Hi—you will note that I have become enamored of the ‘

6.11.07

Hi Brent—you will note that I have become enamored of the ‘—’ or em-dash symbol

I will be selective in response to your email—otherwise I might spend forever responding

I am not altogether happy with my responses. For one thing, I’m not sure that I have got all your points right. Second, what I write is long because I start trains of thought and end up thinking something different. Third, a common or somewhat common framework of ‘meaning’ might be useful if we are to understand each other and I am not sure that we an adequately common framework. I notice that in my own thought, whereas I used to think metaphorically and tangentially (because I was unable to or did not grasp topics directly) I have become more and more able to plumb depth (as I see it) while being direct and literal. Perhaps everything we think or write in propositional language is ‘metaphorical’ but perhaps also there are degrees of metaphor. Then I would say that I have found it possible to be naïvely literal—whereas I might have been naïvely metaphorical I am literal now though perhaps naïvely so. Finally, this thing has become overly long and I don’t have time to edit it

How will we get a framework of meaning? I want to get on with jib and don’t have (decide at present not to put 100% energy into this question.) Wittgenstein struggled with the idea of use. What was he doing? Here just a stab at what he might have been doing. You mentioned privileged (privileging) meaning which implies variant meaning. Before going further consider pure signs. The sign ‘coke’ for example. One meaning associated with it is cocaine; another is coca-cola; these two are related in their origin even though the present relation is tenuous. Another association is the stuff that is used in blast furnaces, that burns and produces CO that reduces Fe203 to make Fe. Any relation to the previous association? I suppose there may be historically but I am unaware of one; however, if one is to insist that every occurrence of ‘coke’ is to occupy the same space in meaning space as a result of accidental identity of signs then why not insist that ‘coke’ and ‘bloke,’ then ‘bloke’ and ‘blake,’ then ‘blake’ and ‘lake,’… ‘like’… ‘lice’… ‘mice’… ‘mace’… ‘race’ … ‘rice’ and sooner or later every sign is admitted to occupy the same place in meaning space. Principle # 1: different signs may have different meaning associations (of course may have the same associations) and 1a: the same sign may have different meaning associations. Preliminary to a discussion of the meaning of a sign, these distinctions may be separated out so as to make communication ‘possible.’ In day to day use, human beings can normally make these distinctions and this is an aspect of stability of meaning. However, another aspect of stability (I suggest) is that too much stability is stagnation and too little is fracturing i.e. absence of stability is a case of no communication, no meaning… Where does stability come from? One may suggest evolution. It can’t all be selection because someone with a bigger gun (or luck) may eliminate a community with a better ‘adapted’ system of meaning… Examine a field where there is stability of meaning e.g. physics. This discussion is huge so only a stab. It seems that, e.g., in transition from Classical to Quantum mechanics meaning destabilizes. Perhaps, then it restabilizes. Does the transition imply instability? The physical universe of quantum mechanics includes the physical universe of the classical. In a sense then meaning was not unstable but, rather, ‘grew’ in the process of expanding understanding i.e. growth in understanding in response to a larger world. (You can see that while I am in agreement with Kuhn on scientific revolutions vs. normal science, I am not in agreement with him regarding the incommensurability of paradigms.) Principle # 2: reference is stabilizing. Although certainly not everyone agrees, someone said philosophic truth should be a priori truth; I’m not in complete agreement for surely that is one philosophic focus but perhaps not every philosophic focus. I wonder if this thought arose in response to the separation of science and philosophy and then philosophy wondering what its role might be e.g. not science but then what? So Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the nature of philosophy and so perhaps the focus on the a priori. In any case if one agrees with jib, one can see then that the ‘a priori’ has reference but its level of referring is different from that of the reference in an empirical claim (which is now seen as not just empirical but starkly empirical.) If someone suggests to me a variety of ways in which we do / do not exist, it is good to see how these ways relate to the world (which includes verbal construction) but is not itself mere verbal construction (and from Principle # 2 We will want to separate out and compartmentalize the different associations and to not confuse them. At least for purposes of preliminary analysis; later we might want to gain from cross-association and of course ‘non-literal’ use of language always stands to have potential gain from cross-association but in that case we do not stop at crossing among uses of the same sign but continue on to association by any means or by no means e.g. accident. It already becomes apparent that the task is one requiring attention and labor. One reason perhaps that there is so little communication among schools of philosophy, between the analytic philosophers and the continental philosophers and, here, a hint that perhaps academic philosophy has become disconnected from the world—and as always the middle road suggests not too much connection nor too little since the first is rigid and the second fracturing; and middle road squared suggests OK not too much middle roadedness either and its OK to be totally misguided at times.) The idea of philosophy being linguistic analysis which had a heyday that is past—who knows perhaps we might evolve into purely linguistic entities whose food would certain letter combinations that our literary bodies would process etc and this might come about by pushing linguistic analysis to a limit, writing software to do it etc. Incidentally I recollect (I have gone through so many paradigms etc that, especially when thinking in one framework, I forget the more remote ones—as though I were a different person) coming up with a list of ways of being—blade of grass, computer program etc and, if I recall rightly, attempting to show the ways had equivalence. If someone comes to me and says we don’t exist (substitute if you want any subject and any predicate and a list of ways specified verbally) in the following ways (assuming that I don’t make the trite remark that if we don’t exist you aren’t talking to me even though you are and incidentally this is destabilizing because, from logic, if A and not-A then, for any B, B) and lists a number of ways, my response might be ‘we have work to do before we can really talk. I might also say lets compartmentalize the subject-sign into its possible associations so that we aren’t talking about angels when we think we are talking of breakfast (only of course to allow cross-association later to enrich meaning and poetry.) Even though we disallowed the evolutionary argument as the full argument, it likely has some weight. An idea behind the evolutionary argument is, in discourse we become unmoored from a universe of meaning; how then can two people engaged in discourse have their meaning-universes overlap? The evolutionary argument, in its idea-an idea but a generic one is ‘meaning has origin in discourse and life; discourse alone may be insufficient—we leave open the possibility that discourse may be sufficient given sufficient diligence. But ‘going out into the world’ is not altogether available, because the interaction between ‘universe of meaning’ and life appears to be greater in time than that of the typical discussion or even life of a paradigm or even, perhaps, the recorded history of ideas. ‘Use,’ then, is an attempt to model the world (of discourse.) And while, this model may be insufficient to fix individual meaning (words-signs) some general features may fall out e.g. linear discourse and lists alone may be insufficient and field study (men in trench-coats and paper and pencil studying language use in the world which includes the pub, the street corner, the Amazon basin and blow-darts, the philosopher’s study—Wittgenstein shaking a poker at Popper, Anil writing, discussions at the nursing station…) inadequate there may be ways to model the world (if we are going to talk, that is perhaps the most we can do and if we are critics-squared we admit that, at least, we don’t know the limits of talk—incidentally the thought that if one is to estimate the limits of language that cannot, perhaps, be done without a model of language and any general discussion of the limits of language probably takes some tacit model) … blah … and how can the world be modeled over tea? The tradition provides a number of related suggestions – reason, dialogue, we can’t, experiment, reflexivity (the interaction of all such suggestions.) Purity mitigates against reflexivity and I can imagine both analytic and continental thinkers chastising the foregoing thoughts for violating their canons of argument (or whatever it is that they see themselves as doing)

Is the meaning of ‘privilege’ capable of privilege? What is the way, if any, and is it desirable—post-modernists rejoice the answer ‘no’ where modernists accepted it with fatalism—I’ve read—out of this loop of mere linguistic looping?

Here’s one way. First, to recognize that linguistic doing is not ‘mere’ because it is in the nature of the human organism that language, perhaps even as a condition of its being—and certainly some adaptationist would argue—has built in reference. But in the nature of its being—i.e. on account of creativity and again the possible adaptive nature of the same there is also freedom in language play that might be called loopery. What’s the way out? Is a way out needed? Good? No, for the loop’s the thing—it’s where creativity lies? It’s good to let it fly? Again, though too much and too little and too much or too little of balance between too much and too little is perhaps not good. The answer is reference, I think. One could say reason and various other things but these perhaps all come back to reference whose root form is that we are in and of the world. Here reference means, after playing with our word games and our metaphysical systems—and perhaps during—we come back and see if we understand where we are better… and so on

I wonder if we would benefit by requiring academic philosophers to spend a year or two in each others camps; a year or two doing physics; a year or two in the peace core in Africa; a year or two drinking; a year or two being a psych nurse who has thoughts of being a mhw; a year or two reflecting but not publishing; a year or two teaching; a year or two not teaching; a year or two on every paradigm known to philosophy

I am literal in that I feel happy with the claim that there is a core meaning of existence and that jib demonstrates that, while we admit existence-as into discourse, a consequence of the core metaphysics is that the existence-as’s are not different (provided that the association of the sign remains sufficiently faithful to its association in the traditions of east and west, the seeing of which of course requires analysis) and, regardless of deviant associations, that association has ultimate power

Of course it is not true that there are no doubts; and it is not true that ‘existence’ in jib is rigid as in e.g. a blade of grass being capable of substituting for the void (and how is explained in jib.) ‘Exists linguistically’ could, perhaps, also substitute but that would depend on the meaning of ‘exists linguistically’

Critical thought is most powerful in its own overcoming. Rather the same as saying, thought alone is not the (my) objective in life although experience which includes but is not at all limited to thought might be in some sense (which association) and some way (in that quality is an aspect of experience if not experience itself)

Ego as affirmation of existence

This was an experiment. Writers seem to say ‘this and this is what the ego is’ and I typically think ‘yeah makes some sense but is that really what the ego is?’ and then, ‘OK, I'll go along with that thought just to see what happens, whether the writer makes good sense, whether something may be learned.’ My motivation for discussing ego was not proof of existence but reflection on the notion of a stable self. Here it seems that there is a continuum and, perhaps, that there should be. Too stable a self (in some ways) might mean rigidity, inability to develop (in the young,) inability to adapt—in the not so young, inability to grow. Too unstable a self or sense of self might mean a self so fractured that function is impaired or not even possible

Logical connections between ego and existence might be interesting but I am not (yet) making that connection—however it does seem that, generally though not universally, incomplete objectivity is a good thing and that recognition of incomplete objectivity is a good thing

I have no logical proofs for essentiality and authenticity. Regarding authenticity, I use the term because it is used in the literature and, I do not have a complete meaning (sense—what the idea means, or reference—what behavior or kind of living is authentic,) and, I suspect, just as ‘the highest value’ includes a search for the highest value and the meaning of the idea of the highest value and a questioning of the value of the highest value (the class of meanings can be formulated so that the highest value is a valuable pursuit)… similarly, the meaning of authentic includes a search for authenticity. I am not particularly a fan of authenticity and I do not think of myself as searching for it or living it; and I particularly abhor thoughts along the lines that, even if I am searching for authenticity, my life is authentic and someone who lives a different kind of life is not authentic. I.e. at minimum, ‘authenticity’ is multi-valent (I think)

Doubt and objectivity

There is being—this is one way of saying ‘something exists.’ What does it mean to doubt that? Descartes (famously) said ‘I think therefore I am.’ I don’t know enough Latin to know whether anything is lost translation from ‘Cogito ergo sum.’ Descartes’ reasoning has been criticized in a number of ways for example ‘Hey Descartes, old pal, maybe you’re just a dream.’ Descartes might respond ‘who’s the ‘you’,’ or ‘Maybe ‘I’ am a dream but if so, ‘I’ is the name for one of the components of the dream—the name for the illusion that I'm ‘I’.’ Or the critic might say, ‘anticipating Freud and Lacan, there is no stable ‘I,’ Rene, all that you know is that there are thoughts or there appear to be thoughts and ‘you’ associate those thoughts with your ‘I’.’ Rene might respond ‘that there are things such as thoughts and books or only appearances of thoughts or books means and I don’t mean implies, at least, that there are experiences and therefore, there is an experiencer—ergo there is a being.’ The critic might say, ‘you’re getting close, but does it really follow that from experience there is an experiencer?’ If time travel were possible, Wittgenstein might want to join in at this point and say something about absence of an experiencer implying a private language and launch into an argument against private language. A proto-Anil might jump in and say, ‘Hey Witt old chap, don’t you think that the private language argument is merely a good argument but not a necessary one?’ at which Rene might say ‘That's great, I like that idea and it also suggests something to me. We want to prove that there is being and we would like to show that there is an I—an experiencer but perhaps we should separate the two thoughts and show first that there is being and second that there is an ‘I’ or perhaps, less ambitiously, show that it is reasonable to say that there is a stable self. The first argument is that there is experience, therefore there is being.’ Now the critic says ‘How do you know what you experience exists?’ Rene responds, ‘That is an excellent question and the relation between the experience of a thing and the thing is indeed a place for profound reflection on objectivity. However, that was not my argument. I did not say and I did not mean to imply that what I experience exists. I simply that there is experience and, therefore, there is something. Experience is something—not nothing.’ Critic— ‘But the fact of experience may be an illusion or hallucination.’ Rene— ‘True, but the conclusion that, therefore, there is no experience is not true for illusions and hallucinations are experiences even though in the case of hallucination there is no external object’

I’m not (100%) sure that we’re talking about the same ‘thing’ when we talk of experience. In smelling a rose the feeling of the smell, the fragrance, is, in the meaning used here, experience…

This is the point of take off. The criticism of the final argument ‘there is experience therefore there is something—the experience itself’ (and therefore that there is being even if we know very little about its nature i.e. even if we know logically very little about what experiences correspond to things) is that it is cast in the form of an inference ‘there is experience therefore there is something.’ Instead the form of the ‘argument’ should be, that it is in the meaning of ‘is’ that, given experience, there is experience—whether or not of an object. This is a rather Wittgensteinian argument ‘If one is reporting an experience but says they doubt that there is experience then they have gotten the meaning of ‘is’ wrong.’ Experience is. Experience is a form of being (being being something that ‘is.’) It is in the meaning of being that experience is a form of it. Further, every form of experience is being. E.g. when I experience a mountain or love, those experiences are (being.) Does the mountain exist over and above the experience? Perhaps, and precisely what is meant by saying that the mountain exists is the next and interesting task but in saying that the experience of the mountain exists it is not being asserted that the mountain exists. The two assertions belong to different ‘categories.’ The existence of experience is a topic in chapter Metaphysics of jib, the existence or non-existence of the objects of experience—in general—is taken up in chapter Objects whose purpose includes to clarify the nature of objects of which an important one is identity, and, in cases where there is doubt, to establish existence (or not) as well as to clarify. It is typically the ‘abstract’ objects whose existence one might be concerned to establish e.g. does a value exist or where do numbers exist (if anywhere) and what is being said in saying that natural numbers exist

If there is no being, you are not reading this note. It may be possible that you are not reading a note but dreaming. If there is no experience, you are not having an experience at all let alone experience of reading this note

If all I have is experience of experience, I have experience. Experience has been said to not be an object—but, apparently it can be so

Therefore I do not and cannot doubt either that there is experience or that there is being (I obviously can doubt that there is experience but I say cannot for emphasis. Wittgenstein might say, if he agreed with me that experience is given, that it cannot be doubted.)

Oh yes I can doubt experience, I might respond to Wittgenstein, but, here, what does it mean to doubt? It would not be a doubt of the fact of being but a clarification of its meaning

Having gotten through that, I add that the existence of experience is (1) not particularly important to the metaphysics but it is important to the study of mind and (2) what is crucial and taken up below is the existence of the void

I should reemphasize that in doubting the existence of experience, one has—I say / think—gotten the meaning of experience and existence wrong. If one has not had experience, one has not smelled a rose, experienced a sunset; if you do not have experience, when you are talking to me you don’t know that you are talking to me but may act as though you do. Experience is the name for what is going on when you smell a rose… One physical thing may be defined in terms of another but experience is not to be so defined and, as perhaps the most fundamental thing about mind, cannot be defined linguistically (there are synonyms but not definitions.) At some point definition stops and what is left is indication. If one doubts experience (except to refine the understanding of it and of existence and so on) one has, I think, gotten the meaning of experience wrong. Incidentally in saying ‘experience’ is there, the ‘there’ is not—on standard accounts anyway—a spatial there… ‘is there’ functions as ‘is.’ Also that something is somewhere in space does not require one to know where. In ‘is there a God?’ the answer is expected to be ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but not ‘yes and in Calcutta.’ God may be in Calcutta but that is not expected in the answer. Are there numbers? Yes (perhaps) but not at any specified or unspecified ‘where.’ But if numbers refer to things at all, and, without such reference mathematics would not have application even if it is an abstract system, then, surely, there is some vague sense in which number has location. If this is all vague, that is now it is in the standard thinking—especially regarding anything not concrete. However, in the recent progress in my thoughts regarding abstract and concrete objects, I believe I have resolved the issue of the location of things—especially abstract things. Abstract and concrete objects are not essentially distinct but the difference is in the way that we study them—in the way that is most fruitful. It is now possible to give abstract objects a location but it is a case by case affair and in some cases it might be everywhere, other cases any which where, still others somewhere but where is not important and so on. It now becomes possible to see that experience may indeed be somewhere but that identifying that where is not (so far perhaps) particularly important. That is predicated on space (and time) being the sole ‘coordinates’ used in the description of being; the treatment in jib admits of other coordinates but regarding their precise nature remains silent—because of my ignorance of such coordinates (except that multiple times are recognized and their meaning explained—the situation is not parallel to space with each time being analogous to a space dimension.) Similarly if one doubts that any ‘thing’ exists, one has gotten the meaning of ‘exists’ wrong—and to not doubt that something exists is perfectly consistent with being given a never ending list of—putative—objects and doubting that every one of them exists. The meaning of exists is this that in saying ‘Brent is’ the existence of Brent is asserted—existence is so fundamental as to not be referred back to some other concept

This does not invalidate the idea that doubt and certainty are continua. Regarding the being and, especially, the nature of—perhaps most—things that we regard as being in the universe, there is doubt and such doubt is healthy. However, that certainty is a continuum does not mean that the continuum does not contain the value ‘1’ i.e. absolute certainty; the certainty continuum may, logically, range from zero to one and the ‘argument’ has shown that the case of ‘1’ is an actual case. That doubt is a continuum does not that it does not contain the value ‘0’ i.e. absence of doubt. It might, alternatively, be said that ‘doubt’ and the ‘being or existence of experience’ are in different categories

Sophistry—can we be certain that there is no certainty? The answer is not necessarily ‘no there cannot be certainty that there is no certainty’ because the two certainties might have somewhat different meaning e.g. contingent certainty and logical certainty. Certainly there is a view of knowledge in which knowledge of the world can never be certain. It may, however, be certain that that view of the world is incorrect and a distortion of a more reasonable view that a certain kind of fact is contingent while another kind is necessary (case by case)

Here are some certainties in knowledge. Analytic truth or truth by meaning, ‘All married men are married.’ Rather trivial and is it even knowledge? Isn’t it just a definition. When it is recognized that an entire mathematical system is analytic in nature, the triviality and the ‘just a definition’ are seen as questionable. More, analytic truth points to a way things have certain kinds of relationships. Kant’ synthetic a priori is supposed to be empirical knowledge that is necessarily true. Regardless, Theory of being (jib) has necessary synthetic truths (that don’t depend on experience being given.) The way to these truths appears to have been via reference and not by suppressing it. In any case, the a priori is now, not seen as a priori to reference, but as a level of reference that is ‘distinct’ from reference to simple objects

Definition of world. Is it something to be defined—or illuminated and clarification. And what does it mean that it has different definitions or illuminations? Does it mean that the different definitions are defining the same thing or different things? If different things then it is a case of many words which have the same sign. If the same thing then perhaps the illuminations and clarifications change while the thing remains the same. Perhaps. How can one know an answer? A standard approach is ‘we don’t know.’ Which is sometimes confused with ‘cannot know’ and ‘there is no privilege.’ Perhaps we cannot know, perhaps there is no privilege but that does not follow from ‘don’t know.’ In fact demonstrating such things may be quite difficult—debates about
Wittgenstein and Derrida (I am little familiar with his writings) go on. Perhaps the academic system is a place where everyone has a corner of the room or a floor but the corners, rooms, ceilings and ornaments do not add up to a room—not because the can’t but perhaps simply in that they don’t: no one has put them or attempted to put them together because everyone is intent on perfecting his or her own corner or, perhaps in showing that there is no such thing as a corner—especially a perfect corner as defined in Euclidean Geometry. The word ‘world’ is clearly many words. It is sometimes used in the sense of context. Although there is an umbrella idea (Wittgenstein says family of meaning) the different meanings or uses are clearly different a little bit as carnivores all eat meat but dogs are not cats. So the question of relative privilege among the different words does not (perhaps should not) arise. But this question of one sign different words (sometimes stated as one word different symbols which could be a little confusing because ‘word’ is used differently) is interesting because even though the words are different, (some) people want to own the word as though it were one. There is also the case to be considered in which different meanings or uses are not in conflict but are complementary (e.g. groups of complementary meanings which groups may be exclusive.) It remains of course that there is a rough primitive idea of the world as the place of our being and that individuals may see and define it differently. But are they seeing differently or seeing different aspects, are they defining differently or clarifying differently and are these differences because of different conceptions or different interests. And cannot some ideas regarding the world be plain wrong (post-modernism would not like that idea.) Also what’s going on here when we talk of privilege. Are we really concerned with ideas (if I have two different ideas regarding the same word or thing I don’t really care about privilege) or politics (people.) When the different words ‘world’ are separated out, is it possible that some of those worlds appear different simply because of different interests, different vantage points, different illuminations but are of the same thing. Might the most spatio-temporally extensive word ‘world’ be one of these? Would the treatment of the different words be the same? While focus has been on conflation or confusion—one sign different words or in another usage one word different symbols—maybe that con-fusion is a place of (philosophic, poetic) fertility and perhaps it doesn’t pay to be too careful (but would one want to universalize—perhaps we can be too careful sometimes and without care about minutiae at others, perhaps some individuals e.g. the poets could be large, others e.g. the philosophers small, some movements large, some small)

Does it not seem, to use Wittgenstein’s language, that any community of speakers—on the assumption that they are talkers and hearers but that there is no mutual understanding or communication of understanding—that there should be some terms that shall have no meaning in terms of other terms. We are not talking of synonyms but of meanings. The alternative seems to be word loops which amounts—if that were all that were involved and there were no intuition and no prior experience and no reference either implicit or explicit. Of course, there can be wrangling about meaning about which terms and so on. To be ever in a state of ‘deconstruction’ is to deny that there is deconstruction. Is it perhaps a delusion of the intellect that everything is to be proved or defined? Suppose there were a band of explorers. They might explore anywhere—on earth and beyond, physically; in feeling and art and poetry; in ideas—they meet and are wondering where to explore and someone keeps insisting that the terms used to define their possibilities, their goals, the next step (including ‘next’ and ‘step’) have no fixed meaning (ignoring for the moment that ‘fixed meaning’ might not have fixed meaning and that no fixed meaning taken to extreme might—does—mean no meaning, no communication whatsoever) they might do this day upon day, drink and be raucous at night, sleep till late morning… Someone might say, hey looking at life—my life—this is what I think, this is the way I see things, this is what I want to do; anyone who sees no meaning in what I say may go; anyone who glimpses meaning and shares some objective may stay; we may debate meaning a while but then we shall go on… and who knows, those who thought there was no meaning might stay and eat and sleep and survive, those who would explore might drop off the edge of the world… perhaps, though, somewhere in the infinity of infinities some explorers might become the universe but see no meaning and others become and see meaning… and experience dissolution… and it would or might go on and on

If we conceive of the idea of world as the maximal world that consistently includes other worlds (I’m not being particularly careful in stating this idea because it’s just a thought: we could call the worlds world-max, world-chemistry, world-adverbs, world-color, world-not…) what kind of ‘privilege’ might world-max enjoy: would it be the sum of all privileges or the intersection? Is a theory of privilege possible? Might it be that in the case of consistency it would be the sum…

An approach that I’ve found very useful in doing synthetic work is to proceed even when there is doubt. When one has built, one can come back and resolve doubt (perhaps.) The perspective given by the system often helps resolve the original doubt—nitpicking or major. Of course one has to be careful that any assumptions made regarding the doubt are not tacitly made in the resolution. I’ve experienced so many examples. Also, knowledge is not it’s own function (not entirely anyway) and if knowledge is an instrument, even in philosophy, that is how it may have to be. This is my approach and I count myself or my work lucky in that so much has been achieved with so much rigor (which of course may be questioned.) Here lies weakness and strength of much modern philosophy. In their relatively nitpicking concerns (their intelligence is not questioned) they remain stunted—the belief may be that this is all that can be achieved andor that this is the best approach to ultimate knowledge if that is possible: a slow, iterative improvement… However, because they (the analytic philosophers) insist on working out things intuitive in an explicit form, their work has often been useful to me in clarifying issues as I work out a larger picture. It is interesting that the theory of being (jib) achieves certainty through universality but when it is ‘applied’ to this cosmos, certainty gives way to less than final certainty

If something exists and we define the universe as all things that exist, then the universe exists. (That of course does not imply anyone can count or list or even that there is a list of all things.) This is a logical operation because ‘universe’ is identical to ‘all things that exist.’ (Therefore what ever Forms there are must be in the universe and so on.) However, having so defined the universe, it cannot be logically identified with what the physicists tend to call ‘the universe’ for what they mean is this cosmos and any extension that may be revealed in the future. Let’s call the physicist’s universe the p-universe and what we’ve defined as the universe, simply, the universe. The universe exists and the p-universe probably exists—we do not doubt the p-universe for practical day to day matters. Instead we may doubt the existence of the p-universe and material and mental things in general to learn about their true nature or, more modestly, to learn better about their nature. (Not to get into the meaning or meanings of nature.) It is not even reasonable, however, to identify the universe and the p-universe. This is because, as shown in the metaphysics and the cosmology of jib, it is eminently reasonable to think that the p-universe is in the universe; however, the universe is infinitely—I think I can use ‘infinitely’ literally but am not altogether sure of this—larger than the p-universe. The p-universe is a puny-verse. One task undertaken in the metaphysics-cosmology of jib is to show that the universe (as defined here) is a coherent universe and—if one wants to get the cosmology right—the best definition (yes I have some doubt that it is the best even for my purpose i.e. getting the cosmology right and, of course, there must be other purposes for which my definition is unnecessary and perhaps even undesirable though I am not sure what ‘authentic’ purposes would find the definition undesirable)

I identify two modes of doubt. First, things that are doubted in practical affairs and such doubt can lie anywhere on the continuum from zero to close to one. Second, things that I do not doubt as a practical matter (e.g. I don’t doubt that I exist for most purposes) but that may be doubted so as to clarify something—the nature of doubt, the nature of being and, specifically, the nature of the thing doubted (what am I?) However, I don’t doubt the fact of being. And though I said that this is incontrovertible I think that ‘incontrovertibility’ and ‘the fact of being’ are different categories. Although I don’t object to the phrase ‘fact of being,’ it is perhaps better to say that it is in the meaning of being that experience is a form of being. Wittgenstein might say that when someone says they doubt that there is being, their statement has no meaning or, perhaps, that the mean to ask about the meaning of being. Without being there is no experience. That cannot be logically said about material things even though there is no everyday practical reason to not say it (the boundary between the two kinds or modes or purposes to doubt is not precise.) What can be said—logically—is that, if the material world is real then without being there would be no world

I may or may not desire to believe that there is being. It may be hard to separate logic from ego. It is not the logical case that inseparability of logic and ego invalidates ego although it may be and is obviously the case that ego often does invalidate ‘logic.’ That it is not the logical case means—what is ego… psychoanalysis talks of ego but have they got it right and even to the extent that they have got it reasonably right are the necessities of psychoanalysis logical or practical; a logical necessity would be insurmountable and practical one would not even if difficult. Even—and this argument is sophistry and, perhaps, not the genuine thing—if logic and ego were to be logically inseparable, the interaction of logic and ego would be a form of being

However, I do have doubt—as explained, about the void. Not about its properties but about its existence. The technical doubts and their refutations are in jib and other documents. My actual level of doubt varies from day to day; currently, many days go by without the question of doubt occurring. The question is what to do about the doubt and I believe I have given you some answers—especially the night you came to my apt for drinks. What to do about it depends of course on the specific purpose e.g. philosophy, life and action…

Even as I write I reflect on being, the void, the proofs and confidence in the void becomes restored. This see-saw goes on. Today I think of yet another proof of the void but I wonder how important proof is—it is important but more important than proof is action

There is a parallel to mathematics which, in its dealing with the infinite and perhaps elsewhere, admits the possibility of hidden paradox. Mathematicians live with it because the fruit is great (Cantor’s paradise)

There is a possibility that all hopes are to be smashed and that we will pay for having hope

Incidentally, there may be a foundation for the void in quantum mechanics—I am not particularly interested in such a foundation and partly because quantum theory may be contingent against the background of the (entire) universe

Nothing more than non-existence would is not meaningless—it is the idea of the void. If someone said we don’t exist, I would say good logical point, now we can get on with clarifying what we mean by ‘we’ (self) and whether ‘exist’ should take on any special meaning if I say ‘there is self.’ I do doubt that I exist and by that I mean ‘how accurate in the senses of precision and extent and identity is this picture of myself that I carry around both explicitly and implicitly when I act in the ways that I act.’ Do I practically doubt that I exist? It’s not practically important to me to believe I exist—when I’m having fun that’s what’s important and when I’m miserable I might rather not exist

There are perhaps modes of existence—but theory of being shows that the modes are not fundamentally distinct. What does it mean to say there are ways of existing? Does it refer to ways of specifying or knowing existence

Someone who doubted our existence would also doubt that we (Brent and Anil) ever had a conversation

Such doubts are good because they sharpen thought—not, I think, and I know I repeat myself, because it is otherwise a good thing to doubt we exist. Of course doubting the existence of numbers is a good thing because, in addition to clarifying number, a flaw in the conception of number (which in modern mathematics is defined conceptually.) And while conventional thinking is that number is ‘abstract’ and does not exist in space and time the concept number does not refer to things in this world, theory of being shows that while that view is tenable it is not the best view and that number does in fact refer to things in this world (if it is a well formed concept)

Never-ever nothing more than non-existence—is that meaningless? Depends on what is meant by ‘meaningless.’ Is it a fact? Sophistry—if it were a fact the question ‘Is it a fact?’ would not be. Is it worthwhile considering ‘never-ever nothing more than non-existence?’ Yes—perhaps logically probably existentially

Wanting or stating experience do not make it so if ‘make it so’ means implication. However, wanting may be a motive to attempt proof or discovery; ego may be and I think is inseparable from the search or the attempt but this is not the same as inseparability from logic, belief or knowledge. That the two forms of inseparability are ‘not the same’ must, I think, mean that, since the first inseparability is given, the second must be possible in some cases even if difficult (it would probably be difficult in significant cases.) Regarding belief there is the special consideration that believing in something not known to be true may have a positive outcome and is not even invariably unreasonable e.g. what I do today depends on the belief—at least implicit—that there will be a tomorrow. Believing in something known to be untrue would be harder to argue but, without further consideration, I shall not assert that it is invariably unreasonable. Sophistry—wanting is a form of experience. It is better to say that it is in the meaning of experience and that of being that experience is a form of being than to say that experience is an incontrovertible premise for the latter looks as though it is or may be the assertion of the certainty of a contingent fact

There is a need to examine philosophical desires. It is probably crucial. It seems to be the typical case that desire should not influence philosophy. However it is not the universal case that desire and logic are inseparable (even if e.g. psychoanalysis were to so claim.) Further, it does not follow that it is the universal case that philosophy and desire should be separate (although it would probably be a good thing to recognize and examine the connection)

The history of my conception of the void—from 1998 or so until 2002, I ‘wanted’ to believe in the void because I felt that that would give my metaphysics a boost. It was then that I roughly developed my present notion of faith—based partly on the thoughts of H. A. Simon, Nobel Prize in economics, regarding the idea of bounded rationality. The motive to the notion of faith was that if I took the void to exist, ‘paradise’ would follow. Quantum mechanics, I knew, as did conservation of energy, suggested the possibility of the void and of something from nothing. However, even though I developed something like an indeterministic theory of belief, I did not believe or claim the void. In 2002, I developed the insight that enabled the proof of the existence of the void that of course I still doubt—it is the one element of the metaphysics regarding which I have doubt

If I did not desire the void I would not be concerned with it. That I may have a philosophical desire to hold the existence of the void is not my source of doubt; the source is criticism of the argument—jib has a number of criticisms and counter-arguments

This is where ‘faith’ enters—what if the void exists and I fail to use its existence because of doubt and so fail to gain ‘fruit?’ And the purpose to faith which is not an ego based purpose—although, since I don’t know myself purpose, I cannot claim to have eliminated ego

Although I do have doubt regarding this one essential, I also doubt my doubt. I sometimes think—are you, Anil, stupid or neurotic or what

The existence of the void does not depend, logically or otherwise, on the existence of anything else e.g. mountains, square circles, dreams, numbers… If nothing were to exist, the void would exist—it is nothing(ness)… here it is questionable whether verb, noun, adjective should be distinguished

It may be, and certainly among certain groups or schools or movements appears to be the case, that there is a philosophical desire other than the logical one to argue against all certainty and so on. Modernism and post-modernism appear to be a case as, in different ways, does analytic philosophy. In some cases, the belief may have origin in past failure e.g. of systematic philosophy. However, that system has failed does not mean that all system shall fail. Kant had a clear argument against certain kinds of system; however, Kant overlooked certain necessities because they probably did not occur to him and made certain assumptions about the nature of knowledge. It may be natural to fear success because e.g. success may mask failure. It may appeal to the ego to be critical in the sense e.g. of analysis or of deconstruction; the appeal may simply be that of invalidating other work / validating one’s own ego

Again, that the ego may play a role in critical thought does not invalidate that thought. Although we think logic, reason and so on constitute grounds for validation / invalidation (validation is of course harder because it must cover all cases of theory reference while invalidation requires but one case—and, therefore, validation must be based in logic or something like it) it is not altogether clear (I think jib makes some contribution) what are grounds and should they invariably be in the realm of logic etc. If something is said about all beings in this cosmos versus the entire universe it may be contingent versus necessary. How is it possible to say something about the entire universe—that should be case by case and will depend upon what is being said

Might there be something called the paradigm of rationality? Would it be a paradigm? If ‘the universe’ of mind were constitutively rational or if it could be argued e.g. from ethics that it should be entirely rational (at least in the domain of knowledge, belief and so on) then it would not be a paradigm

Do we desire fullness, authenticity, the ultimate? Authenticity is not that important to me and in so thinking I am influenced by what existentialists think authenticity to be—and I don’t really know more than a little about what they think. Do we desire fullness—what is that? If it is variety of experience—then, yes, I do desire it. Do I desire the ultimate? Yes, I want that process and if I get anywhere near it ‘I’ might change ‘my’ mind—perhaps just as while space-travel might be an adventure one might want to veer clear of black holes. Do we want the ultimate? I take that question to mean ‘Is it in human nature to desire the ultimate?’ which might mean ‘Is it in the essential nature of some human beings to desire the ultimate?’ Interesting question and the answer might require an examination of ‘ego.’ The cosmology (jib) states that the ultimate will be experienced regardless of desire. Does someone who thinks she or he does not desire the ultimate? Does someone whose explicit desire is just-here-and-now or whose explicit desire is death, in fact, in some—perhaps unconscious—way desire the ultimate? Is it possible that we want everything—the ultimate, this that and the other, nothing, joy and pain, death—while only some of these are manifest or explicit desires? Regarding desire and truth, the cosmology-metaphysics also states that the identity called ‘I’ (for now) will experience not merely joy but also the ultimate in everything negative—pain, frustration, dissolution and ways unimagined. (Practically, adaptation-evolution suggest that since pain is adaptive it will not be limitless.) Do we desire faith? Depends on who we are and what meaning of faith is in question. Some people seem to desire Christian faith (perhaps different from Christian Faith i.e. faith as defined in Christianity.) Defined as the most ‘productive’ attitude etc., I think everyone who is not neurotic has some and the question might be ‘What is my desire regarding explicit and conscious faith?’ My desire seems to be to find or try to find, in the conscious, what is the most reasonable extension of implicit faith (e.g. even when I am not explicitly believing there will be a tomorrow I may be and usually am implicitly believing so.) In fact, there may not be a tomorrow for me or for anyone. If we ask what contingent facts are known logically—the answer must be none or perhaps ‘a very small proportion.’ However, even while it is good to doubt such facts so as to obtain a better understanding, to have more than occasional and natural doubt about many ‘facts’ would be neurotic (often)