It may inform people in such a way that they accept apocalypse—even evil—so as to have strength to bear, even overcome—or, if there is no guarantee of overcoming, to try to overcome or to be in a process of overcoming

On the meaning of agnosticism

Even if ‘perfection’ is real, it is a process in which agnosticism is a key

If perfection is unattainable, the conclusion must be even truer… but, in fact it is irrelevant

What then of Christianity or other faith?

Faith must be ever refreshed

And science?

It, too, requires and is nourished by ever-refreshment

Realization

Interestingly, perhaps strangely, Journey in Being develops a place beyond all limited depth where science and religion meet in literal truth. The meaning-metaphorical truth of (finite) being(s) may be explored and unfolds (may be seen as unfolding) (with) in this framework

That underlies and contains all contingent truth and essence—mind, matter, process, substance and method—as glimpsed in Vedanta, Leibniz, Hume, Wittgenstein and recently by J. A. Wheeler

Bhagavad-Gita

Whitehead

And in the concept of Logos from Greek and Scholastic thought

Material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html

Faith

The focus in this chapter is Faith, religion and related topics

Faith, religion, spirituality

Spirituality and meaning

A distinction is often made today—spirituality is an individual’s way to a higher truth. What higher truth? That depends on the individual’s view of the world. On the secular view, the higher truth centers around those objects and activities that give life meaning. On a more ‘religious’ view there may be a mundane world—this world of matter and flesh—and a sacred world; for a person with this view, the meaning of spirituality is not changed—it is the search for meaning—but the place or locus of search is thought to be different

Meaning in the domains of the mundane and the sacred

It seems that over the ages there are some individuals who have greater penetration or insight into ‘meaning.’ Maintaining a sense of meaning is not a one time act but may require renewal. Truth is not always easy. The burdens and joys of the mundane beckon. We humans are social; there is a place for shared spirituality. These thoughts are occasions for organized religion

Religion and spirituality. The place of religion

There are criticisms of organized religion: their systems of belief are outmoded, there is decay, there are abuses. These kinds of criticism apply to most institutions. Science and democracy are subject to misuse. The logic of metaphysics of immanence shows that there is an occasion for religion. Perhaps because of its associations, the word ‘religion’ is outmoded; the idea is not. What form might ‘religion’ take? The abuses of institutions show, first, that any institution tends to be self-perpetuating and, second, that self-perpetuation is a door to decay and abuse. A balance between institution and renewal is good. But it is not paradoxical that the mix of institution and renewal is difficult. There are no guarantees. For meaning individual needs to be self-engaged. The name and form of any new or transformed religion remains open

Spirituality, religion and the one world

It has become characteristic of Western thought that there are two truths: the truth of the mundane world, e.g. the truth of science, and the truth of religion—of the world of the sacred

It is not that there are no distinctions but a insight of some ‘visionaries’ is that the distinction between the mundane and the sacred is more one of knowledge than of fact

Religion is practiced in the church, science in the university

However, if religion has truth, and if we are navigators in one corner of the universe, we cannot know that the two truths are distinct

Metaphysics of immanence shows: there is one truth, one world

Faith and religion

A connotation of faith is religious faith. It seems to be typical of religious faith that one is called upon to believe something that even to a child might seem absurd. Metaphysics of immanence shows that while, with the exception of logical contradiction, the articles of faith, e.g. the miraculous, are not absolutely absurd. However, at the same time, no support is given by metaphysics of immanence to belief in past miracles or to the expectation of or dependence on the occurrence of miracles

Hume on miracles

A simple but often misunderstood argument was given by the Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume first argued against the necessity of science; included in his target was the necessity of causation. His argument was that scientific law is the conclusion of patterns of behavior from a finite number of observations—which allows for the possibility of exceptions; and, now, some two hundred plus years since Hume’s time, the replacement of old laws required by new observations has itself become a law. Some commentators have interpreted Hume’s insistence that the fact that scientific law allows for exception justifies belief in the expectation of miracles. Hume himself argued that there is no such justification. His argument amounts to an admission of the possibility of miracles but that since any miracle would be an unlikely exception to regular behavior to expect miracles or to base behavior on such expectation is unreasonable

A problem with Hume’s critique of intuition

There is a problem with the approach of Hume and his critics. The world was not constructed of a sequence of observations. When we perceive in terms of space and time, we are perceiving in terms of the ‘woof and warp’ of the world that is built by over geologic time into intuition (even though the categories of space and time may be approximate it remains true that they are deep.) The foregoing thought occupies a central place in the philosophy of Kant… and it becomes clear that although Hume perceived himself as criticizing the necessity of scientific thought he was in fact undermining intuition. Science adds to but never entirely outgrows intuition (the same is true of metaphysics of immanence which has some basis in the necessary objects of experience which are objects of intuition that have a necessary character and in which they are unlike space, time and causation which are objects of intuition but not necessary-as-in-intuition)

The implication is that we are centered in the world because we are of the world; the place of science is that it starts with our intuition and moves outward from there. Wonder is a part of the intuition. Science itself reveals what from a previous perspective would be seen as miraculous: the bending of space and time, the transmutation of the elements in nuclear reactions… Whether there are miracles depends on what counts as a miracle; we may expect the miraculous, that is part of wonder, but, obviously, we cannot depend on them. Even that statement has exceptions: consider some extreme crisis where belief may help action…

Another meaning of faith

Metaphysics of immanence shows that the variety of the world is immense in comparison with known variety; that the variety is essentially unending; that we are part of the variety; and, through, identity and its transformations, the ‘individual’ experiences all variety (the final thought is best understood from the global perspective)

Faith, which includes animal faith, is the combination of intuition, feeling, and cognition that is conducive to the greatest life

Significance of faith

One characteristic of ‘journey’ as conceived here is that aims or goals may arise and change in response to events, intuition and discovery and that aims are not invariably followed—times of aimlessness, times of enjoyment in aimlessness, and times of intuition may occur in relation to a journey and any of its aims

A journey overlaps life—is not thought of as an activity that is distinct from life

Knowledge—certain or otherwise—may be an aim but is not the aim. Knowledge is one means but not the only means

Uncertainty

Given a situation, a place in a journey where or when action should require basis in uncertain knowledge a question arises—what is the appropriate attitude to uncertain knowledge when it is an instrument? One appropriate attitude is, of course, doubt. There may, however, be times when belief, assumption or faith are appropriate. In saying this it is not implied that if faith is adopted, faith must remain evermore. Sequential or superimposed faith and doubt may be appropriate. Reliance on intuition may be appropriate at times and the ‘criteria’ for attitude to be adopted may also be formal and certain or based in faith and intuition and be uncertain

Occasion for faith is immanent in the mundane

It may be thought that, except in religion, occasions for faith are uncommon. It is a fact, however, that, from strict standards of certainty, so much of common knowledge is uncertain that a common attitude to such knowledge of taking it to be the case must be described as an attitude of faith. It is quite the norm for the members of a society to take its culture as given—even though from the perspective of another society that culture contains obvious error or from the perspective of the same society over time its culture is changing. And, while some apparent ‘error’ and change may be due to factors of cultural relativism, others are clearly objective. How can that be said? A clear example concerns scientific revolutions. While some thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn might not have described quantum mechanics as showing error in the classical theory that attitude may be seen as mistaken or, to allow some equivocation, having a mistaken quality. That there is some objective knowledge would admitted by anyone who claims that there is no objective knowledge in science. To dispute anything—even objectivity—is to assert (some kind of) objectivity. The claim here, is not that there is no error in quantum theory but that it eliminates an entire domain of error but contains no error not contained in the classical theory—further this is known by direct and not merely by pragmatic means (of course, experiment and reasons do not lie outside the domain of what is pragmatic and, of course, the statement made suppresses a variety of subtleties that may give it some doubt)

Science, mathematics and faith

While mathematics is often thought to be the most certain of the sciences—see Objects and Logic and Meaning on the question of whether mathematics is a science—the heart of mathematics, especially for non-finite systems, contains the possibility of paradox. To eliminate all mathematics that may harbor paradox is to eliminate rich and fertile areas of thought. Some mathematicians and some traditional views on the nature avoid such areas of mathematics while, perhaps more commonly, other mathematicians prefer to allow work in areas of potential paradox. Precisely what is the attitude of the mathematicians to in the conduct of mathematical thought? It is clear that on some occasions that include fertile development and in some sense, faith is present—even if its presence is only implicit

Reflection on the role of faith in a life, in a journey

Although the reflection includes reflection on the deployment of faith it also underscores that faith is immanent. We construct a view of the world in which we are the implicit author of its depth and dimension; in this view, the denial of faith is consequent upon the denial of ignorance. Openness to ignorance, is the therapeutic openness to faith-as-real. When we experience being in the world as being without guarantee we are most alive. (To forego all guarantee would likely also be a not-alive-ness in the fracture of a psyche. Even this case is not so clear for the process of growth is enhanced by allowing fracture and then reintegration)

Doubt-faith

A journey in or into being cannot invariably have certainty. It must therefore have the characteristics of doubt and of faith—superposed and in sequence that may be called doubt-faith. The core ideas of the Metaphysics of this narrative went through a long period of intuitive development regarding even the fundamental principle was characterized by doubt-faith in its application to the local world before emergence of its certain and universal form. The period of doubt-faith appears to have been essential even though, perhaps, a sufficiently great intellect may have proceeded directly with pure rationality—even such an intellect, however, should, it would seem, have required binding of intellect and feeling as shown in Human being. It also appears that a continuation of the present journey into phases of transformation and further discovery shall require or profit from doubt-faith—at least as a phase

Goal-aimlessness and doubt-faith in action. The example of the theory of objects

To have a goal or ambition, especially a driving one, and yet to ‘allow’ life and times of enjoyment in—at least partial—aimlessness is a kind of faith. It is a very simple faith—being-in-the world is ‘enough.’ An example of—not intended at all—productivity of this simple faith occurs in the development of the theory of objects recounted in Objects. The subject of Objects is important in the history of thought but was not felt to be especially significant to the journey. Still, reflection on objects was interesting—especially the distinction of the particular—concrete—and the abstract. What is an abstract object?

Living with doubt-faith. The example of the theory of objects—continued

Is this the appropriate place for this discussion. Should the discussion be merged with and replaced here by a reference to Objects?

Surely, if there are abstract objects, the cosmology could not be considered complete without their inclusion. Yet, if the status of abstract objects is not transparent, the cosmology could not be considered complete with inclusion. There followed experiments with many conceptions of the abstract object till, finally, inspired by the deepening understanding of Metaphysics, especially that any consistent concept has an object, it was realized that there is no metaphysical—real—distinction between the abstract and the particular or concrete. ‘Things’ studied from the object side are regarded as particular or concrete; those things, whole or partial, studied from the concept side are abstract; studies such as ‘theoretical’ physics straddle the particular and the abstract. That the distinction is absolute is based in a conflation of approach to study with metaphysical kind

Of course, there may be practical distinctions: a rock is the object of the idea of ‘a rock’ and the rock may be touched and seen; what and where is the object of the number ‘1’ and can that object be touched or seen? There are of course many ways that ‘1’ can correspond to an object and one is that ‘1’ refers to all unary collections—the collection of unary collections. In this sense ‘1’ the concept is either an idea or a symbol that is part of a symbolic system and ‘1’ the object is the collection just mentioned. From this vantage point the theory of numbers could be studied empirically; however, a much more powerful mathematical system emerges if the empirical study—from the object side—is jettisoned soon after its establishment and the study is continued from the concept side—in symbolic terms. Where is the object ‘1’? The question is not particularly relevant or interesting but, if you wish, talking from the object side some answer such as ‘everywhere’ or ‘no-particular-where’ may be given. It is crucial, however, that a source—if not the source—of paradox is lack of reference. It does not follow, though, that paradox is best eliminated by reintroducing reference although it may be so eliminated by reference or by surrogate reference i.e. reference to a transparent model

From this outcome of a rather serendipitous and even artificial engagement with the theory of objects, there emerged at once a definite and final understanding of the abstract and the particular or concrete—‘final’ because of the basis in the ultimate metaphysics. At once there was—further and essential—illumination of the object itself, of mathematics and science, of logic and paradox, of knowledge—an illumination that remains, still, on the periphery of a journey

Aims of this chapter

The discussion leading up to the aims has been a little circuitous

1. To examine a concept of faith appropriate to the journey

2. To study faith and religion in general—though briefly. The approach in this study shall follow the fertile template already established: interactive study of necessary truth—especially from Theory of being—and a restricted context—traditional religion and faith and their possibilities

3. To reflect on the place of religion in the modern world and on the possibilities of religion

Further discussion of meanings of faith

Faith as an attitude toward the world

The discussion above reveals a core concept of faith: faith is that attitude toward being-in-the-world that is most productive of being. A variety of terms may be substituted for the final occurrence of ‘being’ in the previous sentence—being-in-the-moment, action, knowledge, ends… These provide application of the concept of faith. Knowledge emphasizes faithfulness to the object; trustworthiness requires faithfulness to persons; commitment requires faithfulness to ends (given the first meaning of ‘faith’ these applications are of course metaphorical)

Religious faith. Not all religions demand ‘faith’

A second connotation of ‘faith’ is that of religious faith. It is not true that all religions require faith; Buddhism, in its original form, focuses on a theme of what is important in life, on a way to achieve that end and, to that end, rejects any importance of metaphysics or religious faith. In Christianity, faith and reason have distinct and conflicted roles—and the theological and psychological roles of faith appear to be distinct; in terms of its own system or metaphysics faith has a distinctive role. Its theological role or aim stems from the conflict that arises when a metaphysical system is upheld that in day-to-day life would—at least—stretch credulity. The psychological role includes the theological intent to resolve conflict but this may be seen as preliminary to the main psychological role—that of regarding the metaphysical system surrounding the biblical Jesus as transcendent truth

Although the two connotations of ‘faith’ have clear connection—else they would be distinct denotations i.e. distinct words with the same sign—the religious connotation is an extreme version of the core meaning of this discussion

The significance of religions faith in hunter-gatherer societies

The significance of religious faith receives illumination from comparison of the beliefs of hunter-gatherer with those of agricultural societies. The hunter-gatherers have been thought of as nomadic because they may have a pattern—typically annual—of following migrating animals, other resources, kinder climatic environments during the harsher seasons and so on. Agriculture made it possible to live in one place. However, as pointed out e.g. in The Other Side of Eden published by Hugh Brody, 2000, agriculture makes it possible and indeed necessary for many members of agriculture based societies to go where ‘work’ is available. In such societies, a fraction of the population is occupied in production of food, food is obtained in exchange for money, and money is obtained through work. In the modern world the fraction of the population involved in production of food is small and even this fraction has to move in response to changing science, technology and economics

Loss of significance of religious faith in the modern world

Thus it is, as Brody narrates, that the nomadic hunter-gatherers have a true sense of place while we, in what we call advanced societies are uprooted and encourage uprooting in unpredicted patterns. These distinctions are reflected in systems of belief. The belief systems of the ‘nomads’ relate to their place, their practices, their physical needs—and it is natural that the same system of belief should address the physical and the spiritual and, perhaps, to not distinguish natural and spiritual. In our world, there is no fixed place, there are no established economic practices in the sense that economic progress is relentless, and work has become disconnected from need. Physical and natural ‘belief,’ i.e. science, is belief that is necessary for practice. It is of course not being said that science is mere belief. It seems that since the natural system of belief has become disconnected from place and psyche, it may be inadequate to address any need of spirit

Science, religion and faith in the modern world. Fracture of the modern psyche

Thus religion and science, faith and secular affairs become distinct—not just because science shows up religion but also because science is detached from psychological need (science may of course substitute for formal religion but it is to be expected that it will be unsatisfying for many—because of its conceptual remoteness and because it may be found barren of spirit or psyche.) This is of course not regarded as truth of religion just as the role of science in economic activity does not establish its truth—unless a pragmatic measure of truth is employed and that could arguably establish some truth for even an absurd faith. Since faith becomes detached from place it becomes an occasion for speculation to lose its empirical side, to flower as an instrument of the spirit—and to be subject to varieties of abuse primary among which is the abandonment of grounding—truth of connection to environment if not truth of spirit or psyche—that may permit and promote other kinds of abuse. The modern philosopher and theologian does not even use the term religion for the faith systems of the hunter-gatherer yet those faiths are closer to the fundamental and core meaning of faith of this narrative

Post-critical faith

Before doubt there is innocence which may be called ‘naïve’ faith. To describe such faith as naïve is not altogether accurate. While doubt has functions it is not invariably productive. Human being has the ‘faculty’ of doubt but this is not true of all animal being or of human being in all stages of development or, constitutively of all persons. For many, especially the critically inclined, doubt destroys naïve faith—or questions it which may be a destruction of naïveté. What is a post-critical faith that has the same quality of trust that marks naïve faith? Is there such a trusting post-critical faith? Perhaps one of the functions of religion may be to support post-critical faith—even though religion is often pre-critical. If, however, the world view of a religion is not one that strains credulity and is at least reasonable, such a religion may support a post-critical faith with trust-in-the-world. Perhaps Buddhism is such a faith since—in its original form—it rejects an elaborate world view or metaphysics. Perhaps, also, the Theory of Being founded in the metaphysics of immanence may provide the framework for such a faith. Still, it may also appear that ‘post-critical faith’ is a not altogether well founded concept and it may be that such faith is a function of personality rather than any post-critical ‘integration.’ This appears to be the case in their attitude to the world during the developments of this narrative. More accurately, perhaps, such faith may be a function of both personality and attitude toward criticism—e.g. that despite the significance of criticism its ‘true’ function is not destruction, nihilism or deconstruction which are intermediate but the service of a creative function whether in knowledge or, especially when knowledge does not appear to be possible, transformation

Concepts of religion

Motives to the study of religion

At the outset, it is important to distinguish two motives to clarifying the concept of religion

A first motive—understanding

One motive is to define and understand religion as it has occurred and as it exists. In light of this motive the study of religion would be empirical but of course not merely empirical because the merely empirical would not provide a concept of religion—and a concept is essential to understanding and this is inherent in the very meaning of concept. It is necessary to note of course that even if the study of religion were to be merely empirical, it would be impossible to avoid an at least intuitive concept of religion without which there would be no distinguishing what is religion and what is not and the merely empirical student of religion would have no reason to not study a cobbler making shoes or to not study the peeling of potatoes in his or pursuit of the study of religion and a study that took no account of what happens in churches, what is written in the Bible and other religious texts, of what is being done in prayer or even what is prayer, should count to the humble empiricist as a study of religion. The merely empirical—altogether non-conceptual—student of religion would do a random walk—think—in concept-space. It is therefore essential that any study of actual religion and what is characteristic of actual religions must have a conceptual side as well as an empirical side. Along these lines definitions of religion may be found such as ‘human beings' relation to that which they regard as holy, sacred, spiritual, or divine’ (Encyclopedia Britannica) or ‘A religion is a set of beliefs and practices generally held by a community, involving adherence to codified beliefs and rituals and study of ancestral or cultural traditions, writings, history, and mythology, as well as personal faith and mystic experience’ and ‘All patriarchal religions present a common quality… the division of the world in two comprehensive domains, one sacred, the other profane’ (Wikipedia.) There is no need to think of such definitions as definitive—they are presented as specimens of definition. They do, however, point to beliefs and practices, and they do emphasize the division of the sacred and the profane—which absolute division is missing in the faith systems of the hunter-gatherers

A second motive—the potential and possibilities of religion

The two motives are, of course, related

A second motive to the study of religion is to consider its potential and possibilities. Because of the naturally intense politicizing of actual religion, its characterization—especially modern characterizations, whether from within or otherwise, should be suspect in relation to the possibilities of religion. If modern science were the only true knowledge, then surely one possibility for religion would be ‘religion is science’ and then the concept of religion might be, also, ‘religion is science.’ However, modern science, even from its own point of view, cannot be regarded as the only true knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is not the only function of religion; expression is an important function of the human psyche and the scriptures would have—a—function, if not as knowledge, then as expression of spirit (psyche.) Even in the secular tradition and even excepting art, literature, drama, poetry, myth and so on as knowledge, science is not generally regarded as the only true knowledge. Therefore, even in the best secular and modern tradition, there is a place for some concept of religion. The individual who has no—explicit—religion in the modern world is an entirely understandable phenomenon but if she or he further declares a poverty of spirit and simultaneously declares that, from science and reason, no religion except science is possible, he or she has misunderstood the nature of science and of religion. The most important consideration is left for last—in Theory of Being it has been shown that this cosmos is a speck in terms of duration, extension and variety and that the science of this cosmos is likewise but a speck in relation to the possibilities of knowledge of being

Implications of the second motive for a concept of religion. That, despite its clear appeal, secular humanism is silent on issues of immense and real significance

What does this second motivation imply for a concept of religion? Such a concept of religion may be divorced from the empirical side—from the external form of religious practice—but could hardly have meaning if disconnected from the related concept. From the first concept it may be noted that religion is not merely about knowledge but it is also about ritual, about morals, about binding community through shared belief and enterprise, about distinguishing distinct communities through distinct belief and practice and so on. And, in so far as it is about knowledge it is not only about our common knowledge but it is also about doubting that secular knowledge encompasses all of being

An example: the nature and meaning of death

On common secular belief, there is nothing beyond death, therefore no one has survived death therefore there can be no empirical knowledge of ‘beyond death.’ Therefore, the thought that the individual does not survive death is not an empirical statement even on secularism one of whose cornerstones is that knowledge has an empirical side. Common sense makes it clear that a dead body is dead but neither common sense nor science nor reason require that the person should not live again in some form on some other distant ‘planet.’ (Do they explain how the individual came to be on this planet? They cannot for relative to science today and secular common sense, individual existence on this planet, even the entire universe, are mere facts.) Of course of ‘another life’ is not proved by the foregoing argument which does not even give another life’ meaning—it does not, for example, at all explain how that life might be connected to this. Religious texts (‘rising from the dead’ ‘identity of Atman and Brahman’) may, even when empirical content is discounted, be seen as questioning the nature—of the concept—of death. Theory of Being has, in Metaphysics, and Cosmology, shown the necessity of a reality infinitely larger, deeper and more varied than that of this cosmological system and, in the clarification of the nature of Identity, shown the meaning, significance and ‘reality’ of the larger universe to the individual

The concept of religion

The discussion suggests the following concept—religion is knowledge and negotiation of the entire universe by the entire individual in all its faculties and modes of being. Here, though, ‘individual’ could be person, or society, or even, e.g., life on earth. There is a definite distinction from other practices such as empirically oriented science which is restricted in its domain of study and its ‘method.’ Why continue to use the word ‘religion?’ It is not necessary to do so and it may be problematic on account of the negative connotations of the word. Use of the word may, however, provide continuity and derive power from any positive connotation and from the influence of religion

An ideal religion

The Theory of Being and Human World provide a framework and some elaboration for religion in this conception. Religions apparently may incorporate a world view, a metaphysics, and a cosmology and a genesis—‘In the beginning…;’ a context or history—including myth; a moral code. Although these aspects may not be essential, the narrative has provided a foundation and framework for these aspects of religion. The framework is not necessarily complete—some version of history might have a place; some aspects of religion such as worship have not been mentioned. If such elements were to be incorporated, their form might be quite different from their traditional forms. Questions such as ‘are we constructing religion as religion’ or ‘are we forging something organic and rooted and perhaps vaguely related to the idea of religion’ and perhaps ‘what is the value of the enterprise as enterprise?’ may be considered. The present narrative arose from a life and not from a plan to live or write about a journey. The question here being asked is whether religion—any aspect of culture—should arise organically or by design. But is that a question to be asked—culture arises the way it arises whether that way be real or artificial, organic—from the soil, so to speak—or designed… or some combination of these ways in sequence or superposed upon one another… and is there not inevitably something artificial about culture—the artifice of culture. Consider for example a ‘dead’ language such—Latin—someone wishes to revive it. What kind of sense does that make—is not the emergence of language an organic affair or at least partially organic? Even when a conqueror imposes his or her language it is, at least, organically interwoven into the fabric of the source culture. Religion, however is not dead, some will say—and for them, is not their religion already organic? Perhaps not; perhaps it has degenerated and is held as a social or political instrument but not as an instrument of spirit (psyche.) For others, religion is dead—but for some of them there may be a desire for some kind of religion. And, still, for those who have no such desire, it is not necessarily true that there is no spark that may light fire. Perhaps the organic / non-organic question is not organic… Finally there is the question of form—what literary, artistic, dramatic as well as political and economic form might an ideal religion take?

These are thoughts that the next author of faith may have already transcended!

Ideal religion and political-economic form? Does that not seem rather contradictory? Is it not debasing to the idea of religion? But—why should it be debasing? Are we so sensitive that realism is debasing? Is not the idea of debasement an illicit appeal to privilege—‘because my faith is so sacred, you dare not corrupt its purity?’ It is understandable that a person should so object, but, in fact, is the sacred distinct from the profane and would not the sacred-profane give meaning to the profane and grounding to the sacred? What is more, recall from Social World, the inseparability of culture, morals, politics and economics—why, in this light, should there be a separation of the ideal and the—social and cultural—real

Functions and significance of religion

Any analysis or evaluation of an institution may be confused by two factors

Factors that confuse the analysis of religion, its meaning and place

Actual institutions do not have the purity of role that they may be assigned in concept. Such implicit multi-dimensionality of role may include the positive and the negative. It is often thought to be negative by ‘purists’ but is not at all essentially negative

The first factor is that although in concept, function and institution may have perfect correspondence, in the world there tends to be—and to some extent there must be—multiplicity of function in what may be thought or defined—e.g. in a constitution—to be an institution with a single function

Corruption, abuse and decay

The second factor, not fully distinct from the first, concerns corruption, abuse and decay. The pure minded may object to any encroachment of function, any corruption abuse or decay. The problem is especially significant for religion since it is ‘supposed’ to be pure. It may at once be said that a religious institution must have an economic base and cannot invariably continue to exist without some political action. The pure minded may then insist—no more than is necessary; and the economics and the politics must be ‘pure.’ Perhaps, given human nature, some corruption is to be tolerated but it should not be widespread and it should not negate the primary function. Should a religious institution engage in economic activity for profit; should it engage in political activity toward general political ends? When does it become an institution of religion only in name? These questions are difficult and are confused by issues of ‘purity’ (no cross function) and the existence of answers written in law and practice

The functions of religion may be described as meaning and non-meaning

Non-meaning functions of religion. The thought that some non-meaning functions are ‘impure’ stems from an artificial division of the world into mundane and sacred, of knowledge into spirit and matter

The non-meaning functions include social identity and difference—bonding and exclusion. Weston La Barre, The Origins Of Religion: The Ghost Dance, 1970, suggests that, via study of the transformations in Native American religion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all religion is a response to a crisis of the cultural system. A religious institution may have any cultural function—political, economic, artistic—but does that make such function religious? Commonly we think not but why? Here, it is clear that sense and reference are altogether stabilized only if one is fixed; it is not, however, suggested that complete stabilization is ‘functional.’ Practically, there appear to be two realms—sacred and profane and the former is the domain of religion. Perhaps, though it is the sometimes apparently bizarre—the straining of credulity—metaphysics of some religions that defines separate domains. If the sacred and the profane are both true can a concept make them separate—that is obviously not given. At this point in history, in the western world, in part from the history to avoid persecution and in part because religion has become irrelevant, the ‘sacred’ is separate from the profane. This is not the universal case even today and it does not make it universally true. If the ‘faithful’ would seek truth over adherence, the sacred might be found to intersect the profane—might, as is sometimes thought necessary—be found identical…

The meaning functions of religion

The meaning functions of religion are tied to psychology on the side of the sacred and spirit (psyche.) The spirit is sometimes thought to be a supersensible and ‘transcendent’ realm. Even though such things are found in scripture and belief, they may be regarded as metaphorical for ‘there is more in heaven and earth than in your philosophy.’ Theory of Being shows the actuality of remote realms on which science and common sense cast doubt—all actual realms are in the universe; however there is no support from the theory for the exclusive character of belief. Why then do religions continue on? Reasons are complex no doubt. First, perhaps, is the non-literal function of meaning. ‘Rising from the dead’ questions the common concept of death; and so on; religion is an expression of awe, of mystery, of the sense of the miraculous. In such functions the meaning is not the literal one even though the literal may be instrumental. Second, the crossover of meaning and non-meaning function; that a belief strains belief makes it especially binding—how binding, for example, is the ‘belief’ that bananas are yellow? Imagine yellow-banana-ism versus spotted-banana-ism as basis of a cultural schism. Third, the political dimension of ‘faith’ stabilizes the institution; this is seen in fundamentalist Christianity and Islam and perhaps also in Hinduism in India. Fourth—institutions are self-perpetuating

Secular humanism tends to make the meaning of traditional religion appear absurd. Such absurdity is, appropriately understood, not absurd. This follows from the metaphysics of immanence

In any interpretation of an institution, the reigning world view—not necessarily univalent—is likely to have significant influence. In the modern world, one widespread view, the one in which the world is much as described in science, that the world views as described in the major religions are, mostly, myth and legend that have function but not literal function, and the sacred and the spirit have psychological impact but are devoid of literal significance and the most profound human values are mundane i.e. of the profane world. Against such a view, the metaphysical content of the major religions is, in general, bound to appear, not merely wrong, but absurd. I.e. such metaphysics are not only non-literal but are necessarily non-literal. This view must be widespread among those who do not have ‘fundamentalist’ faith and since this view is especially common among the educated, the literate and the academic, an influential modern default view is that the meaning and functions of religion—whether valuable or not—lie in the domain of psyche and that science and the senses are the primary source of literal knowledge i.e. knowledge of the mundane or profane

Theory of being has shown (1) that that the domain of the universe—‘this world’—revealed by the modern practice of science, the senses, and secular humanism is an infinitesimal speck in the entire universe, (2) that while the myth-like metaphysics of so many religions may and almost certainly do not hold in ‘this world,’ they are not absurd when seen against the background of the infinite variety of the universe. Therefore, there is a place for religion and religious meaning that satisfies both literal and universal function that is not restricted to science and the senses. Whether such a development will occur in our world, what form it might take and what value it may have are open questions and opportunities. It appears that an original function of religion was an opposition to intolerant and often abusive conservatism. Today, however, the strength of religious belief has a reactionary element. For religion to have the greatest available meaning—literal and otherwise—it shall neither react nor bow to science but shall shed its own limits as well as those of modern empirical and theoretical science

However, even though the absurd myth or legend may be instructive, there is an archaic character to much traditional religion that, even though it is correlated with numeric strength, calls for renewal

The assertion is obvious

Religion in the modern world: the traditional religions

The purpose of this discussion is to attempt a study of the role that religion currently plays in societies and in global politics. Since the discussion is not, here, an end in itself and since ‘religion in the modern world’ has received attention in previous paragraphs, in this version of the narrative it will be extremely brief

Attitudes to archaic religions

What attitude may be taken by individuals and governments who see religions—particular religions or religion in general—as archaic andor destructive?

War is not an option?

One attitude is to declare anger and war! At one time in history this was politically acceptable; it is no longer dead. The standard secular western view is that this approach is unacceptable. There is a real possibility that the twenty first century may move in the direction of conflict; consider the declarations of Pope Benedict XVI. However, neither ‘standard’ views nor fact determine truth. Two differences between present and past are political and military. Democracy reduces the distance between decision makers and the affected and thus decision makers are closer—if only for the need for popularity—to suffering the consequences of decisions (this trend may be in reversal.) Second, the military machine makes the consequences of war terrible. These facts confuse any truth

The inevitability of violence cannot justify violence as a method. Perhaps there are no final arguments. If one has a sentiment for / against violence there may be no argument that will sway the conviction

The strength of the tolerant attitude

It is that fact that gives the tolerant attitude its strength. The intolerant attitude, even in the support of morality, destroys the values of morality

It is now assumed that force is unacceptable as a solution to ideological difference. Why is it an assumption? Although physical conflict entails death and suffering, the final outcome has often been good. There is a principle that is against force and this principle is taken as faith rather than absolute fact. Why is the assumption made—perhaps because it is desired to make it, perhaps because of the pressure of peers, perhaps out of self-interest… And—perhaps—an assumption that is not—cannot be—questioned lacks strength

For tolerance and dialogue

Another attitude is to question assumptions. The present narrative has given strong reason to question many modern secular assumptions. As a result of such questioning, even if there is not acceptance there may be a softening of stance in relation to institutionalized religion. Further, it is real that, regardless of ideology, religion is apparently and into the immediately ‘foreseeable’ future here to stay

It may appear eminently reasonable, especially from what has been learned 2003—present, that a political attitude for the future should include tolerance and dialogue (among many other elements)

The possibilities for religion and faith: renewal

A discussion of ‘the possibilities for religion and faith’ may be taken as a sign of arrogance. Reflect, however, on meaning. ‘The possibilities for religion and faith’ is a concept that has an object—one might argue an immense range of objects but that range would also be one object. In a section titled ‘the possibilities for religion and faith’ the title is the concept and the content is a brief reflection on object side

Possibility

Is there any ‘valid’ possibility for the future? This question has been addressed in previous paragraphs—especially those under An ideal religion, above. It appears, they think, that what is often taken for ‘wisdom’ and ‘knowledge’ regarding an ideal is based on conditions in the past and present that may or may not hold in the future. Looking at past and present, and the foregoing arguments, cases may be made for the desirability and undesirability of some religion. The argument made here, both in logic and intent, is to dispose viewpoints toward ‘desirability’ but admits both unknowns and an irreversible aspect in history. However, irreversibility, even when it obtains, can be overemphasized for it would—perhaps—not be irreversibility regarding religion as religion but form of religion

Here, again, Theory of being has strong significance. Why is religion here emphasized? First, in the interest of truth—there is a realm of the ‘sacred’ intuited in art, literature and faith, in nature… and shown in Theory of being which also shows its fine weave with the realm of the profane or the secular. Second, perhaps as balance to a secular view that is empty in the direction of the actual and which therefore does not address truth and a need for truth

Opportunity

What will happen? No speculation or commitment is made, no guarantee would have sense, no name, no clear sense—‘religion’—or object—institution—given to an outcome. There is, however, for a civilization that has an immense economic form but has lost direction and for the creative power of some perhaps yet unrecognized persons a clear occasion for great endeavor