The problem of faithfulness—the necessary and practical objects—the transcendental meaning of faithfulness for practical objects—relation to Kant’s treatment of the problem of objects—discussion of solipsism and the problem of the external world… Implications for ego, transcendence and immersion

Realistic and definitive treatment of concrete and abstract objects

Abstract objects are in the one universe—there is precisely one universe—the distinction between concrete and abstract objects is neither metaphysical nor epistemic nor fixed for all time but is according to what is the most convenient approach to study—and, therefore, there are objects whose abstract versus concrete character may change and there are objects that may be considered to be mixed, e.g., theoretical physics on some interpretations… in fact may not most objects be tinged with concreteness and abstraction?

Distinctions among objects

Concrete versus abstract, absolute including the necessary versus practical—consider whether the only absolute objects are the necessary, determinate versus indeterminate, entire versus filtered. Implications for pure metaphysics, ethics, object constancy and holism

The variety of being

The kinds of object—the categories of intuition… existence—actual versus fictional, according to definiteness of being—manifest versus potential and determinate versus indeterminate, and according to quality of knowledge—absolute versus practical, definite versus vague, and entire versus filtered—the cases of science and mathematics— logic as an object—a new point here—special cases: ethics, identity, action, the real and universals… truth

Illustrations of object and significance

Jesus Christ is an object

Jesus Christ turning water to wine is an object

The two preceding objects are—regarded as referring to all occurrences—are abstract objects

Since any one of these objects is not the universal abstract object it has many realizations

This does not imply that there is a realization on this earth

Each realization is a particular object that has many copies

Subject and object

Is there a concept of the subject in which subject and object coincide? This would be an enormous simplification of the ever self-questioning of thought. Examples of such coincidence occur in Wittgenstein's ‘the world is the sum of its facts,’ Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger’s thought that there is no ultimate distinction between appearance and reality. In what canonical ways does theory of being elevate these examples from the level of example?

Material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html

Objects

The word ‘object’ was used somewhat loosely in the previous chapters. The object is an important concept in modern thought, especially since the time of Kant. There is a variety of problems associated with the meaning and working out of a proper conception of the object. Such a working out will be very useful from for thought and for this narrative. It is time to take up a study of objects

There is much to be learned from prior thought. However, proper thought cannot ever be restricted by the bounds of what came before. In this chapter the understanding and the development of the object goes beyond the traditions so far

The idea of the object and its nature

The idea of an object is patterned after the ideas of entity and thing. The rough idea of an object is something in the external world—out there—whose existence and nature do not depend on perception or, more generally, on conception. However, regardless of actual existence and nature, all objects that are known to animal being are known in the concept. The first goal of this chapter is a dual one: to ask about the nature of the object-as-known and to investigate the meaning and degree of faithfulness of the object-as-known—the concept—to the object. The question of the meaning of faithfulness arises since we never get outside the object-as-known which is, possibly, of a different kind than ‘the object.’ It shall be necessary, in what follows, to investigate whether faithfulness has meaning and, if so, to investigate degrees of faithfulness. It is of special interest whether there are objects of which knowledge is perfectly faithful

Introduction. Goals. Place of the chapter in the narrative

In Metaphysics, it was established that ‘all objects exist.’ More precisely, for any concept there is a corresponding object provided that the concept entails no contradiction. If one conceives a unicorn, the Metaphysics shows that unless a contradiction is entailed, there must be a unicorn in some actual world. When one sees a horse in this world, one generally knows—except for illusion or philosophical or radical doubt—that the horse exists. The same is true for the objects of scientific theories even though the connection is not as direct as in the case of perception. A central goal of Objects is to locate objects corresponding to our concepts; some will be in our world or cosmological system, others in ones that are remote in space and time. This is the problem of the object. We know at once that there are certain objects whose being is entailed by the concept. These are the absolute objects of which universe, domain and void and their logical dependents are examples

The first goal—to address the problem of the object

In this chapter, the first goal, then, is to address the problem of the object. This problem has been the subject of intense interest in modern philosophy and the most satisfactory approach appears to derive from the thought of Kant that incorporates both empirical and ideal elements

Kind of object treated in the problem of the object—the particular object

The kind of objects addressed in the problem of the object is the particular or concrete objects—the word concrete is of course used metaphorically. While one apple is a particular object, the number one, if it is or points to an object, is not particular. ‘The number one’ has abstract character to it in that it can be associated with an object but is not—does not appear to be—an object. Similarly, a moral would appear to be abstract. The existence of abstract objects is sometimes regarded as given even though it is not clear in what sense they are objects. The abstract objects could, perhaps, be objects in Meinong’s sense in which concept and object are conflated; however since there is a far better one, it is neither necessary nor advisable to adopt Meinong’s approach here

The problem of the nature and existence of abstract objects and their relations to the particular objects is taken up below

Solution approach to the problem of the object

The present approach will combine the ideas of Kant and the metaphysics of immanence developed in Metaphysics. It is found that the problem has a satisfactory resolution for a much wider class of objects than would be thought on the Kantian approach alone

Objects whose being is necessary but are not located in immediate experience

However, there is still the immense variety of objects that are neither the absolute objects nor those of our world whose existence is necessary but are not located in our immediate experience

Location in experience of such objects from the theory of identity

The establishment of the location is completed in the treatment of Identity in Cosmology. As noted earlier, the treatment of identity could have been placed in Metaphysics and therefore all objects have been placed in experience although not necessarily in the experience of this life (which depends on whether the interpretation of ‘this life’ is normal or absolute)

Second goal—address the nature of the abstract object and to compare and contrast abstract and particular objects

The second goal is to address the nature of the abstract object and to compare and contrast abstract and particular objects. Abstract objects are sometimes thought to not exist in space—where, if anywhere, is the number one… and where is justice? The development provides a definitive and surprising resolution to the problem of the abstract object. It is that the difference between abstract and particular object is more one of whether the convenient mode of study is empirical or conceptual. This conclusion is deep, immensely simplifying, cuts out immense amounts of unnecessarily ethereal speculation and is surprising. However, once the solution is laid out, it shall appear to be natural and obvious

The resolution of the problem of the abstract object and the nature of the abstract-particular divide constitutes a significant advance on the question of the nature of the object in general and the nature of the abstract in particular

There are differences between the abstract and particular that must be articulated but it will be found that abstract objects may be spatial (some are not)

After establishing the nature of the abstract / particular divide, other, some lesser distinctions among objects are laid out

Third goal—catalog, i.e., develop a variety of being

The establishment of distinctions of kinds leads into a discussion of the variety of being. This is a third goal of the chapter. The discussion draws from the variety already shown in Metaphysics and, so as to be complete, anticipates the discussion of categories of intuition from Human being

An immense and unsuspected variety of being is revealed. The explicit variety is immense—a greater variety cannot be imagined explicitly because, subject to the requirement of non-contradiction, once imagined any object belongs to the variety; the implicit variety is, logically, the greatest possible variety—there is no greater variety and therefore a greater variety can be neither thought nor written.

Achievement of goals

Not only are the goals achieved, the extent of the achievement is ultimate in character and necessarily constitutes an advance on all other systems that do not at least implicitly recognize the metaphysics of immanence

Contribution

The present development of the theory of objects is, therefore, thought to be a contribution to the history of ideas

Place of the chapter in the narrative

In establishing the nature of being, the variety of being and in locating objects in ‘our world’ the chapters Metaphysics and Objects set up the chapters Logic and meaning, Mind, and Cosmology and the division Human world. The part Journey in being, derives significantly from these developments

A confusion regarding concept and object

In use of the same name for idea and entity and in lack of complete distinction between them, there is a confusion to the study of the idea of the object that has resolution in distinguishing concept and object. A potential confusion remains in that the same word may be used to refer to both concept and object. However, with care this confusion is eliminated. An object X exists—is said to exist—if and only if, to the concept X, there corresponds an (the) object

The problem of the object

The problem of the object concerns the faithfulness of the correspondence between concept and object

Faithfulness appears to be a false ideal

The problem—in addition to empirical concerns, the concept and the object appear to be categorially distinct and, further, every measure of faithfulness of the concept seems to be a refinement only of the concept—therefore, faithfulness appears to be a false ideal. Before proceeding, note that two aspects of faithfulness have been established: kind and accuracy. In the absence of an understanding of kind of faithfulness, it is not clear what meaning accuracy might have in general although in instrumental cases, e.g. measurement of distance, the meaning is clear enough since the comparison is of two objects and not of a concept and an object

Three exceptions to falseness of the ideal arise immediately

1. The absolute objects

From the metaphysics, faithfulness is given for certain objects such as the universe, domain and complement, the void and others derived from such by necessity. Such objects—concepts—are absolute in faithfulness and the question arises whether there are others. Generally, from the fundamental principle of metaphysics, every concept that neither harbors nor entails contradiction is—and must be—realized; the concern that remains is that though the object exists, its identification is not given

2. Sufficient faithfulness

Also from the metaphysics as well as adaptation, some objects (concepts) are practical or sufficiently faithful. Included here are scientific theories which will be shown in Logic to be practical with regard to the world or precise with regard to some limited but imprecisely defined domain. From the concept of form, even in the case of practical concepts, the concept of absolute object has meaning—it is not implied that the form or object itself is definite or that the concept of it may be faithful. There is no simple logical limit to improvement of faithfulness but where it has no meaning it cannot be desirable—and, regarding the variety of being this is seen as positive. Given facts—regarding objects of perception / science, logical operation on such facts is possible and the universality and precision of such operations is taken up in Logic

When there is concept and object—this corresponds to the Kantian case. In Kant’s thought, intuition conforms to reality. In this thinking, Kant was inspired by Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics whose immense success resulted in their being seen as absolutely true—Euclid’s geometry, with but occasional doubt, had reigned for about 2000 years and though the mechanics of Newton had been formulated only a hundred years earlier, had brought to mechanics an order previously unknown in that field and comparable only to geometry

Given the intuition of time, space and mechanics, the expression of the intuition in symbolic terms and logical operations on the symbolic systems permitted formulation of a science of space, time and mechanics. Although it is not clear that Kant did this, it is possible to regard the symbolic capability—which includes logical operations on symbols—as elements of intuition and then, the entire development of geometry and mechanics can be seen as being part of intuition

Kant, of course, did not know that, as physical theories, the geometry and mechanics of his era were to be overturned in the next one hundred and fifty years and to be replaced by ‘better’ theories which, however, were not seen as final descriptions of reality but only as better approximations

It remains, however, that as approximation, human intuition conforms to a domain of the real

Thus Kantian intuition includes the item ‘sufficient faithfulness’ and, via its analyticity, includes the first item as well. In Human being, a system of categories will be presented. Of these, ‘humor’ is seen to be an adaptation to the unexpected, to ignorance, to ‘chaos.’ Humor includes the idea of, where impossible or otherwise undesirable, giving up any ideal of strict objectivity—and, in the extreme, Dionysian embrace of the world

Thus, the intuition may be seen to cover all of being—the case of other worlds is deferred as noted above—even though it does so in a way that is far removed from Kant’s intent to describe an intuition that was precisely tailored to the world

The amazing-though-not-perfect precision of certain branches of theoretical physics may be explained in terms of Kant’s solution provided that ‘intuition’ is understood to include perception, thought and instrument. In effect, Kant had this same understanding

Faithfulness and accuracy. Reflection on the concept-object system. Pre-con-formation

It is interesting to reflect on how the concept-object system might work. It appears that memory is among the crucial elements. The organism—the body, especially the neural and endocrine systems—is pre-con-formed to its environment to the extent that it has the ability to form concepts that have a degree of con-formation to objects—one of which is the world as a whole—that is adequate to function. Even though it may be conventionally thought that the process of concept formation begins at birth, the pre-natal infant is in interaction with the—uterine—environment before birth and this is at least a tactile, kinesthetic and gravitational environment and some concept formation begins before birth

Programmed development versus learning

The divide between purely ‘programmed’ development and development-in-contact-with-environment is surely not at all sharp or all occurring at some particular phase of development. However, in the latter phase of development-in-contact, the forms of the environment result in con-formal forms being laid down in ‘memory.’

Memory of form and memory of facts

Thus seen, memory is more than e.g. the memory of facts, it is ‘memory’ of form that is laid down in neural pathways and connections and so on—memory of facts is probably not distinct in kind though it is likely at a shallower level

This is possible and natural because of the pre-con-formation that arose in genesis—i.e. in evolution (replacing evolution by biblical or any other genesis need not change the present argument.) What is laid down then is a system of concepts or concept-templates. Once this has occurred, perception is likely a combination of object data recall and comparison of memory-concepts. The impression of the object is need not be the result of an entire system of concept-data being received but may be partially received and partially recalled (which, in an organism that remains at least somewhat adaptable i.e. con-formable to new contexts, may continually result in the laying down and modification of memory-concepts even if the bulk of laying down may have occurred in the developmental phase)

Reduction of the infinity of conceivable objects

Recall the thought from an earlier chapter that half of one mountain and half of another could be regarded as an object. It is possible to retrain the intuition to see such ‘objects’ as objects. Given a countable infinity of elementary—indivisible—objects, a non-countable infinity of objects may be conceived. However the normal training of perception is to not perceive most of those conceptions as objects. Function is paramount in the training of day-to-day conception

Note that it is not intended to argue any atomism; the atomistic case was deployed to illustrate the concept of the reduction of the infinity of conceivable objects

Reconstruction in construction of images (and thought)

Sharing of reception and recall in ‘reconstruction’ is easily seen to be efficient in comparison to reconstruction entirely from received data and realistic in comparison in comparison to reconstruction entirely from memory (the latter is at least dominant in imagination, dreaming and form of thought)

The memory-concept

It is important to note that the memory-concept is likely in no sense a geometric or other recognizable image in the sense that if the neural pattern-process that corresponds to a concept were mapped in a dynamic three-dimensional image it would not likely have any discrete form or—rough—recognizable congruence to the object. Undoubtedly, though, there must be some kind and degree of con-formation…

Iconic perception. Thought and reason

The process just described may be labeled ‘iconic perception’ which is intended to convey the perception of physical form (even though such form derives from both entity and perception.) Given the symbolic capability which must also include memory-association of memory-symbols and memory-percepts, symbolic recall and adequate freedoms of symbolic form, result in symbolic expression and operation (thought and reason)

Inadequacy of the empiricist and rationalist programs

While the description of cognition just given shows that some degree of con-formation to objects is necessary and reasonable, it does not ground any precise or faithful con-formation. To ground faithfulness by showing that the con-formation of iconic perception may be regarded—roughly—as the empiricist program. It is clear from the present discussion that such a program will found rough and ready faithfulness but generally no more. This conclusion has often been regarded as undermining objectivity but it can now be seen that it undermines only one approach to foundation of objectivity and not the other approaches described above

Transcendental approach

An argument from con-formation supports some concept and realization of ‘sufficient faithfulness.’ The argument and the concept may both be labeled ‘transcendental’

3. When the concept-object distinction has no significance

The formulation of the idea of knowledge in terms of concept and object is one in which concept and object are distinct but though this has domains of validity there are others when it has no significance. The preceding statement is an approximation in the following way

The intuition of humor is applicable on the boundary between objects of type 2 and 3

Abstract objects

Particular and Abstract Objects—a brief Natural History. Concrete or Particular objects are originally thought of as objects or real entities of the world of which we have or aspire to have knowledge. The present sense of ‘particular’ is close but not identical to a common sense in which it stands in contrast to universal. That is, while particular objects can usually be interpreted as single entities—e.g. a chain of mountains may be thought of as one geological feature, universals are typically characteristics of classes of objects. Although abstract objects such as number and universal—e.g. redness—are often thought to exist, the nature of their existence is questioned—they can be conceived but do not appear to be sensible, and where do they exist?. Typically, they are not thought to exist in this world—perhaps they exist in an ideal world or perhaps, as abstractions from—classes of—particular objects, they are ‘partial’ objects that may be regarded as existing in this world but may, as a result of abstraction, lack some of the characteristics of particular objects such as having causal efficacy and location in space and time. Another—similar—approach to the nature of abstract objects is to regard them as collections. From metaphysics, many particular objects repeat infinitely and the collection of objects that so results from a particular object has an abstract character. Therefore, the abstract-particular distinction is seen to be blurred

Definitive treatment of particular and abstract objects

From the metaphysics, all objects—and concepts—must reside in the universe; there is no ideal world of abstract objects, ideas or forms. Further, from the fundamental principle of metaphysics, every concept that neither harbors nor entails contradiction is—and must be—realized. Therefore, as far as realization is concerned there is no distinction between particular and abstract objects. That an abstract object may have no location in space may be a result of location having no place in the concept… A review of standard lists of objects shows that the distinction is not an actual one but regards the way in which objects are studied. Whereas both kinds have concept and object sides, a particular object is studied from the object side—empirically—while an abstract object is studied conceptually or symbolically. This distinction is not absolute for the dominant mode of study may switch. The positron was predicted theoretically and discovered later. The study of number must have originally been empirical but its later development was symbolic and still later it became possible to study number theory computationally which is at least partially empirical in nature. Number continues, mostly, to be considered abstract because it is via symbolic definition that it achieves clarity and, since, concepts are—trivially—the place of clarity / non-clarity it may be thought that this will remain the case into the extended future; this, however, is neither altogether clear nor given. It is important that while an object may be studied symbolically, such study guarantees existence only if the development is consistent—and that if consistency cannot be determined it may be useful to attempt to study the object side directly or semi-directly in terms of a model. Purely conceptual study can hone consistency but is not universally guaranteed to eliminate inconsistency. From the metaphysics, the consistency of this approach to the abstract versus the particular is built into it. It was not to have been expected that from a list of objects regarded as abstract only in that they did not seem to be particular (concrete,) that there should be any explicit criterion of abstractness such as not having causal efficacy, not having extension or duration, being defined as equivalence in which objects are distinct if and only if certain functions—e.g. properties—are distinct. It remains of interest, naturally, to characterize objects—especially abstract objects—according to kind; such a characterization will, of course, be both empirical and conceptual

Further distinctions among objects

The distinction full versus partial is typically a distinction of particular versus abstract. Distinctions that determine existence include actual versus fictional and logical versus contradictory; from the metaphysics, these distinctions are identical but while the former is based in the object, the latter is based in the concept. Another distinction of this kind is the existent versus the non-existent object. A non-existent object is either one that does not exist in a given context e.g. there are no golden mountains in this cosmological system or one that harbors a contradiction e.g. a square circle; this distinction is conceptually amusing and perhaps interesting and emphasizes the significance of concept and object in understanding knowledge and objects but no essential significance of the non-existent object has come to light in this study—however, it may be interesting to regard the void as the universe of non-existent objects from which actual objects come into being by shedding properties (so that the contradiction collapses.) A distinction according to definiteness of being suggests the following classes: manifest versus potential and determinate versus indeterminate. Sense may be seen as latent or potential reference; without latent reference, there can be no sense. That values and morals may be seen as indeterminate or partially determinate shows that the distinction of fact and value is not categorial. Distinction according to quality of knowledge is also possible—these are, of course, not true distinctions of kinds of object; the following arise: absolute versus practical, definite versus vague, and entire versus filtered

The variety of being

Objects, particular and abstract, may be enumerated first by example, and second by category of intuition—if category intuition is regarded with sufficient generality as in Human being, there can be no broader system of categories. The categories include the practical distinction nature-society-universal-mind (in which universal pertains to the meaning of universe as in Metaphysics but not to the—scholastic—contrast to particular.) Actual varieties are taken up in the narrative, especially in Metaphysics, Objects—the present section, Logic, Cosmology, and Human World

The objects of science

The science of physics may be regarded as the study of the simplest attributes of the objects of the ‘external’ world. In Logic it will be seen that physics is an interactive study from both concept and object sides. The study from the concept side includes mathematics whose origin may have been in an object side but whose systematic study is most conveniently conceptual. That many different kinds of systems may be studied in terms of the same mathematics is a result of similarity of the physical form—and behavior—of the different systems. That the social sciences are not as universally mathematical as the physical may be due to the unique / complex character of social systems. Some future, perhaps qualitative, mathematics may reduce the social sciences to symbolic study. However, given that the object—society—is as complex as the instrument—psyche—and, especially in that whatever is unique in human being is, in the nature of the case, of constitutive interest, a future mathematical sociology may, in general, be restricted to situations of merely utilitarian interest

The categories of intuition

The categories of intuition also contain the distinctions according to existence—actual versus fictional, according to definiteness of being—manifest versus potential and determinate versus indeterminate, and according to quality of knowledge—absolute versus practical, definite versus vague, and entire versus filtered. Some distinctions have instances in the following. Applications. The variety may be extended in application e.g. Theory of identity—taken up in Cosmology. The form of ‘ethics;’ morals as objects; ethics and objectivity—taken up in Social world—ethics, i.e., moral content and moral characteristics, is seen as defining a kind of potential object. All objects influence their future in some sense, e.g., a stone has a physical stability that gives its identity a certain endurance. Objects with autonomy develop corrective tendencies to self-preservation and stabilize against destruction. Preservation, self-destruction and social disruption. When the object or agent evolves to the point of, e.g., humanity where it is capable of some degree of understanding, specifying, its freedom, especially symbolically, and initiating acts of freedom, it may develop values of self-preservation, against self-destruction, in physical, human, aesthetic, epistemic, and universal realms

Action

Action, concept and object: there is a realm of understanding that stands above concept and object in which concept, object and action are in interaction; this realm is closer to the root than is the discrete concept and object or knowledge as independent of its application

The fundamental concepts

The number of fundamental concepts—in Metaphysics, a number of fundamental concepts was identified—being, universe, void, form, the normal… However, since, experience, which may form foundation of the metaphysics, is capable of analysis, there are, perhaps, no fundamental concepts—being-in-the-world is or may be more fundamental than foundation

Truth

Truth—from the theory of objects, coherence is reference (correspondence) of a system of ideas or concepts, i.e. meaning, and therefore truth, lie only partially in single propositions

The real and universals

The Real and Universals—the nature of the real and of the universals is resolved in the previous edition, Journey in Being-New World. Resolution in terms of the present treatment of abstract objects is trivial

Pure metaphysics

A rough distinction between metaphysics and cosmology has been made—in a restricted sense, metaphysics studies being as such; in an inclusive sense, metaphysics includes cosmology (and perhaps science and much else.) It is now possible to (re) define pure metaphysics as the study of absolute objects (the thought arises that further restriction may be made to those absolute objects such as universe, domain and void and their logical dependents whose being is as given as being itself but, even though the distinction is interesting, the restriction would make the concept of pure metaphysics a theoretical exercise that even though real and useful and less than its potential as both conceptual and empirical)

Object constancy and object holism

These features occur in intuition as does ‘object filtering.’ The features may be ‘understood’ without explanation as features of intuition. Recalling that the intuition is adaptation, constancy and holism of object requires no further explanation except, perhaps, to note that, since objects are laid down in memory as wholes rather than—or, since there is arbitrariness to the decomposition of the field of experience into objects, as much—as bundles of properties, there is no true problem of ‘how’ the elements are integrated into a whole (detailed explanation in terms of microscopic and integrated neural structure will of course be of interest)

Ego, transcendence, immersion

Incomplete objectivity is necessary and, therefore, necessarily good

Ethics and faith

Ethics—morals—can be seen as a form within a part of the world. Familiar examples of ‘part’ are the individual and society. If from a given state of the world (Universe) a number of outcomes is possible and each outcome has a certain ‘weight’ or probability of occurrence, ethics is the form of the part that reassigns the weights. The phrase ‘according to certain, perhaps intrinsic, criteria’ might be appended to the previous sentence but any such criteria are already part of form. Since the ethics are a form they are also an object

In Faith, faith will be conceived as follows. Faith, which includes animal faith, is that combination of intuition, feeling, and cognition that is conducive to the greatest life. It is an easy exercise to see that faith is an object

The chapters Ethics and Faith, take up some aspects of the responses of human being—beings with freedom and choice—to object / world indeterminacy. These discussions further elaborate the nature of objects

In those chapters it will be implicit that the object character of ethics and faith is of little practical assistance in determining actions and ends or in achieving a state of being in the ‘light of animal faith.’ However, the object character of morals and faith may give the individual and society a confidence in morals, a certain quietude and pose in being-in-the-world. That there is that object character may affect attitude; however, that the object character has yet said nothing about the detailed working out of action and being should result in restraint in imposing uncertain morals or thinking that pose is escape from disequilibrium or crisis or immanent and immediate action. Morals are lived-in; pose is pose in crisis and action. In the later discussions, e.g. Ethics and, especially, War and peace—which emphasizes morals in action—it will be seen that choices of actions / ends are very much case by case, case relating to case, in the moment, in a hierarchy of contexts, but also in the light of and in interaction with principle: principle never ultimately stands above action and immersion. Principle is principle as—and only as—immanent in the world

Ethics in the void?

Can the title of this brief section have meaning? What could ethics in the void be? Perhaps nothing… yet the following thoughts arise

If anything, the ‘morality’ of the void might be that becoming is ‘good.’ That is so because the transformations of the void give rise to the great and the good even though, simultaneously, the shameful and evil arise... without one side there is not the other. Evil and good are a dynamic of the world; without one there cannot be the other (which is not at all to promote acquiescence in evil but perhaps instead to promote that understanding that my give natural—rather than overly forced—fortitude in the face of pervasive evil and immanent destruction)

These thoughts reinforce the object character of morals, good, and evil

What may be learnt from the ‘ethics in the void?’ Perhaps most importantly it may be learnt that my ethics—our ethics—is not universal ethics (since we may appear to ourselves to be the only animal that has named ethics it is perhaps natural to occasionally be misled into the thought that human ethics is universal.) The universe and the void have another ethic; it is a waste to curse the universe if it should seem to not care for our joy and our pain. We should not care that god may be cruel even though we may care for god-as-a-part-of-being; saying this is not saying that there is / is not god. We learn, then, that we are—somewhat—alone in the universe even as we are connected; this frees us to be good rather than to follow the good, to allow good to be immanent more than something always sought, to not avoid the good in unduly fearing evil, to act without—undue—fear (or attachment to ends) and therefore to act effectively… This reinforces the thought about fortitude in the presence of evil…

A cosmology of objects

Cosmology takes up questions of origins, history, and variety. What is meant by ‘cosmology of objects’

The various kinds of objects, particular object of which ‘thing’ is a case, the abstract objects ‘number,’ ‘value,’ ‘truth,’ ‘morals…’ have been mentioned and some considered

Is there a complete and fundamental group of such objects? How may completeness and fundamental character be ascertained? Is there any hierarchy to such a group? How do these objects stand in relation? Is there a dynamic? How does any cosmology of objects fit mesh with Cosmology? How to think about these and similar questions and is the list of questions ‘complete?’

These and similar concerns and reflections on those issues constitute a cosmology of objects (and, since there were questions about questions, a meta-cosmology)

The cosmology of objects is currently a topic for reflection and development—a research topic or program

Material from previous editions

2006 Edition

Truth

Truth is correspondence but is known (corroborated) by coherence

A Logos has been revealed. The Theory of Being (the Void) is a Logos. Perhaps the Form of manifest Being is that there is being. The Logos of a domain is its constitution; the Laws are contingent in that for a Logos, alternative laws are necessarily realized in other domains of the same constitution. A logic is the Understanding of a logos. The most general Logos concerns presence versus absence; Logic and Metaphysics are the same in a way that parallels object and being

The Real

It is possible, now, to make assertions regarding ‘the Real.’ It is not possible to say anything about the real with confidence unless the sense of the real is given an explicit and appropriate meaning. The question ‘What is real?’ is really two questions, ‘What does it mean to be real?’ and ‘What things are real?’ Very often, the first question is suppressed and the question ‘What is real?’ is taken to be the question ‘What things real?’ However, the first question cannot be eliminated and therefore, if suppressed or ignored, it must surface, perhaps without full awareness, as a common-sense or default or paradigmatic position. Commonly, concrete or material objects e.g. a rock are regarded as real whereas there may be debate whether abstract objects such as Form, Number and Law are real. The often tacit and unstated (because paradigmatic) background to this more or less standard position is materialism: material objects are real and objects whose material status is in question are, likewise, questionably real (i.e. in materialism, abstract objects are not real.) The developments in the present narrative show that Matter is itself an indefinite concept and that the foundation of the real is not to be sought in matter. One possibility is that to exist and to be real are identical. Before the development of the Theory of Being, this assertion does not make sense. That theory places Existing entities on a common plane. The confusions regarding what is real, what truly exists, regard questions of substance and lacking clear answers there would always be doubt regarding what is real. The Theory of Being places concrete objects (those that seem to deserve the label ‘material’) and abstract objects e.g. Form, Number, pattern and law on a similar basis. From the Theory of Being, i.e. from the properties of the void, both the concrete or particular and the abstract objects have power. Before the development of a common foundation to all (kinds of) object, all that it would be possible to say regarding existence is e.g. that a rock exists as matter, ‘2’ exists as number, the shape of the Milky Way exists as a spatial pattern and so on. I.e. the pre-foundational concept of existence must be existence-as. However, the Theory of Being places all cases of existence-as (that have power) on the same plane. Every object exists since it has power as object; every existent (even if not familiar) is an object in that it has the ability to be known as an object (under the full conception of knowledge or knowability.) These thoughts show a way out of default positions regarding the real: what is real is what has power, what can be known. A single obstacle remains regarding the identification of existence and the real and that is the thought, noted earlier, that there are non existent objects. It may be recalled that, regarding the world as such the status of non existent objects lacks consequence; the non existent object is, perhaps, conceptually elegant but has no implication for being. (In the terms introduced earlier the non existent object exists as concept but not as entity. It is clear that there are potential confusions regarding the application of ‘exist’ that need only awareness of the application or reference to prevent actual confusion.) Therefore, excluding the non existent object, to be real is to exist i.e. to be an Object

It has been seen that being has infinite variety. It is now seen that that variety concerns both entities and kinds

Universals

In scholastic philosophy, a distinction between individuals and universals was made. Individuals were particular objects (e.g. a wolf) while universals were types (e.g. the type or species wolf or wolf-hood) which included properties (e.g. redness) and relations. The discussion of the real suggests that (some) universals exist; this position has been called realism (in opposition to nominalism – the position that universals are names)

How can redness be (seen as) an object? A classical concept of ‘properties’ sees a primary property as inhering in the object which (the primary property) from the discussion of form can also be seen as an object. A secondary property, according to the classical account, is one that is not primary because its ‘value’ depends also on observation (and can therefore be seen as inhering in bodies, one of which is the observer, and their relationships.) While the subjective experience of redness is labeled ‘redness,’ the redness is inherent in the relation between the individual and the entity. What entity? Since lighting and other aspects of the environment also affect the perceived color, they too are part of the ‘entity’ even though the entity is thought to be more localized e.g. a solid red ball. Thus the entity is not the ‘solid red ball’ but the ball and its environment; the universe, however, is not the entity. Now, the condition of the individual –his or her emotional state, recent visual exposure and so on– also affects the color or shade of color that is perceived. This concern is resolved by noting that although the individual has the same identity, he or she, is not precisely the same and, therefore, for the present purpose may be regarded as a set of distinct individuals corresponding to e.g. distinct emotional states. Now, regarding the individual and the entity as the object, redness is a form of the object and, so, is possessed of objecthood

It may be noted that what has been called the problem of the possibility of the inversion of the color spectrum, the idea that what one individual experiences as ‘blue’ may, for example, be experienced by another individual as ‘red’ is a distinct issue from the one addressed here. This issue is interesting as well but, here, merits only few thoughts. It is useful to first note that the left and the right eyes of the same individual may experience the color of objects as slightly different even in absence of pathology. Therefore it is not expected that the experience of different individuals will be ‘identical.’ While a complete discussion of this issue may be intricate, it is useful to note that color perception is not isolated but occurs in the context of the emotional and physical and other aspects of the state of the individual and it is therefore unlikely that constitutively similar individuals will have ‘color inversion’ even though precise color identity is not expected

In the later section ‘Cosmology’ it will be seen that every consistent description of a state of affairs must be actual and that, subject to consistency, every actual state must recur infinitely. The present narrative, therefore, is written in countless cosmological systems. Thus, an individual, the present narrative in this case, may be seen as a universal. Jesus Christ is, in this way of thinking, a universal as is the name ‘Jesus Christ.’ Christ and the name are not always associated but the association must hold in countless cosmologies

2005 Edition

Universals

The basic idea is that a universal has form and a form is an object and that the distinction between abstract and particular objects is not an actual distinction

2004 Edition… ‘Whereof one cannot speak’

Truth

I begin with the classical dictum ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or what is not that it is not that it is not, is true’

I speak, initially, of FACTUAL TRUTH and not of other meanings. What kinds of things are true or possess truth, i.e. what are the bearers of truth? Possibilities include beliefs, sentences, propositions, and theories e.g. of science. There is a host of ‘theories’ or conceptions of truth. These include COHERENCE, pragmatist, CORRESPONDENCE, SEMANTIC, and redundancy theories. Regarding each theory, the following questions arise, ‘Is it a complete or partial theory?’ ‘Is it a definition or criterion of truth – or is it definition and criterion?’ or, ‘Is it an elaboration of the idea of truth?’ If a theory is a complete definition or specification of the meaning of truth, then, perhaps, others may be, competing or supply criteria or elaboration. If a theory is a partial definition, then, in addition to the foregoing possibilities, others may be complementary

Correspondence conceptions hold the truth of a proposition to consist in its relation to the world – in its correspondence to the facts. In contrast, coherence theories hold truth to hold in coherence among a set of propositions or beliefs. In some points of view, it is held that a proposition can have truth only in a context e.g. a complete context or metaphysical system. While idealism and contextualism are conducive to coherence theories, correspondence theories are encouraged by external realism. In some views, truth is correspondence while coherence supplies validation or testing. Metaphysical concerns may emphasize correspondence while epistemological concerns emphasize coherence. Both theories are subject to the persistent difficulty of supplying a precise account, in one case, of ‘corresponds,’ and, in the other, of what, exactly, are the appropriate relations that constitute ‘coherence’

Although I will make a few comments on the various theories of truth, it is not my objective, in this document, to provide a comprehensive account. I will attempt to keep ‘truth’ simple, leaving elaborations to other documents, other writers, and later developments

Recall the discussion of symbol and object, of ideal and external object, of intuition, apprehension and comprehension. If the external object is never, of necessity, apprehended as-it-is, can truth have absolute meaning? An answer is, ‘yes and in two ways.’ First, in that while the apprehension often presents as unitary it is not essentially unitary. Therefore, there may be coherence among the elements of the apprehension. Second, there is the ultimate possibility of a formal and full correspondence of the comprehension –which includes intuition and apprehension– to the external object, which the actual comprehension may approximate. It may be noted that, while the distinction between apprehension and comprehension is based in the ‘free symbol’ there also artificiality to the distinction – what is ‘bound’ in the organism is ‘free’ in its original becoming

According to the foregoing, then, truth is correspondence while it is known, at least in part, through coherence. There is some artificiality to this distinction as well since the correspondence between subject and object is, also, a form of coherence, and we might prefer to make a distinction of ‘external’ versus ‘internal’ rather than correspondence versus coherence

It may be remembered that the organism did not produce its own adaptation. Rather, for the organism, the adaptation is given. The truth of the apprehension, though not absolute, is built in. For immediate purposes, truth may be regarded as correspondence or coherence between symbol and the ideal object. For ultimate purposes, truth may be regarded as the correspondence that arises in the comprehension of the external object

When the relations among symbol, ideal object and external object are properly understood, theories of truth are unnecessary. It remains only to illuminate and to illustrate truth

It is now possible to make some extremely brief comments that have implication for the other theories or conceptions of truth

The redundancy theory is illuminated by the following thought. Speaking in the mode of apprehension, The sky is blue and The statement, ‘The sky is blue’ is true are equivalent

However, speaking in the mode of comprehension, the latter statement of the previous paragraph may have the significance of The apprehension, ‘The sky is blue,’ is corroborated in the comprehension. This may be thought of as elaborating the sense of, ‘The sky is blue’ if and only if the sky is blue. This latter specification of the meaning of truth is in a classic form of the semantic definition of truth

As noted above there is a distinction between a concept of truth and a criterion of truth. I hold that the pragmatic theories amount to criteria and that insofar as they imply conceptions of truth, those conceptions are combinations of the coherence and correspondence theories. It follows, then, that pragmatism has no significance for the meaning of truth. However, the ideas of the pragmatists are not without utility and have consequences for an understanding of the way in which scientific theories come to have general acceptance in the scientific community. This thought has been one of the inspirations of a number of twentieth century lines of research into the nature of the scientific enterprise. It may be noted that pragmatist thought has affinities with behaviorism as in, for example, taking belief to be –merely– a disposition to action

At this point, it is possible to step away from discussion of factual truth and comment briefly on ‘higher truth.’ In order to be definitive, it will be necessary to make an abstract statement. The ‘truth of an individual’ lies in achieving harmonic relations. In the ultimate, the relations would be among all being. I will not interpret ‘harmonic’ except to say that its implicit meaning does not imply, only, such qualities as peace and continuity but may include the jagged edges implied by the category of HUMOR. For example, there is a tendency to feel more respect for that truth for which sacrifice has been made. To attempt to be too specific regarding the meaning of ‘harmonic’ would be limiting. Every individual and individuals collectively work out their ‘truth.’ Humor may be seen as including the attitudes of harmony and peace. To go further into a working out of the possibilities of truth would require an incursion into psychology that is unnecessary here but has been taken up in the SOURCES and is left for later development

Since the boundaries of the organism have arbitrariness in an ultimate view, there is also arbitrariness to the distinction between correspondence and coherence. This arbitrariness implies and illuminates affinities between factual and higher truth

The beautiful

Truth and beauty are often discussed together, sometimes being equated to one another. The basis of the equation may be due to the similarity of the emotion evoked and or the fundamental nature of the concepts. Here, truth and beauty are not equated. However, since the equation has been made it is useful to see what similarity there may be

As for truth, beauty may be seen as a system of affinities or harmonic relations

However, the equation of truth to beauty is an unnecessary con-fusion. Simply and naturally, truth and beauty may be seen as coming under the general system of affinities among symbol, ideal object and external object

The affinities or relations include those of ‘cognition’ and of ‘emotion.’ In factual truth, cognition is emphasized. Beauty emphasizes emotion and feeling. Higher truth concerns the entire individual in its internal and external relations