Free will and determinism
Anil Mitra, © January 16, 2007. Modified October, 2007
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Early in January 2007, a coworker and friend asked me to ‘think about free will and determinism.’ He had read an article in which a number of scientists were arguing from recent experiments that humans do not possess ‘freedom of the will.’ That evening we discussed the nature and possibility of free will and determinism. The following words are an elaboration and improvement (with respect to range and precision) of the first reflections
Contents
Why ask questions about free will and determinism?
The system of Journey in Being
Logical status of the system of Journey in Being
Mind, consciousness and the unconscious
Science and the Philosophy of Mind
Is there Free Will? Is nature (all being, the universe) deterministic? Questions of free will and determinism are clearly related. However, are the questions of whether there is free will and whether determinism reigns the most interesting or important questions regarding free will and determinism? Or are they perhaps relatively easy to answer (and if so why do we get stuck on them) and should we not then get on to (what I think are) real issues of how much indeterminism, how much freedom of will is there, what are their natures, if there is indeterminism how can it be that form and structure arise, and what are the most reasonable and productive areas and ways in which (human) freedom can be nurtured…
What is free will? What is determinism? What is indeterminism? Being clear about these concepts is as important as good arguments. What is the relation between free will and determinism and indeterminism?
What is determinism? The universe is deterministic if its entire past and future depends only on its state at some specific time e.g. the present. Is determinism different from ‘what will be will be?’ Yes and the difference is that under determinism, if from some initial state the universe had a certain history then, if it were returned to the same state, the history would be exactly the same as the earlier one. In other words, determinism is ‘what will be will be and is determined by what is.’ Obviously, there are questions. If the universe never returns to the same state, what would it mean to return it to the initial state? If the universe does return to the same state and is deterministic, does that mean that the universe must cycle through the same history over and over? It turns out, as shown in the long essay, Journey in Being, that such questions are not particularly interesting. There are, it is well known, difficulties in the concept of determinism that not obvious from the definition just given. Given a set of determinate objects as in classical science (mechanics) there are laws that determine definite trajectories. What, however, if actual objects are not as determinate as in the theoretical formulations? E.g. what if time and space are not as finely divisible as imagined in classical theory? I.e. to what extent is determinism a property of laws (that are perhaps at most conceptual and quantitative approximations to nature) and to what extent a property of nature itself… Determinism implies that future states are precisely determined by the present. Since there is one universe, this implies that some states are accessed and that others, though logically possible, are not accessed. Even in indeterminism, however, some states may be non-accessed. Since there is one universe, there is precisely one set of accessed states that is the complement of the set of non-accessed states (and the union of these two sets is the set of logically possible states. Perhaps determinism may be defined without regard to time. In that case, what would be the distinction between the set or kind of set of accessed states in determinism and in indeterminism?
What is free will? Individuals have free will if, in a given state, they can choose from among alternative actions (and consequently have some effect on the future.) It is not implied that the individual can choose any conceivable action, that choosing and following through on an action is easy, that an individual can affect the future in any way he or she might prefer. Thus one liberal picture of the free individual as capable of exercising unbounded choice with ease is ruled out: moral choice is often inherently difficult. Free will is especially significant when the individual (or group) has the ability to conceive and nurture alternative futures and to actions that are conducive to chosen alternatives. Note that the definition of free will rules out (at least Hume’s version of) compatibilism which is the idea that free will and determinism are compatible (this is discussed below)
What is at stake in asking these questions? There are possibly various moral and social implications. There are implications for human freedom. The compatibilist however argues for free will despite determinism and, if the arguments are valid, the negative moral, social and existential implications do not follow from determinism
There are some superficial psychological motives
The scientists seem to be arguing against free will – see, for example, Ed Stoffel: Scientists Consider Free-Will and American Scientist Online - Free Will and Free Won't. At least many scientists argue against free will in human nature and against indeterminism in nature itself. They cite experiments showing that in simple actions, neurological control occurs in unconscious centers and not in conscious ones; that consciousness later catches up with what had already been managed unconsciously. There are a number of problems with such arguments. First, the claims may be true in what are routinized activities. However, if I decide to undertake a routinized activity at 4 PM tomorrow, a conscious part of the mind is involved. Perhaps there is an unconscious component but there is also a conscious one. In fact it seems reasonable to think that what is implicated in most activities is an interaction between the conscious and the unconscious with one or other dominating according to kind of activity. It is reasonable to think that the seat of mental causation tends to the conscious, primarily in non-routine affairs. A second problem is that whereas we often think of the unconscious as being deterministic this is not necessarily the case. Perhaps some aspects of choice arise from indeterministic activity in the unconscious in interaction with the conscious (this idea is developed in Journey in Being.) A third problem, mentioned again later, is that since determinism is infinitely more specific than indeterminism, proof of determinism cannot occur by example but must be proof in principle
Two to three hundred years of deterministic science is on the scientist’s and other determinist’s sides – from Newton, excepting perhaps Darwin, on to Einstein, to the other great division in biology –functional biology– to Freud. The tradition of determinism within philosophy is even longer and dates back to Aristotle’s substance theories, perhaps to Plato and earlier, and on up to substance theories today (substance theories contain an implicit determinism –I have not seen this point mentioned elsewhere– that may have something to do with their appeal: explaining variety mechanistically from simplicity but also with their inadequacy for substance theory is determinism in disguise and therefore cannot truly explain novelty or variety or complexity.) Perhaps Aristotle’s thoughts on biology form an exception (I should perhaps investigate his four causes and reflections on biology.) The scientists apparently are saying that the average man or woman has a psychological motive to believe in free will – ‘of course I have choice’ is what the common individual is supposed to think. However, the scientist may also have a psychological motive for his or her belief. First, there is the long tradition of determinism within science whose mature theories were deterministic for roughly 300 years while the advent of indeterminism occurred only in about 1900 with Planck’s the introduction of the quantum, formalized in the work of Heisenberg and Schrödinger c. 1925 and finalized c. 1928 with Max Born’s probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. (Debate regarding probability and indeterminism in quantum theory goes on but it seems fairly clear that quantum theory is indeterministic in principle permits deterministic like structures and this is interesting because it goes against the ‘randomness does not permit structure’ argument of the determinists that is often cited against indeterminism and is a particular form of my general argument that absolute indeterminism not only permits but actually necessitates structure.) So, then, the scientist is traditionally a determinist. Also, and this kind of thinking, is fairly common among academics, there is the self-serving thought that the professional gets to instruct the common person. Not only is the scientist the knight, she or he instructs the serfs… and there is an added bonus the knight is able to instruct the priest (philosopher) as well. I’m not arguing that this is a huge deal but only that whatever your argument, you might have a hidden psychological agenda so let’s get over it and focus on the arguments
A theological reason to argue determinism is the belief in the omnipotence and omniscience of God. A theological reason to argue for free will is existence, according to doctrine, of human choice in good and evil
Also at issue is the fundamental nature of the universe –of being: is it a machine or are there truly unique or novel events– and of how we perceive it – whether there is freedom to create understanding. The nature of being and the nature of understanding and perception are of course interwoven
Perhaps the first lessons the infant learns are that there are determinate things, deterministic behaviors. Not all is formlessness and unpredictability. Determinism is the first lesson perhaps
It is also the first lesson of science. Laplace said that given the positions of all the particles of the universe and their initial motions, the rest is calculation (rephrase; note that his observation grounded in the system Newton’s Principia)
The opposite, freedom of choice, freedom of will, freedom of action, freedom to create – knowledge, life, being… is perhaps a stage beyond the first. The two fundamental categories determinism and indeterminism are in tension
Confusing these motives is the thought that only determinism can give us form. That indeterminism contains randomness out of which form never comes. That conclusion is false. Evolutionary biology and quantum theory show the way. Given indeterministic variations (indeterministic means that what results from the variation was not in any sense determined by the initial state,) those that are near symmetric and relatively stable and therefore relatively durable are the ones that come to populate a formed cosmos. The thought can be raised to a general principle
‘What will happen will happen’ is sometimes seen as determinism. It is not for while it is true that ‘what will happen will happen,’ this is different from ‘what will happen is given.’ The ‘what will happen will happen’ argument that is sometimes given for determinism is, therefore, invalid
Compatibilism is interesting (apart from ‘academic’ interest) only if one is wedded to both determinism and free will. I think it’s bogus because its motivation is unfounded and its argument false
Let’s remember that a proof of determinism carries a far greater burden than a proof of free will. To prove free will all that has to be shown is some instances of free will (existential issue.) To prove determinism what has to be shown is that there are no instances of indeterminism (universal issue)
Argument for determinism. So and so domains have been shown to be deterministic. This is not a valid argument. Science is deterministic. Again, invalid. Only some theories of science are deterministic. Quantum mechanics is not. Evolutionary biology may seem to be silent on determinism but if true novelty does indeed arise in evolution then evolutionary theory must be either explicitly or implicitly indeterministic. In the implicit case the indeterminism is or may be hidden from view and thus the opportunistic but not necessarily logical debater may cash in on an apparent determinism. Freud and various psychoanalysts have argued for determinism in affairs of the psyche. Again, they have shown at most, determinism in this or that aspect of psyche but not all aspects of psyche. Surely, one would not argue that free will is to be equated, as certain liberal thinkers have argued, to freedom to do just anything one desires. Free will is completely compatible with the idea that significant choice is difficult to realize in the first place, difficult to create in concept and difficult to implement in fact. Therefore, regardless of what the master may have argued, Freudian psychodynamics and the existence and expression of human free will are not at all incompatible
Argument for indeterminism. Novelty is real. Determinism is the absence of essential novelty
Argument against indeterminism. The above argument for determinism; this has been seen to be invalid. Indeterminism cannot result in structure. This has been seen to be invalid.
The argument for indeterminism is a knockdown argument if you accept (1) There is novelty and (2) Novelty is incompatible with determinism. The argument is eminently reasonable because determinism is equivalent or identical to the idea that there is nothing essentially new
Well perhaps there is a way for determinism and novelty to be compatible. But compatibilism seems to amount to the thought that if things were different, outcomes would be different: if one were in a different state, one could choose differently. Well that is not really saying anything. It is apparently a façade, and not a very good one, and especially not one that meets the standards of sublimity that are ascribed to Hume. It is a façade for an attempt to reconcile the sense of freedom of will and determinism in a time when there was every scientific (at least) reason to believe in determinism. In modern times, compatibilism remains of interest to anyone who believes or wants to believe in determinism but it is otherwise not even very interesting as an academic argument because there is nothing deep or perceptive about it and its content amounts to nothing (a contentless argument that were perceptive would be academically interesting)
It seems then that the argument from novelty should be accepted. However, it does depend on novelty which is a given though not a necessary given. Further, the argument gives us no clue as to the extent to which indeterminism pervades. Is there any possible necessary argument for indeterminism? And is there a way to determine the extent of indeterminism’s reign? In absolute indeterminism these two questions have an answer
Let’s remember that a proof of some domains (or sub-domains such as classical mechanics within physics, that there are of necessity deterministic-like mechanisms and sub-domains, perhaps even extensive, within psyche) is not a proof of determinism
It might appear that while indeterminism is relatively easy to demonstrate (should it hold) that absolute indeterminism, that there are no unaccessed and no inaccessible states (except for contradictions i.e. violations of logic and note here that something is being said about logic rather than thinking that the classical logics or the logics of the text books need to be imported to weigh in,) … that absolute determinism since it is a universal claim would be hard to demonstrate. It would indeed be hard if the method of demonstration were to be case by case
The logic of how indeterminism gives rise to novelty and determinism cannot give rise to true novelty; of how determinism lies within indeterminism – indeterminism gives rise to form and therefore, occasional pockets of determinism like behavior has been given. That is, if you accept novelty, you reject determinism; further, indeterminism is not subject to the common objections of formlessness
Argument for absolute indeterminism. The argument is from the existence and nature of the void. See Journey in Being where the steps in the logic are (1) nature of being and existence and nature of the void (contains not only no thing but also no pattern, form, or law…) (2) existence of the void, (3) if some state whose description contained and entailed no contradiction were to be inaccessible and unaccessed (relative to the entire universe it is shown that unaccessed and inaccessibility are identical; they are not similarly identical when restriction is made to a specific cosmological system such as ours) that would constitute a law of the void and therefore there are no inaccessible states which is the definition of absolute indeterminism and the proof just is one aspect of building up the significance of the concept of absolute indeterminism. As seen above, absolute indeterminism necessarily requires the origin of form although not necessarily in every essay into being. And even if the aborted forays into being are infinitely more frequent, it is in the nature of form to have greater duration, perhaps even infinitely greater duration (figuratively) and so there is a balance. But this balance is not important for when sentient form arises, the fact of infinitely many transient sub-forms has no existential significance to being even though it has a quantitative significance – it is from among the many unstable ‘experiments’ that the few durable ones are selected
Absolute indeterminism of course implies the existence of formed cosmological systems such as ours. But it also implies, in principle, a huge degree of freedom. It implies that creativity is infinite. How is this compatible with what we know about human nature? There is no actual compatibility. Except for logical contradictions (true impossibility) what is classically thought to be impossible (based on understanding / intuition) is replaced in the Theory based in absolute indeterminism by improbability – improbability of a colossal magnitude so much so much so that, in common experience, there is no distinction between ‘normal’ behavior and the behaviors allowed by absolute indeterminism
This ties in to:
One of the ideas behind Journey in Being (regardless of its name) is that building up a complete picture based on the new ideas requires a Journey in understanding – first through classical science and philosophy and then rebuilding a picture of the world that does not violate the essentials of the common picture but allows them in their domain whereas outside the domain the universe is vastly more varied. Implication: isolated discussion of topics such as free will and determinism will invariably have limitation due to not being developed in coherence with a complete picture (a limitation of the multiple contributor approach to the encyclopedia, especially the philosophical encyclopedia – when all the experts have analyzed everything that has been written about every topic, the system is still deficient and this applies not only to actual encyclopedias but to the encyclopedic character of our entire system)
As a taste of the picture observe the following quote or rephrase: the universe is more varied than all our myth, all our stories, all accounts of fact, poetry and fiction
Another taste. The void is the ultimate substance. The existence of the void and absolute indeterminism are equivalent. But to call the void a substance is stretching the real concept of substance (deterministic, uniform and unchanging) for the void ‘is’ absolute indeterminism. Therefore, though I have toyed with calling the void the ultimate substance I do not do that
It may be noted that the system of the Journey in Being is so broad and so deep that there is probably going to be some tie in with just about any discussion of a conceptual nature except the most specialized
Although the inspiration for the system is manifold, I have made the following claims that are pertinent to the character of the logical status, pertinent to any specialized study and therefore to a more complete treatment of free will and determinism i.e. to not merely being literally complete but to having confidence that the treatment is in principle complete
1. Regarding the general metaphysics, logic, cosmology and ethics, the claim is that these are founded in ‘absolute logic.’ How can that be if logic is derivation from premises to conclusions? It is possible because there are some empirical necessities of a general nature (often and usually overlooked) and because at the level of the metaphysics the system itself is general. What are these empirical necessities? Here are some (an improved list since I earlier claimed only the first one):
There is being
There is distinction or variety
There is the world i.e. universe or all being
There is sentience
There is intuition
The list continues but I am not certain about the status of the following
There is perception (question this) and perception is free vs. bound (the distinction between free and bound appears to depend on who or what is the individual)
It is tempting to say there is language but we have seen that the concept of ‘there is language’ is an extreme reification of a vague phenomenon that appears to have precise distinction in human perception as a result of the specialization of certain features of intuition
There are Kantian objects (question this)
There appears to be ‘self’ and ‘other’ one of whose distinctions is degree of shared perception i.e. roughly inner vs. outer (question ‘appears;’ question the replacement of ‘appears to be’ by ‘are’)
2. Regarding the more specific applications that lie at the intersection of the general theory and some specific topic (e.g. human being, human psyche…,) since the general theory is founded in logic, the necessity of the development depends on the necessity of the content of the specific topic. However the necessity of the special topic is not merely “as I found it” but as it became transformed by individual analysis and by insights from interaction with other topics also in their finished form which include the general system
The discussion of free will and determinism lies at such an intersection. Determinism is an issue at the highest level of generality regarding ‘what exists.’ Free will concerns sentient being and is relatively specialized. While it is argued that indeterminism is necessary regarding being as a whole, can it be argued that free will is necessary (and not just a contingent fact) regarding a class of sentient beings that include human being? The discussion of ‘originality’ in Journey in Being makes universal claims regarding mind and I should review it to see what of that or similar argument may be applied to free will. These are some of the co-implications of the present discussion and the relevant sections of Journey in Being
Another issue that has not been raised so far concerns the nature of consciousness, the nature of the unconscious and their relation. A naïve picture might be one in which consciousness is a relatively specialized, localized, and rather singular phenomenon while the unconscious is vast and extends in depth and breadth starting from the root of the conscious and extending through the entire mind, through the body and the entire material world. In this picture, consciousness is singular, the unconscious is ubiquitous; consciousness is peculiar, the unconscious is the stuff of all being; consciousness may be ineffectual, the unconscious is the seat of all cause. The odd thing about all this why consciousness arises or might arise at all. One might be tempted to suggest that there is a God after all who, in his or her kindness or wickedness gave animals feeling and consciousness. A half answer to this issue has been given by naturalists and philosophers who suggest that consciousness arises in evolution because, by its ability to focus on the needs of survival, confers an advantage. It is a ‘half’ answer in many respects
First though not most important, the advantage is not only a result of an ability to focus. Consciousness goes together with freedom of focus and thought and thus an ability to create conditions of advantage – not merely an ability to adapt to the conditions. But this thought is not at all the most significant because it does not address the nature of consciousness but only some of its results. The nature of consciousness is the acute sense that we all have – the qualities of things, their colors, the meanings of words but not just meaning but the sense or inner quality of meaning. The question regarding the ‘origin’ of the acute quality of consciousness is a key to resolution of the issue
A detailed answer is found in the sections on Mind and Human being of Journey in Being, where (and I hope I am not guilty of mere hubris,) consciousness and feeling are conceived not as singular, as distinct from the (unconscious) ‘material substrate’ but as continuous with it. The reader may refer to the above link for a discussion (proof) of the necessity of the argument. The argument, elaborated and demonstrated in that document, is that consciousness and feeling are not singular or different in their essential nature. Rather, feeling is universal but not in the least bit of a kind that we as feeling beings would recognize. It is not said that an electron feels as you or I do; rather the meaning of feeling is extended with logical necessity (as shown) to the root of being. The argument is developed and the outcome is that consciousness is the built up, elaborated, concentrated and focal manifestation of root ‘feeling.’ Here of course various counter-criticisms may arise ‘panpsychism raising its ugly head’ and so on and the criticisms are addressed in Journey in Being. Therefore, consciousness is not singular; and it is not separate but continuous with the unconscious elements of mind and it is not just an empirical mistake to suggest that behavior is determined in the unconscious but it is also a logical error. The reconceptualization makes it possible to see how the functioning of mind is a ‘conversation’ between conscious and the unconscious and how both play essential roles (conscious deliberation, the unconscious immersion in the immediate of rest and danger…) how these roles become necessary. And, the reconceptualization goes beyond this and suggests (actual the suggestion is shown with necessity) that via the relation or pathway conscious processing ® the unconscious, a continuation with the so-called (the idea of the material is also shown up in it somewhat limited character) material substrate: the unconscious ® ground of being (universe.) Again these thoughts begin as speculations but their necessary character is shown in Journey in Being. A very brief outline of the logic follows
Note: the contents of this section are incorporated to Journey in Being-New World II
‘Presence to’ (i.e. being present to world which includes being or organism) is the essence of mind which, in animal being, is feeling
In animal and human being, mind is the elaboration and focusing of feeling
FEELING is whatever it is at ground zero that results in e.g. animal feeling. I.e. FEELING and feeling are different concepts. Feeling is a case of FEELING; FEELING is the extension of feeling to the root of being. It may be thought that due to the pervasion of absolute indeterminism, the origin of feeling may have origin later than the root; however, also, as a result of absolute indeterminism, feeling that may have had later origin will find its way to the root. In the normal case, normal feeling should have origin in the normal root. (For the concepts of the normal and of absolute indeterminism, see Journey in Being; note, however, that the most recent concept of absolute indeterminism –that the only inaccessible and unaccessed states are those that are logically impermissible– may be not yet written in that document)
To deny this is to be ever condemned to paradox e.g. the mind-body problem; to accept it is grounding, entails no contradiction, paradox or absurdity e.g. of panpsychism
It may be remembered that paradox is disagreement among (what should be tentative) propositions or positions held as true. The world as such contains no paradox
Consciousness is not opposite to but continuous with the unconscious i.e. the conscious is acute, focused while the unconscious is diffuse; the two are in constant communication with varying degrees of relative intensity (e.g. reflection vs. alert)
The following are in error: (1) any equation of the unconscious (at whatever level i.e. even at the root or ground of being) with inertness or with an absence of ‘presence to,’ (2) any equation of the unconscious with the caricature of matter as ‘dumb’ i.e. with taking the standard conceptualization of matter as its essential characterization
Relative to animal mind the conscious vs. unconscious distinction is appropriate. Relative to an understanding of the entire range of being, the term ‘the unconscious’ is unfortunate i.e. it has erroneous connotations
It seems that science is often used in making premature conclusions about human nature and about mind generally. Another, related, where such conclusions occur is in the literature on consciousness. In the early twentieth century under the sway of behaviorism, it became possible to think that human individuals had no inner experience. Of course, there were varying shades of behaviorism and it was only the extreme version of logical behaviorism that banned mind to non-existence. Logical (analytical) behaviorism is the claim that mental terms or concepts are words or ideas for behaviors, groups of behaviors or behavioral dispositions. Methodological behaviorism is roughly the claim that while mental states and categories may exist, given the public character of science, they are not fit objects of scientific study. Such attitudes came to dominate academic psychology and to influence academic philosophy. (A third kind called psychological behaviorism, is a program of study within psychology that “…purports to explain human and animal behavior in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, learning histories, and (for certain types of behavior) reinforcements. Psychological behaviorism is present in the work of Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), as well as Watson. Its fullest and most influential expression is B. F. Skinner's (1904-90) work on schedules of reinforcement.” Quoted from Behaviorism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy))
Study of consciousness became unacceptable in academic psychology and philosophy. Clearly, while some versions of behaviorism made the study unacceptable, others asserted that there is no such thing as consciousness or conscious experience. It was only in the last thirty years or so of the twentieth century that the multi-disciplinary study of consciousness became acceptable and even fashionable
However, there are writers, even in the recent literature, who explicitly or implicitly deny the existence of conscious mental states. The para-arguments are familiar ‘The lay person believes he or she is having conscious experiences because he or she is used to or wants to so believe.’ (Certainly, not all writers hold such beliefs and there are also many who have a firm and argued belief in the existence of conscious states)
My thoughts on such issues are detailed in Journey in Being and earlier in Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. In these articles, my approach has been to first conceptualize consciousness (in its larger contexts of mind, individual and world) and to then analyze the claims regarding the existence of conscious states and the nature of what may be called non-conscious awareness. The analysis reveals a variety of confusions in the literature that have their root in premature conceptualizations
How do researchers come to deny free will, consciousness, and mental events? Earlier, some psychological motives (perhaps unconscious) were identified. Additional motives, now revealed, include the intent to be scientific. (However, as John Searle has argued in The Rediscovery of the Mind, 1992, the argument that mental states are not a fit subject for scientific study rests on a confusion. The confusion is that whereas the content of mental states may have a private character, that character does not imply that the existence of such states is non-objective. This point does not end discussion and the reader may continue his or her reflections with or without referring to the literature)
The logical point that makes researchers make extravagant non-existence claims is the inadequate attention to the conceptual nature of the entities under study, to their variety of manifestations, and to consequently premature claims regarding nature and existence
The discussion may now be taken to a second level where it might be argued that if mental categories are conceptual, does this not at least register a doubt regarding their existence? The conclusion, for which I must refer the reader to Journey in Being and continuing developments http://www.horizons-2000.org/, is that whereas the conceptual character of mental entities is positive in that it allows freedom of discovery, it does not entail that mind and mental categories do not exist or that they are ethereal or non-particular or merely abstract (or abstract at all)
Where does this leave us? First, the practical conclusion that it is a mistake to conceptualize the conscious-unconscious spectrum as discrete and categorial; which conclusion stands contrary to the spectrum as discrete view that leads to erroneous thinking regarding the relation between consciousness and causation. Second, the common error, that the ‘material level’ analysis of ‘higher level’ ideas such as consciousness may assume that the higher level is already understood and all that is needed is the careful description of the material level. It is probably a part of the normal categorial intuition to think in such terms and ‘lay’ persons, philosophers and scientists are subject to the sway of this erroneous but natural way (which serves well in the day-to-day.) Nonetheless, the error is profound and in the hands of the scientists has been recently finding yet another path to undermine the concept of freedom
This undermining may not be intentional but may represent an entrapment in a system of immature conceptual categories. Such entrapment is itself a falling short of the correct degree of freedom of thought and may, perhaps, be seen as a reaction to the liberal excess in the estimation of the nature and degree of human freedom