CONCERNING THE THIRD QUESTION
How or why is consciousness different from seeing (as watching a movie)?
(I recall the popular 19th century argument that the eye [and its ability to
represent the world internally] has to be a God-given gift.) I am trying to think
of a conscious mental ability that is not based on sense data, including
avoidance of threat, variation from boredom, language acquisition and tai chi
ch'uan… Any ability that is not based on sensory input at the beginning.
I can not think of any...
And since consciousness remains within my head as an inner experience - I
mean, it doesn't radiate out of my skull materially or ethereally - is this
similar to the 19tb century eye is this another 'gap" problem, the gap in
understanding? Or the gap in our acceptance of some explanation or another?
Correct me, does not current understanding explain sensory input as electrical (light), molecular
(scent, mechanical (touch and sound) encounters ,with human sense receptors
(eyes, nose, body and ears) - which input-"carriers" are transmuted
to electrical excitement and structural growth and arrangements of neurons
which in turn are interpreted, comprehended, made sense of though (amazing)
neuronal systems (those complex systems still not completely understood)-, alertness,
arousal, the exquisite mental abilities that physiology and anatomy have, are
hormonal, electromechanical, and bio-mechanical activity of neurons -
experienced as wakefulness (and all the amazing things humans do during their
wakefulness)…
Is the question about ideas? Ideas being immaterial in the same way
memory is immaterial?
The experience may ·"feel" immaterial as a quality of our
contemplating experience... The awareness of awareness "feels"
immaterial. And yet why can not awareness of awareness be the same type of
process as memory and as comprehension and sudden insight based in brain
structure and brain activities (inducing electrochemical and cellular
structural change)? Why cannot consciousness be a transformation of the
material to electrical energy?
If we ask ·"what blue feels like..." As some meta-experience of
blue, can this be explained by our perceiving blue as blue (which is immediate
sensory input) for the reason the object we apprehend is blue; and our puzzling
about "the feel of blue" is an imaginary experience merged with,
melded with past experiences (memory) and creative thinking (novelty in
interpretation of our virtual in-skull sensory reality)?
Is there some objection or elimination (in our discussion) of energy as
the nature of consciousness? Or at least energy as an emergent component (a
spin-off) of the brain's thinking?
Now, if the discussion goes to "yes but"... And argues
"Okeh, say consciousness is energy (the electrochemical kind), we still
have the question 'how does consciousness which is not energy arise from
energy?'" consciousness is a feeling (abstract noun), an experience
(abstract noun)…our circling philosopher persists...
And how can I argue that?
It must come down, for me, to an inability to accept the question as
valid... Except to dispel the question with blind conviction that far me an
explanation of neurology suffices to explain to me my experience of what I term
consciousness. I have to drop out of this circle.
December 11, 1999
Bayside, California