PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS
ANIL MITRA PHD, COPYRIGHT © 1999
– 2000, REFORMATTED JUNE 17, 2003
Document status: June 17, 2003
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PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS
2 What
is the nature and source of the question “What is mind?”
3 What
are effective approaches to answering these questions?
5 What
is the place of mind in the world and the universe?
PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Look at the first few “problems”. I want to give a sense of why these are problems at all; a sense of why the problems or questions are or may be important; and a feeling for the history of thought that has gone into the issues - the varieties and traditions of thought, some estimate of their places and relations
It is in the nature of learning that understanding is not merely imparted from one individual to another; understanding grows through the engagement of the thought of the learner and continues to grow as the learner thinks and re-thinks the issues from a variety of learned and original approaches. If discovery and creation are at the boundary of the unknown are in the dark, without any guide, this should be imparted in teaching
There are many ways to
understand the issues and there are many approaches to answering the questions.
Is it sufficient to consider questions about mind in isolation or, due to
actual or conceptual links, is it necessary to also consider the rest of the
world within which mind resides[1]? It may take time to
get a sense of the nature of the problems, in what sense they are problems, the
various approaches, their motivations, their “success”, what is merely
parochial?
I believe that human understanding of the problems is incomplete, in process - but I know of no final reason to believe that the understanding is essentially incomplete. There is little doubt to me that even if terms such as “mind” and “matter” should turn out to cover the processes and entities in the world the understanding, use and meaning will evolve. I think there is good reason to believe that the terms as used today will be replaced by more comprehensive concepts - even if the terms remain the same. What will those new ideas be? This is not a complete mystery - it does not take long to see the limitations, to have ideas for directions of resolution. It is natural, then, that there is a -historical and individual- variety of attempts to overcome the limitations. The [kernel of the] truth may lie within some of these approaches
It may be best for reasons that will become clear to consider the questions together
We are used to talking
about mind. What are the ways in which we do that - everyday, in reflective
thought, in different cultures over history?
Is mind something that is “there” waiting to be discovered or [/and] are even our best concepts of mind somewhat hazy attempts at understanding, limited in clarity and range of application. The problem is that of the dual uncertainty of the object of study and the concepts and means used to understand it[2]
To begin with, it seems
to me, that reflection on mind is associated with phenomenal[3]
experience. Perhaps that is merely because I am reflecting but without
phenomenal experience there might be a universe otherwise identical to ours but
it would make no difference to its “inhabitants” whether there were or were not
that universe. Intelligence, problem solving can be done by machines that are
not - I think - conscious. Immediately I ask whether there is something
different between human [animal] and machine intelligence. There are
differences - each has areas in which the other is outclassed; human
intelligence is more general purpose, rooted in the way in which humans are
tied into the environment. Are these differences essential? And is human
intelligence necessarily tied together with phenomenal experience - or is the
connection contingent, an accident?
Is mind necessarily tied
into phenomenal experience? Probably - that is a first response! Does
phenomenal experience exhaust the realm of mind? The answer might depend on
what I mean by “exhaust”. There is little doubt that there is non-phenomenal
awareness - provided “awareness” is appropriately understood. But, one asks, if
there are non-phenomenal mental events, are they in some way tied in with the
phenomenal? This in turn depends on what I mean by “mental” and “mind” but it
is too early [in this discussion and perhaps altogether] to make sufficiently
definite specification. Mental = what would be conscious, something in brain… Precisely
what do I mean that something is mental when it is not phenomenal? Do I mean
that there is intelligent behavior, that it somehow simulates behavior that is
associated with phenomenality or thought, that it is adaptive, that it is the “product”
of brain processes or certain kinds of brain processes, that it could be
phenomenal or associated with the phenomenal [e.g. a process that is phenomenal
while learned but unconscious or peripherally phenomenal when habitual]… or am
I thinking that phenomenality is not the essential mark of the mental [despite
its apparent to some necessity for humans to be alive as humans] that
intelligence or stimulus-response or intentionality [keyed-in] or information
processing or adaptation are the essential marks of the mental with
phenomenality being a product and or an advanced stage of the mental?
When I think about my own
mind… immediately, the form of the question raises philosophical issues: there
is a field of phenomenal experience that is included in what is being referred
to but what is the “I” and the “my” and does mind refer to anything over and
above the field? But talk must begin somewhere. Start again. When I think of my
own mind, I first think of my phenomenal experience. But what is going on here?
Why am I using a term “mind” as though there is something over and above the
experience or experiencing; is mind a thing - the way I am using the term it is
not a physical thing but why do I want to limit “thing” to “physical thing”; or
is mind the functioning of something over and above the functioning of my “body”;
and of course why do I not think of “body” as problematic? I just walked out to
my front porch saw the view of fields, hills and sky and thought - is all this physical,
material? What is the physical or material? Is it something that exists or has
always existed independently of experience and ideas or do experience and ideas
somehow contribute to “physical” nature. It is a subtle question in a number of
ways; the concept of matter is a variant across history and culture - modern
physics gives us a different view of matter than our first experience of it;
the Kantian points to an inseparability of the objects of our World and the forms of our experience
and thought - even if there is a “thing-as-such” do we ever encounter it?
Clearly, there are differences in the world but are our experiences and ideas
of the various kinds essentially
contingent, patchwork, shifting… or can we come up with forms of experience and
ideas that are unitary, necessary and final?
What is the status of a view that there is a world that is the full world or universe that is independent of phenomenal experience - realism [of a kind]? What is the relation to external realism and what is the “external” realism? What are the relations among realism, external realism and materialism… and perhaps other monisms [idealism of the kind that says that the phenomenal is the real, neutral monism] and dualism? A commitment to a realism is not a commitment to any kind of substance ontology… but the two may be confused - both temperamentally and conceptually
Some approaches to these
questions are as follows. 1. Begin by admitting an unknowable or as yet unknown
nature of “things-in-themselves” but proceed by criticizing that idea. 2. Criticize
“mind” and “matter” as higher order concepts treat something else as
fundamental - “experience”, “being-in-the-world”… 3. Combine the first two as
in Heidegger’s idea that human-being-in the world is, to begin with, most
fundamental … then integrate or evolve toward a full ontology. 4. Continue to
treat “mind” and “matter” as categories or substances but improve understanding.
Regardless of the actual position [monism, dualism or rejection of substance
ontology] there is a problem of the relation between mind and matter; and there
are “sub” problems of the varieties of mental phenomena - getting the varieties
correct, their relationships, their origin and function, and the relation of
this rich system to the systems of the body. This includes the modern problems
of consciousness or phenomenal experience. Finally, given the variety of
approaches what is their relative status… and what is the standing of the very
idea of having an approach? Some approaches may be found to be trivial but many
will have some merit. Regardless of final validity of the approaches, any
summing up will come to terms with them: showing the place of the approach,
perhaps incorporating some elements or ideas… This points to the idea of having
an approach. At minimum each approach is an attempt at understanding. Synthesis
is not mere incorporation but, rather, breaking down and selective and creative
building up. Understanding does not lie outside the world. There is no final
rock of understanding except that confidence that stems from being in…[4]
Is it all just due to the
Cartesian tradition? What of thought and use before Descartes? Certainly the
idea of substance ontology begins much before Descartes. What of times and
societies when and where this problem and the associated terminology did not
exist? Have there ever been such times [except early in human development] - and
if so was [is] the problem truly absent or present in another guise or not as
clearly in focus or being regarded as a problem?
This is of course to suggest that the resolution of the problem should not be too narrow - at least to begin with. Social, cultural and historical data should be considered in addition to the philosophical and scientific
The first thought is of the pervasion of Cartesian dualism in our academic thought and everyday lives? Note, of course, that modern awareness of Cartesianism as a paradigm rather than the way the world is has not removed the paradigm or its influence on how the “problems” of mind are viewed
But is Cartesianism the cause
or a symptom of something else that is more fundamental? Such as the
instrumental approach to the world? Is the instrumental approach worth
investigating here? What is the history, with cause-effect type relations
receiving consideration, of instrumentalism and Cartesianism?
Are there other social factors? The way science is done? The tension between “religion”, “science” and “secularism”? That tension figured into Descartes’ thought
Whatever the factors I am not thinking of them discretely. That is, there are possible interactions among the elements of the problem
Some consideration of this issue was unavoidable in reflecting on previous ones
One meaning of this
question is a factual one. Is mind a form of being or being itself? If mind is
a form of being is it coeval with being or does it have an origin within being?
If mind is a form of being what is the nature of the significance that mind [phenomenal
experience and thought] attaches to itself?
The second meaning ties in to the question of significance. I ask myself “is humankind central?” That question reflects a somewhat parochial interest - except of course that humankind is inevitably in focus due to my kind. If not the kind on this world that is most in touch with the question of significance or centrality, humankind is the one with which I find myself most intimate. In the interest of significance itself - of full experience of ones own nature, however, I place myself first in primality and then in animal kind and so on until I reach consideration of my kind as a democratic participant in the expression of possibility [from “the void, the vacuum, nothingness, no-thingness, the gray continuum…”] and so partaking of the ultimate. I may speculate on the necessity of this participation - and find that it is possessed of a rational basis. I find in the end, however, that the true question pertains to the reality, the centrality, the continuity, the possibilities for, the ultimates of mind - of phenomenal experience and phenomenal being. The issue is connected to consciousness as a “mystery” in the sense of wonder, or awe or of the power of [one’s own] being
[1]
An idea of the complexities. “Mind” is a concept. Any concept has meaning [use]
and as such attempts to refer to something in the world [has a place in use];
both meaning and referent [use] are approximates; they are not independent of
context - the individual, society, history; as a member of the world which is
described in various terms such as “matter”, mind has relations to the world
but the terms of description are subject to the same issues; language has [at
least] difficulties in escaping from this enmeshment since what we are talking
about is language; the entire range and history of thought -e.g., of
philosophy- is implicitly under review - not merely as to validity but also as
to the nature of the undertaking. Two points. The moment we question a part of
the world we question the entire world in its variety, layering and relations.
And, there is no criticism that is outside criticism. No, four points. And the
fourth is that “there is no criticism that is outside criticism” should is
therefore also not outside criticism. This sounds paradoxical. No, an unknown
number of points? What is the way to cut the Gordian Knot, to clean the Aegean
stables? It may begin with simplicity. By being in the world. By not asking
naughty questions. That is our island. Then we can go to the edge and fall off…
then we can be naughty… and so our island grows… and to it we can come back
when we feel the tug of the vortex… but our island is not stable… there are
quakes, continental drifts, oceans cutting at the shoreline, winds blowing
drifts of sand to dunes and sea… and we fear and accept…
[2]
In developing knowledge about an aspect of the world that is unclearly known
there must be an uncertainty in the object or aspect under study and the
concept and other instruments by which it is known. If there is an unclearly
known “object” known through a definite concept then there is an indefinite
concept that defines the state of knowledge better. We may talk of mind as
though it is something definite, like a new continent waiting to be discovered,
but we do not know whether our concept of mind points to something definite and
that calls into question the clarity and definition of the concept.
Generalizing, the dual uncertainty is that of the field of concepts and of the
field of being or phenomena that include the concepts. This is ultimately good
for it points to the strong binding to idea and object, to form and reality
[3]
Looking ahead to what is written below, I am using “phenomenal” to cover all
[subjective] experience. This includes the phenomenal experience of things, of
feelings and emotions, of thought and images…
[4] I am tempted to say “being in the stream” but that metaphor may be partial. Of course there is a play between actual understanding and confidence; and confidence may be of forced and natural kinds; and perhaps there is no final distinction between actual understanding and natural confidence
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