The original aim of the document was to complement metaphysics with epistemology, for metaphysics as knowledge of the real is without justification if it just posits knowledge. Epistemology—the nature, validity, and justification of knowledge—is a necessary complement to metaphysics.

In fact, metaphysics and epistemology ought not to be considered distinct, for (i) metaphysics ought to carry with it its justification, and (ii) knowledge is in the world and therefore the study of knowledge ought to be at least a topic in metaphysics.

Further, we ought to be interested in the value of knowledge; therefore, in connection with metaphysics, we ought to be interested in ethics. Axiology is the study of value and includes (a) the nature of values (b) ethics and aesthetics, which overlap, for ethics is about desirable vs undesirable states of being and what constitute the states and desirability; and aesthetics is about what states are beautiful and how and why and their desirability.

But ethics may also in part determine what criteria knowledge ought to have, for while it is often tacit that knowledge ought to be certain in order to be considered to be knowledge (i) perhaps certainty is impossible at all (as held in Pyrrhonic skepticism) (ii) even if some certain knowledge is possible, certainty is certainly not always possible, but use of incompletely certain knowledge may be better than rejecting that knowledge

Finally, how we reason or arrive at valid conclusions, or logic in a general sense is an important endeavor. And though logic may be seen as part of epistemology, we follow tradition in naming it as among the major branches of philosophy.

What we find is that, under the real metaphysics, this binding together of metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, logic, and science (meaning science and its philosophy), under one umbrella, philosophy, is even tighter than suggested above. It is an essential unity.

The program of the document is as follows. First, we provide meanings of the terms; the aim is not to cover all aspects of the received meanings, but to define the terms relative to the real metaphysics. This is not ad hoc for (i) there will be significant overlap between the present and the received meanings, uses, and contents (ii) it provides a coherent and grounded logic of the meanings and natures of the terms. Then, second, we show how the ‘disciplines’ are bound together as one.

Philosophy

What is philosophy?

Knowledge is valuable, not just because it illuminates the world (the aesthetic), but also because we depend on it in choice and execution of action (the ethical). Relative to both the aesthetic and the ethical, reliability is important. Knowledge becomes philosophical when we question its nature, its reach, and its validity—and when we attempt to address these issues.

When a culture has a tradition of knowledge—and all cultures do—a tradition of philosophy may arise. This is especially true when oral traditions are supplemented by written tradition.

In some cultures, the lines of development of a sophisticated philosophy may be such that the philosophy of other cultures does not appear to be philosophy; this thought is neither valid nor invalid—it is relative.

Philosophy is a written tradition of man and culture, become self-aware, and consequent progress via cultivated imagination and criticism (imagination and criticism are in interaction, for each enhances the nature and content of both, and both are essential).

How does a tradition of philosophy arise? The question sheds light on what philosophy is. Let us look at western philosophy.

The origins of philosophy

The account will be somewhat speculative.

The evolution of the human mind is one ‘singularity’ in the evolution of being (there are prior and parallel singularities, but for the purpose of this section the human mind needs to be the focus).

Our mind gives us a relatively high degree of freedom from instinct. It is both the occasion and source of need for explicit knowledge of the world, accounts of what lies beyond, informal reason, and ethics. In small societies these are formulated and passed on in oral tradition and the culture of behavior.

In larger societies there is a need for something more tangible and permanent. A written and institutional tradition emerges. Schools and institutions of religion emerge. The early tradition is based on authority and dogma.

Then, some individuals reflect on the process itself. There is a freeing from and break with authority and dogma. But what replaces them? If religious cosmology is a set of stories regarding what is beyond the world, metaphysics begins with grounding in the world itself (Thales theory that the substance of the world is water—naïve to us, but fundamental in being a break from speculative dogma). If we need a cultural ethics that began with a moral code, human beings can then reflect on what morality is about and how it may be formulated in terms of principles and reason and based on observation). If this early development is not fully conscious (even if it is everywhere, ‘water’ is speculative). The process becomes more self-reflective. A logic emerges (and much later explicit epistemology). But we can see how the philosophical disciplines emerge interactively—metaphysics is about the world, epistemology is about how to reason about and know the world, philosophical logic is about reasoning generally, ethics is about how to behave in the world, and since all these elements are in the world (knowledge is not something that is outside the universe), while knowledge grows upward and laterally, it also reaches down to foundations, which, perhaps, may escape the shackles of original hypotheses (as is found in the real metaphysics.

Parallel to these rather formal developments, there remain questions such as What is our nature in the universe, what is our destination, how may we get there, what is the significance of our being in the world—if it is only a brief stay bounded by birth and death? This may be called ‘philosophy of life’.

There are roughly two widespread views on a philosophy of life. The first is religious—religion is the answer (religious philosophy though not philosophy of religion is about justifying and explaining religious views). In the second, secular view, the answer is that meaning is to be found in this world. It is only since the Age of Enlightenment that philosophy began to be disentangled from religion and it is only in the twentieth century that there was a complete break (which was of course for many but not all philosophers and others). Major reasons for the break were (i) the rise of science (ii) the idea of self-founding or at least foundation independent of dogma for philosophy (iii) education and relative economic self-sufficiency and liberty for many. Science came to be seen as the master of the what the world is about. It became widespread that the world itself was not the domain of philosophy and though this was not universal, philosophy in the twentieth century, when it was about the world, was to be in the service of science. Philosophical reflection on the meaning of life was (i) secular—meaning is to be found in this life and this world (ii) where the secular was not felt to be enough the answer was to be found in existentialism and nihilism, which emphasized how to deal with the loss of meaning in the contraction of the world from religious to secular cosmology.

However, as seen in the real metaphysics, while science has truth, it is far from the whole truth regarding (i) the extent of the universe (and the kinds of being in it) and (ii) the nature of being, particularly, of our place in a hierarchy of being and becoming. Thus, philosophy and metaphysics for the world and for living break free from the nineteenth and century dogmatic attitudes toward science (which though not universal were widespread, especially in that tacit thought of non-religious persons). Furthermore, it is seen in the real metaphysics, that while we are limited beings, we can know the boundaries of being (the greatest possibility), regarding how the boundary is filled we may know some rough details and some perhaps general paradigms.

Parallel to this and unsurprisingly, given twentieth century speculative metaphysics of Whitehead and the general reaction against metaphysics, there is in the work of twenty-first philosophers such as Graham Priest, Markus Gabriel, Laureano Ralón, and Gregory S. Moss (as in the work Everything and Nothing by Gabriel and Priest), an emerging metaphysics that may be labeled ‘real’ rather than speculative, idealist, materialist, or dogmatic.

Therefore, philosophy returns to also being about the world and consequently about more than the meaning of life as seen in existentialism and nihilism.

Philosophy of the meaning of life is perhaps core philosophy as much as the formal subjects of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and axiology.

What is the value of philosophy?

The values include insight into the nature of the world, the human condition, and the use of knowledge.

However, knowledge is more than a system, it is a living entity which remains in interaction with action in the world.

Philosophy of life (‘the meaning of life’)

What is it that gives life meaning (see The Meaning of Life—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)? What is meaning in this sense (we have some idea what it might mean but the meaning of meaning in this sense may be enhanced and clarified by reflection)? And is such meaning individual and secular or is it also social, cultural, civilizational, and transsecular?

We are not suggesting that the philosophy of the meaning of life is of greater or lesser value than the and the disciplines of academic philosophy. Rather, they are mutually informing and guiding.

What are the main disciplines of philosophy?

Generally, and for the purpose of this document, the main disciplines are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic (logic is understood in a philosophical sense that is more than formal logic and includes reasoning in general).

Where does science fit into this scheme? In real metaphysics, it is tacit that there is significant (i) rational metaphysics (ii) speculative metaphysics. Rational metaphysics is well founded without speculative elements. Speculative metaphysics is not merely speculative but hypothesizes or speculates upon some elements of the metaphysics and subjects it to rational and experiential (empirical) criticism. Rational metaphysics is certain (perhaps we may allow some uncertain elements, but these and their consequences ought to be segregated from the certain). On the other hand, speculative metaphysics need not have certain application to the entire universe but has good enough application within a realm of the universe, e.g., ‘the world’. Under speculative metaphysics, the division into science and metaphysics is not definite, but science emphasizes the empirical without exception so far.

Metaphysics

Metaphysics is knowledge of the real; it goes without saying, that certainty is a critical value, a (seemingly) small uncertainty, may yield results that are wildly untrue in their nature or as a result of compounding of error. Yet, as seen in the real metaphysics, there is definite value to good enough knowledge, especially when framed by the perfect.

Epistemology

Epistemology is (a discipline whose study is that of) knowledge of knowledge.

Western epistemology has arrived at the following content to epistemology—it studies what knowledge is (the nature of knowledge), its origin or sources, its scope, its value, justification of knowledge (‘epistemic justification’), belief and its grounding or rationality (such as that rationality may be)… …

What is knowledge?

Let us begin naïvely. Even naïvely, we admit that there is some knowledge of good enough quality in some sense, for we know that in knowing we are enabled in successful action (which may include further knowing).

But that does not tell us what knowledge is. Continuing naïvely, when I think I know something, I may picture myself picturing something in the world. So, I may naïvely conclude, that when I know I picture or model the world (similarly, knowledge in a book is also a kind of picturing or, at least, enables me to picture the world). Clearly, though, (i) what is in my mind-brain (or the book) need be nothing like what is in the world and (ii) that, if I took it as justification, ‘me picturing the world’, is also a picture, and therefore, no justification at all, for it would be circular.

On the other hand, that it is circular cannot not rule out the depiction picture of knowledge. Not too naïvely, there is something to the depiction picture (picture of picture). The pictures from my memory are similar to my present and experienced pictures of the world. I am a being that is adapted (in part) by having a facility to picture (model) the world; there is truth to the ‘picture of a picture’.

But (i) it is perhaps rough (ii) there is more to knowledge than picture of picture, e.g., in descriptions in terms of language (though the picture of a picture idea may be extended to description) (iii) it does not provide justification (in itself).

Here, I have focused on the vehicles of knowledge (persons, books) and not knowing facts or knowing how; I will consider facts later; knowing how is not irrelevant but for our purposes, may be subsumed under ‘vehicle’.

Skepticism

But there are reasons to doubt all knowledge. Cartesian skepticism is the view that all knowledge ought to be doubted (because, e.g., as analyzed by René Descartes, a priori, any piece of knowledge may be in error). Cartesian skepticism does not deny knowledge; Descartes used it as a starting point to establish knowledge. The lesson is that if you want certainty, one approach is to begin with doubt and then to remove doubt (if you can). The subtext is that certainty is important, and it is, but it is also important that it is not and ought not to be paramount in all situations. There will be situations in which some degree of reliability is what we will want to aim for; there will be situations in which action is so needed, that it will be best to use whatever knowledge and instrumental devices are at hand.

Pyrrhonic skepticism is the name given to the view that no knowledge is possible. But what is the point to a concept of knowledge according to which there is no knowledge? Surely, it is doing something like taking ‘picture of picture’ too seriously. Surely, it means that, in some sense, the leisure to reflect is aborted, perhaps from laziness, not pushed to its limit—i.e., there is insufficient skepticism about being skeptical (the skeptics do admit to skepticism about skepticism but remain skeptical). If left there, one might think that Pyrrhonic skepticism taken with absolute seriousness is a defect of thought. However, (i) it may be a spur to reliable and meaningful knowledge (ii) pyrrhonists advocate achieving an untroubled state of mind, rather than knowledge—and though taking to its extreme would be nihilistic, there is something to the view (which suggests a balance or mean between nihilism and knowing, between calm and the problems of knowing).

Sources of knowledge

The senses are a source of knowledge. Empiricism is the view that the senses are the only or at least the main source. A strict empiricism that appeals only to raw sense is incoherent because raw sense does not provide a picture at all. On the other hand, a lax empiricism that allows more than raw sense is allowing pictures, which may seem empirical but are not in that they have (i) structure (ii) require re-cognition (from memory). Empiricists sometimes get around this in arguing that there is reflective experience; there is; but it does not get over the objections from structure and re-cognition.

Rationalism allows, beyond raw sense, that pictures (the term is metaphorical here), are innate. Not necessarily innate in being there from birth (or earlier, or in genetics), but innate in being constructed during development.

A resolution is to combine the empirical and the rational as being the same thing at root. In primitive awareness, the empirical and the rational are one; in higher awareness, they diverge.

While a rationalempiricism is a source of knowledge, it may also be argued as justification. After all, how we get knowledge ought to have something to do with justification. But we do not know that picture of picture is good knowledge at all. ‘Picture of picture’ is called the correspondence theory of knowledge-as-truth. An alternate is the coherence theory—knowledge occurs in and is justified by the elements of knowledge cohering with one another. But these approaches do not guarantee themselves.

Justification

One approach is via evidence—evidentialism justifies belief (in a potential knowledge item); it contrasts to reliabilism, according to which belief is justified by coming from a reliable source (a source that generates true belief, which is a priori circular).

Certainty is not forthcoming from the foregoing. Some degree of reliability may be, but then why appeal to either evidentialism or reliabilism?

Enter pragmatism, justification via results; or Charles Sanders Pierce’s pragmaticism “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object”.

The Gordian Knot

Here, there is a gordian knot to be cut.

Logic

‘Logic’ is vast.

Mathematics employs formal logic to deduce results (theorems) from axioms or postulates (and theorems already deduced); deduction is regarded as ‘certain’—given the axioms, the theorems follow. Formal logic may be regarded syntactically (axioms and theorems are not about anything except themselves) or semantically (they are about something—‘models’) and thus even the semantics are formal. Most mathematicians use logic informally, while those who need the machinery typically use ‘first order predicate logic’ (propositional logic is a special case), supplemented by set theory. Beyond that, there is a plethora of formal logics, which are studied, researched, and used by philosophers and logicians.

But philosophy concerns itself with more than formal deductive logic. They may consider inductive logics in which the results do not certainly follow from what is given—the logic of the discovery of scientific theories is an example (not so often acknowledge is the ‘logic’ of the discovery of logics). Then there is reasoning in general, both formal and informal.

In the end, the object of study and, therefore, the study itself is seamless. This is brought out in the real metaphysics.

Ethics

See the real metaphysics > axiology.

The real metaphysics

Part I—the abstract or ideal metaphysics

This side of the real metaphysics employs abstraction, which is retaining in a concept only those aspects which can be and are undistorted. Is this possible at all? Yes, as argued in real metaphysics. The result is the familiar universe as realization of all possibility; therefore, the universe has identity and being with limitless variety, phasing in and out of manifestation, and peaks of being; therefore, all beings realize these ultimates (and merge in so doing); which is an integration of the immediate and the ultimate.

Part II—the real metaphysics

Now, given that the ultimate is given, it is not a limit that beings not yet limitless employ the pragmatic knowledge of a culture, for, though imperfect in classical senses, it is the best they have, and it improves the effectiveness and quality of the path to realization. The abstract illuminates and guides the pragmatic and the pragmatic illustrates and has instrumentality toward the ideal ultimate. The join of the abstract and the ideal is a pragmatic join named the real metaphysics.

Part III—axiology

That ethics and aesthetics are bound in as part of the real metaphysics is manifest.

Conclusion

“At root, the empirical, the rational, the pragmatic, reason, and value come together as one.”

“Philosophy—i.e., metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, reason, science, and meaning of being – of life—is one.”