Difficulties in the viewpoints and the narrative

A minor concern is the occasional equation of metaphysics with the study of the occult, of the remote? How is it possible to promote a metaphysics as a world view? This should not present a true difficulty for this is not the meaning of metaphysics employed in the narrative

The meaning used here is the one employed in modern philosophy. It could be called ‘philosophical metaphysics’ in contrast to metaphysics as the study of the occult arts. While any philosopher will regard this as obvious—within academic circles ‘metaphysics’ almost invariable refers to philosophical metaphysics, this it may not be obvious to all readers. Of course, there is no absolute agreement on the meaning and subject matter of philosophical metaphysics but it may be regarded, roughly, as the study of what is—most—real. This is the meaning of metaphysics in this narrative. In this meaning, there is no focus on the remote or the immediate over the other

In the remainder of the narrative, metaphysics will mean philosophical metaphysics

In the present sense there is a tradition in the study of metaphysics in western philosophy that dates back at least to 600 BC. Some ancient names associated with the study of metaphysics are Plato and Aristotle. The scholastics studied metaphysics, often for theological purposes. Recent stand out names in metaphysics are those of A.N. Whitehead and Martin Heidegger although, of course, there are many, many others

In reflecting upon what is most real—this is of course just one characterization of metaphysics—it is clear that that should include what is immediate and immediately experienced and what is remote and occult or hidden. The world is what there is—or was or will be. In a language that does not heed the distinction between past, present and future, i.e., that deflates tense, the world is what there is. Of course, while this mode of description is neutral with regard to tense, it does not reject tense, time and temporality

Here, as will be seen, lies some power of the metaphysics; here lies some of its character as the study of the real

Connotations of metaphysics

As noted, there is no absolute agreement on the subject matter of metaphysics

Here, metaphysics will be the study of the real. It will turn out that the concept of being is pivotal in this study

In a narrow sense, metaphysics is the study of being. However, this study cannot be watertight and the study of being spills over into the study of—philosophical—cosmology which includes the study of mind; it includes the study of objects; and it has affinities with logic—it will turn out that logic and metaphysics are identical. Thus metaphysics has broad and narrow connotations. The narrow connotation, the study of being, is sometimes called ontology. However, the phrase an ontology sometimes refers to the study of the fundamental elements of being which may be thought of as the simplest things or kinds that constitute all being. Thus a materialist ontology is one in which the fundamental elements are simple kinds or elements of matter

A study of the divisions of any discipline reveals that universal agreement is often lacking. This is especially true of philosophy. The lack of agreement does not reflect a fuzziness of the divisions. Rather, since the divisions correspond, in some sense, to divisions of the real—and the study of the real—any lack of agreement in the constitution of the real may be reflected in lack of agreement on the nature of the divisions and the divisional boundaries

There is error in thinking that lack of agreement in the concept of an artifact—and the disciplines have an artifactual character—represents a retarded state of knowledge. Rather, there is invariably some play in the conception of artifacts

If an ultimate metaphysics were developed, the artifactual character of philosophy and its main divisions might be eliminated

This ideal is achieved in this essay

Regardless whether the reader will agree with this estimation, its evaluation should present a challenge

Sources of the view

The view that is developed in ‘Journey’ has been glimpsed by the Western thinkers Leibniz, Hume, Wittgenstein, and more recently contemplated, if perhaps tangentially, in regard to the foundation of theoretical physics by J. A. Wheeler. Some of its contours have been laid out in Bhagavad-Gita and Vedanta. There are points of contact of the view with the ideas of possibility, necessity and ‘possible worlds’ from modal logic. There is reference to voidism in Buddhist metaphysics (madhyamika;) this voidism, however, is a mental or epistemological one in which one receives truth through silence following a reasoned refutation of all metaphysical views; there is also reference to voidism in Judaism. Undoubtedly the idea has been glimpsed times; its power is such that it should enter into the thought of anyone who reflects on the nature of being long enough. The view has affinities with developments in theoretical physics e.g. the idea of the quantum vacuum and the thought that a becoming from a true void is not an essential violation of the principle of conservation of energy

A metaphysics of ultimate power

Thus whatever is conceivable without contradiction is possible and whatever is possible is actual… Therefore, the possible and the actual are identical and, with sufficient broadening of the meaning of ‘conception’ the conceivable and the actual may be identical

The metaphysics of immanence harbors in its womb an image of all being: the variety or breadth of being is implicit in it. In that it will show that all being is and may be regarded as being generated by the void, the metaphysics is ultimate in depth. Alternate statements of this ultimate character are: every state of being is equivalent to every other state and Logic is the universal law (the reader is referred to the body of the essay for the demonstrations of these assertions)

Thus the point of view—the metaphysics, the account of being—is both unfamiliar and surprising

It is necessary to show (a) the validity of the viewpoint or metaphysics, (b) that the metaphysics is not inconsistent with common experience and (c) any violation of reason—including reflexive common sense and science—is only apparent

Even when these developments have been followed, it may take time, familiarity and experience to see the new metaphysics as a unity and as incorporating the valid parts of science, common sense and tradition… and still various points of unease may remain

Nowhere developed in its present explicit, ultimate, and logical character

However, it has not anywhere, to my knowledge, been developed in the clarity, structure, elaboration and development of implications, and with the rigor that occurs here

The reader may face a number of difficulties understanding and absorbing the difficulties -- not least of which may be the expectation that the view is an elaboration or foundation of a familiar world. Instead, the view includes the ‘familiar’ world but is infinitely larger and more varied than the familiar

The view presents a picture of the universe that is infinitely more varied and perhaps strange than the familiar views e.g. common sense, science, myth... A first difficulty is that of recognizing the magnitude of the view. When this is seen and absorbed, a second difficulty is in reconciling the new view with e.g. that of science. Does not the new view do violence to science? No, it does not for, it does and must agree with science in the domain of validity of science

What is the viewpoint or metaphysics?

What is the view?

Naively, it is that ‘anything is possible.’ However this characterization must be conditioned

The first characterization is that the logical impossibilities remain impossible. For example even if it should be possible that an apple be simultaneously red and green it is not possible for an apple to simultaneously be red and not red. In this example it is only possible for an apple to be simultaneously red and green is if being ‘red’ does not imply being ‘not green’ and ‘green’ is not ‘not red.’ In quantum mechanics an electron can simultaneously have spin up and down; it follows that up is not not down and down is not not up

The second characterization is that the contingently impossible is ‘unlikely’ and the contingently necessary is ‘likely.’ The contingently impossible and the contingently necessary are context dependent

The third characterization is that what is possible is not necessarily desirable, i.e., ethical. However, it must be remembered that in ‘infinity’ what is locally ethical may not have application

A fourth characterization is different in nature from the previous three. The previous characterizations were ‘logical.’ The fourth is cosmological. It is simply that the universe is vastly larger, more complex, more varied but less deep than is commonly thought under the common paradigm

The integration of the universal and the immediate

The picture is universal—it is a metaphysics—and is not logically dependent on any ‘local’ picture such as science, myth, religion, literature, or system of ‘totally’ consistent ‘stories.’ However, the filling out of the picture requires all these stories and the ‘glue’ and fluidity and extension of imagination and experience. This system of experience cannot be filled in for a reader by a writer; the writer can, however, suggest some ways to experience and paint some broad strokes

Aspects of the view that make for difficulty due to their ultimate andor novel character

Equivalent points of view

The equivalents mentioned above are further extended in the narrative. Seeing these equivalencies may be challenging in that their proofs cannot be appreciated until their meaning has been absorbed. The multifaceted character of the metaphysics may require to be worked with before the reader can feel comfortable with it

The discussion so far has suggested the truth of the following equivalents to the metaphysics. Logic is the one law of the universe. All possible states are actual (all actual states are obviously possible.) The universe is absolutely indeterministic, i.e., from any state, any other state—even if only known as possible—is and must be accessible. The void which is the absence of being exists and contains no object, form, pattern or law; it is this equivalent that is shown and provides demonstration of the metaphysics. The final equivalent is that the universe is absolutely non-cosmomorphic. This last equivalent has the meaning that the only features the entire universe in all its being shares with the local cosmos are the necessary features of the necessary features of the local cosmos

An unfamiliar and surprising metaphysics or world view

In comparison with typical modern perspectives—secular, scientific, humanist, religious or alternative—the view of the universe developed here—the metaphysics and the cosmology—may be strange and unexpected. It reveals the universe to be of the greatest possible extent, duration and variety; i.e., the only ‘objects’ that are not in the universe are those whose conception contains an essential contradiction

The picture covers the depth and breadth of extent, duration and variety

The picture may appear to contradict science / common sense (but reflection on the self-defined limits of science reveals that the picture is consistent with science and even follows from science on a certain reading of the principle of Ockham... additionally the picture is also consistent with a reflexive common sense)

Novelty of concepts and meanings

New concepts are new, e.g., the Normal (the sign is used as a distinct symbol)

Many concepts are essentially new in their interpretation, e.g., Logic, Universe, Void, Abstract and Concrete Objects

Some concepts are profoundly trivial, e.g., Universe, Being, Void, yet it is, in part, the triviality, that leads to profound consequences

Some concepts, e.g. Logic and Form are simultaneously deep, simple, and profound in consequence; and the simplicity, depth and profundity are interrelated

A metaphysics that appears to be at odds with what is real

In the previous paragraphs, the doubts concerned the demonstration of the new view and the magnitude of its consequences. Earlier, it was noted that the new viewpoint appears to be distant from the common views, e.g., from everyday affairs and from science. However, it was also noted that the new view or metaphysics was based in deduction from what is necessarily empirical. Most readers will be familiar with the idea of deduction but what does it mean for something to be necessarily empirical? Is not empirical data necessarily subject to error? The point is analyzed in the chapter Being. The analysis, briefly and approximately, is this. Although the content of observation may be doubted, to doubt that experience of a world exists is to misunderstand the meaning of both experience and existence. It may be doubted that there is an external world or a subject but this is not asserted; what is asserted is, simply, that there is experience and that it is of some world whether external or not. It may be doubted that the alleged objects of experience exists but it cannot be doubted that there is experience of objects whether real or delusional or merely constructed in experience. This is—part of—the necessary empirical base from which development of the metaphysics proceeds. It could be argued that the conclusion is trivial and indeed it is in its claim regarding what exists but it is non trivial in demonstrating some existence and, as shown in the chapters Metaphysics and Cosmology, and as suggested by the foregoing discussion, it is of ultimate depth and breadth in its further consequences. Perhaps, then, it is science and common sense that are wrong. However, this is not what is asserted. The metaphysics agrees with science and common sense within their domains of validity—in fact the metaphysics confirms, in a sense that is explained in the narrative, the necessity of domains of valid science and common sense, in general and in the particular case of this world. Further, the valid part of the picture of being from science—as well art and the valid parts of religion—are pivotal in the elaboration of the Metaphysics, which, in turn has illuminating consequences for what may be valid in science, faith and religion as well as for some aspects or ways of seeing artistic truth

A metaphysics or view that is entirely new?

From the histories of ideas and of science it seems unlikely that ideas of such magnitude should be entirely new. In fact the ideas are not altogether new and there must have been individuals from time to time who had intuitions similar to the present one. The intuitions occur in the Vedanta of Indian philosophy, among the mystics of the west, may be regarded as being part of some of the ‘great’ religions provided that their texts are interpreted metaphorically. On the formal side, the thought of Leibniz, of Hume and of Wittgenstein had a number of logical points of contact with the present metaphysics. However it does not appear that the view has been previously developed with the logical foundation that is provided here, with the present insight into its significance, or with the depth and breadth of its present systematic development and systematic application

There are undoubtedly further influences. To begin with there is the negative influence of substance theory and what are perhaps its two primary metaphysical instances—materialism and idealism. Experience with these and other metaphysical positions led to dissatisfaction. Something more was sought. It is not clear when the transition occurred—there was of course no precise point. Further, it is not precisely a transition in terminology, e.g. from materialism to a focus on being. As discussed in the narrative, provided that ‘matter’ is appropriately understood it makes no distinction whether the term used is ‘mind’ or ‘matter’ or ‘being.’ This will of course be disputed but it is requested of those who would do so to first read what the narrative says on this subject. As has been mentioned, the study of being has a tradition in western philosophy. This may of course have been an influence. Among those who studied being, notably Aristotle, Plato, Whitehead and Heidegger, struggled with the idea recommend it—not, it is hoped out of perversion but, instead, out of identification with the struggle to understand. The scholastics wrote on being and essence with what appears in retrospect, despite the brilliance of a St. Augustine and a Thomas Aquinas, to have been a confusion. Those writers may be forgiven by posterity for they knew not what they wrote; if, however, they did they would have known that they wrote apologetically in favor of dogma. A cast of modern writers is harder to forgive but respect for the fellow being prevents the mention of the famous existentialists of the 20^th century—except Heidegger. In retrospect, Heidegger stands out because of his quarrel with ‘2000 years of substance theory.’ It is not clear to what extent Heidegger set up the present dissatisfaction with and absolute rejection of substance theory but the rejection was not imported—it involved a struggle, a wrestling with ideas, before the dawn of clarity. Further, it appears that Heidegger did not go all the way with the rejection, for as shown in the narrative, it is rather impossible to logically reject substance theory without also rejecting determinism which must harbor some at least occult substance

The breadth of the developments

The developments do not stop at the ultimate metaphysics and its philosophical ramifications that are the subject of Theory of being

After reading the entire essay it will be appreciated that it has encompassed, touched, and altered the entire range of being and thought—not just human thought—as an integral whole and, to a significant degree, in its details

This is important to know for the reader who is expecting a specialist treatment of some specialized topics may be disoriented by his or her misleading expectation

Knowledge is important but subordinate to being, transformation and action

The journey, even in its logical development, is not merely about knowledge but it is also about action; and the ‘action’ is not merely application of ‘idea’ but continuation of it and this is essential for completeness of both being (idea alone is insufficient) and for understanding

In intent the development is primarily about being and transformation even though the content may suggest that it is about metaphysics and philosophy

Put this way it is clear that the idea that ideas should be put into practice is not invoked. Instead what is being said is that ideas are not complete without articulated action

Aspects of the argument that make for difficulty

The logical development of the argument

The logical development of the argument is unfamiliar; but it must be followed in order to achieve understanding

The apparent simplicity of the arguments

Drawing back from the details it is seen that the argument is supremely simple. There are there are two parts to it. The first is necessary demonstration in which conclusions follow logically from necessary facts involving simple ideas such as being, all being and absence of being. This results in what may be labeled pure metaphysics. The second part is probable demonstration in which what we know of the local world from experience of its details is used in combination with the pure metaphysics. The conclusions may have an extremely high degree of probability but are not certain. The source of the lack of certainty is the uncertainty regarding knowledge of details. What is certain, however, is that such conclusions cannot be certain and when that is recognized, certainty is seen as undesirable and uncertainty as adventure and opportunity

Along the way there has been developed a metaphysics of ultimate breadth and depth, resolutions of deep concerns regarding the nature of objects, logic, meaning, mind and human being and human issues. It may seem that the writer is advertising his thought. Perhaps so. However, the attitude is this. The writer has long had an ambition to make a fundamental contribution and to that end practiced doubt and humility along with diligence, application, energy, thought, living and adventure. The humility may have had a certain honesty but it was also recognized that doubt and humility served the goals well. Therefore, it was a ‘realistic’ humility and not a retiring one. Somewhere along the path it was recognized that there was the potential for ultimates. It was an intuitive thought and the writer sought to realize the intuition in explicit terms and developed by reason. Further along the path the author accepted that, while something of worth had been accomplished, the core intuition remained at the level of intuition. It was therefore a surprise and an infinite delight when, in 2002, the insight that enabled the logical turn occurred in the shadows of the mountains of Northern California. Since 2002, the original insight has been elaborated into a logical system of metaphysics, a cosmology of ultimate breadth and the numerous other developments noted above and elaborated in the essay. The system sometimes appears to the writer to be that of a stumbled upon strange and beautiful landscape. One further development may be noted. Although the system has always been seen as necessary, the clear nature of its also empirical character has recently been seen—as noted earlier and elaborated in the narrative. Although the writer is indebted to others for inspiration and although there has been originality of thought, it often seems as though it is the ideas themselves that are the driving force. There is a sense that what is most in flux is most firm. Despite doubt and over above reason, this independence of the ideas enhances the sense of their truth

In the end, it is hoped that the reader would be left with this thought that the ideas of the narrative are supremely simple, that any apparent complexity is neither inherent in the ideas nor the result of a writer’s pretension but is perhaps due, on the one hand, to the influence of certain characteristic and finally misguided modes of modern thought and on the other hand to a writer’s inadequacy in expression or, to express the thought sympathetically, to the fact that a writer is struggling with a vision whose clarity and contour, and depth and elaboration continue to emerge as he writes

Aspects of the narrative that make for difficulty

Brevity of the narrative

Relative to the scope and content, the narrative is very brief… explanations are minimal, examples and analogies do not abound. This reflects, first, the author’s style of thought and, second, his experience which, in part, permits brevity of expression since it is backed by an intuitive picture built up from experience

Although the length of the work is not excessive in comparison to other texts, it seems clear that it can be significantly shortened without omitting content. It is hoped that a greater efficiency may be introduced into the narrative at some later date

A narrative that does not avoid technical content

…often in plain terms—that the technical content is in plain terms may make for difficulties (1) for the experienced reader who may prefer technical language and the use of symbols and logical expressions and (2) for all readers who may not know that the content is technical (here ‘technical’ means, first, that the content is perhaps somewhat beyond that of ‘common’ experience and, second, that the ideas and their relations are specified rather than being drawn entirely from the common background of language competence

…whose primary interest is human interest and of being and transformation

The narrative does not belong to a standard genre

The narrative contains interwoven elements of a variety of genres—essay; formal system including metaphysics, logic and so on; travelogue / journey; implicit history of being and therefore of the universe in intimate relation / identity with individual journey—but is not any one of them; therefore, it does not fit the standard molds that the reader may expect and with which the reader may be at ease

Aspects of the journey that make for difficulty

On doubt

As noted above, doubt is not suppressed. This may dismay the reader who wishes to see a rocklike edifice. However it should enhance the confidence of reasonable readers. The source of confidence should not be the ‘honesty’ of the narrative but rather the careful examination of the theory from many different points of view

And for those who like edifices, there is edifice enough and it is splendid in its variety, its scope and its depth, in its containment of all that is and can be validly conceived. Regarding the rocklike character of the edifice, it may be observed that being ‘rocklike’ is a metaphorical characterization and what is rocklike from one perspective is fluid from another. If the reader accepts the arguments, it will appear rocklike to him or her

It may be noted that there is some—at least apparent—similarity between the existential character of the object of the theory developed here and that of the objects of non-constructive mathematics

The viewpoint is sufficiently unfamiliar and the consequences of such great magnitude that generalized doubt is natural—over and above actual doubts regarding the validity of the argument. Over time, even though the viewpoint has become familiar, doubt remains—this is natural enough since doubt was one of the engines of development of the viewpoint. Although doubt may make the reader uncomfortable with the argument, he or she is not expected to relinquish doubt for doubt can only sharpen understanding of valid argument—by spurring clarification, refutation, and validation of the argument and the doubts and by motivating indirect validation of the argument in seeking ramification and application

On theory

Readers may register a hesitation regarding the word ‘theory.’ The following comments are intended to allay concerns regarding its use when applied to terms such as theory of being, theory of identity and so on

It has been said of the theory of evolution, ‘it’s only a theory’

In one connotation, the word theory applied to a thesis suggests that it is hypothetical. In another connotation, a theory is fact or factual—is not at all hypothetical

Here are some ways in which a theory can be factual. (1) Although the dynamical theories of theoretical physics form a progression since, e.g., the dynamics of Newton, each dynamics is factual within its domain of validity. (2) The phenomenon of life of earth is limited in its domain, i.e., it is not a universal phenomenon. There may, of course, be a universal phenomenon of life but earth bound life would be one example of it. Therefore, the theory of evolution has a finite domain with which to work and the Humean limitation regarding infinite domains does not apply to it. (3) The theory may apply to the most general features the universe—so general that their application is factual. It is possible, for example, to say that the universe exists. Various quibbles may be taken up in support of doubt of the assertion—experience does not imply existence and even if the assertion is true it is trivial. It will turn out that the assertion—along with others—is far from trivial in its import and that even though it appears to be obvious, the assertions will lay a foundation for an ultimate metaphysics and for powerful tools of demonstration

Journey as return to trust

The expansion in scope from ideas to—journey in / transformation of—being and identity is move to security and away from doubt. This may be experienced as paradoxical

It is understood that ‘trust’ and ‘security’ are appropriately understood. Such understanding addressed in the following paragraph

There is confidence in the narrative of ideas but this confidence remains laced with doubt. To some extent this derives—not so much from the nature of the ideas as it does—from the psyche of a writer that has always, it seems, been characterized by a mix of confidence and doubt regarding most affairs; doubt and confidence, which could stand in opposition, stand as duals and lie, perhaps, in the temporal aspect of being. Perhaps, it might be hoped, confidence and imagination have spurred new ideas and the energy to continue on while doubt has eliminated dead end ideas and, therefore, the arguments of the narrative have, at least, some degree of reasonableness. This has truth but it is not the entire truth. The rational doubts are raised and critiqued in the narrative. Then there is the doubt regarding the magnitude of the conclusions already noted. There is a related empirical-like doubt, not mentioned above, that for the intellect to inform the organism as to its possibilities seems to upturn the order of things—however, it should be remembered that this is precisely one place where the power of science lies. Again, though, science includes ongoing interaction between prediction and verification. This is a reason for the turn in the journey from ideas to experiments in transformation—the primary reason for the ‘turn,’ however, is that transformation concerns entire being. Occasionally there is a feeling of entrapment in the commitment to a journey and a writer wonders why he should not be living a ‘normal life’ or, perhaps, commitment to more immediate, more pressing ideals—problems of want and immense injustice, opportunities of beauty. The writer remembers, though, that the journey is ultimately rewarding despite sacrifice and it is also, perhaps, the writer’s supreme creative contribution. Still, such a writer might feel a sense of freedom—and loss—if the main ideas of the narrative were proven convincingly wrong. However, this reason to encourage doubt is self-centered. Some might see this line of thinking as self-destructive but here it is seen as the result of a desire to experience life itself—not that the journey is not life but, simply, that it is not all of life. Also, doubting a writer’s work pays attention to the work; it is better to have one’s writing criticized than ignored. However, the basic reason to encourage doubt is, it is hoped, that, even if it is naïve to think so, truth is a process and it is a combination of confidence and doubt, imagination and criticism that best serve truth. Given the magnitude of the ideas of the narrative and the ambitions of the journey, perhaps even the errors of a writer’s thoughts may be or spark contribution

Technical difficulties… and difficulties of meaning

On meaning

The narrative employs common words but it is expected from the foregoing that the meanings attached to the words is often new and it is important for the reader to be aware of this. The psychology of stable word meaning and stable grammatical forms is an illusion with durability being relative and one side of the stability of meaning; the other side is fluid and it is in fluidity that meaning adapts to aspects of the world previously unknown and un-conceived

There is an interaction among metaphysics, ‘common sense,’ intuition, and the meanings

In the following, replace / eliminate links

Some meanings, e.g., that of Being are definite. This might be simplifying except that there is, in philosophical and related thought, no accepted definite meaning of ‘being.’ It is an achievement of the development that definiteness of denotation and connotation of ‘being’ are shown to be possible and unique and that this meaning is ‘found.’ Other meanings, e.g., that of God are not. The metaphysics, however, in combination with the senses of god (also see on the meaning of agnosticism_1.html and on the meaning of agnosticism_2.html,) may require certain characteristics of god, may allow others and may suggest yet others. In considering the meaning of ‘god’ a hierarchy of meanings from general, down in various directions, to the specific may be considered. The senses of ‘god’ are important and the last chapter of Whitehead’s Process and Reality may be useful here

Technical character of the discussion

Since the developments have not been reported in earlier work, it is necessary to employ careful definition and use of concepts. The technical character of the work may be suppressed in a future work that emphasizes the meaning, significance and implications of the narrative

The difficulty in seeing an analytic metaphysics as an integral whole

Although the formulation of a theory of being—a metaphysics, its cosmology and so on—may be analytic, the theory stands as an integral whole. However, readers may have trouble in seeing the whole. As noted elsewhere, there is no substitute for working through the arguments, first, in order to understand them and, second, to see the structure of the theory as a whole

For full understanding, it is essential to follow the arguments. However, this, in itself, does not guarantee that the reader will see the metaphysics that is built up—in its essence, its interacting wholeness, it magnitude and depth, its universal range of application. The reader may have to work with the developments, the elaborations and applications, the relations to alternate views and to sub-theories in order to build up an integrated view. A second reading of the text is often the key to seeing the wholeness of an unfamiliar system of ideas. The section A sketch of the journey may assist in building up an integral view of the metaphysics

The individual who follows the arguments may or may not agree with them. Those who agree will also agree that the theory of being—metaphysics—developed is valid and ultimate in that it is a picture of the entire universe

Readers who find fault with the arguments will not be persuaded by them. However, invalidity of the arguments does not imply invalidity of the theory of being that is their result. Without positive disproof, readers who disagree with the arguments will agree that the resulting theory of being is, at least, possibly valid—for it is shown to be consistent with experience or the empirical, with reason and science, and with reflexive intuition and common sense. It is also shown that, if true, the metaphysics of immanence is ultimate. For these reasons the metaphysics, if true, is also robust

The individuals who agree with the arguments will, therefore, find the theory of being / metaphysics of immanence to be true, ultimate and robust

Those who disagree will (a) have doubts about the arguments or (b) feel that the arguments are positively invalid. The concerns of the former class may be addressed by the presentation in the narrative of a number of alternate arguments, in the mesh of the different parts of the development—the metaphysics, the theory of objects, the logic, the cosmology and so on—and in the demonstrations of consistency between the metaphysics and other views of the world such as the valid aspects of prior metaphysics, the metaphysics of experience, science, and so on. The concerns of the latter class may be anticipated in the discussions of a number of criticisms of the arguments and counterarguments—responses—to the criticisms

The logical development of the ‘argument’ is unfamiliar

… but it must be followed in order to achieve understanding

The reader

To the reader

The typical reader is likely to be unfamiliar with the present view

A discussion of the potential and perhaps unexpected difficulties of understanding may assist the reader in navigating the development of the world view ‘what the world is like’ as well as provide some introduction to the narrative

Purpose of the discussion of the difficulty

The narrative presents a number of formidable difficulties of understanding for novice and expert alike

Being aware of the potential difficulties and their character will help the reader negotiate them. The individual who has a mature understanding of being—the expert—may experience disorientation in the encounter with a revolutionary and ultimate metaphysics. The reader who is not extensively read in metaphysics may appreciate guidance regarding the character and the dimension of the developments

Additionally, there are positive suggestions that may assist understanding

To all readers

The reader who does not regard him or herself as well read in the topics developed, many of which are listed in the contents, may think that the unfamiliarity of the ideas is due to his or her lack of exposure

All readers should know that the development is largely original and perhaps difficult and that even people who regard themselves as experts in metaphysics and related subjects may have difficulty understanding and absorbing the ideas, especially if familiarity with the terminology leads them to expect that they will cover familiar ground

In fact, the expert may find that familiarity with the terminology and with the traditional connotations of the terms may be a block to understanding. One source of such difficulty may be the need to absorb the—vast—broadening and deepening of the ideas. The difficulty may be compounded if the experienced reader thinks that the new system of meaning is a potpourri or mere reformulation of concepts from the literature; and the difficulty may be insurmountable if, in addition to these normal difficulties, there is a resistance to relinquishing the reader’s hard won understanding

These issues are well known in relation to any theory, system of concepts, or metaphysics that is essentially new, that shows the limits of the old and, within those limits, reduces to the old. In the words of Max Planck, ‘A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it’

Since most individuals absorb much of their world view or intuitive metaphysics from the cultural milieu, any reader may experience the difficulty of the expert. Because of the gap between the received world views and that of this narrative, the reader who turns to the literature to help understand or gain some measure of the present narrative may remain unenlightened as a result of his or her endeavor

For individuals who have experience with the topics of the narrative

Relative to the goal of transformation, ideas are limited

Because the ideas are pivotal and because they are so well developed in relation to actual transformation, it may seem that the narrative is about ideas. The ideas, as explained in the narrative, have inherent importance in a number of ways—as transformation, and as the place of the experience of and a means to transformation of being and identity

For those who read the narrative seeking ideas in metaphysics, cosmology and so on there is the following potentially confusing or misleading consequence. Since ideas are felt to be important, there is an attempt to have them stand independently, i.e., by empirical criteria of being grounded in the real and by rational criteria of deriving non-empirical results by logical means. The philosophy of science teaches us that that is not possible—that the generalizations of science have a hypothetical character and that the accepted theories are not those that have been proven right but those that have not been proven wrong. However, the narrative shows that positive assertion is possible and explains the contexts of such assertion. The interpretation is either the metaphysics of the narrative is not science or the hypothetical character of science is not universal and the metaphysics is or may be science

The narrative shows that—and how—there is and can be no contradiction between science and the metaphysics developed here, for (1) even though it is sometimes thought that science reveals the edge of reality, careful analyses of science and its history, show that the most that can be positively claimed by science is that it reveals reality within definite boundaries of various kinds, (2) there can be no disagreements between the metaphysics and science within those boundaries for the disagreement would result from science being illogical, (3) the metaphysics reveals the limits of the universe and shows the current theories of science to be infinitesimal domains relative to the universe, (4) whereas science must be hypothetical because it is concerned with all patterns within a contingent context, the metaphysics is, at root, concerned, first, with the most universal of ‘patterns’ concerning the immediate and remote and this pattern, named Logic, requires no empirical verification because it refers only to the necessary empirical facts of which the prime examples are being, all being, domain and absence of being and, second, with all patterns and facts within the universal context where they lie within the subject of the necessary—of logic…

However, since it is being itself and its transformations that are the ultimate goal of the journey and since it is felt that it is being that is of ultimate importance ideas are secondary to being. There is therefore a track that is parallel to the independence of the ideas and in this second but most important track, an idea may be held in high esteem if it is estimated to be transformational. It might be argued that it is the independently standing idea that is most transformational. However, the narrative argues that this is not known to inevitably be the case and that the greatest outcome may be the result of allowing both tracks in parallel without the principles of either one being invariably held dominant over the principles of the other

This may be disorienting to people who hold an either or mentality. It should be noted that, here, either / or refer to approach to realization and not to being itself

It is to be emphasized that the tracks are kept separate and not confused; however, the point to this mention of the issue is to warn the intellectual whose primary interest may be in the ideas against the potential confusion. It may occur to the reader that the second track is a kind of pragmatism in which the nature and therefore the justification of knowledge lies not in the relation of knowledge and known but in the relation between knowledge and outcome. It is valid to ask, however, whether there is an essential difference between justification in terms of the relation between an idea and the world and justification in terms of the relation between an idea and outcomes. Regardless of any concern with pragmatism, it should be noted that the second track is not a pragmatism because it does not pretend to justify ‘knowledge’ but is, rather, a state of being in which ideas and action remain fused without any definite possibility of separability. It is reasonable to think that this state of being comes before and includes the discrete case in which knowledge or knower and action are distinct and the question of ‘justification’ may arise

Understanding the metaphysics or point of view

Pertinent to the section Suggestions toward understanding

Following the narrative is perhaps the best way—if laborious one—grasp and understand the metaphysics. Here is a way to quick but incomplete understanding. Remember, though, that a view from one angle does not reveal the whole unless the whole is already known—a shadow reveals a man wearing a hat only if we have seen men with hats; the whole is known, more or less, when it has been seen in many of its aspects—and then the aspects may appear to derive from the whole, which is now in intuition, instead of constructing it. Consider the progression of scientific theories in a given scientific discipline. Over time, the viewpoint in fundamental science has become broader; that is, later theories validly describe domains or realms of phenomena that are more extensive or that have greater variety than earlier ones. One aspect of the development requires giving up familiar but narrower views of the nature of the universe that project from the local to the universal. An example is the change from an earth centered view of the solar system to a view in which the sun is at the center. What is gained is that, in the non-local perspectives, the description of things becomes simpler and this is an enormously enabling factor in the advance of science. The reader is now invited to ask what might result in a perspective that is most universal, i.e., least dependent on any perspective. Putting the question another way, what part of our way of seeing or describing things is it that will remain when all perspective has been relinquished? Perhaps the only aspect of description that cannot be relinquished is not that of physical or other natural law but that of something that is prerequisite to—comes before—the law or nature of this world, of all worlds. Let us work into this idea by way of an example. In the local physical geometry a square is distinct from a circle. It is possible to imagine a less crisp geometry in which ‘squares’ and ‘circles’ are not distinguishable. However, a geometry in which a square is not a square—something is not what it is and not merely not what it may seem to be—would be impossible in any world—this consequence is independent of any particular nature of the local cosmos. There is a discipline whose business it is to exclude contradiction—it is logic. This suggests that the perspective of logic cannot be transcended—and simultaneously suggests that logic is what is prior to natural law and raises the question of the nature of logic. Sometimes logic is seen as dry—not particularly relevant to the lived life—even if it is useful and even if modern or post-Aristotelian logic is a work of depth and beauty. However, the thought so far suggests another perspective on logic. Is logic what we have learnt that it is over the intellectual history of the human race or should we define logic as what is left over when all perspective has been relinquished? The narrative addresses this concern but enough has been said to show how logic is universal—in the narrative the term will be capitalized: Logic will be what is universal, i.e., common to all being and logic will be, roughly, what is researched and taught in schools and universities. We will anticipate that while logic is argument and deduction, Logic is the form of all being and, further, there is some clarity to the relation—surely there should be some relation between deduction or proving and the form of all being. If your thought is illogical it may be mistaken and the mistakes you make may or may not have consequences and you will still be loved; if your being is ill-Logical, you do not exist, you cannot exist, and you are neither loved nor hated

The ‘argument’ of the previous paragraph is not intended to be a proof of the metaphysics—the world view—developed in the narrative. It is instead intended to show that the metaphysics is plausible. Proof is given later. However, although proof should be more persuasive than plausibility, the present argument has suggested why logic may be the single law of being—the universe—and is therefore, perhaps, more intuitively persuasive

Technical concerns

The ground of the metaphysics is a logical-empirical dual

The metaphysics is based in what is necessarily empirical and developed according to logical principle—in fact, the development sheds light on the nature of logic—and is not at all speculative (doubt, however, is not suppressed.) The universe must contain whatever is true in science, religion; it shows the necessity of this and an infinity of other worlds and explains them in terms of the introduced concept of the normal; and it shows that the only fictions are logical contradictions; it reveals that the world as seen in the common perspective is relatively infinitesimal in extent and variety. The reader who anticipates speculation or fantasy, whether based in flight of fancy or extrapolation from the edge of science, may expect to feel disoriented in reading the narrative; however, where the basic principles are applied speculatively the fact is not suppressed. Finally, the view is not a stand alone metaphysics; its development is part of the journey; and it is applied to a number of fundamental human concerns and conceptual topics

A logical proof of—the validity—logic?

One potential difficulty concerns the derivation of the concept—meaning—and validity of logic

It seems paradoxical that logic should be logically derived—if logic were derived by logic, the conclusion, speaking simply, would be the premise; nothing would have been derived. However, that is not what is done in the proof—explicitly or in effect. What is done is to show that there can be no constraint on the states accessed by the universe. The only ‘constraint’ could be, for example, that of contradiction which is not a constraint at all. ‘A ball cannot be red and not-red’ is not a constraint. To think that it is a constraint is rather like the ‘constraint’ that the universe must be the universe. The previous sentence could be a constraint if the meanings of ‘universe’ in its two occurrences were different but it would not be a constraint on either of the individual meanings. Thus the no-constraint idea is identified with logic. Now the modern history of logic has revealed that there are many logics. Even though some of those logics, e.g. the propositional calculus, are more basic than others, this presents the idea that logic is the one law of the universe with a problem. There is a further problem that unless the axioms of logic are specified with care, logic will be paradoxical rather than ‘logical.’ The way out of this concern has already been suggested. The notion discussed here provides a concept of logic and that is why it has been labeled Logic. The concept is specified implicitly and work has to be done in order to see the relation between Logic and the logics. Further, the concept of Logic is shown to provide a benchmark for logics. This thought has not yet been developed to its full potential but there are some suggestions for how it might work and one key point is that, Logic must have definite reference to the world in the same way that science or the statement ‘that apple is red’ has reference to the world with the exception that while science and ‘that apple is red’ have application to a limited part of the world, Logic has no limit of application

The theory of objects

One consequence is that it is pivotal in developing a theory of objects. The problem of external objects is that the experience of the object and the object are distinct and there is no way to guarantee faithfulness of the experience or concept to an object. Of course, since we live in the world there has to be some practical faithfulness but how is that to be understood and is there nothing more than approximate faithfulness. The theory of objects that is developed shows that there are two classes of object that may be labeled ‘necessary’ and ‘practical.’ The necessary objects are those whose being is guaranteed by experience as being defined in experience. Examples are being itself, the universe or all being, the void or absence of being, and domains of being, i.e., parts of the universe. Though the examples are trivial, each example forms the basis of profound consequences that are explored in Metaphysics. Regarding the practical objects of everyday experience whether common or scientific—a mountain, an apple, the objects of quantum theory—it is argued that practical acquaintance is good enough; this argument is reasonable enough and should be surprising. However, it is further argued, and by this point the argument is able to assume a trivial form, that where practical knowledge is all that is to be had, to expect more is unreasonable, and that the limit on practical knowledge is ‘good’ in that it shows doors to further discovery and adventure. There is a non-trivial part to the argument and that occurs in showing without reference to the science of perception or quantum theory that, in an absolutely indeterministic universe, there must be limits to the faithfulness of knowledge in general. However it is also observed and shown that it is only in an indeterministic world that form and knowledge may arise as a matter of course, i.e., with some degree of probability; that in an absolutely indeterministic world, form and knowledge must arise; and that in a deterministic world, if form and knowledge are not given at the outset, they cannot arise

The metaphysics enables the development of two further aspects of the theory of objects. The first concerns the nature of abstract objects and their distinction from concrete objects. While a mountain is a concrete object and ‘one mountain’ appears concrete enough, what kind of a thing is the number ‘one?’ Can the number ‘one’ be touched, seen or located in space? Apparently not. If the number ‘one’ is an object, e.g. if it is more than an idea, it must be abstract. Some thinkers doubt that ‘one’ is an object—they doubt that it exists. However, the metaphysics shows that every consistent concept must have reference, i.e., to every consistent concept there must correspond an object in the universe. This shows, first, that numbers do exist and, second, that any categorical distinction between abstract and concrete objects is illusory. There are of course subtleties to the argument—it should explain where an abstract object is located and this and other concerns are addressed in the narrative. More importantly, the conflation of the concrete with the abstract appears absurd as well as to contradict the tradition of thought regarding abstract objects. Surely, there is some difference between the kind of thing that a mountain is and the kind of thing that a number is. Some subtlety is required to address this question but what is shown is that the distinction is not one of kind but one of the approaches to study. Both abstract and concrete objects can be studied empirically or conceptually but abstract objects lend themselves to conceptual study and are, therefore, studied conceptually while concrete objects are best studied empirically. However, one could study the concept of an apple conceptually even though the study might not reveal much. The case of number is interesting. It is probable that before the idea of number came the idea of one thing, two things and so on. In all likelihood the properties may have been studied empirically—one apple and one banana make two fruit and so on. At some point though it was discovered that the study of number could not get very far empirically and that conceptual study led to much empowerment. Thus began the symbolic study of number, at first perhaps only as iconic representations in the mind of the thinker or perhaps as marks on the ground. Much later it was seen how to develop number systems axiomatically and the abstract study of number took off. The metaphysics however, shows that if the axiomatic study is consistent it must have representation. That the study of ‘abstract’ objects need not be ever symbolic or conceptual is seen in the return to empirical study of number in computational approaches to number theory and the computational approach shows not only the empirical side to what has to all intents become abstract but it also shows how the power of the conceptual approach can, perhaps unexpectedly, be rivaled by the empirical

The point the distinction between the abstract and the concrete is that abstract objects lend themselves to conceptual study and concrete objects are best studied empirically should, perhaps, restated so as to emphasize what has been learned. There is no distinction among intrinsic kinds of objects but when an object is best studied empirically it may be labeled concrete and when the best study is conceptual the object may be labeled abstract. It may be added as a peripheral point that scientific theories are neat in that they are—often—best studied with a combination of conceptual and empirical approaches

The second consequence of the metaphysics for the theory objects is that, together with a study of the categories of intuition, it enables the development of a system of classes of object. That is, the metaphysics enhances enormously the study of the variety of objects