfulness are lacking it is still true that (1) the different senses and may (or may not) corroborate one another and in cases where there is no disconfirmation either by cognition (perception and thought) or in (extended) action it may be said that there is sufficient faithfulness (2) in other words, adaptation of organism in the environment allows talk of sufficient faithfulness
If among all modes of cognition and action there is no disconfirmation, the object is real or existent or non-fictional. The label ‘real’ applies tentatively and will be analyzed further in what follows
Even though there is no mapping from the entity to the concept-object, there must be some at least rough correspondence (e.g. a net but without congruence or meaning to congruence.) Why?
An absolute object is here said to be one regarding which the concept-object is entirely faithful
It was earlier argued that abstract objects are absolute and, as idealized, they are but, the concept is not the immanent object
Existence-as matter…
Power
Existence as such
Elaborate, explain and synchronize the cases with the table
Local (ground, intuition, common knowledge, science… generally contingent and capable of error unless otherwise demonstrated; the ground case is immanent and ‘object’ lacks significance) and universal (necessary except when applied to the not universal case)
Add value, identity….
|
Object |
Kind of being |
Errors |
|
Object of Kantian intuition |
Practical, organism bound but not fully genetic, has developmental and cultural elements |
Yes, but a good thing. Good in the way that what is necessary can not be evil or good but its acceptance is good… and makes way for approach to if not realization of faithfulness |
|
Object of common knowledge |
Practical, basis in extended intuition and culture, similar to science but rough and ready |
Yes, and a good thing except under refusal to recognize the possibility of error |
|
Object of science |
Practical, bound to human intuition extended to include symbol and so on, with cultural elements; similar to common knowledge but more precise through care, precise measurement, experiment, use of precise language including mathematics |
Yes, but not eternally given, and in so far as there are errors, that is a good thing |
|
The Objects of the Metaphysics of Immanence. Includes Logic and Form Particular and abstract on uniform basis The value and object on a uniform basis |
Actual. Practical when applied to the important but not universal contingent case |
Yes when there are errors in understanding and, again a good thing. Errors in the contingent case also a good thing |
|
Knowing and action in interaction. This case can be studied as an object but in the concept i.e. the knowing, a discrete object is not identified (as the concept acquires freedom in a process described in Mind and in Human world, the rudimentary idea of object begins to emerge but is not there in the beginning) … Note…This case might, as founding all previous cases, be placed at the head of this table. However, it seems that in terms of understanding, the case is best placed here |
The organism and world are conceived in our symbolism as objects but the organism does not have the idea of object and therefore there is no being of a discrete object according to the organism… even though human being might assign the object to the sensation of the organism The importance of the case is that it underlies all other cases, that it is the root case that is close to ground and that as the case begins to acquire freedom as described to the left it is the source of all concepts and objects… and, further, suggests that at ground level the idea of the concept as faithful to the object, even though such faithfulness can be achieved in some cases as above, has a degree of artificiality |
Concept of error not clearly significant. However, the significance of error even if not the concept of it may begin to emerge |
Recall that the universe is all being
All concepts and objects reside in the universe
It is clear that particular objects are in the universe
The significant content to the assertion about all objects is that concepts and abstract objects are in the universe – and not in some other world or some abstract space
There is a way that human beings sometimes think of their world as one in which ideas and concepts are immaterial or ethereal. This is perhaps the result of materialism or some other kind of reduction or, perhaps, the freedom of concepts that may but do not necessarily ‘point’ to some object or objects. The impulse is powerful but not necessary
The main aspect of the assertion concerns abstract objects. However, it will be effective to first consider ideas and concepts. If the idea is that of an abstract object, there may be an inclination to think that the concept is not in the real universe. However, the concept is in the mind or brain of the thinker or marks on paper or states of a computer… Because the system of concepts can be manipulated without regard to the dynamics of physical objects the view is encouraged that, in themselves, ideas are not real. It is clear that ideas may be regarded as formal or in some abstract space; however, in fact, they reside in the actual world
The reasoning regarding abstract objects follows a similar template. The template is that while the abstract object may be even validly thought of as in an abstract or immaterial, mental, or ethereal space, the only objects that have no residence in the universe are the so-called non-existent objects (Meinong) or self-contradictory objects such as the square circle
A gold mountain has been thought of as a non-existent object but, from the Metaphysics, it is clearly not except under some unusual concept of mountain and of gold as exclusive
Similarly from the Metaphysics, a consistent concept must have a realization or class of realizations in the universe. Thus, even if the local application of the concept is at most approximately empirical and even if both concept and object may be validly thought of as residing in abstract spaces, the object has residence in the real
It is here that further elaboration of what kinds of ‘object’ such as atom, star, idea, concept, form, and number exist
The theory of objects is precursor to the Theory of Variety or Cosmology
The two ideas or meanings of form (which are not truly distinct) enable the characterization of particular (concrete) objects
It is here recognized that, for sentient being, a particular object is known via a concept… That while objects have causal efficacy, the concepts do not – at least not in the usual way of particular objects… That the conceptual character of the knowledge does not result in doubt regarding the being of objects but places doubt on the nature of understanding but, further, the ‘gap’ between concept and object is positive in allowing also the possibility of closure of the gap…
The Theory of Objects is study of the possibility and nature of objects, the kinds of object –particular, abstract; entity and complex– and the nature, possibility, and distinctions among the kinds
The study of the kinds leads into a study of the variety of objects. The Theory of Objects is a precursor to Cosmology or the Theory of Variety
An abstract object is known via a concept that does not correspond to particular objects. As in the case of particular objects, the existence of the concept does not entail the existence of a corresponding abstract object. As in the case of particular, the gap between concept and object is a positive freedom regarding the possibility of (improving) knowledge
A number is an (example of an) abstract object. The concept of number corresponds to forms of concrete (particular) objects and their collections. A vocabulary may be introduced in which the concept is the abstract object. An alternative vocabulary may be introduced in which the abstract object exists in another world. Both such vocabularies may (perhaps) be made consistent and useful but are also fundamental confusions. The object lies in this world but pertains to aspects of particular objects and is therefore an abstract (ed) object; as such the abstract object is known empirically. The concept, once formulated, may be studied independently of the world (e.g. by symbolic means) and the concept may be regarded as given in its nature; this view is encouraged by the intuition of number and by the successful and powerful axiomatic formulation of number; in this sense the concept is not empirical. However, the fact that the concept is not empirical does not mean that it is eternally given (even if there are eternal givens in the background to which the concept approaches) and the concept may change; the concept of number has changed; two phases may be recognized: an early empirical phase in which the species (human) comes to grips with and adequately formulates ‘number’ and an abstract phase in which number is studied independently with deepened understanding and completion of the potential of the concept
(Note that Bertrand Russell’s definition of a number as the class of classes that can be placed in one to one correspondence with a particular finite class is one way to capture the form of number. In this way, number does not appear to belong to the world. However, Russell’s approach is not only possible one. Appeal to the intuition of number emphasizes both world and concept side; and the intuition may be formalized axiomatically and the properties of number regarded or tentatively studied as the properties of the revisable axiomatic system)
All objects may be seen as having an abstract and a concrete side
Just as the concept side of a particular material object is not causal in the way of the material object; so the concept side of an abstract object is not causal as object. This is not quite what is meant when it is said that abstract objects are not causally efficacious. What is meant? Perhaps, that number as a non-material object cannot be causally efficacious
Is the conclusion about causal efficacy valid? Is there anything causal about the forms of the objects to which number corresponds? First, number is so highly abstracted that one does not expect physical causation. Second, in the full reinterpretation of cause in the Theory of being (dynamics) number may be a seat of causation (this is to be studied.) Third, in a less abstracted abstract object, the aspects of the object captured in the object (concept) may be involved in causation. In this case, just as it is proper to use a name in saying that a particular object is causal it may be proper to use the name (not an empirical entity) in saying that the abstracted aspect (empirical) is causal
In fact, particular objects are abstracted
The distinction between abstract and particular object breaks down in two ways. Both kinds have conceptual and therefore abstract sides; both kinds are, in fact, abstracted
The foregoing explains why abstract objects have been thought of as (1) mental (this characteristic was first abandoned by Frege,) (2) non-causal, non-spatial and non-temporal, (3) defined by negation. Here we have seen that all objects have a concept and a world side; that the concept may be regarded as mental –intuitive– or otherwise –formal, logical– but in neither case is the object (world) side mental in nature and in neither case is the world side necessarily fully captured by the concept (case by case analysis is required to make this judgment and this of course does not imply that there are no generalities to be had.) All objects have a causal aspect but the degree and kind of cause is a case by case or class by class endeavor; and the most abstracted of objects will be seen as having flimsy causation or none at all. And in all cases there is abstraction which may be confused with essential negation
Remarks of the following kind are often made ‘the study of number is not empirical for if it were, we would be studying physical objects rather than doing number theory to discover the theorems of arithmetic.’ Regardless whether the study of number is empirical, that one does not study the properties of physical objects to determine theorems does not itself make number non-empirical. The properties of collections of physical objects are, to some degree, built into intuition and language and what is built in include some elementary properties of numbers which can then be developed and even corrected e.g. as axiomatic systems in apparent isolation from the physical. Is the study of number empirical? Not explicitly but a reasonable case can be made that, in some reasonable meaning of the word ‘empirical,’ the study of number has already built in empirical elements
Here the concept of the concept-object of Journey in Being-New World is avoided as interesting but unnecessary
Objects correspond to concepts. If the object is a particular, it is a particular object. If the concept allows many particular objects, the object corresponding to the concept may be called abstract
If more than one object corresponds to a concept, the concept defines an abstract object and may be defined as the collection of all objects that correspond to it; there may be a set of properties such that those and only those objects have that set – in that case there is an explicit definition of the abstract object
The form of the concept is immanent in all its instances
The form may be thought of as residing in an ideal world but it is not at all necessary to do so
A concept may be regarded as an object. This is altogether distinct in kind from the object that corresponds to the concept
An abstract space e.g. Hilbert space is immanent over e.g. patterns of concepts
An abstract object may be thought of as residing in another world but this is not necessary or advisable – except perhaps for practical purposes
If the properties are spatial e.g. all objects that contain a certain point, the abstract object may be regarded as spatial. Being an abstract object does not entail being non-spatial although some abstract objects are non-spatial
Similar comments may be made about abstract objects and temporality
If the (concept of the) abstract object refers to all objects that exert a physical force on some given particular object the abstract object may be said to be causal. Some but not all abstract objects are clearly causal; some but all abstract objects may be seen to be clearly non-causal (more on this needed but may be in the separate Objects file)
A particular object can be seen as abstract: the set of objects that correspond to the concept contains one member – the particular object
If, for abstract objects A, B, and C, all A's are B's and all B's are C's, then all A's are C's
A symmetry may define an abstract object
Morals as forms of (incomplete, of the possibility of) forms e.g. as the right or the good
The indefiniteness of objects makes for the possibility of moral forms
Free will
Morals are standard, perhaps normative, choices
An ethics is a system for the making of choices
Meta-ethics is the study of ethics – the nature of ethics, ethical argument, the objectivity and foundation of ethical judgment
Morals are extended by ethics
Morals and particular, perhaps complex, objects ‘combine’ as one
The idea that morals are not real, not objects, has to do with the idea of object as a relatively determinate object in space and time
The objection to ethics as real is at root a substance theory of objects
When the individual is regarded as a becoming-object or journey-object, morals are seen as real
When ethics and morals are thus seen as part of an object (or, alternatively as an ‘abstract’ object) there is unification of entity and morality just as there has been unification of ‘object’ and concept and, under, Identity, unification of the multiplicity of individuals as Brahman
In the later section, ‘Ethics and objectivity’ it will be argued that there are cases where it is necessary to act as though absolute knowledge (knowledge as though of an absolute object) obtains even when (absolute) justification is lacking but when, perhaps, the justification is (as far as known) at most contingent
Consider the immense consequences of the Theory of Being, of Identity, of the Cosmologies developed… In reflection, they felt as though they had encountered a New World. And even though this vision was bound in necessity, they could not (altogether) escape doubt. There was further doubt regarding their ability to apply this vision to the ambition: the realization of the ultimate in (from) the present. Doubt, they reflected has many manifestations. Among these is ‘essential doubt.’ Essential doubt is integral to (sentient) Being as part its being; its source is the essential indeterminism at the root of being. Pushed to an extreme in emotion it is neurotic doubt; to an extreme in an attempt to uncover unassailable principles it is rational, even radical doubt (which, too, may have a neurotic component if it becomes the attempt of a being to found itself in its discrete manifestation. If permanently disengaged from knowledge and its process, doubt becomes absurd.) Even essential doubt, however, is not static. It fluctuates and must fluctuate since realization is not constant; even apparent stasis is founded on equilibrium between non static elements. What is it then that can ‘justify’ Faith? Faith has some justification in Understanding but also in Morals. The individual believes (perhaps places hope) in some vision; that it has (possible) value is also a root ‘justification.’ This is no justification for any particular faith; the faith in question should have withstood criticism with regard to truth, feasibility and value before value is justification. However, as has been seen truth, feasibility and value are Ethical dimensions
Truth is correspondence but is also known (corroborated) by coherence
It is possible, now, to make assertions regarding the real. It is not possible to say anything about the real with confidence unless the sense of the real is given an explicit and appropriate meaning. The question ‘What is real?’ is really two questions, ‘What does it mean to be real?’ and ‘What things are real?’ Very often, the first question is suppressed and the question ‘What is real?’ is taken to be the question ‘What things real?’ However, the first question cannot be eliminated and therefore, if suppressed or ignored, it must surface, perhaps without full awareness, as a common-sense or default or paradigmatic position. Commonly, concrete or material objects e.g. a rock are regarded as real whereas there may be debate whether abstract objects such as Form, Number and Law are real. The often tacit and unstated (because paradigmatic) background to this more or less standard position is materialism: material objects are real and objects whose material status is in question are, likewise, questionably real (i.e. in materialism, abstract objects are not real.) The developments in the present narrative show that Matter is itself an indefinite concept and that the foundation of the real is not to be sought in matter. One possibility is that to exist and to be real are identical. Before the development of the Theory of being, this assertion does not make sense. That theory places Existing entities on a common plane. The confusions regarding what is real, what truly exists, regard questions of substance and lacking clear answers there would always be doubt regarding what is real. The Theory of being places concrete objects (those that seem to deserve the label ‘material’) and abstract objects e.g. Form, Number, pattern and law on a similar basis. From the Theory of being, i.e. from the properties of the void, both the concrete or particular and the abstract objects have power. Before the development of a common foundation to all (kinds of) object, all that it would be possible to say regarding existence is e.g. that a rock exists as matter, ‘2’ exists as number, the shape of the Milky Way exists as a spatial pattern and so on. I.e. the pre-foundational concept of existence must be existence-as. However, the Theory of being places all cases of existence-as (that have power) on the same plane. Every object exists since it has power as object; every existent (even if not familiar) is an object in that it has the ability to be known as an object (under the full conception of knowledge or knowability.) These thoughts show a way out of default positions regarding the real: what is real is what has power, what can be known. A single obstacle remains regarding the identification of existence and the real and that is the thought, noted earlier, that there are non existent objects. It may be recalled that, regarding the world as such the status of non existent objects lacks consequence; the non existent object is, perhaps, conceptually elegant but has no implication for being. (In the terms introduced earlier the non existent object exists as concept but not as entity. It is clear that there are potential confusions regarding the application of ‘exist’ that need only awareness of the application or reference to prevent actual confusion.) Therefore, excluding the non existent object, to be real is to exist i.e. to be an Object
It has been seen that being has infinite variety. It is now seen that that variety concerns both entities and kinds
This idea should either be a section or be discussed together with some other topic in Objects
The topic concerns the root of knowledge as e.g. semi-persistent relations among forms whose origin is not in correspondence per se but in durability
To Logic?
It has been seen that any event or object that harbors and entails no contradiction must occur or obtain. In the case of particular objects this is extensional necessity
Intensional necessity or logical necessity is extensional necessity over certain abstract objects. What objects? Start with examples. That the extensionally necessary must occur is logically necessary. That all red apples are red is logically necessary. Thus one object of logical necessity is the proposition whose truth is determined by its meaning
To where?
The different instances of an extensional necessity constitute an abstract object that may be regarded as a form. May the being of this (kind of) form be regarded as an intensional necessity? The abstract object however, like Aristotle’s substance, is not very interesting. A species, for example, is more interesting
The discussion here is tentative and illustrative of arbitrariness in what and how many ideas are central or fundamental. Five central concepts were identified in ‘Metaphysics: Theory of being.’ The issue is whether there any significance to the number of such concepts. The void is the absence of being and the universe is all being and so the number may be reduced to three: being, logic or logos or form, and the normal. If form and the normal are regarded as inherent in the object then there are two i.e. being and object. The thrust of the present section has been the identity of being and object. I.e. object is inherent in being. However, being –that which is– is so basic that it may be regarded equally as concept or given. Perhaps there are no fundamental concepts