2008 EDITION
Source material for Social world
ANIL MITRA, COPYRIGHT © 2008
CONTENTS
Material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
Experimental character of the concepts
The general issue of separation / purity
Institutional definition—conceptual and factual—is an immense conceptual and experimental project
The occasion for ethical system or theory
Emotion and cognition in morals
The process and context of choice—and freedom
Intrinsic and derived value. Absolute Ethics
Material from Journey in Being-New World-essence.html
The social world provides—one—context for individual meaning and commitment. Commitment is commitment to the production of values deemed worthwhile. It is not the case that meaning is absolute meaning or that commitment guarantees outcome. However, commitment is instrumental in outcome and meaning is the place that outcome and effort may be appreciated. In addition to the provision of context, institutions make possible works that are beyond the power of an isolated individual
In Social world, the ideas of society, culture and institution are developed from enumeration of the possible kinds of group interaction in light of the Metaphysics and the nature of Human being. The significance for the journey is that the group, the Social world is, in the elaboration of its nature, one object of interest—an object that undertakes a journey, and for the individual it is both ground and support
In sociology, culture is often used to refer to the sum of learned and transmitted human knowledge, belief and behavior
A central idea is that human freedom is a contributing factor in the makeup of the human social world. It is not suggested that there is any set of determining factors for it is unlikely that such a set could be found; and it is not thought that individual freedom is necessary for all societies—human and non-human. However, it is part of the central idea that human freedom is essential for some aspects of human society—and the thought is that that freedom is essential to the self-determining aspects of human society (again, it is not suggested that there is complete determination by any set of factors.) Human freedoms of thought—linguistic and other—and action contribute to human culture and it is human culture that defines and binds the various aspects of human society that acquire their structure in the form of institutions
A dynamic scene may be described in terms of state, process and genesis. Therefore:
The institutional forms are defined by action—and choice—and organization or structure; and the founding or genetic institution—culture that includes, reflexively, the institution of the institution
Language, religion and morals and ritual and play, and drama and art, and science and the humanities…
Discovery or creation and origination.
Transmission includes education and archive. In the modern world these institutions items are often but not at all entirely or solely concentrated in the university (and library)
Family, community…
The immanent structures of society and social groups—Economic, Political and Legal
Completeness
From the components of a dynamic scene, culture, organization, and action constitute a complete system at a high level of generality. As a generic term, ‘Social group’ is generically but not explicitly complete for organization. Social groups may be seen as groups that are social entities—microcosms of society—such as community and family and special purpose such as organizations whose functions are economic, political and legal. Action is social and (roughly) physical. Political and legal institutions are institutions of group choice and action including. Economics as analysis of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services has concern with the interface of social groups and the physical level. The intent of this discussion of completeness has been to show a rough and non-exclusive rather than a neat and necessary completeness
There is clear interaction among morals, politics and economics. The following definitions are repeated or suggested
Politics is the process of group decision—and action; government is a political institution
The immanent forms of feasibility, especially in human affairs, are labeled Economics; economics is the study of Economics. In this sense economics includes the ‘common’ economics of the previous paragraph that is suggested by the possibility of generalized application of economic theory
It is clear that Economics and Politics should (and do) intersect for feasibility is a determining factor of political process. Similarly, Ethics and Economics must intersect. Even purely ethical concerns have an economic aspect when the ethical concerns are in conflict. Additionally, equal or equitable distribution of values (education, goods…) is subject to economic constraints such as conservation—resources are finite—and human motivation in the access of provided values. Legal questions of deterrent have an Economic flavor—in the extended sense of economics
Political theory, political philosophy and the study of economics arise from the interest to understand and perhaps to improve social institutions. In this process a certain study is labeled ‘politics’ and another ‘economics.’ Later, the notions may be refined andor expanded. The notions are found to be interactive and may have overlap. The very concept of what is economics may change in response to the needs of and learning from study and application—and from the needs of completeness. Thus, neither sense nor reference of terms such as economics and politics is given. In this sense, the fundamental concepts within social theory are experimental. It may be thought that the natural sciences e.g. physics and biology are not themselves empirical objects; that however is at least partially contingent and a breakthrough in analytical or computational methods could blur the boundary between physics and biology and although it is commonly thought that biological structures—e.g. human minds—cannot change such things as structure of elementary particles and laws of physics and this is indeed the normal situation, the metaphysics of immanence shows it to be both possible and necessary if infinitesimally probable
Economic power confers strength and therefore political power—large corporations wield immense political power. Is such institutional crossover unavoidable? Is it good / bad for economics, for politics, for society? Is it morally right / wrong? These questions are difficult to answer even in very specific situations. Applied to ‘crossover’ among any set of institutions the difficulty may be multiplicatively—perhaps exponentially—higher. It is not clear, of course, that crossover has meaning in every institutional context. Answers are further complicated by the fact that there is a tendency to make an assumption about one institution when discussing others. It might be thought that it is morally wrong for a corporation to use political power but is it intrinsically wrong or does the wrong stem from an assumption about the most effective social organization? Does a wealthy individual have the right to greater buying power and the greater political power that that might entail? Perhaps, it may be argued, since the existence of corporations depends on a law that confers advantages so that—at least idealistically—all can benefit from economic productivity, the corporation has a greater responsibility in the use of its power. The same, or something similar, however, may be argued of the wealthy individual. What, however, if the corporation or the wealthy person use their power for good? What if the corporation or person uses their power to become economically more powerful? It appears that what is economically, politically, socially good / bad may need case by case evaluation and that the most corporate law can actually do is set up rough guidelines (even while it thinks it is doing something else.) The example also suggests that it is—at least practically—impossible for a corporation to not use economic power to political ends (purchase of raw materials has a political component.) The example further suggests that while the political / economic distinction is real to suggest that politics and economics define distinct categories is in error
As a second example consider a society in which there is a general belief that religion and secular affairs should be separate—while ‘church’ and ‘state’ may be separated by law, it is hard to see how law could separate religion and secular affairs and it is not possible for human fiat to separate the sacred and the profane even though it might separate the ideas of the sacred and of the profane. In this society there are various kinds of abuse. The people are disempowered, they are abused by the police when they speak out politically, their economic product is taken by the government without fair return, and the power of government is abusive at home and abroad. The people are religious and revere their clergy who therefore also have political and economic power (donation.) What are the moral uses of clerical power?
There are examples of such questions in War and Peace and Faith
The following thoughts arise: Although there are practical reasons for institutional separation—division of function, expertise, administration, abuse—the concept of institutional purity is more myth than fact. The problem of institutional definition and separation is immense in its magnitude and any actual resolution should, perhaps, be case by case and even so should perhaps be experimental in addition to deriving from expertise, morals, law and administrative needs
The triad genesis-organization-action contains implicit dynamics at two levels. Theoretical economics contains a number of dynamic theories and models—descriptive and quantitative. In the definitions a number of interactive dynamics within and among institutions are implicit. War and peace includes some qualitative dynamics. Further study and development of dynamics of or in society—social systems—is a research project
An ethics or set of morals addresses questions of ‘what one ought to do,’ ‘how one ought to live.’ This formulation suggests that morals concern individual behavior and individual life; however, perhaps as a result of global interaction / communication / comparison, ethics has grown to also emphasize individual behavior and group / social action in group / social / world contexts. The basic questions, then may be extended to ‘What ought I / to we do?’ and ‘How ought I / we to live?’
An ethical or moral system is an ethics that covers a comprehensive range of situations in which the ‘ought’ question arises and a comprehensive range of satisfactory life-styles, perhaps arranged in a value hierarchy. The term ‘ethics’ may be used in place of ‘ethical system.’ An ethics may take the form of a set of prescriptions of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors—you shall not kill—andor a set of principles—do to others as you would have them do to you—andor an ethical theory. An ethical theory may be seen as a generic principle or collection of generic principles
As a disposition to certain—kinds of—behaviors or acts and to seeking certain—kinds of—ends, morals, prescriptions and principles are states of being and therefore objects. An ethical system is a collection of objects that may be seen as a compound object
In philosophy, the generic term Ethics refers to the study and evaluation of ethical systems which include ancient and traditional systems as well as ethical theories. As a collection of dispositions, Ethics is an object
The occasion for ethics is freedom. It may have been appropriate to include consideration of ethics / morals in Human being but, since moral systems have cultural expression—but are not mere artifacts of culture and may therefore have universal elements—it is effective to consider ethics here in Social world. Undoubtedly, individuals in non-human societies have built in behavioral tendencies—some with basis in emotion—against mutual harm; individuals of other species do occasional but not merely accidental harm one another and so what is built in is, in general, at most a tendency that averts ‘excessive’ harm—which situation may be the result of a balance among ‘competing’ tendencies. Human beings also have such built in tendencies, e.g. a near universal feeling of warmth at seeing an infant. As human freedom developed so did the ability and occasions to override innate tendencies
Human freedom, it was earlier noted, is the ability to conceive different outcomes, to choose from among them, and to effect that choice and has basis—among other things—in novel concept formation. It was also noted that exercise of freedom was difficult and one source of difficulty is in overriding innate tendencies. This is one source of a need for morals. If it were the only source, morality might be a conceptual substitute for—perhaps even nothing other than—innate tendencies e.g. primary emotions. However, a significant result of human freedom is the creation of novel cultural—including technology and social arrangement—contexts. Here, the innate tendencies are inadequate; therefore human moral systems cannot depend on conceptual and symbolic formulation of innate tendencies and primary emotions alone. Precisely here, incidentally, lies the crux of argument against an entirely emotive explanation of human morality—as well as an argument in favor of a partially emotive explanation. The assertion that human freedom is the occasion for human morals and ethical systems to arise and to have application may make it seem that it is being said that freedom preceded morals; it seems more reasonable, however, that freedom and morals grew together as mutually necessary elements of emerging and developing culture
Ethics in particular and value in general has a universal character as a potential object, i.e., a concept that is the universal potential object
Anthropological study—Ethics in small-scale societies, George Silberbauer, in A Companion to Ethics, Peter Singer, ed., 1991—suggest that in small groups morals are more negotiable and less ends in themselves; their function appears to be the enhancement of personal relationships. In modern society, morals tend to be ends and are less are less negotiable; personal relationships are less important—stability derives from institutionalization of various functions and moral creativity is concentrated in specific persons, institutions and times. This is perhaps a function of difficulties in the coordination of shared morals in large societies by interpersonal relations alone. Here, then, lies a possible explanation of the origin of the moral component of ‘world religions.’ The transition from the traditional codes to ethical theory may be explained by increasing communication and interaction among societies with different traditions and emergence of rationalism in the modern period that dates from the ‘enlightenment;’ clarification and order among ethical theory may be enhanced by the professionalization of thought in academic institutions
Emotion which may be regarded as a form of binding—including binding to others by empathy—is clearly essential to morals. Emotion is perhaps the foundation of moral intuition and it is not obvious that moral intuition is more than the cognitive expression of the emotive component of morals. The occasion for development of ethical systems over and above ethical intuition is human freedom that may override intuition in old contexts and is instrumental in creation of new contexts that are not in the ‘domain of reference’ of intuition. The cognitive formulation of ethical system has been criticized on account of its alienation from moral intuition and emotion. This criticism does not take into account the significance and effect of human freedom. The cognitive component of ethics is not free floating and has binding through reason, through experience in the use of ethical system—at least potentially, and through maintaining continuities with tradition and moral intuition which remain important
Some persons are persuaded by emotion and others more by reason. Therefore, even an individual who has no intrinsic care for reasons, will be interested in reasons if they would persuade. Everyone who has an interest in morals has some interest in reason—even if the interest is derivative
Since freedom is pivotal in morals, it may be useful to examine its process. Situations arise in which there are options—there is occasion for alternative outcomes over which there is some control. The options may be presented to andor created by the actor—individual or group. The intended outcome may be act andor an end or outcome of an act. The process may be roughly written, options ® choice ® intent ® action ® end… The ellipsis indicate that the ethical context is not necessarily terminating and the generic process is continuing over either similar options (especially when the end or outcome is similar to the original situation) or different ones. The intent is an intended action andor which, since control is typically less than total, may be distinct from the actual action andor end. A number of such processes may occur simultaneously
Any element of a process that has elements of—expression of—freedom may have moral value. Each element—or even combination of elements—of the process may be constituted of sub-processes. This is especially the case for action which may be compound and extended. What is the limit of resolution into sub-processes? It is perhaps when the elements are so fine grained that they do not possess—clear—moral value
If the options are simply presented to an actor or actors without his or her or their choice, moral value may not be not assigned to the options for that actor(s.) If the actor is active in creating options, e.g. conceiving, designing, building and accumulating instruments of war, the options—their creation and ongoing existence—may have moral value (positive or negative.) Choice and intent are not invariably distinct but they may be so when there is a time prior to actual intent in which the options are weighed without commitment. Even when choice and intent are distinct, the process of choice may have moral value when options that have moral value are allowed to remain—or removed from—among those from which choice will be made. This moral value may, however, be assigned to the options rather than choice. Intent has clear moral value
The distinction between ‘action’ and ‘ends’ may be sharp but is not invariably so. Action and ends may both have clear moral value to the degree that they are under control. The ‘right’ is a common label for the moral value of an act—which can be right or wrong; the ‘good’ is, similarly, a label for the moral value of an end or state of being—which may be good or bad. The ‘assignment’ of moral value is complicated by the fact that elements of the process have physical and psychic dimensions—at least practically though not ultimately. Options may be physical and psychic; choosing and intending are psychic; without a psychic dimension, e.g. choice andor intent, apparent action is not true action; the character of ends is complex for some ends are states of psyche, e.g. happiness or loyalty, while those that are physical, e.g. more food may be doubted to count as having moral value unless there is some impact in human experience. If freedom is the occasion for morals, experience is perhaps—perhaps with emphasis on ‘perhaps’—the place of moral value
‘Evil’ may be the label for an act, an actor predisposed to or with a history of wrong actions or bad intentions; however, on account of the problematicity of the concept of evil, the narrative will not focus on it
Does lack of clear distinction between acts and ends imply lack of clear distinction between the good and the right? Not necessarily for when the outcome of an act is another act or state of action, the second act or state may also be regarded as an end. In an ethical system, what is regarded as good or intrinsically desirable, may be explicit or implicit. The right, then, refers purely to action, i.e. to what an individual or institutional agent should do in responding to or cultivating the good. Thus ethical systems or theories contain systems of theories of the good and systems or theories of the right
Consequentialism is the view that what is right is the promotion of the good. An ethical system is consequentialist—an older term is teleological—if its theory of right is the promotion of the good. An objection to consequentialism is that it appears to permit deviation from the good in promoting the—larger—good, i.e. that it appears to assert that ‘the good end justifies the means.’ This, however, is not a consequence of consequentialism for if the means is neutral with regard to the good the statement is irrelevant and if not then there is no a priori justification of means; rather there is or may be an issue of conflicting goods to be resolved—whose resolution may be already implicit in the theory of the good or, alternatively, may be lacking in which case the system is incomplete or impossible in which case the system may be conflicted or paradoxical. The objection, therefore, is not an objection of principle against consequentialism but may require some consequentialist theories to be completed and others to be made consistent
The alternative to consequentialist ethical systems are the non-consequentialist in which action has moral supremacy in that moral value is determined more by action than by—other kinds of—ends. One kind of non-consequentialist ethics is the—strictly—deontological in which the good lies entirely in the right; here the good must be honored and not merely promoted. There are variations and may be alternatives in approach to the conceptions of consequentialism / non-consequentialism; the present approach attempts to eliminate a priori confusion in the distinction
The discussion so far clearly provides no explicit moral system—and is not intended to do so. How is the good or right to be set up and how is the consequentialist / non-consequentialist choice to be made—when it is indeed a choice? Are there deep or deeper principles that generate practical ethics? Such questions raise the issue of the nature of ethics and ethical reasoning—over and above logic—and may be labeled metaethical: metaethics is the study of the nature of ethics—the nature of moral concepts, judgment, principle and theory. Whereas in ethics moral judgment is the object, in metaethics, ethics itself is the object
In contrast to metaethics which is the study of ethics and ethical systems and concepts, ethical systems that specify systems of right and good have been labeled ‘normative ethics’
Although developments in—philosophical—ethics have made improved understanding possible, there appears to remain a gap between ethical ideas and application—and applicability. When ethics is seen as an object, it may be studied / deployed from the concept side i.e. abstractly or from the object—particular, concrete—side as in ‘applied ethics.’ The gap between object and concept sides suggests that philosophical ethics and perhaps even practical human ethics have not—completely—matured. In the history of philosophy, the separation of areas of study as sciences is perhaps characterized by contact being made by the concept and the object side of study
Most theoreticians appear to have a preferred orientation—consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However, the distinction is not always clear in practice and the arguments for or against consequentialism are not entirely persuasive (else everyone would be one or everyone would be the other.) Perhaps the best approach is to take every situation as it arises but not, however, to ignore its relations to other situations or its place in the hierarchy of contexts. Nor should ethical concepts and principles be ignored but they should perhaps, at least on account of their incompleteness, not be taken to stand entirely above—or below—situation and context. The considerations in War and peace give support to this approach
Feeling—experience—appears to be the place of value. The value of non-feeling states—the inanimate beauty of the Himalaya or a crate of penicillin—may be regarded as derived. However, if feeling is the place of value all animal being has such a place but rocks and crystals do not. This is the normal view. From metaphysics of immanence, however, every element of being has at least primitive and remote experience. In an ‘innate’ human morality, there must be some natural tendency to place human being at the center of value and it is probably unlikely for any practical ethics to make no distinction between human and other mammals, between mammals and other vertebrates and so on down to inanimate objects. However, if realization and transformation with any ultimate component is a goal, i.e. if normal limits are not regarded as absolute, the practical—normal—hierarchy of value must be seen as limited. In systems that seek to universalize value, animal being has intrinsic value. Is there certainty about what states—except those characterized by the most neutral of descriptions—have value and in what degree? No—and this must have something to do with incomplete knowledge of what states are possible and what value may inhere according to what measure in yet unrealized states. In thinking that a satisfactory ethical system has been arrived at, a metaphysics—at least practically and implicitly—is regarded as given. Plato developed an ethics in the context of form
A common ‘belief’ today, c.2008, is that the universe is roughly as described in the ‘big-bang’ cosmology, and that our world is essentially the secular world of material things and secular or non-spiritual value. What has value and in what ranking according to what system is not regarded as precisely known because, in part, of incompletely known possibilities of the secular world. The metaphysics of immanence suggests that that there is an absolute ethics. To explicitly know that ethics and its significance for human being, it is necessary to know at least the possible and feasible transformations of human form and feeling and though it is known from metaphysics of immanence that the possibilities are immense, only the rudiments of a detailed pictures and paths are known. Still, it is reasonable to think that even if the sense of ‘ethics’ in absolute ethics is not alien, its reference is immensely remote from the normal view of human being as living in a secular world and that even a Platonic ethics is only a metaphor for the possibilities of reference
Is the ‘beautiful’ a value? Many, perhaps most, persons consider the beautiful and its cultivation to be of value. However, does the beautiful have moral value? Axiology or—general—value theory seeks to identify, clarify and compare ‘values’ such as moral, economic, aesthetic, epistemic and even logical value. Aesthetic value—the value of the beautiful—may be considered to be a special case of ethical value. If so, it is necessary to ask, on the assumption that a strict distinction exists, how a choice might be made between the purely aesthetic and the strictly moral. The question might arise in deliberating the allocation of finite resources to aesthetic projects versus elimination of hunger. One resolution might be in ‘assigning’ the strictly moral projects a higher value. However, there should be some limit to such an assignment because at least some people might not consider a life in which only material needs are satisfied to be worth living. In any case, the connection between ethical and aesthetic value is sufficiently tenuous that any tension between them typically surfaces only when imbalance in priorities is excessive. Is there a connection between knowledge and ethics i.e. not only obviously as in the choice of what areas of knowledge are worth developing but in the question whether ethical concerns have any role in clarifying the nature of knowledge—in determining what counts as knowledge? Ethics appears to have some role in determining the role of certainty in knowledge. A value of security emphasizes certainty; the value of realization may lessen the value of certainty in favor knowledge that, though less certain, may have greater realization or other utility
Values may compete logically in that the cultivation of one value necessarily eliminates the other—as in moral dilemmas which may be eliminated in a theoretical system but which continue to be real problems due, not to ignorance, but to conflicted andor different values. A particularly case of logical competition arises in political realism which is the position that national interest—at least sometimes—comes before individual interest. While this position is maintained by the political realist, it is difficult to maintain strictly by those whose ethical strain is less ‘pure.’ What is the status of political realism in contrast to individualism in morals which is the position that all values derive from the individual and group interest is nothing more than joint individual interest. That individualism is an extreme that may appear to be reasonable but political realism has the following kinds of counter-claim. In the first place, as may be seen from Theory of being, a nation—group—may be regarded to be an organism. Even if the individual is the locus of right, the individual may assign his or her right to the group; this raises the question of the status of a few individuals who do not so assign their rights even when the majority does. A calculus of individual rights may contingently if not necessarily work out—in particular contexts—to a national right… national right may be a mechanism to guarantee individual right. And, what is considered to be an individual right or good may not be feasible in the group. If political realism encourages or permits abuse, individualism may do so as well
Another kind of competition among values arises when a value appears to be reasonable but its application to all—universalization is often held to be a requirement of values in moral systems—individuals would be infeasible. What, for example, is the proper attitude to opportunities such as higher education that promote the general interest including individual well being but cannot, perhaps, be available to all? Should economics effect what is of value and not just the degree to which a value is realized in a given society? The thought may be rejected as base but is not such rejection itself a moral value? What is the real value of a freedom such as reproductive freedom when the outcome is a population problem that limits resource availability, may be implicated in war and global warming, and whose long term consequences may be disastrous?
Although both conservative and, especially, liberal may enjoy moral purity, is not such purity an instance of the habit of substance thinking whose result is narrowness of vision and inability to resolve paradox and conflict
Another instance of the habit of substance thinking in ethics is found in ethical principles such as killing is always wrong. It is of course not the purpose of the following discussion to argue against the principle or to question its practical value. The purpose is to analyze the nature of the principle. The principle obviously does not apply to an accidental cause of death. It applies to a choice, an intent to kill and a consequent act of killing. Some religions prohibit all killing including killing non-humans. Is it wrong to shoot a lion that is about to kill a human infant? Is it wrong to kill another person in self-defense when there is no other option except to allow oneself to be killed? Would it be wrong for a member of a community to kill a person who was about to kill everyone in the community including himself? If killing is said to be universally wrong, not everyone will agree. An argument from ethical principle may be made against all acts of killing even in the face of killing but, again, such arguments run against counter argument. It might be said that it is not certain that a killer was about to kill and that killing the killer was necessary to prevent killing everyone in the community; however, waiting for certain knowledge results in universal inaction. The idea of intending to kill is close to the idea of murder. Is murder invariably wrong? The intent behind definitions of murder—which differ according to legal system—is that murder should be invariably wrong. In Anglo-American law, murder is a homicide committed intentionally, while manslaughter is homicide that is the result of recklessness or a violent outburst e.g. when provoked by the victim. Taking, intentional homicide as specifying the sense of murder, is the killing of a sleeping member of an enemy army murder? Numerous examples could be given that show, not that the idea that murder is heinous should be retracted, but that given any fixed definition of murder, there are likely to be acts that satisfy the definition of murder but not the intuition that the act, even if reprehensible, should not be regarded as murder—other examples are mercy killing that is not regarded as murder in European law but is so in Anglo-American law and ‘assisted suicide’ that is not regarded as murder in all jurisdictions. In conclusion, general proclamations such as ‘all X is wrong’ have at least two functions—to function as prohibitive and to provide a community with a sense of security; however, to regard the proclamation itself as universal, as substance, is a categorial error in that it equates, e.g., the category of morality and a specific category ‘X’ that is defined ‘objectively’ and so does not contain the category of morality even if there is intent to capture moral sense
In a previous version, ethics was treated as the most comprehensive object. The motivating idea was that except for freedom and choice, there is but deterministic behavior and deterministic objects are not very interesting in their poverty of potential and variety. Although there is no reason to reject the ideas behind that treatment, it was based in the idea of an object as actual. If objects are understood to include potential, then it is not necessary to think, rather unclearly, of ethics as a more general kind of object
To regard values as objects, think of their function. As choice emerges in behavior, it may have both creative and destabilizing potential and value may emerge as stabilizing. Thus values and the ability for values to emerge may be seen as self-stabilizing characteristics of systems. This does not mean that values will not promote freedom, creativity and so on for excess stability in one area or level of activity may result in stagnation and destabilizing in others. Perhaps, however, stability is not the appropriate concept. A system is in the process of realizing potential; values have emerged as conducive to that process—and include morals and other stabilizing features but are not limited to these. Because context—environment—may change in unpredicted and perhaps unpredictable ways, values that are too determined may be destructive. Adaptability and creativity in value emerge. Even though precisely what value is an adaptation to and whether adaptation reigns absolute are not given, there is some rough ‘objective’ that value emerges from and conduces to. That rough objective contains indeterminate features and therefore, value has indeterminate aspects including openness to the indeterminate which includes humor—discussed earlier as an element of intuition. As a property, though not a determinate one, value may be seen as an indeterminate object or, rather, an object with determinate and indeterminate features