Joan 12 99

I am at work doing 8 hours from 11pm to 7am; it is a slow night.

I read your letter yesterday and found that I have disagreement in fundamental and detailed ways concerning the main topic --the nature of ideas, consciousness, sensations-- and concerning how to think about conceptual-empirical ideas generally. Also, you seem to be attributing to me views that I do not have and do not believe that I have expressed. For example I do not feel or hold that ideas are immaterial or that consciousness arose in dreams. Further, idealism does not make ideas immaterial or discount the reality of matter; I am sure that I have said this. I am not sure that you understand my position. I am not sure that you understand the various alternatives to materialism in the way that I do -- there definitely seems to be some gap there. I am not sure that you understand what aspect of creativity I am talking about in the context of the origin of mind/consciousness… or why I consider it to be important and how it is used in the argument; I might guess that you are reacting --or recollecting already established reactions-- to the profusion of literature, much of it pulp, on creativity from the 60s through 90s. Upon reading your email of the 17^th it seems to me, reading your comment on the question "What is consciousness?", that the gap must be there. Thinking about this point, it seems that a similar gap exists in the literature and in the tradition; there are different camps; each camp has its brilliant writers; the members of each camp tend to regard their own views as obviously true and have difficulty understanding the ideas of the other… there is a tendency to criticize caricatures of the ideas of the alternative camps. It seems to me that it is somewhat unusual to see, as I do, the merits of the main alternatives - I do not care for some of the minor alternatives that I find intellectually repugnant; I have been an out and out materialist and never more so than when I was 16 and had read Laplace's views of the universe as a giant calculable machine... I am guessing that you have been having strong reactions in connection with the idealism-materialism issue and, more particularly, with my views and writing on that topic. I do not want to discount the content of your views but perhaps you seek security in your own belief; seek to avoid the persuasion of apparent opposites. I am guessing that you seek some bedrock in the stream…

The view that you seem to espouse --that sensation, ideas, consciousness are in or arise only in physical signals, neurophysiology-- is a combination of materialism [physical signals, brain are the foundation] and empiricism [sensation as the source of perception, ideas and knowledge] and while numbers of people do adhere to this view it is by no means the current view. Nor is it a distinctly modern view: the distinction materialism/idealism heightened by Plato and Aristotle originates even before them and continues with British Empiricism beginning with Locke vs. continental idealism in, e.g., Kant and Hegel and on to the modern day. I am not sure whether the version of the view in your note is intended to be "news"; however it is solidly in the materialist-empiricist tradition and repeats or continues to contain the problems that alternative ideas address. Here are two of the problems: knowledge has origin in the confluence of sensation / signals and growth of the body - i.e. origins are not contained in the sensation / physical signals alone; the origin of sensation as sensation and not merely as a label for the physical signal is not explained; likewise the origin of consciousness as consciousness is not explained. Believing in it [your view] appears to be common sense but requires one to already have a prejudged commitment to materialism and to ignore the fact that consciousness has not --David Chalmers argues that it cannot as one well known current philosopher with a wide following who does not hold the view that you label the current view-- been explained in terms of molecules and cells… or matter generally. The modern discussion [Chalmers and people with like views vs. materialist/empiricists] is the legacy of a raging debate, as noted above, that goes back to Plato and Aristotle. It is not enough to explain away the problem by saying something like The experience may "feel" immaterial as a quality of our contemplating experience…[which, in any case, is speculation about the source, nature and content of someone's views] but it is necessary to demonstrate that matter [neurophysiology] explains consciousness - an actual demonstration needs to be given. Such a demonstration has not been given; a proof of its impossibility [David Chalmers, 1996. The Conscious Mind] has been given -- not everyone agrees of course; and a proof of the possibility of such a demonstration has not been given even though many believe it to be possible.

Another current alternative to materialism-empiricism is from Thomas Nagel. Nagel's views have evolved since he originally wrote What is it like to be a bat? in 1974. In Conceiving The Impossible and The Mind-Body Problem, 1998, in a modification of his earlier view on a divide between mind and matter he supports the view of a third modality. As a variation on these themes, Colin McGinn continues to adhere to naturalism but holds that human intelligence is insufficient to provide any explanation or understanding of the basis of mind in nature. There is thus a variety of current views on the mind-body issue. Of course continental philosophers tend to take the stance that it is mistaken to talk about a mind that knows but regard knowing as a form of being-in-the-world. The problems raised in these modern objections, as well as the classical ones, show that to label the matter-sensation theory as the view --current or otherwise-- is to be systematically unaware of or to systematically repress the problems.

The explanation from materialism and empiricism [matter as the basis of sensation; sensation as the raw material of all experience] dates back at least to Locke and, some form of it probably to the Greeks. The view has appeal -- and difficulties. The main difficulty, if not impossibility, requires construction and consideration of alternatives. The this difficulty, noted above, is not a lack in explanation or explanatory gap but an insufficiency in any version of materialism [of which energy is an aspect; and therefore any objection that applies to a materialist basis of consciousness applies also to energy] to date that is definite and not vague. A vague or a future and definite "materialism" may admit mental elements and would so not count as a true materialism. Therefore, yes, there is some objection to energy as the nature of consciousness.

[---------- To say that a position such as the materialist / empiricist hypothesis of the previous paragraphs is not the whole truth is not to say that it has no truth. ----------]

Another, not unrelated, issue pertaining to materialism / idealism is as follows. What are the natures of the material and the ideal? Are they fixed and given as part of the universe of reality or are they [human] creations? The easy and preliminary answer is "both," e.g., they are creations in the service of understanding reality. But, one asks of the nature of reality -- are matter / idea real and if so, can either one contain the essence of the entire realm of the real? Materialists answer "matter," idealists say "idea," and others say neither and yet others --dualists-- require both. Is there anything else to say regarding this question? Yes; although there is a reality, given that we are in evolution, our perceptual apparati may not be able to fully capture reality - we know this; perception, however, is enhanced by conceptual knowledge - perhaps that --together with perception-- can capture reality. However, conceptual knowledge, too, is in evolution - of a different but related kind. What that means is that, not only may our percepts and concepts fall short of reality, but their very natures are unfixed and incompletely determined. Therefore, not only may they fall short of reality - even as they are in reality, they have no intrinsic nature; there is no final justification of a concrete materialism or concrete idealism other than pre-judgement. The form of the argument reduces to: the world is ideal / material because I think and/or feel it to be ideal / material. Hidden in the argument is a refusal to be flexible, creative regarding the nature of the categories that have been created in evolution and by us in the service of the real.

[---------- The interpenetration of the ideal and the material is the subject of the Veda, the Upanisada, the Gita, the orthodox and heterodox systems of Indian philosophy… and of pre-Socratic, of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, of Kantian and Hegelian thought, implicitly of the Empiricists, of 19^th and late 20^th century idealism and of modern science especially in its most material stronghold - physics. ----------]

In the course of the last few discussions and notes we have discussed "what is consciousness?" I have asked what it may be, what is the concept of consciousness? Your response has been to provide lists of types and examples. At no point have you given --as far as I can tell-- a statement of what it is. This is the psychology of the arch-empiricist. The arch-rationalist on the other hand gives a concept. Neither approach yields anything; the empiricist flounders in a sea of undifferentiated data; the rationalist has no data; in real life "empiricists" and "rationalists" fare better than this because their epistemological deficits are compensated by intuition and experience. Epistemologically, however, what is necessary is a blend: a brief verbal description --as an indication rather than an absolute definition-- that is illustrated, supported and fleshed out by a sufficient number and variety of examples… but not by infinite lists [lists are useful to build a theory, a model, but must then be supplemented by a concept to know something about the completeness/covering ability of the list.] The point: there needs to be some concept --over and above vague, merely intuitive and reactionary views-- of what is a sensation or an idea, what is consciousness before one can begin to make a judgement of the basis of sensation and consciousness in things other than themselves. Lacking, also, is a concept of matter; see, if interested, my Internet catalog of problems for why such specifications are absolutely crucial to the discussion.

As a practical position, neurology explains much more than phrenology -- that is not hard to do - just about anything explains more than phrenology. But as a completed explanation of consciousness, neurology does not and cannot do more than phrenology. The most trivial demonstration of this is that neurology does not, because it cannot, provide a single mental concept; concepts such as perception, consciousness must be given and neurology can then aspire to enter into the circle of explanation. Less trivial demonstrations are the objections to materialism. Neurology can be a good part of the circle out of which you "have to drop."

It appears to me that the best way to drop out of the circle is to be silent. Therefore you should not need to explain yourself or receive comments on the subject or on your views. Further, for various reasons, I would prefer to not put in energy unless that energy is matched. Also, I prefer to remain flexible, and, even while I hold a view, remain open to change and not be defined by reaction to misinterpretations or even correct interpretations of what I say; or what may be said. When one uses ideas such as materialism, idealism it is in human nature to treat them, even when ill-defined, as concrete at times; in general the concepts are in evolution and even though one can provide concrete definitions [with a field of concepts] at any given time, the concepts do not necessarily fit the referents. The tendency to concreteness has values; but it also becomes a form of intellectual rigidity and even, at times voluntary, slavery. Therefore the approach I prefer is occasional concreteness and definiteness contained within a general openness that allows evolution of and recombination within meanings in the way toward understanding.

Therefore, I am not providing a detailed response- that exists in my writing. [That is somewhat inaccurate; however, this began as a very brief note.] But, feel free to continue the discussion with the knowledge that I would expect openness to further discussion / debate; of course, I cannot and do not dictate your behavior, but in order to participate in this particular discussion, I expect participation… and the alternative is to not be in my discussion circle regarding the issues in question and not to wobble or weave in and out. However, there is fundamental disagreement --including that I do not want to associate or be associated rigidly with views and categories-- and that would figure in to any discussion.

Incidentally I disagree with your claim that you do not "do" criticism; rather --I feel-- you are intensely critical by nature but are uncomfortable with criticism per se and with the intensity of your feeling. Criticism --in its proper form-- assumes that views can be right/wrong; its purpose is to avoid error, to seek what is right. In the ideal case, it is ideas and not persons that are being criticized. In the real case, persons identify with views; despite the negative aspects of this there is the positive aspect that it motivates individuals to sharpen and refine their thought. Imagination and criticism are "the" tools of thought. Concept formation is one of the instruments of imagination. Inability, discomfort, or inattention to concepts is a foundation for lack of imagination. One then depends some more concrete kind of imagination such as visual imagination; views must then be concrete or received… Without criticism convictions must be blind or arbitrary.

[---------- The right --in its epistemic rather than in any ethical meaning-- e.g., "this trail leads out of the forest," leads to good, life affirming action; wrong leads, trivially, to destruction and so to evil even if there is no evil intent. The point is intentionally simple but reveals, in its extreme, the "banality of evil." There is an ethical imperative --I do not say an obligation-- to the epistemic right and so to criticism.

That there are examples of the banal face of evil does not imply that evil is banal in its essence. ----------]

Just one final comment in response to your thinking. At the level of the function of the body all energy is essentially electrical energy. Other forms play a minor or constraining role. It seems to me that there is a place for more precision in thinking on mind, matter and energy.

What is the relationship among alternative metaphysics? I pointed out earlier that one motivation to consider idealism is in the difficulties and problems of materialism. This is somewhat to say that materialism is the first view and it is only in consideration of its problems that a search for alternatives may arise: there is a temptation to regard materialism as the first ontology. That is not to say that materialism is correct but that it is the first one that arises and others arise as alternatives… Is materialism the first ontology in this sense? Let us consider the possible origin of materialism and problems at that level. Before ontology, man lives in experience of being-in-the-world. That pre-ontological man need not be seen as using those labels "being", "in", "the", "world"; the descriptor "being-in-the-world" is our hypothetical stance. There are experiences and modes of experience but these may be our categories; substances [matter, idea…] are not posited or postulated. What is the postulation or reification of matter as substance, i.e. what is being said when matter is said to be real? [Note, first, that to deny the reality of matter would not be to deny reality.] In positing matter as substance, a phase of experience is conceptually separated out --what is thought to be elementary, what is common, definite, persistent, enduring, tangible and labeled matter; and, although things such as rocks are considered fully material, the experience or experiencing of rocks by [human] subjects is not regarded as a form of material but is held to belong to a different realm: that of "mind." This is the much criticized Cartesian cut -- criticized at times in my writing, but also in the literature, specifically in the writing of Heidegger and other existentialists and phenomenologists. Now, having made this cut, why should we expect that the portion carved out would be the whole of reality? But that is what materialism asserts - that any non-material category, specifically mind and the experience and experiencing of matter, although not a special kind or form of matter, should be a special arrangement or process of or within matter… should be reducible to matter. There is no a priori reason to expect that! We have come to expect it because of the success of the materialist / scientific mode of explanation and reduction: vast tracts of cosmology, the physical world, then life are reduced to matter in the form of atomism; atomism has had so much success --in range, across modalities, and in the number of phenomena-- that we expect, a posteriori, the reduction to go through. However, the universality of the reduction, even if true, must, as we have seen, be contingent upon our experience, must be true a posteriori upon the history of the tradition. Materialism is not and cannot be a necessary truth. But, a new generation or a new age, comes to view the a posteriori judgements of a previous time as a priori. The contingent is transformed into the necessary. This shows that materialism is not primal, not obvious, not common, not given, not the first ontology that it is commonly considered to be; this is clear. However, a doubt regarding this clarity may arise. We are familiar with materialism. It pervades. Was not life reduced to matter -- starting with physiology, then with Darwin's basis of the origins in the material world and culminating with the molecular basis of heredity? Let us consider this question. We feel comfortable [despite exceptions such as Driesch, Uexküll, and Haldane; and despite critical as opposed to naïve vitalism] with the elimination of vitalism as a serious philosophical foundation to biology. The material foundation of life established over the 19^th and 20^th centuries is regarded with near universality as a vindication of materialism. Consider, therefore, what physics might explain life? Life arises in evolution -- it has not existed forever; at the beginning were the material elements of the earth. This origin, even if materialistic, cannot be deterministic; and therefore the underlying physics must be essentially indeterministic. The quantum theory is the one universal theory from physics that is essentially indeterministic; but, if we accept the ideas of Roger Penrose, that indeterminism is not yet formulated. Thus the nature of matter required to explain life in all its facets is clearly not of the mold of any common notion of what matter may be. True, we have become used to the ideas of quantum mechanics but the quantum mode of description cannot be regarded as conforming to the classic conception or notion of matter. In bringing life into the material fold, the nature of matter has been expanded rather than life reduced. Thus "matter", considered historically, has no definite referent, no final essential characteristic. We expect that any incorporation of mind in to the explanatory fold of materialism will require matter to become immaterial. The name of such a future "materialism" will depend on the spirit of the age.

In contrast to materialism, idealism does not carve out a portion of reality. Some versions of idealism may perform a "cut" but idealism as idealism does not do so. Idealism as idealism, as being-in-the-world carves not and includes matter among its elements. But idealism has problems by association [e.g., your strong reaction] and, further, as frequently interpreted is not a-hypothetical. It is not a negative mark against empirical knowledge to be hypothetical - but the hypothetical character of an ideology [that definitely includes materialism] would make it suspect as a candidate for a first ontology. The first ontology, as noted above, may be the ontology of pre-ontological man who, of course, has an ontology but not a defined or critically held one. This ontology is of course not explicitly ontological and may be better labeled onticity [Heidegger]. The ontology or onticity of everyman is the wholeness of his being in the world; of course the world has intrinsic fragmentations uncertainties - indefiniteness in its very being. It is this that, at least in part, makes for the problems of justified true belief, of certainty as characterizing knowledge. However onticity is Logical in that it is of and mirrors the world and will thus participate in the fragmentation [within-wholeness] and uncertainty; thus ontology-in-being will mirror or capture the fragmentation-uncertainty. However a fragmentation in ontology beyond that of the world, including what is learnt as culture, would be…what…? …probably a maladaptive system of reality… mental "illness" -- psychosis as impairment in the being-ontology of nature and neurosis as an impairment in the realm of interpersonal relationships and society.

What are my final views on the subject? They are in evolution but the following is what they may be in the end. Regard materialism to be defined by modern physics --classical, relativistic and quantum-- as interpreted by, say, Roger Penrose; according to Penrose, that interpretation is a deterministic one; for the purpose of mind-body issues allow materialism to include any kind of biology --evolutionary biology, physiology, anatomy including modern neuroscience-- with the restrictions that a) as matter, the brain / body cannot do anything not allowed by modern physics and b) no mental elements are allowed into what counts as matter or biology. Regard [strict or strong] idealism to be defined so that mental content and experience is regarded as the basis of the ontologically real, i.e., these, perhaps generalized in an appropriate way but without allowing essential material elements to enter, form the fundamental constituents of all being. Then either 1) idealism will hold, or 2) some combination [weak idealism] of idealism and materialism and perhaps some undiscovered element will form the "ultimate ontology"; the result may be reinterpreted as materialism, or as idealism or as mode III; it may in the future interpretation be a monism even though relative to current ideas it would be a dualism… [note that idealism could be (a) existential - the ideal elements enter at the level of being or (b) atomic - the ideal elements enter at the level of fundamental particles.] The one major thing that that "ultimate" ontology will not be is a materialism according to the prescription given above; and, even if the union of the elements is not difficult from a theoretical point of view, it will be deep from an existential and from a conceptual point of view in showing the deep connection if not identity of Being and World.

Modern studies, keeping within the scientific tradition, focus on an explanation of the phenomena of mind; there is, however, a lack in the attention that is paid to the exploration of the scope of mind. Of course, science and humanities are a form of exploration of that scope as are many other endeavors. However there is a need for a study of the conceivable, the possible and the actual and their interrelationships. It is true that modal logic talks about these concepts; however its approach may be described as having poverty of range and content.

Thomas Nagel is the only modern writer with whom I am familiar and whose ideas are similar to mine.

In closing, I should offer thanks for another occasion to clarify my own thinking.

Anil