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PROBLEMS IN THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF ANIL MITRA PH D, COPYRIGHT © 1999
REVISED March 2022
Outline. Bulleted links (
Bibliography | Copyright | Footnotes TaBLE OF CONTENTS The Structure of the Set of Problems Constitutes an
Implicit Metaphysics The Website and Plans for Future Development Tentative Status of the Document and Current Studies in
Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 1.1
The Concepts of Mind and Consciousness 1.1.2
First Meanings of Mind and Consciousness 1.1.3
Need for Further Analysis of the Concepts of Mind and Consciousness 1.1.4
Evolution of the Concepts of Matter, Mind and Consciousness 1.1.5
Recognizing Mind and Consciousness: the Signs 1.1.6
Confusion between the Signs and the Concepts 1.1.7
The Mystery of Consciousness 1.2
What Is the Extent of the Conscious in Relation to All Mental
Phenomena? 1.2.1
All Mental Phenomena Are Conscious 1.2.2
Mental Phenomena Are Either Conscious or Accessible to Consciousness 1.2.3
There Are Mental Phenomena That Are Not Accessible to Consciousness 1.2.4
There Are No Conscious Phenomena 1.3
An Atlas of Mind and Consciousness: Structure, Functions and Dynamics 1.3.1
The Elements of Psychology 1.3.2
Directions and Modes of Development for Psychology 1.3.3
Elements of Mental Processes as a Dynamic System 1.3.4
Psychiatric or Mental Disorders as Variation 1.3.5
Exceptional Abilities and Performance from a Framework of Variation
and Nurture 1.4
Direction of Further Study 2 Relations
among Mind, World and Time 2.1
Mind and World: Two Problems 2.1.2
The Problem of Mind and Matter: Explaining Mind from Matter or Nature 2.1.3
The Problem of the Structure and Dynamics of Mind 2.1.5
The Problems of Consciousness 2.1.6
Are there two Problems or One 2.2
The Concept of a Theory of Mind and Consciousness 2.2.2
What will or should a Theory of Mind and Consciousness Do? 2.2.3
What Would It Take to Have a Theory of Consciousness? 2.3.3
Biology and Neuroscience 2.4
Mind, Society and Language 2.4.1
Relates to, Mirrors Psychology in Two Ways 2.4.2
Communication, Mind and Consciousness 2.4.3
Thought as Internal Speech or Dialog 2.4.4
On the Knowledge of Other Minds 2.5
Mind, Machines and Technology 2.5.1
Nature of Machines and Tools - Machines as Objects 2.5.2
Role of Machines - Machines and Tools as Aids 2.6
Mind, Information and Mathematics 2.6.1
Cognitivism and Its Critics 3 Origins
of Mind and Consciousness 3.3.1
Adaptivity of Mind and Consciousness 3.3.2
On the Nature of Knowledge from Its Evolutionary Context 3.3.3
Evolution: Bio-psycho-social 4.1.2
Nature and Status of the Problems of Mind and Consciousness 4.2
Ontology, Metaphysics and Being 4.2.2
Specific Ontologies or Metaphysics 4.2.3
Relationship to Special Disciplines 4.3
Epistemology, Explanation and Theory 4.3.2
Scientific and Evolutionary Explanation: Nature and Value 4.3.3
Society and Epistemology 4.3.4
Thoughts on Future Forms of Explanation 4.3.5
Explanans - A Variety of Source Theories 4.3.6
Explanandum: Mind and Being? 4.3.8
A Hierarchy of Neutral Ontologies 4.4
Method: How to Study the Problems 4.4.1
On Constructing New Theories 4.4.2
What Will It Take to Develop a Theory of Consciousness and
Mind? 4.4.3
A Variety of Conscious Experience - Mind as Experienced in a Variety
of Contexts 4.5
Sources - the Literature, Institutions 4.6
An Approach to a Theory of Mind and Nature 4.8
The Future of Studies in Mind and Consciousness 4.8.3
What if all Problems of Science and Philosophy Were Conceived and
Solved 4.8.4
The Scientific Problems - Physics, Biology, Psychology Introduction
I have been thinking, writing and reading the
literature on consciousness for a while. I have arranged my thought into a
set of problems that I want to be reasonably well organized and complete The field of consciousness research is in flux:
proposed solutions to the problems do not have finality at the present stage
of development. Indeed one problem is to identify the main issues. I thought
it would be useful to publish my reflections in the format of a set of
problems. As a catalog of problems, the content of this document is a
compilation of viewpoints and issues rather than a development of a single
theme from a single point of view My original intent was to sketch an outline of the modern
problems of consciousness and this catalog will reflect that concern.
Additionally, there were various reasons to take a
broader view. An obvious one is that consciousness is an aspect of mind, which,
as a fundamental and main descriptive category [the ontological status of
mind is one of the issues considered in this document], provides firmer
ground from which to understand consciousness and its relations. Thus, I
decided to consider the problems of mind generally while retaining a focus on
consciousness A second reason to take a broader view is as
follows. Much of the recent activity and excitement in the theory of
consciousness is due to [1] the new models of mind from philosophy, cognitive
science, artificial intelligence, and proof theory; [2] the promise that
ongoing experimental and theoretical neuroscience is detailing places and
processes in the organism-brain where micro-physiology meets the classic
mental functions such as memory, cognition and emotion; [3] breaking of the
materialist-functionalist domination in psychology and philosophy of mind -
and a willingness to explore mind itself. Modern physics may also
provide critical insight into the mind. This modern activity is very
specialized – in a number of ways. The principles of organization and
criticism of such activity come in part from general considerations such as
are provided by the traditions in psychology and the philosophy of mind. At
the same time, the tradition is by no means completed and contains its own
cycles of expansion, error and correction; ongoing reflection and analysis
will continue to remain productive. Importantly, the new activity in the
theory of mind and the continuation of traditional thought should be mutually
informing. Therefore, it is important to consider the historical context of
the study of mind The analytical approach should be balanced by
experiment. In the case of mind, the study of experience is a form of
experiment The demands of history and of the present may be
met through consideration of current and classical problems. The requirements
of both theory and experience may be satisfied by considering input from a
variety of disciplines and traditions A personal reason to expand the scope of the catalog
is to make it a more complete resource for my broader interests, especially
in the theory and nature of being The Logic of the Arrangement
The logic is expressed in the scheme: Mind; its
relations; and criticism This can be expanded: [1] Mind, its structure and processes [2] Relations to the world, dynamics [3] Origins - immediate, developmental,
evolutionary and ultimate, and [4] Philosophy, questions about the nature of the
problems, “meta-questions” Naturally, the topics overlap There are many open questions; the main issues are
grouped into the four topics and are recounted in section 4.7, under the
heading Status of the Catalog of Problems. In the present version of
the document, it is the place of mind in the world -and study of the
relationship- that forms the organizing principle. An outline of the problems
and reasons for its deferment is given in Section 4.7 Because of the interrelations, reflection upon the
problems as a group enhances understanding of the individual problems. The
broader concerns, ultimate issues, the immediate, and the practical sphere
are mutually relevant A number of primary and supporting themes are
developed in stages, interwoven with one another. The supporting themes are
related to but do not directly constitute the main subject. These themes are
taken up as needed and hence the recurrence. However, recurrence is not
repetition and each occurrence may involve a new consideration or point of
view. Thus, there is a natural development of some of the supporting ideas in
the contexts of their application. It would be useful to gather the different
aspects of a topic: Appendix A lists some of the themes and the locations in
the document where they are developed The Structure of the Set of Problems Constitutes an
Implicit Metaphysics
The terms ontology and metaphysics are used
somewhat interchangeably. However, ontology may be used in reference to an
actual or explanatory generative principle behind a metaphysical system A value of metaphysics is that consideration of a
significant problem in a universal setting contributes to understanding of
the problem and of the whole. This development does not arise at once but is
iterative, reflexive and interactive. Thus, a system of metaphysics and its
application arise in interaction The structure of any problem set that aims at
completeness must, in part, imply and derive from an ontology or metaphysics,
which may be implicit or pragmatic. Pragmatic, here, may mean a system
that is defined by practice rather than as a separate system whether explicit
or implicit. My initial plan was to use the tacitly defined scientific
worldview that defines the terms of much of the modern discussion on mind. As
described above, I have relaxed the original intent; this will place the scientific
view in a context. The scheme Mind, Relations and Origins, Reflection or
Philosophy assumes a metaphysics of mind-in-the-world. Derivation [see
Topic 4] of a set of issues or problems from the interaction of current study
and metaphysics is currently implicit in this document The Website and Plans for Future
Development
A primary long-term objective is to develop
a site for my work in Being and the Elements of Being The purposes of the present site for a Catalog
of Problems in the Science and Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness are
[1] to publish, to contribute, to learn by criticism [2] to experience site
development and maintenance - updating, advertising, registering, maintaining
correspondence... I chose consciousness because I have been studying
and writing about it for a while, because of its pertinence to the larger
topic of Being, and because of its current interest Plans for the present site on mind and consciousness are: tighten
the logic and the organization - and, to some extent, bring together themes
that weave through the discussion; incorporate material from the spectrum of
disciplines labeled cognitive science - especially artificial intelligence
[AI] and proof theory, from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and
psychiatry, and other sources - including other cultures and direct
individual experience - noted in the document; elaborate and modify the
content in response by my own and others’ ideas and criticism and to progress
in the field; report on developments and results in a program of study, and
research... In planning and working out the present format, I went from the
particular [mind] to the general [philosophy, metaphysics]. There is an
advantage to the reverse order - general to particular that I have used in
other writing - and I may adopt that approach later Discussion and plans for the site continue in the
immediately following comments An In-Process Document
This document is part of the blurred boundary
between formal and informal work that is a byproduct of electronic publication This is definitely an in-process document.
Commentary on others’ work, though critical, is primarily for learning and
sharing. Similarly, the cycling through various ontological positions is not
subscription to any particular ontology or even to the idea of categorial
ontology. This cycling shows the relative nature of categorial ontologies,
which is brought out also by noting that a categorial ontology such as
materialism has no meaning until the notion of matter has been specified
sufficiently so that we know that if other categories turn out to be
included, that is not the case because what is called matter actually has the
mental residing deep in the recesses of its original nature. One way in which
I work through a variety of ontological positions is through commentary on
work of other writers; this is effective in that the metaphysical positions
of the writers are intended to be instantiated in application. I have not
worked out a complete and systematic metaphysics; it is not clear that one
would be useful. However, there should be at least a sketch of a complete
system of the one world; for I see meaning as neither merely atomic nor
merely established by use; rather meaning occurs in the context of, at least,
a descriptive system or theory of the one world and the application of the
system. The document builds toward an outline of a complete system. This placement
within such a complete system would also be a requirement for classification
to be the basis of categorial ontology Upon completion of the document, it has become
clear that there are two main problem areas: Mind - what it is or its nature and its significance;
and its relations to the world. Note that the world includes mind. Relations
are defining; they include spatio-temporal relations and intensionality The background of understanding These two problem areas will guide further
development Tentative Status of the Document and Current Studies in
Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
I hesitate to say that the working through a
variety of categorial positions - this includes positions that are asserted
or intended to be non-categorial - without presenting any definite position
of my own is representative of the field. However, even though I may later
make a more definite commitment, I feel that the indefiniteness is rather
characteristic of the field of mind-body relations today. My position is definite
in that [1] I specify a framework for the formulation of background
metaphysics, [2] I specify what makes an intended monism such as materialism
truly monistic - I argue that many so-called materialisms or idealisms are
too under specified to count as a true monism, and [3] I present alternatives
for the way in which the ontological framework may work out - this implies
that the current scene is indefinite despite claims to definiteness, [4] I
define a program of research - drawing from the current scene and my ideas of
effective organization from practical and theoretical / conceptual points of
view - at experiential, theoretical and ideological levels Is the indefiniteness of ontological foundation
that characterizes the field of mind-body study, including the origin and
structure of consciousness and its place in the realm of mental phenomena, an
essential indefiniteness? This is somewhat an open question for me. However,
I have been coming to believe that definiteness in metaphysics goes together
with detailed work in the study of all known realms of phenomena. Metaphysics
is not something that is specified in advance; its specification and
elaboration is not separate from the elaboration of the individual sciences
and disciplines. This does not mean that metaphysics is without use over and
above any appeal that it may have to the human spirit since the process of
mutual specification is in the form of dialog. Furthermore, there is no implication
that metaphysics is impossible. This is because modes of knowing and
knowledge are also part of the equation of discovery. As a rough
approximation, one may say that today’s science is - and is informed by -
yesterday’s metaphysics. Similarly, our metaphysics, in addition to giving
significance to the process of discovery - this has a rather subjective
component, may also inform tomorrow’s science and practical knowledge. A
framework for this process is given in the previous paragraph An Invitation to Readers
I welcome commentary - appreciative, questioning,
and skeptical - from others Acknowledgements
I have cited main references, sources of
information and ideas. The text references are collected in a bibliography
and links are provided for Internet sites I am immersed in the cultural milieu and its
tradition. I have been reading the popular and technical literature in a
number of fields for many years. I have absorbed ideas and vocabulary from
these sources. Various conclusions and ways of thought, which might otherwise
be original, are have derivation from the cultural environment and likely to
be anticipated by others. It does not seem necessary, even if possible, to
identify all these influences. However, a general awareness of the influence
is healthy and the debt is acknowledged Revision of May 2003
The site http://www.horizons-2000.org
is no longer restricted to the issues of mind and consciousness. As planned, the
focus on mind has been expanded to being The main document for the site is Journey in Being.
There, I have collected, conceptually systematized and condensed my thought
on mind. I have been fortunate to have found much conceptual clarification
especially with regard to the ontological status of being generally and mind
in particular, with regard to the mind-matter issue and to the nature and
kinds of mental function However, the document Journey in Being is
not dedicated to mind. Its four sections are Knowledge and Action,
Experiments in the Transformation of Being, The Variety of Being, and Action
and Influence. The first and third sections are pertinent to the present
document. Knowledge and Action includes a treatment of mind,
consciousness, of various problems especially mind-matter and of the mental
functions. The Variety of Being has a discussion of cognitivism and
computation in relation to the study of mind and includes a discussion of the
ontological status of machines including the question of machine intelligence
which is not a controversial topic and of machine thinking and machine
consciousness. The treatment there – on mind and machines – goes far beyond
that of the present document Status of The Document
The present document is useful as a source of
detail and as a possible foundation – for organization – if I write again
specifically on consciousness. With that end in mind and since much content
is now in Journey in
Being, I have excised a number of parts of present document 1 Mind and
Consciousness[1]
1.1 The Concepts[2] of Mind and Consciousness
The first meaning[3] of a notion in the context
of humankind[4] and culture[5] is through experience and
use. The first experience of mind is as experience[6] itself; and later, a name
such as “mind” may be used. A tendency to reification may attach a spatial
metaphor, e.g., the seat of experience [7] to “mind”. This first
meaning will be modified below Here are two aspects to this. You and I
may use the same word but refer to different things. A first step is to make
sure that we are talking [more or less] about the same thing. Secondly,
although something may exist, our idea or description of it may be adequate
or inadequate for the context or purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to go
beyond the “first” meaning. How may this be done? What is revealed for
“mind”? These questions are addressed in what follows Regarding mind, without consciousness
or sentience, i.e. without phenomenal experience, there is no datum, no
subject, and no discussion. The first approach identifies what it is that is
[to be] under discussion; it is the occasion for the word “mind” and its
meaning In reflective thought there have been
two related senses [Runes, 1983] of this first meaning: [1] The individual
mind is the self that perceives, remembers, imagines, feels, conceives,
reasons, etc. and which is functionally related to an individual bodily
organism. [2] Mind, generically considered, is a metaphysical substance,
which pervades all individual minds and is contrasted with matter or material
substance. I.e., we can talk of individual minds... and of Mind. The latter
appears to be hypothetical. Discussion starts with individual minds It important to talk about meanings and
uses because the correspondence between words, meanings and uses is
many-to-many; because any given correspondence is never clear and definite;
and because words and meanings are in flux, i.e. in evolution. This does not
mean that there should be no sense of focus or concreteness to meaning;
words, meanings, concepts and uses cohere or coalesce in more and less well
knit groups; meanings and uses remain stable for periods of time that may
correspond to phases of history or to the ascendance of a paradigm within
which meanings find application. Enlightened dialog about meaning encourages proper
but not false clarity, and is a part of the growth of knowledge It is important to be clear about the
meanings of the mind and consciousness [1] because of the centrality of mind,
especially of consciousness, to human experience, [2] as part of establishing
any adequate theory of mind, and [3] because “consciousness” is used in a
variety of related senses. It is thus important to be clear on the meaning
used here and it is desirable for that meaning to be the core or primary
meaning [in a sense elaborated below] and to have appropriate historical
continuity. The difficulty of analytic definitions of mind and consciousness
relates to the difficulties associated with establishing their precise nature
and boundaries and relations to the world. Regarding the central nature of
consciousness and difficulty of definition, the following illuminates the
point: “Consciousness cannot be defined: we
may be ourselves fully aware of what consciousness is, but we cannot without
confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly
apprehend. The reason is plain: consciousness lies at the root of all
knowledge[8]” The human psychology of language is such
that naming something lends concreteness to it; and therefore the naming of
mind already contains a latent hypothetical character [9], [10].
This is a source of confusion and error but also of fruitful adventure into
the nature of the world. From a practical point of view, we should remember
that the form of mind is the form of experience 1.1.1 On
Meaning[11]
As
suggested above the first meaning of a concept is through experience and use.
It is implicit in this thesis that meanings are not given but evolve. It was
also implicit that a first meaning of “meaning” is related to experience and
use Here
are some thoughts on this issue. As Wittgenstein emphasized, talk of meaning
must look to use. This statement is indefinite if the purpose of talk about
meaning is to find definite meaning. Meanings have more or less concrete use,
first, in close-knit sub-cultures. There is, however, regardless of openness
or closed nature of the sub-cultures, an interaction or communication, even
when only an indirect one through interaction with the common culture. These
interactions are threaded through time. Tracing these processes must be
difficult since their time scale frequently exceeds the life spans of
individuals and of interpretations. What appears closed over a few years may
be open over a generation A
related consideration focuses on the hierarchy of structures through which
meaning is elaborated. At the first level, there is experience and use. At
another level, there is the class of informally related concepts, meanings
and uses. I think of this as a modified first meaning. A second level
of meaning of is arrived at through an elaboration of a descriptive world and
this includes the possibility of theories. Thus, consciousness, emotion,
cognition and so on find enhanced meaning by being placed in relation to one
another. In this second level of meaning of a word / concept, we may find
that a bit of the meaning of cognition should go under emotion; we may find
emotion to be a compound concept. We might find a single or small number of
elementary phenomena that constitute the field of mental phenomena. The old
meanings are stripped down and built up; some concepts are discarded and new
ones arise. Even in the most anti-empirical or extreme rationalist of
settings, the process must be informed by the experience - at least at an
unconscious level. The metaphor of a collage is appropriate under the
following provision. After the collage is constructed, the artist looks at
the collage and asks, “Is this saying anything?” In addition, if the answer
is “No”, or “Yes, but not quite the right thing!” then the collage may
receive additional work or start again with a blank canvas The
first and second levels of meaning correspond roughly to the idea of “sense”
and the following levels correspond roughly to “reference”. The
relations among these levels correspond, approximately, to a system of
relations among sense and reference A
third level meaning of a word / concept or system of words is through the
addition of an active and intentional empirical phase to the process of
second meaning described above. We now have a system of concepts that stand
in relation to one another and a system of description, possibly a theory,
that provide understanding or explanation of the world or a more or less
coherent sub-domain of facts and patterns. There is attempt to improve the
faithfulness of the system of description over the domain and / or extend to
domain to which the system applies. This attempt includes explanation of
known phenomena and prediction of new ones; new experiments are suggested by
the predictions and experiments require further prediction and comparison;
and, when the theoretical system is in sufficient disagreement there is the
revaluation of that system as described in the previous paragraph Meanings
evolve in mutual relation to other meanings [second level of meaning] and in
the evolution of context or application [third level]. The associations of
words and meanings also change but words do not precisely follow meanings.
Even given a fixed set of meanings, word associations change as the space of
the meanings is explored; other influences are sound and custom These
second and third levels of meaning of word / concepts provide second and
third meanings of meaning There
is an analogy with axiomatic systems[12]. Consider Euclidean geometry: for two
millennia there was an open question and debate about the fifth postulate -
the postulate that non-parallel lines meet at exactly one point. The
postulate was finally shown to be independent of the other postulates; i.e.,
the negation of the fifth postulate could be added to the first four
postulates without contradiction. This led to the possibility of
non-Euclidean geometry. In so generalizing from Euclidean geometry, just one
of a number of alternative meanings of “straight line” generalizes
appropriately. In further seeking to analyze the nature of the concept of
space and its possibilities the idea has been generalized to spaces without
metric where relations between points are specified in terms of “continuity.”
The various theories of modern geometry and topology have a broad range of
application to natural science and within mathematics itself. In the process
the definitions of the basic concepts or terms and their meaning is changed.
The way in which meanings change in general is similar though not as formal Alfred
North Whitehead, 1929, states this as follows: “A precise language must await
a completed metaphysical knowledge.” From
the present considerations, the following can be added to Whitehead’s
observation. Meaning cannot be completely isolated from the entire system.
However, the act of naming is an act of partial isolation and the process of
partial isolation for the purpose of clarification of use and meaning is a
process of illumination and, though not complete in itself, part of the
expansion of the system, or increase in its faithfulness over, the domain of
application. This is a structured affair for a word can have a general
meaning within, for example, the English Language - the distinction between
formal and informal languages is not significant here - and derivative and
specific meanings within specific contexts. When a word / concept is isolated
from a special context, its more general meaning may still be available The
process of meaning is not separate from its broadest canvas, yet separation
is necessary for the process to go on. This is the case even when the
separation is not an analytic operation and is not fully someone’s mental
content. The separation may be a process in a small community that is subject
to selection pressure. The process, then, is something that occurs with
natural language and its use. The canvas of meaning, in the case of natural
language, may be so broad as to not come within the scope of most natural users However,
consider Edward Hall’s [1995] description of negotiations in a meeting with
tribal leaders in Arizona’s Navajo reservation in the 1930’s. He describes
how, before the main discussion, the Navajo leaders provided a careful
account of the meanings of the terms to be used. When the natural canvas is
not so large, its entirety comes within the scope of users. The distinction
between users and specialists, that appears to be a product of civilization and
specialization, is not yet fully established In
the academic and other specialist communities such as trade organizations, it
becomes the business of the practitioners to work with meanings and the
nature of meaning. The distinction between users and specialists [by virtue
of coinage, acknowledged expertise, keepers of tradition] becomes formal;
expertise is accorded and has some basis in use and institution but does not
become absolute. There are tendencies, both institutional and psychological,
to make the distinction absolute; however the idea of central store of
correct meaning, use and construction is somewhat mythic: at times we behave
as though it were real but cannot point to any final arbiter. Even a
canonical set of meanings, grammatical and spoken forms is derivative –
though not in 1-1 correspondence – from [a] metaphysics. We may regard it as
Written that the most secure fortress has begun to crumble even before it is
conceived In
the social realm, the construction of meaning transcends discovery: it is
also part of the process of creation of “reality.” What
kind of mind would be such that its creation of meaning would be [part of or
interactive with] the creation of natural or of universal reality? Is the
answer “There is none”? If there were another answer, what would be the
nature and meaning of “mind”, “meaning”, and “reality”? What would that mind
be? What would be its relation to human minds? A
fourth level of meaning of a concept, as much potential as actual, occurs in
the confession of limits to knowledge and is manifest, not by a polite
omission from conversation of what we do not know, but by visiting the shadow
and dark regions at the edge of the universe of what is known. If such
journeys lead us in to the shadow it is the positive shadow of a journey to
the center of what we are and not the negative shadow that in exalting limits
into absolute boundaries passes as light. In the actual case, the shadow is a
continuum from light to dark; however, when limits are made absolute the
shadow is seen as dark, something to be avoided The
concepts of mind and consciousness are elaborated in this document,
especially in sections 1.1.2, 1.3, Topic 2, Topic 3, and section 4.4.2 1.1.2 First Meanings of Mind and
Consciousness
1.1.2.1
Consciousness
The
meaning of consciousness used here is that of phenomenal or subjective
experience - to be conscious is to have phenomenal experience. The phenomenal
qualities of conscious experience are sometimes called qualia. In the words
of Thomas Nagel 1974, a state is conscious if there is something it is
like to be in that state This
is the first and core meaning of consciousness. Two ways in which it is the
core meaning follow. Firstly, there needs to be a name for the
phenomenality that is so central to [human] being in the world; the history
of its use makes “consciousness” proper to that task It
follows that the first experience of mind stated above is as consciousness.
As a meaning, this is to be modified below Awareness is related to consciousness. In some
uses “awareness” can be substituted for “consciousness” as described above;
in related uses, awareness is more and less than consciousness: “I am aware
that her spirit is present” includes the possibly of knowledge by inference
but “I am conscious of the presence of her spirit” seems to imply direct
apprehension. There is a sense used in psychology and cognitive science in
which an organism can be aware of something without being conscious of it.
There are examples from normal and abnormal psychology. People
occasionally become conscious of something that someone said a few seconds
after it was said. The delayed response includes knowledge that something had
registered without entering consciousness. This phenomenon is a common
experience and does not necessarily involve pathology. Another example is
“blindsight” in which brain injured persons have awareness without phenomenal
awareness of objects in their visual field. This sense of “awareness” is
non-phenomenal awareness. Non-phenomenal awareness appears to be real but there
is potential for confusion in using “awareness” to refer to both phenomenal
and non-phenomenal experience The
second way in which phenomenal experience is the core meaning of
consciousness is that there are varieties of other uses that add some
ingredient to this core meaning Consciousness
is sometimes used to refer to the following related but distinct ideas:
awareness of awareness[13], self-consciousness, conscience,
higher consciousness, introspection, and language consciousness In
the modern literature, a distinction is sometimes made between phenomenal
consciousness, which is the core meaning that I am using here, and access-consciousness
[Block, 1995]. Block defines phenomenal-consciousness as experience and
access-consciousness as availability for use in thought or action;
access-consciousness may or may not be associated with phenomenal
consciousness. So defined, access-consciousness is related but not identical
to awareness in the sense of non-phenomenal awareness: although a degree of
awareness is present in blindsight, the awareness is not necessarily
available for use. The motive for the introduction of access-consciousness
appears to be to make valid distinctions and to have a concept of
consciousness [or signs of consciousness] available for use in cognitive and
functional theories of mental processes. One problem with the use of
“access-consciousness” is the associated confusion that the term was supposed
to dissipate. This point is discussed further below. A second problem is the
question is as to whether access-consciousness is different from phenomenal
consciousness [Chalmers, 1997] or whether it is a functional or cognitive
characteristic or correlate of phenomenal consciousness. The fact that the
awareness in blindsight is both non-phenomenal and unavailable suggests that
access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are not different, i.e.
they are logically distinct [this is expected of corresponding functional and
phenomenal terms] but empirically identical [this is desired of corresponding
functional and phenomenal notions.] Even if the phenomenal and availability
concepts are empirically identical, they are conceptually distinct and this
distinction may be useful. I suggest using “consciousness” for its original
phenomenal sense [unless it is shown that there is no such thing as
phenomenality] and other terms such as “awareness” for the cognitive,
functional or behavioral measures of consciousness. A problem with
“awareness” is that it, too, comes pre-loaded with multiple meanings.
Alternatives are “availability” and “cognitive correlate”. As used in this
document, consciousness is phenomenal consciousness Chalmers
[1996] argues that mental terms can have two sets of meanings: a phenomenal
meaning and a psychological meaning. The psychological meanings are supposed
to be objective: functional, measurable, behavioral, instrumental, pragmatic
or operational. Searle [1997] criticizes this view and advocates that there
is a single meaning to psychological phenomena - the phenomenal, intrinsic,
conscious meaning. Further, if there is only the phenomenal meaning or, more
generally the meaning as mental phenomenon, are the functional meanings
characteristics or correlates? And, what is the status of the functional and
related theories of mind? These issues are taken up in more detail below As
noted by Searle [1997], some cognitivists effectively subscribe to a view
that there are no conscious phenomena. A variant is that conscious phenomena
are unimportant. Another variant is to redefine consciousness in a way that
is not consciousness at all; and, perhaps, to allow for the original meaning
but to alter its significance. It is not necessary to think that these views
or their motivations or consequences are explicit or intended. An example of
the appropriation of “consciousness” is through the idea of
“access-consciousness,” noted above. A comparison with “heat” and
“temperature” is used as justification by historical analogy. “Heat” used to
be used, with confusion, in reference to two separate concepts that are now
called “heat” [roughly amount of energy; think of the analogy with a water
tank - heat corresponds to the volume of water] and “temperature” [in the
analogy, temperature corresponds to pressure; in a tall slender tank the
pressure at the bottom is greater than in a squat shallow tank even though
the volume of water in the tall tank may be less]. Note that we do not have
two similar terms that could have been suggested by the historical
development: A-heat [amount] and D-heat [degree]. Rather, there are two
separate terms: temperature and heat. Why should we use
phenomenal-consciousness and access-consciousness when, in the sense inherent
to the meaning of consciousness, phenomenal-consciousness is consciousness
and access-consciousness is not consciousness at all? This perpetuates the
confusion that it was sought to alleviate. One thing is clear: phenomenal
consciousness is here to stay[14] and access-consciousness is confusing
and poor etymology Need
for a Catalog of Terms and Concepts It
is clear that there is some need, even in the absence of the functional and
related meanings, to clarify terminology and classify concepts. It is not
clear that, given the pace of publication, this would contribute to
conceptual clarification, which must in part be an historical process. My
intent here should be to display some of the variety, to state my choices
with reasons and to attempt to be appropriately consistent 1.1.2.2 Mind
The
first experience given above of mind as the place of experience or
consciousness is incomplete as a meaning. It may logically or empirically
turn out to be the case that mind so experienced includes unconscious
processes but, at this point, it is desirable to give a modified first
meaning: Mental
phenomena and processes are those phenomena or processes that are conscious
or accessible to consciousness The
concept of the unconscious stated below follows from the present concept as a
tautology This
“definition”, which derives from a conception of the unconscious as outlined
by Searle [1992, Chapter 7] is founded in the following considerations: [1]
It is based in the original experience of mind[15], [2] however, mental phenomena as conscious
phenomena is too restrictive, [3] to posit unconscious phenomena that are not
accessible to consciousness goes beyond the scope of the original meaning and
begins to turn mind into something that it is not, i.e. the concept becomes
so broad that it begins to designate just about anything. I remain open, of
course, to further dialog and refinement in these considerations I
have been talking as though phenomenal experience or accessibility to
phenomenal experience is the mark of mental phenomena. Another “criterion” of
the mental is intensionality. The way in which a sentient organism takes up a
thing in its environment - that environment includes ideas if the organism
has them - seems close to what it means to be mentally engaged with something
that, as a result of the engagement, becomes an object. There are
non-intentional conscious states and unconscious intentional states. So,
which is primitive, consciousness or intensionality? Even though
intensionality comes close to the core, consciousness, as I said earlier, is
the first experience of mind. All intentional states are either conscious or
accessible to consciousness. Another possible characteristic of mind is intelligence.
It is necessary to be careful what is meant by “intelligence”. As I use
“intelligence”, it is adaptation itself adapted or the process of evolution
incorporated into the organism. Although this does not imply consciousness or
intensionality, it points to them. If one is looking for the origin of the
mental in evolution this is one place to look. This is interesting but all
these criteria... how do they fit together? The point here: there is an
aspect of futility to this kind of debate! The global objective is a
process that inherits and modifies systems of understanding, explanation and
prediction in the process of use or application. Meanings and primitives are
actors in that theatre. This is taken up, first in sections 1.3, 2.1, and
2.2.2 below and subsequently in a distributed way throughout the document In
the next section, I begin to look at broadening the realm of mind and
consciousness. In doing so, I am aware that I might make the concept “so
broad that it begins to designate just about anything”. This result will be
avoided by retaining the present sense of the mental as a special case of any
extensions to the sense. Such extensions may occasion refinement and
understanding. It will also be proper to show that any extended sense
deserves the designation as “mental.” There should be some kind of continuity
between the levels of meaning 1.1.3 Need for Further Analysis
of the Concepts of Mind and Consciousness[16]
In
this section, I am not looking for a refinement of the definition of mind or
consciousness. I am not taking the point of view that the ideas of
consciousness and mind are adequate but need elaboration and clarification.
Rather, I consider that there is meaning of consciousness that includes the
meaning considered so far. I am also concerned with justifying this position,
with what the broader ranges of meanings and entities may be, and the limits
to these ranges 1.1.3.1 Consciousness
Domain of adequacy of the human experience
of consciousness as the concept of consciousness: Analogy
with concepts of matter - modern understanding of matter is significantly
evolved from the original immediate experience of what may be called the
psychological investment in the permanence of physical reality. The notions
of mind and consciousness are quite primitive in their development. This does
not mean that the primitive or “folk” notions are invalid. However all
notions, primitive, folk, or modern, scientific and philosophical find their
validity within a certain context. One of the adventures of human exploration
is in the broadening of context, of worldview. The question is open, but I
believe that “mind” and “consciousness” are capable of evolving in to greater
domains of validity and, as they do so, the concepts will evolve[17]. The modern meanings will not be invalidated
within their domain and will find interpretation within the future meanings.
Why do I believe this? The following factors contribute: the loose ends in the
modern system; extended reflections on mind and consciousness and
experimentation with the concepts; the influence of alternative western
traditions and eastern traditions; that the notion of the idea need not be
the ephemeral, immaterial thing we tend to imagine that it must be; the
freedom, and the consequent potential to subsume greater regions of
experience, afforded by generalized concepts in my experiments - conceptual
and actual[18]...and the resulting ties that are
found between the realms of matter and mind in consequence of these
explorations. Thus while it is clear that - given the modern concepts of mind
and matter and the modern forms of scientific explanation - there should be a
tendency to make matter [nervous system] primal in our explanatory systems;
this is not required in experimental forms of the concepts 1.1.3.2 Mind
Domain of adequacy of the human experience
of mind as the concept of mind As
with consciousness, the concept [at any stage or level including the meaning
or definition by pointing and common sense] has elements of anthropomorphism,
is limited; we recognize the co-evolution of meanings concepts,
definitions, theory, applications and culture There
is a tendency to argue the limits of understanding based in the anthropic and
cultural limits to perception and the anthropomorphic and culture based
qualities of the concepts; at the same time, we argue universal limits to
universal properties and relations based in the limited conceptions. The
resolution is familiar; the criticism of any fundamental meaning requires the
criticism of all fundamental meanings; the process of criticism is
essentially reflexive As
concepts and meanings evolve they may be held back by the baggage of old
associations; while the perspectives of a given time and place, a given
cultural niche, imply certain necessary relationships among the ideas e.g.
“mind from matter”, there is room for invention and evolution in meaning that
alter, invert and introduce new basic relationships, ontological givens. The
old givens lose primacy; the old relationships lose their necessity 1.1.3.3
On the Ontology of Naming
There
is a legacy of issues associated with the words “mind” and “matter” and other
categories. Contrast and variety provide richness to the world so, certainly,
not all of the issues are problematic. The Cartesian tradition, for example,
was a source of innovation and progress but, viewed rigidly as an ontological
statement rather than as a solution to a problem of a phase of cultural
history, has become a block to understanding; it is a favorite scapegoat that
is frequently chastised along the path to clarity and further progress in the
realm of fundamental ideas in the modern world. The ideas of mind and matter
and of the gulf between them are, however, by no means merely of Cartesian
origin. I believe that within the milieu of human biological and cultural
evolution such a split, though by no means necessary, is natural. That
milieu, large as we may perceive it to be, is, from the vantage point
of the universality, a niche. Further growth in the realm of ideas would be
growth of and beyond the traditional and the modern categories By
the ontology of naming, I mean the tendency to assume an implicit set
of categories, regardless of explicit recantation, that is based in human
psycho-sociology and is potentiated or exaggerated by naming the categories.
So, for example, if I restrict my speech and thought to “I...” “I am...” “I
do...” “I think...” i.e. if I allow only categorially neutral nouns and the
verbs corresponding to the categories I may avoid the need to explain “mind”,
“matter”, and their relationship. I may diminish the force of categorial
thinking. I am not suggesting an immediate modification to vocabulary and
usage[19]. However, in terms of a hierarchy of increasingly neutral ontologies - or a single ontology in
which there are levels of universality - we would eliminate the concepts in
question from the higher levels. This leads to the following consideration: What
is a mental act? The
following is not meant to be a definition. It is a reminder that the received
categories can be avoided There
are difficulties that arise from supposing that I am a physical entity that
thinks. Rather, I exist and live in a field of experience that is populated
with discrete-like entities and continuities and painted with qualities. I
have varying degrees of control and of causal give and take and other
faculties [functions]. For example, I have a certain degree of control over
thought but I experience control and flow with physical balance and inertia.
I encounter entities that, though possessed of independence, I experience -
through perceptive empathy, analogy, and transference - as mirroring my own
experience; these are other beings Do
I really need to talk of mental acts and physical entities? Cannot all of
experience, being, myth, culture, knowledge and science be situated
economically within this framework without reification of contingent
categories? The
key is the economic consideration. Brevity and significance may be obtained
from naming but reification is a possible price 1.1.4 Evolution of the Concepts
of Matter, Mind and Consciousness
This
topic includes evolution of words, ideas, definitions, concepts and theories What
is primal, consciousness [mind] or matter? Consciousness and mind are focused in
specific forms of matter; matter is everywhere - so matter, it would seem by
experience, is primal. But, a re-understanding or re-conceptualization of
consciousness may reveal it primal and the possible destiny of consciousness
may make it immanent and so primal ...However,
mind and matter are projections behind the one universe [the whole of
being] that includes the categories of mind and matter as phases of
description. Mind and matter refer to no definite [type of] object, use,
or meaning therefore there can be no ultimacy to the projections of idealism
or materialism[20] In
the following, idealism and materialism will be used only in extended senses
to be specified. At the same time I will consider the following alternatives:
[1] retreat from the categories or modes, and [2] consideration of a mode,
whose nature is not specified in advance but is sought in terms of the
condition that it will include the elements of matter, mind; the name of this
mode may be Being 1.1.5 Recognizing Mind and
Consciousness: the Signs
Needs
for a system of signs have included the following: Reduction.
One motivation has been the need to maintain the scientific worldview Getting
a theory. Given the status of modern theories of the material world -
primarily the physical and biological sciences it is difficult to see how
these could explain mind and consciousness per se. How does my own
consciousness, my experience arise from matter that in its fundamental or
aggregate descriptions appears to be devoid of mental characteristics. This
issue is considered in more detail below. However, if one had a set of signs
that necessarily and sufficiently indicated the presence of mind and / or
consciousness then the conceptual headache, the “explanatory gap” would be
eliminated The
way in which need for recognition arises is as follows: First,
consider a common analogy that is used, i.e., the way in which the wetness of
water arises from the properties of the molecules. Wetness is not a property
of the molecules; it arises through the interactions of the molecules. The
analogy is that, similarly, consciousness is not a property of the material
elements of the brain, yet it arises from the interactions. There is however,
the following difficulty with this analogy or numerous others that use an
analogy from physical properties in the bulk arising from physical properties
of the molecules. Although wetness or, more generally, bulk physical
properties have an experiential meaning, i.e., I can feel the wetness
of water, and I can feel the hardness of a diamond or see a
diamond cutter scoring softer materials, these are not the aspects that are
directly predicted from the properties of the molecules. Rather, wetness - or
hardness - is first translated into physical terms, e.g. surface tension and
so on as a measure of wetness, and the prediction is from the microscopic
physical properties to the bulk or macroscopic physical property. In the case
of consciousness, which is experience itself, what are the corresponding bulk
physical or biophysical attributes? Various
measures have been proposed. Mind and consciousness or are nothing but
aspects of the underlying biophysical substrate, they are the behaviors, the
functional or causal relations, sufficient causal powers. These all suffer
from the same problem: given that they are not consciousness itself, how do
we know that are sufficient to guarantee consciousness? When the feel of
wetness is translated into physical terms we know that materials with the
appropriate bulk physical properties will attach to the skin in a certain
way, feel a certain degree of consistency...but how would we know that the
purported signs of consciousness would guarantee consciousness? No answer is forthcoming
and, further, there are reasons that there is no answer. Whereas wetness and
other bulk physical properties are clearly physical, this is not
clearly the case for consciousness. Whereas the wetness can be described in
both subjective and objective terms, this is not the case for consciousness Therefore,
there is a need to know how to recognize consciousness: so that we will know
when an explanation or theory is an explanation of consciousness However,
there is a potential circularity to this search for signs. The signs
validate the theory and, so, cannot be validated by it. In working with the
field, as information is gathered, tentative explanations constructed,
applied and modified understanding grows and the signs initially rough and
ready are refined through the process rather than predicted by theory. There
is an analogy with the development of the concept of force in physics.
Newton’s second law of motion relates force and motion and therefore seems to
supply a measure of force. However, this would be circular and the measure of
force has to come from other effects that are first the rough and ready
notion of effort. This notion is then refined through other effects whose
measure is reproducible in quantitative terms The following possibilities arise: a.
An explanation in current biological and physical terms will be given, and Either: We
will recognize at that time that the explanation is indeed an explanation of
consciousness; it will be an “aha” experience in the sense that the
explanation includes its own verification Or, By
that time, we will have translated the phenomenality of consciousness into a
set of sufficient terms that allow prediction from the microscopic level.
There are currently, only clues as to how this might happen. A new element to
physics, e.g., the requirements for creativity or Penrose’s non-computable
quantum gravity, may turn out to be necessary to explain certain
characteristics or aspects of mental phenomena. It is not clear, however, how
we would get a sufficient set of signs, i.e. a set of signs that would
positively identify the presence of mind or consciousness or any of their
phenomenal aspects Difficulty
of explanation from the organism to phenomenal experience At
this point, the difficulty should be clear. It should also be clear that the
difficulty is not inherent to the ideas of organism, matter, or biology.
Rather, the difficulty is a function of our current understanding or
worldview in which organisms [as physical and biological entities] do not
have mental terms entering into their description. This lack of mental terms,
though not necessary, is not ad hoc but is based in a tradition regarding the
nature of the entities and the best current biology and physics. If the lack
of mental terms of description is not necessary then the entry of mental
terms into biophysical explanation may involve nothing more than an
alteration of semantic associations. It is not known whether a semantic
change would be sufficient or whether some new element would enter into the
descriptions and theories. The new element would be both ontologically new
[at least relative to the dominant ontology and in terms of precipitating and
requiring new semantic associations] and truly empirically new. I now turn to
the possible nature of this ontologically new element b.
Some ontologically new element will enter into: Biophysics;
the material level will incorporate mental terms. This may occur at the
micro-level. These terms will not necessarily be obviously recognizable, and
translation into normal human terms may be necessary Or, The
understanding of mind: the concept of mind will be expanded to include
physical, material, or bio - physical terms or elements Or, The
expansion will be for both material and mental modes Or, A
third mode or category will be introduced. However, mind and matter are
capable of broad [re-] interpretation and may, essentially, in the future
encompass what from the present perspective, would seem to be a third mode. I
believe that mind is especially capable of expansion in terms of
understanding of what it “is”. Directions of approach, discussed in this
document, include expansion of the nature of experience from its present
association as intangible, and metaphysically specialized. Some directions of
metaphysical generalization may be suggested by the idealist metaphysics of
the past. Regarding a third mode, any alternatives that have arisen in the
past - e.g. a parallelism that is maintained by an outside power - appear to
be mere inventions even if motivated by the problems of explanation. Thomas
Nagel [1998] notes that “the great reductive successes in the history of
science have depended on theoretical concepts - not natural ones - that
replace brute correlations with reductive explanations”, and suggests that a
third conception, requiring imagination to conceive, may be possible although
presently unimagined, that will directly connect the mental with the physical[21], [22]. Nagel also suggests - he uses the
term sympathetic imagination, this goes back to an earlier paper [Nagel,
1974], that a useful preliminary would be a detailed structural phenomenology
of experience. Establishment of a third causal / explanatory mode into the
mind / body realm would meet a number of the characteristics that measured
the success of earlier reductions: synthesis and conceptual integrity - the
third mode will subsume matter and mind, reduce to previous systems in their
domains of adequacy, agree with previous systems in those domains; and would
predict new results, and would likely involve conceptual revolution. In the
event of this sort of development, it is not clear, nor does the history of
science provide a clear answer, whether the third mode would be given a new
name or whether it would be called “mind” or “matter” A Model for Explanatory Reduction: the History of
Electromagnetism The
history of electromagnetism is an excellent model example of new concepts and
explanatory reduction through integration of diverse modes into a single new
mode rather than of one mode to another. The variety of the concepts and the
number of contributors to its incremental history make electromagnetism,
perhaps, a better example than Newton’s integration of matter, motion and
gravitation. Of course, dynamics and gravitation are part of the background
and provide both framework and metaphor during the development of
electromagnetic theory. The beginnings of electromagnetism are in antiquity:
the observation in nature of electrical and magnetic phenomena. The birth of
modern electricity and magnetism has been associated with William Gilbert,
1544 - 1603, physician to both Elizabeth I and James I of England; Gilbert
experimented with magnetism and electricity for 17 years; he conceived of the
earth as a magnet and had ideas, expressed in different terms, that corresponded
to the concepts of charge and of electric field It
is not the purpose, here to provide a history but, rather, to present only
some historical elements for the purpose of analogy. On the experimental side
there is the discovery of more and more magnetic and electrical phenomena
that culminates with the discovery that electricity and magnetism interact: a
changing electric field “results” in a magnetic field and vice versa. This
already implies conceptual development in the idea of a field of force, first
as a conceptual and mathematical device but later as a physical entity in its
own right. Mathematics, in turn involves quantification. For example, the
observation that there is no electric field inside a charged sphere led, from
Newton’s calculation that the gravitational field inside a uniform spherical
shell is zero, to the conclusion that electrical charge interacts according
to an inverse square law. In turn, there is the quantification of the
relations between electric and magnetic phenomena - the laws of Biot-Savart
and of Ampere; there is the Ampere’s brilliant work on the interactions
between electric and magnetic phenomena; Faraday’s intuitive development of
the idea of the field; C. F. Gauss’ and others’ development of the
mathematics of fields; the generalizations of the phenomena to be interpreted
under the ideas of electricity and of magnetism; and, finally, James Clerk
Maxwell’s famous completion of the set of four equations -now called
Maxwell’s equations- that finalize the formulation of the classical theory of
electromagnetism. This, however, is the beginning rather than the end of a
story. The theory so developed shows that light, radio-waves, X-rays, gamma
rays are all electromagnetic waves that have the same speed in vacuum: the speed
of light that, having been previously experimentally determined, is now also
predicted by Maxwell’s theory. These developments weave in various strands of
experimental and theoretical work. Earlier the energy of interaction of
electric charges had been associated with the electric field; the
mathematical development of the consequences of Maxwell’s equations, with
proper interpretation, now showed that electromagnetic waves carry energy and
momentum - previously thought to be characteristics of matter. Later it was
shown that Maxwell’s equations, unlike Newton’s theory of gravitation, do not
change their form under what are called Lorentz transformations. These
transformations indicate the non-invariance of spatial and temporal relations
as viewed by observers moving relative to each other. This is equivalent to
Einstein’s special theory of relativity - and is part of Einstein’s
theoretical development. This shows why, within the framework of the theory,
matter cannot be made to travel faster than light: the interactions between
matter are made up of fields that travel at that same universal speed. Within
the framework, the speed of light is not a contingent number but a universal
characteristic. Meanwhile, there is an ongoing research into the relationships
between electricity and life. Nerve-impulses, the elementary processes of the
brain and nervous system are electrochemical in nature; and from chemistry:
chemical interactions are electrical in nature, i.e., the processes of wet,
sloppy, brains and nervous systems “are” electrical in nature. [Of course,
this story is incomplete in that, for one thing, the existence of atoms
requires non-electrical forces.] There are also the developments of
Einstein’s theory of gravitation in which space is capable of interpretation
as the matrix of relationships among matter: space, time, and matter
[space-time-matter] are coeval. And from the quantum theory of fields light,
and electromagnetic waves in general are themselves particulate in nature or
at least in manifestations. The ideas have evolved from being inventions of
metaphorical convenience to real, material and constitutive of a significant
phase of the universe What
is the moral? This is what I take from the history just sketched. [1] The
introduction of new concepts occurs roughly in step with experimental
discovery; in fact the two are interactive in causal and constitutive ways;
[2] The new concepts contain essentially new ideas frequently expressed as
variations of old ideas. [3] The new ideas often begin as formal with their
status as real requiring interpretation and identification but are later
found to be physically real [in the case of physics] and, in the case of
fundamental ideas, constitutive of physical reality. [4] Physical objects may
be represented by extreme abstraction There
is an issue of recognizing mind and consciousness in entities with which
human beings lack sufficient perceptive empathy. This may be significant for
recognizing consciousness in other living, artificial [robots, computers] and
hypothetical [in thought experiments] species. These questions have
significance for theory and for technology. Although intrinsic definitions
and criteria are always important, it may not always be possible to implement
them - especially for future technology When
working in the immediate realm – with mind and consciousness, as they are
understood – the issue of recognition is practically simple: recognition
follows from perceptive empathy The
same may be said about the recognition of matter, except that “empathy”,
though it could be generalized, should be replaced by sensation. In going
beyond the realm of the immediate, matter is recognized by its effects in
combination with theoretical understanding...and not alone by sensation. This
is the history of the physical sciences The
same must be true for mind and consciousness. Once we go beyond the
immediate, the question of recognition becomes significant. The means of
recognition begin with the immediate means i.e. perceptive empathy. Enhanced
recognition may, perhaps, be developed in analogy with the corresponding
experimental and theoretical developments in the physical and biological
sciences. What are the effects of mind, what are appropriate instruments -
over and above normal perception, and what are the lines of conceptual and
theoretical development? 1.1.6 Confusion between the Signs
and the Concepts
Two
problems can be identified: adequacy and confusion The
confusion is partially due to the desire to get a reduction between mind and
its signs 1.1.7 The Mystery of
Consciousness
1.1.7.1
Consciousness as a Problem
There
is a common meaning of “mystery” that centers on enigma, inscrutability...
This is in contrast to the idea of a problem as something that calls for a
solution. There is a problem of consciousness in that a full scientific
explanation of consciousness - its existence, its elements, or structure -
has not yet been given though there are some tentative and partial
explanations. In this sense, consciousness is a problem There
is a range of viewpoints regarding the magnitude and order of the problem.
John Searle [1977] regards the explanation of consciousness to be a problem
that will be solved as solutions to sub-problems - explaining specific mental
phenomena - cumulate; David Chalmers [1996] finds the explanation of
subjective experience to be a different and harder [conceptually] problem than
the one of scientific explanation of the details viewed as objective
phenomena... Chalmers calls the problem of subjective experience the hard
problem of consciousness; Thomas Nagel [1998] suggests that resolution of the
mind-body problem may require a mode that is neither mind nor matter; Colin
McGinn [1991, 1995] appears to think we do not have the ability to explain
the mind-matter connection We
are at an interesting point of confluence in the histories of the science of
mind and of science itself. Regarding mind it is no longer taboo to speak of
mind as mind in the temple; and there are promises of explanation from
neuroscience, psychology and philosophy and, perhaps, cognitivism and
computer models [see Introduction for some details]. At the same time the
explanations are not yet in place and perhaps we have not even got the
categories right yet. Seen from the perspective of the history of science, we
recognize that the position is a familiar one: there was a point in history
when the explanatory apparatus and concept of electromagnetism[23] were not in place; and there was another point
when the idea of life and the explanation of its functions and origin were
not available. Looking back, we see that these great questions were brought
to fruition. We may, therefore, expect resolution to the problems of mind and
body. We have “been there before” and the territory should be familiar: since
the number of data points is more than one we may be tempted to extrapolate
to the present instance. It may be frustrating to our sense of history and
confidence that resolution to the problem remains a problem; we are not used
to the idea of being in the dark or in the shadows of knowledge. Perhaps we
do not even know the meaning of the shadow... but there are three possible
meanings that occur to me: there will be no resolution to the problem of mind
and body; we are in an incubation period prior to fairly normal resolutions;
the resolution will contain surprises not contained in our reading of history The
first and the third possibilities are, for me, the most exciting. The
possibility of “no resolution” can only mean to me that we are not in that
phase of history - the modern phase; or we are not that species or form of
being or part of that universe that will find resolution; but we live in and
partake of a Universe in which mind-body is not merely explained - it is
realized. The idea of a surprise is rather exciting - even if I am not here
it good to think that that fortune may occur in the future 1.1.7.2 Consciousness as a Mystery
A
second meaning of mystery - a truth that can be known only by revelation - is
based in religious use. Although we may not subscribe to literal religious
meanings, we can experience their sense through awe or wonder. In this second
meaning, the mystery of consciousness is the wonder we sometimes feel at our
own sentience...and at its varieties and beauty. This is significant in that
our experience of wonder may inform us of the importance of consciousness and
its study...and provide us with insight - directly in that we may experience
consciousness as a connection to the world and indirectly as motivation to
experience the varieties of consciousness and its intra / inter relations In
this sense, the mystery is the wonder felt by being about being. A related
source of wonder is a human sense of uniqueness of the consciousness
experienced by human beings and felt by perceptive empathy to be experienced
by other sufficiently similar species The
mystery in the present sense is felt in the immediate or proximate domain but
provides a connection with the ultimate 1.1.7.3 Consciousness as the Place of
Meaning
Without
consciousness, there is no discussion, no adventure; there is but “blind
nature.” Consciousness
entertains both mystery and light and, in consciousness, they find meaning 1.2 What Is the
Extent of the Conscious in Relation to All Mental Phenomena?
The
prescription, above, that mental phenomena and processes are those
phenomena or processes that are conscious or accessible to consciousness
provides a definition of the unconscious as those [mental]
phenomena or states that are not currently conscious but are accessible to
consciousness. This implies that there are no mental phenomena that
are not accessible to consciousness, i.e. there are no deep
unconscious phenomena or all unconscious phenomena are shallow
unconscious phenomena. Identify the shallow and deep unconscious as the
regions accessible and inaccessible, respectively, to consciousness This
formulation is as expressed by Searle [1992, Chapter 7]. It states one of the
classic characterizations of mind The Following Possibilities Arise: 1.2.1 All Mental Phenomena Are
Conscious
1.2.2 Mental Phenomena Are Either
Conscious or Accessible to Consciousness
The
shallow conscious is the region of the unconscious that is accessible to
consciousness. On this view, the only unconscious mental phenomena are
shallow Unless
necessary, I will not assume the following which denies the prescription
above 1.2.3 There Are Mental Phenomena
That Are Not Accessible to Consciousness
In
addition to the conscious and the shallow unconscious, there is a deep
unconscious that is not accessible to consciousness. The deep conscious is mental
in that it is described theoretically in mental terms...and its existence is
inferred by the predictions of the theory. Despite predictions, if the deep
conscious implies contradictions and there are alternative explanations of
the predicted phenomena we should discard the hypothesis of deep unconscious
phenomena 1.2.4 There Are No Conscious
Phenomena
This
is not an actual position or a position avowedly held by anyone in a serious
way. I suppose it would be too much to hope that there is no one working in
the field of mind and consciousness explicitly holds that the object of study
does not exist but, as pointed out above, there are a number of writers who
tacitly hold this view - probably for strategic purposes and in order to
uphold a conception of a scientific ideology such as materialism 1.3 An Atlas of Mind
and Consciousness: Structure, Functions and Dynamics
The
treatment in Journey
in Being supersedes the original treatment here. Therefore
much material has been excised and useful details retained 1.3.1 The Elements of Psychology[24]
1.3.1.1 Psychology
Faculties
or functions**: The
classic mental functions are emotion, cognition, motivation, and memory Or,
a detailed list: Sensation,
perception and attention, arousal and sleep, dream and hallucination, memory
and learning, thinking: iconic and symbolic - section on language below,
writing, reasoning, conception, action, feeling, emotions, approval and
disapproval, motivation, will and drive The
purpose, here, of a list is not completeness but for use in breaking down
before building up. A multi-cultural list may be useful. In seeking what are
the “elementary” functions it will be useful [1] to use a list as a source of
ideas; [2] to ask, what is the variety of adaptive needs that mind must
satisfy - such as faithfulness in perception, freedom in conception, a degree
of social binding / bonding in emotion; and [3] to ask what is the shape of
the adaptation as realized in mind [intensionality, consciousness]; and [4]
to understand how these aspects arise in evolution On
the Nature and Variety of Specific Kinds of Mental State There
is a literature on anger - its nature and its uses and disuses. Some of this
literature omits consideration of the idea of anger as a learned response;
anger as something that can be conditioned, something that is malleable; and
a multi-dimensional continuum of responses with emotional content to some
kind of challenge or threat which finds anger as a narrow region in the
continuum. Here, I am not addressing what is challenged - the organism or the
ego and so on. There is a relative of anger in the continuum that is a
sustained intentional summoning of resources that is maintained under control
and at an optimum level to meet a threat. This is something that may be,
developmentally, something that comes after “pure anger”. But, I am not aware
of a word for it. This limitation in common vocabulary is, I think, the
result of careless thought and at the same time deprives language users the
benefit of ready access a useful response. Multiplied across the finely and
multiply dimensioned spectrum of mental states this must be a deprivation for
those who might be users rather than generators of language. It is a
limitation on the kinds of responses available for individuals; and it is a
limitation on the kind of society in which we live; in the present case, a
limited concept of anger, which may be valid as a base concept, provides the
following alternatives to threat: aggression and victimization. It may be
argued that that is the kind of society that we want - that that kind of
society is one that is more able to defend itself against various threats.
However, that would a statement of value but not a final characterization of
the concept of anger and its varieties. These are some of the kinds of thing
to seek when stripping down and building up the mental “functions.” This is
in part a problem of standardization of language and education and
formalization under notions of correctness and uniformity of communication
over the need of adaptation and richness There
is no doubt that a richer vocabulary and a reflective adaptation of language
would place a wider variety of useful mental responses available in the
cultural milieu. One argument against this is the argument from
standardization; this is a utilitarian argument and, given the premise, the
following questions remain [1] where is the distinction between user and
generator, and [2] what level of detail and flexibility is set by utility.
The lack of complete distinction between user and generator, i.e., between
layperson and expert is a counter to the any argument from “ordinary
language.” The
continuum of emotional states and the functionality vs. non-functional issue
is analogous to the idea of mental illnesses being relatives of functional
dispositions - see section 1.3.4 Psychiatric or Mental Disorders as Variation Some
problems The
binding problem[25] Is
motivation is a separate function Origin,
nature and possibility of knowledge Development
and determinants of behavior Variation Structure,
interactions and dynamics[26] Macroscopic,
microscopic aspects – elements: building up the functions from elementary
processes Mind
itself: mind-mind relations and interactions... function as a unit entity Input,
output issues Body,
external world Characteristics
of mind: consciousness, intensionality, belief, purpose, and mood 1.3.1.2
Iconic Expression
Art,
emotion and being in the world Culture
as a “world” 1.3.1.3 Language and The Symbolic
Capability
The
distinction between symbolic capability and symbolic systems and performance
is significant. The origin and function of the symbolic capability is less
contingent that that of specific symbolic systems. I believe the following
distinctions are important: origin of symbol systems, language, logic,
mathematics vs. origin of symbolic, linguistic, logical and mathematical
capabilities Meaning Psychological
basis Language,
concepts, creation and communication Effect
on psychological function and on ability and performance 1.3.1.4 Role and Relations of
Consciousness
Some
sources of information are Searle [1992], Freud and others on consciousness,
intensionality, the unconscious, personality and related topics 1.3.1.5 Intensionality
See
section 3.3 below 1.3.1.6
The Unconscious
There
are forms of the unconscious not clearly specified by the concept of mind as
what is in or accessible to consciousness. Consider the idea of the seen but
not recognized, or “hearing” something and recognizing that something was
said and what it was a few seconds later. This breaks down into two cases.
[1] Something was registered neuro-physiologically and presents in
consciousness with more than the usual delay; this includes the case where
sight and sound are not in synchrony - binding breaks down. This is a simple
though interesting case of an unconscious phenomenon. [2] The substance is
seen but the form is not recognized. This is a case of interpretation.
Application of “unconscious” to the phenomenon is metaphorical. However, this
relatively clearly metaphorical case may point to borderline cases that may
require additional classification 1.3.1.7 Personality
First
principles 1.3.1.8
A Special Role for Creativity[27]
The
essential element of the creative process is in the production of something
that is essentially new, that is not contained in what came before.
Creativity is a process in time 1.3.2 Directions and Modes of
Development for Psychology
1.3.2.1 The Ontology of The Functions
This
is a topic in philosophical psychology The
Ontology of the Functions would give a basis for the functions in
ontology - or show the lack of a basis and need for alternatives. More
generally, ontology may inform the various aspects of psychology including,
for example, the unconscious and personality These
considerations relate to Kant’s program to develop an understanding of
knowledge based on the [common sense but easily minimized] idea that
knowledge and its modes are a connection to the world. A modern
interpretation is in Hundert [1989] The
application of philosophy has received scrutiny and criticism. A first
comment about any critique of philosophy is that the process of application
need not be philosophy at all but receives that interpretation in a world of
compartmentalized academic departments and disciplines. Thus, since
psychology is a mode of relation of organism to world and describes function,
psychology must be a function of the world - though not necessarily a simple
or direct one-to-one function. Now, since ontology is about the nature of the
world it is in a position to inform psychology. This information is
productive as far as the ontology is reasonable and not overly insistent on
its formal side. It is understood that formal development has roles in the
growth of the theoretical disciplines; this affects application indirectly
and or potentially. With regard to both reasonableness or faithfulness and
adequate but not over-focus on the formal aspects to the detriment of reality
the application of philosophy is informative to philosophy itself. This
mutual information would be dialog in a less specialized setting 1.3.2.2 Human Experience as the Starting
Point
Accumulated
knowledge of the experience - empathy, behavior and experiment; analysis of
the idea in reference to other minds, other species, necessary
characteristics of mind - adaptation and creativity; comparative analysis of
matter and mind; analysis of being… 1.3.2.3 Mind and World
The
fact that mind and consciousness are part of the world suggests their
interpretation as modes of relation and sources of action - as adaptation.
This obvious idea leads to significant consequences. Intensionality, for
example, derives from this idea as an obvious consequence. [Imagination and
analysis come together in the obvious. Imagination points out what is obvious
– shows up the remote as transparent; analysis shows how the obvious leads to
new conclusions. In practice, of course, the interactions between imagination
and analysis are interwoven and layered.] Study
of mind needs to incorporate the relations of mind What
are the modes of being in the world? The
world is multi-valent. Freedom can be seen as freedom to adapt - made
possible by imaginative abilities both symbolic and iconic. There are also
reasons for behavior to be tied in to the natural and social environments.
This is a source of faithfulness in perception and emotion including joy and
fear: Free:
thought, imagination Bound:
emotion, perception The
distinctions are not absolute. There are adaptive exceptions; and there is
“breakdown” in mental disorders. Examples: hallucination, euphoria that bears
no relation to the individuals needs and context - these are examples of
mental states that should be bound to the environment but have become
disconnected from it. Depending on culture, context and cause, hallucination
can be inspiration, demon or symptom; euphoria can result in heightened
perception and energy or out of control behavior 1.3.2.4
The Animal World
Use
of animal psychology as a way to learn about human psychology requires
interpretation Although
the experimental psychology of animal species - domestic and wild - provides
some data that is useful in the study of human psychology, the behavior of
animals is questionable as a source for theory and concept formation. An
exception to this thesis follows Suppose
we want to learn about the ontology of mind - what is the nature of mind, or
consider the question of the developmental and evolutionary potential of the
human mind. It is useful to be able to place the human case in a continuum.
For example, in trying to provide a meaning to conscious that goes beyond
consciousness as phenomenal experience by including phenomenal experience as
a special case, it may be useful to consider creatures for whom we do - and
those for whom we do not - have perceptive empathy. It may be useful to
consider the question of consciousness in relation to organisms all the way
down the phylogenetic tree 1.3.2.5
Adaptation
Evolutionary
origins Intelligence
as adaptability: the process of evolution appropriated by the organism 1.3.2.6 Physiological Basis of
Psychology
Various
systems: nervous and endocrine systems; organs of perception and action; body
- immunity, reality [physics] of the body and relation to mental process:
time and mood Physical
and chemical aspects of the environment, effect of microorganisms 1.3.2.7 The Social Dimension
Social
factors in psychology Group
action Special
concerns: Charisma
and leadership Politics
and groups 1.3.2.8 Special Contexts: Application
Industry Personnel Advertisement Clinical
psychology Education 1.3.3 Elements of Mental
Processes as a Dynamic System
1.3.3.1 Metaphor
The
function of functions 1.3.3.2 The Elements
Input-process-output
as prototype for perception-thought-action and so on Bound-free The
properties of the neuron 1.3.3.3 The System
Build
up from elements, the following are mutually interpreting Nervous
system, brain and sub-organs Mind
and function Society
and environment Dynamics
of the body 1.3.3.4 The Form of the Dynamics
I
do not expect the dynamics to take the mathematical form that it does in the
physical sciences The
inspiration will include the following: inherited forms of description,
analogy with other modes such as biology and physics, actual organisms - the
human organism as a being to be conceptually and empirically known… Sources
of information: Psychology:
classical, folk, indigenous and cross-cultural Organism:
endocrine-nervous system, organs of perception and action 1.3.4 Psychiatric[28] or Mental Disorders as Variation
1.3.4.1 Comments on Variation and
Statistics
Discrete is variation due to discrete factors
of inheritance and factors of cultural integrity Continuous variation is due to truly random
variation and or summation of many small effects 1.3.4.2 Role of Culture
Production Interpretation “Ill”
and “healing” roles Concept
of etiology 1.3.4.3 Mental Illness and Disorder
The
topic of psychiatric disorders is not intrinsic to psychology since culture
has an influence. A mental disorder can be seen as a degree of variation of
intrinsic psychological factors that has a certain interpretation in a given
culture. “Objective” criteria such as degree of subjective distress, or
impaired social function sufficient to occasion clinical attention are
relative to the norms of the culture. However, it is true that each culture
has its own criteria, perhaps implicit and qualitative, for intervention. The
criteria for and modes of intervention may be culturally relative but the
fact of intervention and its relation to context are not culturally relative Etiology
will be considered later. Without etiology, it is difficult to distinguish a
disorder from a syndrome In
what follows, I consider mental disorder as a topic in the variation of
psychological factors 1.3.4.4 Hypotheses Regarding Mental
Illness
Mental
illness is determined, in part, by variant psychological factors A
proper ontology of psychological function is a prerequisite for a coherent
classification of disorders Variation
in cognition Cognitive
capacity: intellectual function, disability Cognitive
process: hallucination, delusion, and paranoia Variation
in action Capacity
- organic basis: Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s chorea Motor
process - neurotransmitter related: Tourette’s syndrome, catatonia Emotive
variation Emotive
capacity and tone: mood disturbance - mania, depression Emotive
process: anxiety Consideration
of agitated vs. melancholic depression leads to a concept of emotion as
“frozen” emotion [also, time dimension appears flat], and mania as involving
“lability” of emotion; and, consequently, the cycling of Bipolar Disorder, in
phases of depression and mania - or both 3.
The main functions of emotion, cognition as thought and perception,
motivation as intention and action lead quickly to a specification of the
major mental illnesses and some of the sub-types This
discussion is a first approximation due to simplicity of ontology and neglect
of interaction among emotion, cognition-action and other factors 1.3.4.5 Interactions: Symptoms of
Psychiatric Disorders Are Not Pure Manifestations of Discrete Categories
Schizophrenia
has a mood component that is included in the negative symptoms of
schizophrenia. This is known through observation and classification and from
the improved response of schizophrenia to anti-psychotic medications that
also have action upon the serotonin system. Is the mood component direct or
secondary? In part, the answer to this question depends on level and mode of
description and understanding Mood
disorders may have cognitive disruption or psychosis Schizoaffective
disorder has a mood and a cognitive component. It is not subsumed by either
schizophrenia or a mood disorder Mania
exacerbates personality traits. More generally, mood modulates expression The
principle is simple - mental function is not completely compartmentalized;
detailed explanation is complex and not fully known. Open questions include
interaction of the functions and or their organic / bio-chemical base vs.
multi-dimensionality of the organic / bio-chemical base The
issue also raises questions about the nature of emotion, mood and cognition.
Are these functions elementary or multi-dimensional; and if multi-dimensional
are the elementary functions in a many-to-one or a many-to-many relation with
the compound functions? These questions have an ontological component 1.3.4.6 Further Ontology of Psychiatric
Disorders
1.3.4.6.1
Psychodynamic aspects
The
role of defense mechanisms in the disorders 1.3.4.6.2
Organicity
The
issue is subtle. In some sense, all disorders have an organic basis.
Distinctions are due to three somewhat interactive factors: [1] disorders due
to gross organic injury, degradation, or lack of development: [2] disorders
whose organic basis may have thought to have been purely psychogenic due to
lack of experimental data, inadequate experimental techniques, absence of
knowledge of organic mechanisms such as neurotransmitter function; and [3]
interaction between mental and organic processes 1.3.4.7 Psychiatric Disorders and
Creativity
Creativity
can be generalized to exceptional ability, performance and function The
idea that a relationship exists, examples, and generic explanations are well
known Explanations A
generic explanation is that mental illness and exceptional performance are both
variations from normal function Heightened
sensitivity, expressive ability, motivational and action resources - a
particular case of the generic explanation Defense
against or compensation for the burden of mental illness One
explanation / mechanism of creativity is as a compensation for functional
deficits. This is different from defense against the burden of mental
illness. Compensation for functional deficits is one explanatory factor for
the “idiot savant.” The
freedoms that result from mental illness: time, resources, and personal space Causal
Explanations Variation
in characteristics over populations is adaptive due to multi-function,
synergy, heightened function, and adaptivity to the future evolution
of some phases of social function. The foundation of these points from the
framework of variation and natural selection needs review In
some settings it is an advantage to lay low in winter: seasonal affective
disorder; emotional binding to one’s social network is adaptive and therefore
disruption of the network is likely to be disruptive of mood: depression -
or, as a defense, mania; heightened energy in spring - to take advantage of
the good weather to do general or seasonal work such as agricultural work -
or to undertake a task is valuable: spring fever and mania These
examples are suggestive. The causal relationships come in two flavors:
variation in the gene pool is necessary and creates all kinds of variations;
and, adaptive variations are selected and [some] disorders are variations or
corruptions of adaptations. Konrad Lorenz [1973] has written on the
possibility of this kind of relationship. For example, mania can be seen as
heightened energy gone wrong 1.3.5 Exceptional Abilities and
Performance from a Framework of Variation and Nurture
Section
1.3.1.8 A Special Role for Creativity, above focuses on the essential element
of creativity. The focus of the present section is on actual ability and
performance 1.3.5.1 Variation
Comments
on variation are in 1.3.4 Psychiatric or Mental Disorders as Variation, above Two
aspects: Variation
in the individual: ability; and variation in performance: navigation in a
complex world These
factors make exceptional performance singular, a result of attunement in
complex spaces, and likely not susceptible to statistical analysis It
is expected that the dimensionality of exceptional performance is high while
the dimensionality of mental disorder is low 1.3.5.2 The Nature and Literature of
Exceptional Achievement
Anecdotal
literature is important due to the multi-dimensional nature of processes of
exceptional achievement. It is expected that the dimensionality of the
“space” of exceptional performance is greater than that of disorders. If
ability is seen as an aspect of performance then disorders are in a continuum
with exceptionality 1.3.5.3 Nurture
Environment Development Peers Self-nurture Development
and cultivation over time, and The
essence of peak performance 1.4 Direction of
Further Study
The
following approach to study defines the Topics: Mind Relations Origins Thinking
about the problems: Philosophy 2 Relations
among Mind, World and Time
As
for Section 1.3 above, this topic will include structure and dynamics.
Structure implies an inclusion of spatial relations and dynamics an inclusion
of temporal relations 2.1 Mind and World:
Two Problems
The
use here is that there is one world. The world encompasses all being. I may talk
of multiple worlds; that use is metaphorical Since
mind is in the world, the relation between mind and world include psychology.
The functions of psychology are a function of the structure and dynamics of
the world The
remaining sections of Topic 2 are special cases of the present section 2.1.
The division is not intended to be disjunct [watertight] 2.1.1 Mind and World
2.1.1.1 Extent and Acuity of Mind
Mind
associated with entire world - mind is every where; and, perhaps,
concentrated in certain regions - brains, nervous systems... but diffuse over
the rest, e.g. like a bell curve Or: Strictly
limited to regions with certain characteristics 2.1.1.2 Saturation
The
original treatment introduced the idea of saturation, the ratio of mind to
all being in a region of space. The idea was not intended as precise but for
possible future use Since
I have not found a use for it, the treatment is currently eliminated 2.1.1.3
Interaction
Correlation Correlation
does not imply interaction. However, correlation forms a framework within
which the presence and strength of interaction may be evaluated. Correlation
is important [1] in absence of established causal relations, and [2] possible
indication for a need for additional factors of explanation Cause
and Identity In
the case of full identity, mind and world are the same thing and, there is,
strictly, no interaction. However, in that case there would be interactions
within mind that we could label mind-world interaction. In the case of the
identity theory, mental processes are supposed to be certain world structures
undergoing certain processes. There is an interaction between those processes
and the world at large. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the validity of
the identity theory for there to be knowledge of what those processes are.
Therefore, it may be necessary to use mentalist language and to talk of
interaction even though we would know that the language referred to “nothing
but” world phenomena Materialism
[the concept is elaborated in section 2.2]: all mind is matter. The identity
theory also known as physicalism or central state materialism: mind and
mental process are certain forms, structures, and processes of brain Mentalism
/ idealism: the world is mind 2.1.2 The
Problem of Mind and Matter[29]: Explaining Mind from Matter or Nature
This
is an aspect of mind and world In
the modern scientific worldview Mind and World become Mind and
Matter or Mind and Nature and the central problem is the origin
of mind in matter The
focus is on scientific and philosophical explanation based in modern physics,
biology and psychology; this much lies in the tradition that sees mind as
being caused by or seated in matter. In the second half of the 20th
century, the computer-network-information-processing model also became
important. Cognitive science is the recent
discipline, dating back to the 1970’s, that studies mind as a system of
abstract relations and processes - the information processing model is
central - and draws from psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, artificial
intelligence, the social sciences and philosophy. That an approach may be
labeled modern and scientific does and should not at all mean that there are
no current alternatives. However the modern prominence of the scientific view
is given; and it is true that this provides the dominant paradigm in the
English speaking world One
can, however, practice in the mode that derives mind from or “seats” mind in
matter without subscribing to it as an ontology; and one can make parallel
practices of alternative modes in the interest of comparative studies - these
would, at minimum, sharpen and define the scientific study - and intrinsic
studies. There are two alternative traditions: one may be labeled idealism
and has two major projects [a] to adequately identify the concept and realms
of mind and mental phenomena -- this preliminary project is necessary to give
substance to the project of idealism; without it idealism is flat, a merely
intellectual pursuit, and [b] to identify the real and being with mind or
consciousness. The second tradition includes the names Aristotle, Whitehead,
Heidegger and others[30]; it may be labeled the science,
theory or philosophy of being. In this tradition, being is most
fundamental, but its nature is not specified - it is to be discovered. The
philosophies of the east, especially that of India, are especially
significant for these alternatives centered approach centered in science and
materialism There
is a practical motive for focus on being. This motive draws some inspiration
from the great ideas and works but is not directly dependent on them. The
motive is as follows. The approach through science and / or materialism
frequently does not explicitly recognize the central importance of human
experience; some level of denial usually present: consciousness as such is
eliminated or reduced, or its cognitive significance is marginal or null, or
its existential significance is minimized. The approach through idealism
appeals to an apparently unreal category as its ontological foundation, and
can be interpreted as antithesis to the scientific worldview that is the
fruit of a four century long tradition. I believe that possibilities for
idealism and the nature of the idea are significantly under-conceived. Though
various misconceptions relating to mind and body, including notions of
distinct categories, are customarily attributed to Cartesianism, I believe
that the central intuitions regarding mind and body have some adaptive basis.
To survive is to survive in some ecological environment; therefore,
recognition of the absolute real is not one of the conditions of survival.
That is there may be a tendency [but not a necessity] to think in terms of
mind and body that does not necessarily require categorial reification The
approach through being cuts through these issues and restores the real. The
need for this approach arises in a search for the real, not merely due to
2000 years of categorial philosophy, but also due to the particular
circumstances of the history and paleo-history of the present ecological
context inclusive of its physical, biological, social and psychological
dimensions These
and related comments are not intended as arguments against science, its use,
and the scientific worldview. Final judgment, affirmative or otherwise, will
be the natural consequence of pushing the limits of explanation [of which
prediction is a form] and use as far as possible; the issue of restraint in
science is a practical, economic and political one rather than a conceptual
one. What I would argue for is, parallel to the scientific endeavor, an
openness - also with reasonable conceptual and practical restraint - to
varieties of human being and thought that, under the undue influence of what
may be called scientism[31], may mistakenly thought to be contrary
to the principles of science and reason Focal
approaches to this program - the problem of mind and matter - are conceptual
and philosophical. The focus on mind and world and on mind and
matter are both of intrinsic interest; and they both provide foundation
for philosophical and scientific aspects of: 2.1.3 The
Problem of the Structure and Dynamics of Mind
This
could be labeled “details” and that should not detract from importance or
interest. Scientific explanations include [1] of the interrelations among the
elements or features and process of mind, [2] of the features and processes
of mind in terms of the underlying physics and biology and in terms of social
relations and communication. Human language is significant for human
consciousness and psychology Focal
approaches to this program are scientific and analytic. Item 2 [2] can be
approached from a scientific [roughly mind from matter] and a
philosophical [roughly, mind and world] viewpoint 2.1.4 Boundaries of Mind
Is
the mind of an individual in the body or brain; does it extend beyond these
organs 2.1.5 The Problems of
Consciousness
The
problems of conscious arise as a special case of the problems of mind 2.1.5.1 The Fundamental Problem of
Consciousness: Explanation of Phenomenal Experience
This
is the problem of explanation of phenomenal experience from matter. The atoms
and molecules that “constitute” the nervous system including the brain
include no reference to phenomenality or to mental terms at all in their
scientific description. How, then, does phenomenal experience arise? The
problem has been considered above where it was seen that analogy with the
explanation of macroscopic physical properties from fundamental microscopic
entities is not at all helpful. Even if the detailed explanation of the
causal and external descriptive aspects of mental phenomena is completed, the
phenomenality of experience is still left out. Thus, the problem presents an
explanatory difficulty I
have called this The Fundamental Problem of Consciousness. Churchland
[1996] says explicitly and Dennett [1991 and in An Exchange With Daniel
Dennett, Appendix to Chapter Five, Searle 1997] says, in essence, that
there is no fundamental problem in the sense specified here. Churchland and
Dennett say, in effect, that there is no problem of phenomenal experience
over and above the problem of the scientific explanation of the causal and
external descriptive aspects of mental phenomena. Searle [1992, 1997] writes
that there is a problem of explaining phenomenal experience in that
materialism, behaviorism, functionalism and all scientific explanations to
date have left out the phenomenal aspect. The scientific explanations include
the works of Crick [1994], Edelman [1992], and Penrose [1994]. It seems to me
that Searle’s assessment is correct. Searle [cited above] says up front that
“consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon” and that “We will
understand consciousness when we understand in biological detail how the
brain does it”; he calls this “biological naturalism.” This defines Searle’s
program and he elaborates it in some detail. I am not doing justice to
Searle’s arguments here but it seems to me that it suffers from the complaint
that Searle uses on the materialist-functionalist approaches. The complaint
is that, after the description is complete, the phenomenal aspect is [will
be] left over. However, see remarks under The Explanation of Phenomenal Experience
below. Biological naturalism appears to be a reasonable way to approach
understanding and explaining consciousness and, regardless of ideology, it is
one of the main current approaches[32]. If we regard the physics [and
physical science] of the brain to be an aspect of its biology then biological
naturalism is the way to explanation from natural science. However, I believe
an explanation is needed to show why biological naturalism is not a variety
of materialism or another categorialism. Assume that the brain causes the
mind. Then, since nature causes the brain, in evolution, nature causes mind.
Even if biology is not reducible to physics, biology may be caused by physics
and in that sense, physics causes the mind and consciousness. Further, it is
Searle’s [1992, 1997, 1998] quite reasonable position that the mental and the
physical are not categories - that something is physical does not mean that
it is not mental - and mind is instantiated in certain forms or arrangements
of matter [nervous systems and so on]; and, since mind is then latent in all
matter, this would appear to be a form of pan-psychism. Whether mind is
latent in matter depends on concepts of mind and matter; future
reconceptualization may find what was considered latent to be actual in the
new system of understanding. Note, here, that there is a difficulty in
talking of mind, matter as given when the concepts are tentative and concrete
when the concepts are abstract. It would also seem that, on the irreducibility
of mind, Searle is implicated in a dualism. Searle’s motivation is the need
to avoid mistakes that result from using Cartesian categories but it is not
clear that he succeeds in avoiding ontological “confusion” altogether. This
is not surprising given that we may still be struggling with a reality that
is inadequately described by present concepts regardless of whether those
concepts describe categories. Further, even in the realm of the world as is
currently known, it is not at all certain that the way from natural science
supplanted by reason and analysis will not require additional new ontological
elements to provide the necessary explanation. Chalmers [1996] argues that
the physical level does not entail consciousness and that new natural laws
will be needed to make the connection between phenomenality and the
biophysical level. Thomas Nagel [1974] has argued a somewhat similar position
in that explanations of phenomenal experience do not have the causal
necessity of explanations in the natural sciences. More recently, Nagel
argued [1998] that the explanatory connection between mind and body would be
through a third, inclusive, mode. Nagel directs his skill at carefully
defining gap in the connection between mind and matter: “We conceive the body
from outside and the mind from inside, and see no internal connection, only
an external one of correlation or perhaps causation. But in spite of the
vividness of the intuition, I believe that it reflects our conceptual
limitations rather than the truth: The difference between the modes of
conception is so great that there is every reason to suspect that we would be
unable to see an internal necessary connection even if there were one.” Thus,
it is likely insufficient to merely loosen up the categories so that bodies
can be physical and mental at the same time. Nagel’s arguments are insightful
and persuasive - the argument for a third mode appears to be sufficient but,
perhaps, superfluous in that the necessity of a third mode is not clear even
though a good case has been made. A similar point of view is found in Mitra
[1998c] where possible needs for additional ontological elements - also
emphasized in the current document - are pointed out. See the discussion[33] for a consideration on the issue of need for a new
ontological mode. Colin McGinn has well known position[34] is that consciousness lies somewhere in the range
of being opaque to human powers of understanding and explanation to requiring
a major change in the scientific view and explanatory modalities The
Explanation of Phenomenal Experience: I
began by considering an explanation of phenomenal experience a different
order of problem than the scientific problem of mind and consciousness.
However, my views are not currently as definite. I see the following options: Either A
scientific explanation of the details of mental phenomena will be an
explanation of consciousness. The result may require no more than an altering
of meanings; or the explanation of phenomenality will be entailed, in a way
not yet seen, by the explanations of the details Such
explanations may require the identification of sufficiently central mental
phenomena distinct from but, perhaps, implicitly related to phenomenal
experience. Candidates are intensionality and creativity. On the physical
side, we ask: What property or process of matter will entail the mental
phenomenon or phenomena in question? I argued[35] that creativity requires an indeterminism that
generates essentially new structures as stable variations from the old. This
is related but not identical to Penrose’s suggestion that a non-computable
quantum gravitational theory is a candidate to explain the non-computable
powers of the human mind. I believe that my proposal is more central and
capable of broader interpretation. I want to repeat the point that a physical
explanation is not a non-biological explanation; and that this particular
physical explanation is a partial one that needs to be complemented by other
biological elements Or If
phenomenality does not yield to scientific explanation from current or future
physics and biology, or if such explanation is shown to be impossible, then
some ontologically new element will be needed. I should add that I do not see
how explanation from future science will be shown to be impossible since the
physics of the present already contains ontologically different elements than
the physics of the 19th and previous centuries. Thus, a physics or
biology of the future may provide the necessary ontology. As I have argued
below in detail, the new element may come from physics and biology, or from
the mental side in terms of an expansion of the concept of the idea, i.e.,
the concept of the phenomenal, or may be some new element that is neither
material nor mental. The distinction between a new element and an element
that is an expansion of the mental is not clear 2.1.5.2 The Problem of the Scientific
Explanation of Consciousness
This
is the problem of explaining the powers of consciousness. It requires an
elaboration of the various features of consciousness and an explanation in
scientific and material terms - this does not, of course, imply materialism This
problem is a chapter in the scientific explanation of mind and mental
phenomena, section 2.1.3 above 2.1.6 Are there two Problems or
One
It
may turn out that the resolution to the consciousness-substrate [matter /
body / brain / information] problem will come from detailed scientific
studies In this view there is essentially one problem or problem complex. In
contrast the - perhaps dominant - view ascribes special difficulty, even
impossibility, to an explanation of the subjective aspect of consciousness
and so regards the consciousness-substrate issue as a separate problem and,
perhaps, more difficult than an explanation of the structure and dynamics of
consciousness. This position does not minimize the difficulty of an
explanation of structure nor does it eliminate a need for conceptual or
philosophical analysis in that explanation 2.2 The Concept of a
Theory of Mind and Consciousness
The
purpose of this section is to consider what it would take to have a theory of
mind / consciousness. It is necessary to first identify what a theory of mind
/ consciousness should do[36]; what aspects should it explain? Since
mind is part of the world a theory of mind is part of a theory of the world.
A more specific reason to consider the idea of a theory of the world, taken
up in more detail in Section 2.2.1.2, is that in the absence of a world
specification other concepts such as materialism, idealism and supervenience
cannot be specified with sufficient precision to render them definite in a
theoretical or a utilitarian sense. Therefore, first consider: 2.2.1 A Theory of the World
[1] Establishes
the main elements / processes / phenomena in the world and their interactions
and relationships. Although it may be considered desirable to have conceptual
unity, this may not be possible. A simple case of conceptual unity would be
the situation in which all elements are of the same type and interact on the
same level so that all descriptions of basic types and interactions are at
the same level. It is a requirement that a theory, as part of its nature as a
theory, will reduce the amount of data to specify all the facts, i.e. some
facts will be predicted / explained by other, basic, facts such as low level
facts or boundary or initial conditions; it is desirable that the theory
introduce understanding. The theory may explain the existence of elements on
the same level or relationships among them; this is a form of prediction;
hitherto unknown elements may be predicted and facts hitherto unknown to be
possible or not even conceived may be shown to be possible May,
in specific contexts or local environments, allow explanation / prediction in
some detail of phenomena and processes from a limited set of data about the phenomenon.
Such data include boundary and initial states. Boundary states represent the
interactions with the rest of he world and initial states summarize the
history of the environment in a statement about the configuration at a
specific time. It is clear in general, and this is true in physics, that such
prediction of the world as a whole and / or for all time forward from the
remote past [the “origin” of time] is associated with special problems [2] May
establish universal primitives [from which, by definition, in terms of
the theory, the existence, prediction and explanation of all other elements
is possible...] …
And / or, relative primitives that are universally primitive relative
to a broad enough basic class or basic category of elements
which is then, by assumption of the relative primitive condition, a closed
system and the restriction of the theory to this system which, again, by
assumption a closed theory …
And / or, conditional primitives that are, in the absence of specific
interactions with elements from outside the class, primitive relative to a
broad enough conditional basic class or conditional basic category.
The class defined by a set of conditional primitives is not closed and the
theory of this class, the restriction of theory to the class, is not a closed
theory. Examples of interactions with elements from outside the class are
initial conditions [includes immediate origins], boundary conditions
[communication?], and input-output [perception or sensation and action] Materialism:
the concept of matter contains a set of universal primitives. What is matter?
Matter is tangible or sensible, pervasive etc. As noted in Section 4.8 below,
however the concept is to be explained by starting with the first experience
of matter - commonsense, supplemented by the best knowledge of the day, i.e.,
science in the light of philosophy. It is important to specify what
information is to be used in an explanation of what matter is or else the
concept has no definiteness. In the future matter may assume may turn out to
have primitive concepts of mind; this is not contradictory of common
understanding of mind because it may be that only in certain combinations
would the aspect or “property” of mind become manifest just as any number of
material phenomena manifest only in certain combinations of matter. Thus,
matter or materialism, defined in terms of any future physics has
insufficient definiteness to have significance In
analogy to the distinction between logical and methodological behaviorism, we
could specify a logical materialism and a methodological materialism. Logical
materialism would be the position that only matter exists, and all other
levels of language are abbreviated versions of the language of matter.
Methodological materialism would be a research program based on the physical
and biological sciences. A few marginal purists might object to physical
cosmology as being rather speculative, and diehard chauvinists might object
to inclusion of “living” matter. It is safe to say that the bulk of academic
scientists and philosophers in the English speaking and the Scandinavian
countries c. 2000 A. D. are practicing methodological materialists[37]. This would be true even of the faculty in
psychology and social sciences even though those disciplines would have their
own specialized disciplinary research programs 2.2.1.1 Requirements for a Complete
Theory of the World
A
Complete Theory of The World [TOW] would: Be
more specific and concrete in the details and kinds of events etc Be
demonstrably about everything Desirably
be unified, homogeneous But,
we do not have a complete TOW...how could we know that all the practical
categories of our universe [nature, society, mind...] were included in any
proposed TOW? That
would be a positivism, not a strong one in terms of a set of atomic facts,
but a weak one based, for example only, on something sprawling like the
fundamental theories of modern physics But,
in a practical sense, what would it take to have a Complete Theory of the
World? Look
to physics.
Although I do not subscribe to the idea, why, arrogance and sanguinity aside,
would physicists or metaphysicians claim that they had a Theory of
Everything? The
physicists would be encouraged by the fact that much of the natural world is
subsumed by physics; cosmology shows something of origins The
metaphysicians would be encouraged by having a theory of a theory of
what it takes... that would be learnt other experience with specific systems
which would: Explain
everything Exclude
all else A
theory of the world, then, would include: A
theory of explanation, and A
theory of origins This
would be in a practical sense and would not have anything positivist about it However,
modern science and academics including philosophy, is not, according to its
own canon, in a position to give the world a complete theory of itself. A
theory of the world, then, seems impossible except for the principle of
ignorance - which is skeptical not only of possibilities but also of limits -
promotes that impossibility to remoteness! We
thus begin to see[38] the appeal and the remoteness of any
physicalism / materialism... and, again, the logic of the outline of this
essay The
ultimate Theory of Everything... is also a Theory of No-Thing... not in the
sarcastic sense of explaining nothing but in that it explains origins from
no-thing The
metaphysical outline of such a theory is not as hard to appreciate as is
commonly imagined - the remoteness of the “context” being a positive [due to
the freedom] as much as a negative factor [due to difficulties of imagination
and consistency.] 2.2.1.2
Models of Causal Relationship and Explanation: Supervenience
The
topic of causal explanation is taken up, in general, in section 4.3. This is
an appropriate place to consider the concept of supervenience, introduced by
G. E. Moore [1922] in the context of ethical theory. Supervenience has been
recently taken up as a tool to analyze the relationship between consciousness
and matter, especially in Chalmers [1996]. Supervenience comes in a number of
flavors with technical definitions but I will focus on the main kinds and on
meanings. B supervenes logically on A if A-properties determine B-properties.
For the purpose of this definition, A-properties include laws relating
elements within domain A but not laws relating elements of A to elements of
other domains. If, in addition to A-properties, additional causal laws
relating A and B are required to determine B-properties, the supervenience of
B on A is said to be causal or, in appropriate contexts, natural Is
consciousness determined by physics, i.e. would all the facts of physics -
the positions of all particles, the spatial distribution of all fields etc.
over all time - determine the facts of consciousness? If consciousness is logically
[constitutive supervenience] supervenient on the physical then facts about
consciousness are physical facts and it would be logically contradictory
for the physical facts to be given and the facts about consciousness to be
undetermined for the facts about physics would be both determined and not
determined. Note that physical laws, expressly microphysical laws, are for
the purposes of the concept of logical supervenience, included among the
physical facts and this is probably a good thing. Natural
supervenience of consciousness on the physical obtains when, in addition to
physical facts and laws, natural laws - connecting consciousness to physics -
are necessary to determine the facts about consciousness. These natural laws
are not physical laws. The argument is that given two physically identical
individuals it is logically possible for them to have different conscious
states though, in our world, given our world’s natural laws, the
physical facts determine the facts about consciousness and so physically
identical individuals [identical configuration of particles and fields in
identical environments from time minus infinity] have the same conscious experience Now
this argument is clearly equivalent to the claim that consciousness is not
physical. Why is consciousness not physical? Of the following points, the
first two are from Chalmers, 1996: “The
best evidence of contemporary science tells us that the physical world is
more or less causally closed: for every physical event there is a physically
sufficient cause.” [p. 125] Physics
could be defined so that phenomenal experience counted as a physical property
- and on this reading, the natural laws relating consciousness and the rest
of physics would be physical laws, but “On a more natural reading of
“physics” and “physical,” experience does not qualify. Experience is not a
fundamental property that physicists need to posit in their theory of the external
world; physics forms a closed, consistent theory even without experience.”
[p. 128] One
could appeal to the intuitions that consciousness is not spatial. But, what
is the location of the spin of an electron? In the background of these
considerations is the counter-intuitive quality of the notion that
consciousness is physical. These arguments could be drawn out. However, these
intuitions are very contingent on the modern worldview and, if revisions to
that view as outlined in the following paragraphs occur, there would be a
change in the worldview and the contingent intuitions Now,
the claim that physics is closed and consistent is very strong despite its
not having a clear meaning. Does this mean that non-physical causes do not
have physical effects or that physical events have causes that are known to
the physics of today? Does it mean that mental causation is physical
causation? For now, I will focus on the following concern As
I emphasize subsequently, “What would a mental characteristic
[consciousness] ‘look’ like at the microscopic - quantum -
level?” I.e., what will be the shape of consciousness at the micro-level?
What this amounts to is that it is possible that consciousness is
supervenient on the physical as defined in current physics but is not seen
there precisely because the connection has not been established. This is a
possible outcome until the contrary is established. Also note, as elaborated
in this document, that explanations from biology and from physics are fully
compatible in a number of ways; importantly, explanations from biology and
physics should be complementary with biology providing both general framework
and details and physics providing some fundamental ontological elements. It
is possible that, as a result of future developments, physics will entail
phenomenal consciousness as a fact - while biology will provide the main
characteristics, functions and details. Once the entailment has been
established it will be possible to see consciousness in physics, to
recognize the shape of mind and consciousness at the microscopic level.
This may require an altering of the semantics; I have pointed this out
elsewhere in this document Two
additional comments, also repeated in this document, are pertinent. These
considerations point to the vagueness or, more precisely, the indefiniteness
of the concept of materialism, i.e., of physicalism when the concept of
matter, i.e. of physics is not carefully specified. What is the logic of a
specification of physics? Secondly, without precise specification of what
physics is over and above “physics is what the best physicists do” the notion
of the physical or the material and of logical supervenience on the physical
is indefinite and, therefore, devoid of significance. Therefore, concepts of
physicalism / materialism require precise specification in addition to
conceptual definition. This specification would include a detailing, at least
in principle, of what kind of entities and class of laws are to be admitted.
This specification is just as important - for the present purposes - as a
careful working out of the concepts of supervenience [on the physical] Now
return to the question: 2.2.2 What will or should a
Theory of Mind and Consciousness Do?
2.2.2.1 Within the Framework of
“Methodological Materialism”
[Methodological
Materialism is used playfully in that it is not intended as a coinage,
and seriously in that it points to a pervasive and inescapable influence. The
influence is, of course, not absolutely inescapable; however, the pervasion
of the materialist orientation of science - to the scientist or philosopher
hoping to do constructive work in mind-body relations is like the ocean to
sea-creatures.] Establish
mental elements / processes / phenomena as a conditional basic class;
includes theory, dynamics, explanation, structure, prediction, and reduction
within mental phenomena. The idea of reduction includes the possibility of
levels of mental phenomena and the possibility of micro and macro phenomena.
Elaborate. This is of course the program of psychology Explain
and predict the existence of mind and consciousness in principle based on
material underpinnings - the physical and biological sciences, their built in
predictive theories, and the general principles of deduction, i.e., logic.
This is not to imply that induction, intuition, and heuristic reasoning will
not play important, if auxiliary, roles Similarly,
explain and predict the details of the program of psychology The
program within the framework of methodological materialism includes the case
of property dualism except that this case requires specification of
additional mental-material relations that may be established empirically and,
perhaps, appeals to logic and theory. The case of substance dualism is not
included but that case would also require the establishment of
mental-material relations as prerequisite to a theory of mind Includes
eliminative materialism as a special case. Eliminative materialism says
anything only if mental terms can be eliminated altogether though they may be
retained for convenience as a kind of shorthand. The radical case would
eliminate mental terms due to their supposed retrograde status Use
of abstract relations as a substitute for mental terms requires an additional
class that is arguably basic but would appear to be conditionally basic. This
has been identified as the program of cognitive science. Examples are
behaviorism, functionalism including computer functionalism. It has been
argued that when this class of theories is required to have justification, or
provide explanation of the existence of mind and consciousness and
explanation of the details of psychology - even in principle - the theories
must themselves be elaborated in greater and greater amounts of detail until
they reduce, in the end, to materialism. Thus, the theories that are
cognitivist in this sense may be and have been called surrogates for
materialism 2.2.2.2 Open-ended Permissive
Methodological Materialism
As
noted, it is very hard, regardless of ideology, for a practicing scientist or
philosopher when doing science or the philosophy of science to not be a
practicing materialist. However, this does not require commitment to
materialism. This lack of commitment may be due to an open attitude,
ideology, or from understanding the evolution or history of ideas. Thus, even
while maintaining continuity with the tradition of, e.g., physics, there is
no prediction, without entertaining elements of rationalism, of the nature of
fundamental entities of physical science beyond the immediate future. The
immediate future can be interpreted as the era of the current ontological
paradigm. Beyond this era, the fundamental entities of physics may then turn
out to include idealistic / mentalist elements or even be entirely
idealistic; and the evolution of science may require this. This appears, of
course, to be counter-intuitive[39], against the modern scientific
worldview 2.2.2.2.1
Practices within Methodological Materialism
Within
the framework of the practice the following sub-practices may occur. The
apparent contradiction is allowed in view of the dominance of practical or
methodological materialism and various reasons to consider alternatives Non-categorialism:
no categories posited; continue research into mind-mind and mind-matter
relationships; see what results may come including the possibility of a
posteriori establishment of categories. This is the practical case Complementary
idealism: a complementary approach that allows expansion of the meaning and
domain of idealistic / mentalist elements by examining the nature of the
ideas and by analogy with the history of the idea of matter. Essentially an
idealist / mentalist program but recognizes the dominance and significance of
the modern paradigm. Motives are the open-ended nature of the history of
ideas, and indicators - not proof - that the modern paradigm may have limits
that are shown up by the analysis of mind in terms of that paradigm. One can
practice this approach consistently within materialism as interpreted
immediately above - undoubtedly many academic philosophers maintain this
practice without explicitly admitting the case. The end result may be
idealism / mentalism but, as I have pointed out a number of times, that
future idealism would be significantly more robust than idealism is commonly
conceived to be 2.2.2.3 History of Knowledge Approach[40]
A
practical approach seeks to most effectively be part of the patterns of the
history of knowledge. In ordinary science[41], the pattern is one of problem solving and
“ordinary” scientists do not ask deep questions about the nature of their
subject. Here is one musing on an approach in the face of paradox. While
heeding the progress of knowledge and science, the approach would not espouse
any radical monism or categorialism; nor would it radically espouse any
anti-categorialism; nor would it reject the practice of a monism or a
dualism; but this is only a first approximation for the approach would not
radically reject radicalism for which there may be a time and place; this is
not mere eclecticism; it embraces history; and history embraces and sheds all
these positions 2.2.3 What Would It Take to Have
a Theory of Consciousness?
2.2.3.1 Within the Modern Scientific
Framework
This
is essentially a matter-centered approach Objectives
of a theory of mind…
The following is a summary of considerations above. A theory of mind will
explain and predict the existence and details of mental phenomena from the
structure of the organism, especially the structure of the nervous system, in
the environment Objectives
of a theory of consciousness… It will elaborate the place of consciousness in
mind; and will similarly explain and predict the existence and details of
conscious phenomena...” Should
the theory be causal?
This is desirable in that it will be further confirmation, and continuation
of the scientific worldview. I have argued that the theoretical gulf may be
unbridgeable[42] except that the way out may be an unforeseen
aspect or product of the explanation or be a result of a simple evolution in
meanings. However, if these possibilities do not arise, the gulf may be
unbridgeable within the scientific view. That would mean a limitation to
either human powers of explanation or the mode of explanation, i.e.,
primarily the scientific view and its paradigmatics. It remains true that the
nature of the gulf and what it will take to bridge are open questions Alternatively,
the theory may be merely correlative and predictive. In this case, a “bridge” is necessary
to take the place of causal explanation. A bridge could be a system of signs
- behavior, functional relations; David Chalmers has proposed bridging laws
on account of his conclusion that mental facts are not reducible to physical
facts. Note that some physical theories that started as correlative but
acquired causal status later. Because of their power, universality,
multi-level aspect, and promise physics has gotten used to regarding its
theories as causal. Should biology and explanation based in biology be
different? Note, however, that the introduction of field theories in fundamental
physics contributed significantly to a foundation of the concept of causality
in local interaction The
following is an analogy that may be useful for merely predictive theories. Force is the factor that “binds”
matter and motion in physics; force is interaction between particles of
matter. What are the factors of interaction that bind mind, matter and their
“motion” or change in cause and affect? A first answer is simple:
perception and action, or the afferent action in which matter affects mind in
perception and the efferent action in which mind affects matter in action What
are the parameters of explanation? Mental Structure,
dynamics: level of detail... begin with simple creatures, gross level
features Micro
mental features... are there such features? If lucky, as in physical science,
there will be some simple features at a micro-level that aggregate to the
same feature at the macro level Input-output:
perception, action Material Biological[43] Brain
and nervous system Other
organ systems: endocrine Microscopic
level: cells Bio-chemicals Physical Macro-level
features include biological ones... and any physical characteristics that
affect function of the nervous system Micro-level
features include those that may be required by mental processes that do not
have analog in functional biology. An example is the requirement of
creativity that some basic process should be non-deterministic[44] 2.2.3.2
Sufficient Conditions for an Explanation of Mind from Body or Matter
Two
approaches: Experiment
with a variety of necessary conditions, i.e., list significant
characteristics of mind and mental phenomena. An explanation of each of these
aspects is necessary. At some point in the cataloging of explanations, it may
turn out – after the fact – that an explanation of mind or consciousness has
been given Ask
what would be sufficient One
approach: Characterize
what is to be explained: mind, consciousness Explain
the characterization. This may be harder than the individual explanations in
[1] but easier than the process of [1] 2.2.3.3 Alternatives to Materialism
2.2.3.3.1
Kinds of alternatives
2.2.3.3.2
Enlarge the class of phenomena to be considered mental
Dualism Monism:
mind meets matter, bridging. Mind and matter subsumed in a more comprehensive
category. Although the conceptual gap is large, the actual gap in the
immediate domain may turn out to be small when the bridge is adequately made: By
extension of meaning and reference Parameterized
and mirror ontologies Non-categorialism: no categories posited; continue
research into mind-mind and mind-matter relationships; see what results may
come including the possibility of a posteriori establishment of categories 2.2.3.3.3
The problem of idealism
What
are the difficulties? Idealism
in the mentalist sense is counter-intuitive: mind, idea, will appear as
immaterial; some ideas are ephemeral Violates
common observation: mind is always observed with very specific forms of
matter in a nested hierarchy: organism - metazoa - organisms with nervous
systems - animals with brains Other
minds; solipsism Counter-scientific:
nothing in the traditional scientific worldview [particles, atoms,
chemicals...] display, according to the canons of scientific description,
anything with a mental character. Note, however, the beginnings of mind-like
behavior in quantum mechanics. Even though there may be debate about the
claimed qualities, whether they manifest at a macroscopic level, the mental
characteristics purportedly explained... the debate is not even conceivable
in classical mechanics. There is however, the following question: What
would a mental characteristic “look” like at the microscopic - quantum -
level? In this connection, also see section 2.2.1.2 A
private conversation[45] revealed the following difficulty. I
was describing an experiment with a view in which the concept of idea
was structured and broadened to include characteristics of matter; a number
of the problems of idealism tentatively overcome. The following problem was
raised: in moving to a new ontology or metaphysics, it seems that the old
categories of mind and matter would be inadequate; the new description should
arise fresh from the mind of the thinker. There are, of course, a number of
examples from science where revolutions resulted in a mix of fresh and old
vocabulary. However, the old vocabulary usually has a new, even
radical, interpretation. This is better than mere newness for, although
interpretations change, meaning maintains continuity and so the new ideas
maintain continuity with the old. For example, the same physical quantity may
occur in new and old physical theories. In cases where the old use has
meaning, the new use reduces to the old. This is significant, since the
classical ideas are close to intuitions and direct measurement, and allows
for a degree of meaning and measurement. In non-classical situations, the
radical aspect may become manifest What
are the requirements of an adequate idealism or mentalism [46], [47] Resolution
of the difficulties: a variety of kinds or level of mind or mental phenomenon
- a continuum ranging from ephemerality and immateriality to hard surfaces,
fists and grime... and from global origins to discrete particulars, including
other minds, in the present Reinterpretation
and subsumption of the scientific worldview within the parameters of the
idealism; the result would be so successful as to become obvious; be a
“paradigm” and foster “research programs” [Lakatos, 1978] Would
this require a revision of physical science? By
the time that such a view became established the changes in physics and
psychology would likely be such that any further changes at that point might
well be trivial and, practically, not recognized even if conceptually
significant 2.2.3.4 A Third Level of Meaning: Mind
and Consciousness
Relationships
to the world provide a third level of meaning. I have discussed the idea of a
field of concepts at a number of points in this document. The idea is that a
structured system of concepts, in which the meanings of the individual terms
are not completely separable, is for description of the world. Thus, the
meanings of mind and consciousness are not completely separable from their
place in the world. Thus, relationships to the world provide a third level of
meaning 2.3 Mind and Nature[48], [49]
2.3.1 Mind from Matter
As
noted in section 4.2.2 Searle [1992] has an interesting account of the
history of materialism in which the underlying motives and the status of
materialism are considered. Searle firmly believes that categorialism is
confused and at the seat of much of what he identifies as the confusion in
the philosophy of mind. Of course, materialism or physicalism and its relative,
functionalism, continue to thrive in the literature. There is no need to
recount the 20th century history of materialism; Searle’s work
just cited includes an excellent account of that history. However, it is of
interest to consider one recent contribution to the materialism Michael
Tye [online] argues in favor of physicalism. Reference is made
to “Mary’s story” due to Jackson [1982]. In the thought story, Mary lives in
a black and white world but learns about color from books and reading. She
learns the names and physical properties of color and light and becomes an
expert in color. One day she experiences color and learns new facts about color
that her knowledge of physics did not give her and could not have given her.
The conclusion is that since she acquires new knowledge through experience
her earlier physical knowledge is incomplete and therefore physicalism is
false. This is the “Knowledge Argument” against physicalism. This is where
Tye begins his account. He considers the “Ability Hypothesis” - the standard
physicalist response to the knowledge argument: What Mary learns from
experience is not “knowing that”, it is not information; rather, it is
“knowing how”. Tye finds this argument to be inadequate because the Ability
Hypothesis does not give a satisfactory account of “knowing how”. I refer the
reader to Tye’s article for details. He argues, despite the Knowledge
Argument and the inadequacy of the Ability Hypothesis, that physicalism can
be justified anyway. I take the essence of Tye’s position to be the
following: The new experiences Mary undergoes and their introspectible
qualities are wholly physical and they are new knowledge even though she knew
all the pertinent real-world physical facts. In other words although the
experiences and introspectible qualities are physical, they cannot be
imparted through the kind of formal education that Mary had while she was
captive The
discussion is interesting and Tye’s final claim is that “the Knowledge
Argument can be answered.” Although this an argument against an argument
against physicalism, is this an argument for physicalism? I think not,
for the fundamental problem of materialism remains: mental phenomena are
still there and not reduced to matter after the material level descriptions
are spelled out 2.3.2 Physics
2.3.3 Biology and Neuroscience
Neuroscience
is a major element in the circle of fields that will provide a scientific explanation
of mind and consciousness 2.3.3.1 Locus of Consciousness
2.3.3.2 Detailed Relationship: Mind and
Brain
Extended
or functional brain Neurophysiological,
endocrine systems Organs
of perception and action 2.3.4 Anthropology
The
contributions of anthropology include natural explanations of human
consciousness 2.3.5 Physics or Biology?
The
claims of biology are obvious from a consideration of neuroscience and the
occurrence of consciousness in organisms but not in rocks. Of course, this is
based in the primitive conception of consciousness but this is consistent
with the materialist perspective. Additionally, the project to explain the
functions of mind in detail must draw significantly from neurophysiology In
opposition to the claims of biology consider that creativity - the creation
in time of the new, of what is not contained in what came before - requires
[an element of] indeterminism. This follows from the fact that determinism is
the doctrine that the future is determined by the past. Indeterminism does
not arise at the “gross” biological level of description but, rather, at the
atomic or sub-atomic levels, as described by quantum theory. Thus, a physical
level is required to explain the origin of consciousness in matter Against
indeterminism, it has been argued that “randomness” produces chaos, not the
organization seen in mind, and is so no better than a sterile determinism.
Here is the counter to the argument from sterility: In the beginning, there
is a random variation from nothingness. Otherwise, however, the variations of
indeterminism are trials that occur from a structured world and unstable
variations are self-eliminating while stable variations [existence] persist.
The argument may be extended to mental creativity and applies to choice and
ethics The
process of creation in mental activity involves recombinations of ideas and
sparks of new ideas. The analogy to evolution is obvious. A spark may also
trigger a recombination. Organic [living] matter focuses the physical
processes in mental action. By extension, groups of neurons, groups of
organisms are also focal agents Thus,
a complete scientific explanation may include elements of physics and
biology. Physics will provide certain key types of foundational process that
are required by the nature of mind; additionally the physical sciences may
enter in a mundane role in that the physical and chemical properties of the organism
and its brain enter into the determination of mental character. Biology will
enter by selecting, amplifying, the fundamental physical processes and
translating them to a symbolic level - and providing aspects of
interpretation of that level; additionally neuro-anatomy and neuro-physiology
will - and do - play roles in explaining the variety of mental function 2.4
Mind, Society and Language
2.4.1 Relates to, Mirrors
Psychology in Two Ways
The
functions of psychology are functions of the structure and dynamics of the
world, which includes society Confirmation
or affirmation of an individual’s sense of what is real through dialog and
social interaction 2.4.2 Communication, Mind and
Consciousness
Learning,
modeling An
example: a parent’s influence on my being in the world: beauty, joy and work The
milieu of ideas Exposure
to the milieu: new ideas, the tradition and the literature Exposure
to the milieu: criticism The
milieu of the journey Sustenance
of individual being Mutual
and group action; common endeavor Mutual
charisma. The mutual charismatic influence of, e.g. a dedicated group; this
is pragmatically, if not conceptually, more inclusive than what is thought of
as charisma in religion, politics, and leadership - and in cults; mutual charisma
- is a give and take charismatic influence among a group that includes the
one way charismatic influence as a special case Mutual
sustenance. This refers primarily to being as being but includes, also, a
range of factors such as emotion, respect, competition, affirmation; and,
secondarily, material factors of survival 2.4.3 Thought as Internal Speech
or Dialog
“Thought
as speech” is not “thought is speech”, i.e. the former is the reasonably
obvious assertion that one mode of thinking is through silent processing of
speech associations. “Speech” can be generalized to hearing and to all sense
modes Thought
as internal speech or dialog brings into focus a relationship between
communication and thought, between being social and being mental 2.4.4 On the Knowledge of Other
Minds
This
is a classic problem in philosophy. There are two reasons for its inclusion
here. As one of the standard problems in the philosophy of mind, it may
contribute to the understanding of the whole. Second, there are some considerations
on the question of other minds that inform the problems that are most
directly of interest to me: the nature and structure of mind and
consciousness, the relationships among minds - especially in a society, the
mind-body problem in its generic and detailed senses. This, rather than
standard considerations, is the main purpose to inclusion of a discussion of
other minds: the considerations that follow question the status of other
minds - the nature of their otherness - rather than their existence 2.4.4.1 Reasons for Inclusion of The
Problem
2.4.4.1.1
General Reasons
As
for many special or seemingly special problems, considerations of the
individual problems are mutually informing and contribute to understanding
the whole which in turn provides frameworks for the individual problems and
the question of what are the main individual problems By
reflection on problems that question commonsense it is not necessarily the
intent to question commonsense in its day to day application, but to continue
knowledge - as for example in science, the claims of religion, of myth and
mysticism - beyond its everyday application 2.4.4.1.2
Illumination of Specific Problems
Other
problems receive illumination in at least two ways. First, the question of
other minds fills in some gaps in the reasoning that goes into the other
problems. Second, the problem of other minds occasions and sometimes
requires answers and reflection on other issues. These ways are specific
cases of the interactivity of problems The
following problems or points are illuminated: Mind
- body Here
are some points of proof. Since the problem of other minds arises from the
asymmetry between the knowledge of my mind and the knowledge of other
people’s minds the question is how to translate the asymmetry into symmetry.
For example, like effects imply like causes. [What is the epistemic status of
the claim that “like effects imply like causes”? 1. As in all epistemic
considerations, the universe of facts is conflated with the universe. That
those two universes may be identical is not a given. 2. The universe or a
part of it is divided into cause and effect. That division is not necessary.
There is no single way to make that division. 3. Can two systems of causes –
or effects – be identical? That question is practically open due to
the considerations in [1], immediately above. The question is also
theoretically open since identity would be known from a principle such as the
Leibnizian principle of the “identity of indescernibles”. In practice, this
principle or some alternative is assumed or part of the background of action
much in the same way that causation, time and space are part of the
background. 4. It is therefore, questionable whether identical effects imply
identical causes [A]. 5. The question of whether like causes imply like
effects is subject to all these limitations and the additional one that it
follows only plausibly from [A]. Such principles are not certain but must be
assumed or are tacitly part of the background or framework of action Nature
of knowledge - natural [defined below] and analytic [in the general sense of
knowledge by careful thought.] The
spectrum of mind: as I reason from similar effects to similar causes, I may
also reason from observing a continuum of effects to a continuum of causes.
I.e., in looking at creatures arranged according to some phylogenetic tree
[different concepts of phylogenetic relationship lead to somewhat different
classifications] I see degrees of similarity in appearance and molar
behavior. I can conclude that there are degrees of similarity among the
nature of experience [level of consciousness...] and mental capabilities. The
conclusion is, of course, not at all specific; and it does not give me
detailed data on the qualities of the experience of non-human organisms. Is
specific and qualitative data accessible? How? The
problem of relationships among minds; what or where is the boundary between
minds of distinct individuals? 2.4.4.1.3
Some Specific Illuminations
Sheds
light on the fundamental problem of consciousness The
problem of other minds is, in part, a problem in the social aspect of mind 2.4.4.2 The Problem
2.4.4.2.1
The Source
Saturday,
July 24, 1999. I have been thinking about the problem of other minds today.
Now I am at work, there is a break in the action, the evening is winding
down, and I am sitting in an office by myself. I can hear my coworkers and
friends engage in casual talk. I am automatically attributing conscious
feeling to them, not only to their words but also to a sigh, a murmur, and a
laugh. It is almost as though I experience their experience, feel their
feeling. It feels a little like being in their conscious space. But, on
reflection, I know that I am not feeling their feelings. When they go away, I
am left, while awake, with only my own conscious experience. My own mind
occupies, for me, a singular position. It is, in a sense, my private
universe, most present and most immediate - there is nothing more immediate
from which I infer it. My experience is primal, others’ experience is
assigned - or, because of the structural and behavioral similarities,
inferred from like effects to like causes. This, except when I am being
analytical, is not conscious, requires no noticed effort and yet it is there:
I do not feel their feeling, I do not experience their
experience. Yet, I do not doubt that others have experience, and in a good
sense, I know that they have minds. Still, it is something I need to
know. I do not need to know that I have a mind; the phenomena come
first and the labels, “mind” and “mental”, come afterward when I recognize
that the world is not made up entirely of [my mental or phenomenal]
experience. There definitely is a difference between my experience of others
and my own experience This
is the source the problem of other minds. There are a number of issues 2.4.4.2.2
The Issues - A Preliminary Version
What
is the sense in which I know that others have minds; and how do I come to
have that knowledge - or, how do I come to have natural confidence in the
awareness of other minds? Given
that there is a sense in which I do not know that other minds exist - I think
it is more accurate to say that the knowledge is of another grade than the
knowledge of my own mind - how can I prove, or show that other minds exist?
Why would I want to do this? It is not that I am insecure and want to be
sure. Rather as I am questioning the nature of mind, I come naturally to ask
other questions and reflection on those questions informs the original
questions. Further, as noted above, in going beyond the realm of the
day-to-day, natural knowledge and natural confidence may lose their
applicability I
can take a Kantian approach and ask: Given that I know that minds exist what
does that tell me about the instruments of knowledge, about my mind and about
mind in general? I
can question the nature of the doubt. Given that it takes so little for a
friend to evoke a feeling: that, in absence of reflection, I feel that I feel
their feeling, am I perhaps missing something, being overly analytical, if I
insist that I must doubt the reality of their experience 2.4.4.2.3
Further Reflection on The Problem
Why
am I so sure of the separateness of the experience of others from my own
experience? My first response is that just as it is natural to hold that
others have experience that is identical in kind to my own experience, it is
also natural to hold that their experience is separate from mine As
I noted above, when my associates go away, I am left with my own my mind.
Further, it is natural to associate mind with body. Therefore, separate
bodies imply separate minds. When my body dies, my experience ceases but
others’ experiences continue... I am listening to my friends again - they are
American. I grew up in India but have spent most of my adult life in America.
When I arrived in America, I found it difficult to associate feelings to
subtle behavior - I could recognize the main emotions of joy, anger and so on
- but, in time, I learned the associations. Probably, all “empathy” is learned
and is not a direct sharing of experience I
think of someone I have never met, say the President of The United States. I
have no idea what the President is currently thinking or feeling. Our minds
are clearly separate. [That is good.] Yet,
if I am in the business of doubting, I should doubt all appearances. When I
do meet someone, I come away from the meeting with some feeling of or
regarding his or her feeling. Clearly, there is deep empathy between people
who are close. The literature is complete with examples of shared experience
such as shared psychotic disorders[50]. Consider the case of my own
experience. Is that experience attached to the atoms that make up my body?
No, it is only through the confluence of the atoms, molecules, and cells, in
development that I have the ability to have and recognize experiences. The
experiences are instantiated in situations. True, my body is separate from
others’ bodies but not absolutely separate. That feeling separateness is an
element of natural knowledge, good for many first purposes, but not absolute.
Therefore, perhaps, experience is not fully separate; perhaps I can and do
have a degree of the experience of others. Perhaps the notion of absolute
separation is a reification of the everyday experience of separateness
heightened by a psychological and biological need for separateness and
possibly by an emphasis on materialism In
arguing the case for shared experience, I am arguing the following: [1]
sharing of experience in the sense that your experiences are my experiences
would, in general, only be to a degree. Given sharing of experience, it is
reasonable to expect not only that it is a matter of degree but that the
degree will be a variable, i.e., a function of a number of factors that include
shared history, the current situation and, perhaps, time scales - what is
diversity and separateness on a short time scale may be a unity and
commonality on a longer time scale; and [2] in seeking understanding of mind
beyond the everyday, that I consider the possibility and follow the evidence.
How will I follow the evidence? In the way that all theories follow evidence:
there is no deduction from facts to theory. Rather, a theory is inducted from
experience; the induction is an at least semi-heuristic process; the status
of the theory is then tentative; explanations are given, predictions are made
and compared, theory is adjusted 2.4.4.3 The Issues
The
issues are as above but modified by the consideration of shared experience.
The modified issues or parts of issues are italicized: What
is the sense in which I know that others are separate and have minds;
and how do I come to have that knowledge - or, how do I come to have natural
confidence in that awareness of other minds? What
is the degree of separation and sharing; upon what parameters -
interpersonal, situational, and historical in the sense of personal history -
does it depend? In what sense, and to what degree, is the idea of a complete
compartmentalization of experience good and the basis of a program of
understanding Regarding
mind, what do I know exists? Reflection shows that at the extreme level of
doubt, I can have good reasons to doubt not only others but also the
connection of an organism or continuity to this experience that I call
mine. What, then, is the status of the [in this sense hypothetical]
entities that “I” call “me” and “others” I
can take a Kantian approach and ask: Given that I know that other minds exist
- i.e., that there is structure over and above experience - what does
that tell me about the instruments of knowledge, about my mind and about mind
in general What
is the status of doubt and criticism and what is the nature of the knowledge
that is the positive product of the “negative” process of doubt and
criticism? Comment:
for practical purposes my position is well defined: you and I are quite real;
I can empathize with you and the simple explanation is that I assign feelings
to you on the basis similarity. For “final” purposes, I do not doubt the
occurrent reality of our existence but I find no reason to rule out shared or
joint experience. A practical reason to question the nature of the existence
of your or my mind is that I can learn something by elaborating reasons and
refutations The
question does not doubt other minds but asks how “other” are they? Over time
all things dissolve, mingle. What is the significance of this confluence in
the actual present? Is the present -are we- opaque to it or merely
insensitive to it? 2.4.4.4 Lines of Approach to The
Problem of Other Minds
The
foregoing considerations do not question the existence of other minds so much
as examine their status. Given the natural idea that other minds are real,
how can one show or explain this in light of the difference in status between
my mind and others’ minds? The difference between the idea of showing
[demonstration] and explanation in the present context is that we want an
explanation of what we already believe to be true; further, in so far as the
“thesis” of other minds requires proof, absolute proof is not forthcoming
and, instead, explanation must suffice. An alternate way of putting this is
that any proof is likely to depend on more or less reasonable assumptions
rather than concrete and absolute facts. One could then ask what is the point
of the consideration. It is that, firstly, in traversing the circle of
important questions, one comes back to the start with greater understanding
of the parts and the whole, and, secondly, in exploring beyond the familiar
environment of our day to day experience - this varies with culture and
history - thought, understanding, explanation alone will not answer all
questions. We will also have to experiment, experience the world, live, die -
and our actual lives and deaths, in addition to the lives and deaths of our
ideas, are a foundation for our successors. Explanation and thought provide
direction to the search and give meanings to our lives and their endeavors 2.4.4.4.1
Perceptive Empathy
How
do I know that other persons are conscious? An answer that I have given is
“perceptive empathy”. But, perceptive empathy is not sufficient; the question
is how do I know? Perhaps the question can be recast: how do I know or
why may I believe that perceptive empathy constitutes knowledge? 2.4.4.4.2
The Limits of Criticism
First,
note that I can question even my own mind. When I am in a reflective mood I
may question the existence of other minds, but my own phenomenal experience
may present as constituting the whole universe. It is this apparently most
real of things that is most worthy of criticism Here
are some considerations from “brain-in-a-vat” types of arguments. How do I know I am not just a brain
suspended in a vat with my experience being the result of stimulation by
electrical impulses? I suppose I could not prove or disprove this - as noted
above phenomenal experience is fundamental in its nature and proof from
something more fundamental is not to be expected. Suppose that I am a brain in
a vat. I cannot know that, I can at most believe it. The supposition that I
am a stimulated brain in a vat is not really different, apart from mythical
content, than the supposition that I am an idea in the mind of God, or that
the universe is supported on the back of a turtle. The “arguments” against
“supernatural” fantasies include the argument from natural knowledge on the
practical side in combination from the principle of economy of hypotheses or
Occam’s razor on the conceptual side. It is the idea that I am a brain in a
vat that would require an explanation; the idea that I am part of nature
needs no explanation even though we like natural explanations. In fact, the
reason that the brain in a vat explanation of experience requires an
explanation is that it seems that it is far more complex than the natural
picture of mind and experience as a product of nature. The principle of
explanation in the natural picture is simple: mind is a result of nature. In
the unnatural picture, the explanation is complex: how is the natural case
simulated? This is much more complex than the fact that nature “exists”: we
must know its detailed patterns of behavior. The point I want to make here is
not that there is an argument that shows that that my experiences are not the
product of a scientist stimulating a brain. It is, rather, to remind myself
that as long as I am questioning the natural knowledge of the fact of other
minds I can also question the nature of my own mind. There is also the
following consideration: What is it that is being questioned by the
brain-in-a-vat argument? It is that the content of my mind may be an
illusion. But, one of the contents of my mind, if not of anyone else’s, is
that I have a mind. Surely, not even the brain-in-a-vat problem questions the
fact of experience itself; it is just the fact that there is a “me” connected
to my experiences that is questioned. That the “me” of my experiences is, at
minimum, nothing other than a set of experiences that have a certain
coherence in the present and over time. Doubt is a form of experience Failure
to explain other minds is not an inherent limit to human knowledge; but a
limit to certain modes of knowledge and imposed requirements on those modes There
is an analogy with physics, the familiar example of the prediction of a bulk
property, e.g., wetness, from the microscopic properties. What do the
physical properties at the macroscopic level predict about the consciousness?
We do not have such a prediction, of course, but if we did, we would note
that the prediction from physics does not show that water is not conscious
but the prediction is of certain properties, which together with the natural
belief that there are no further properties is interpreted as absence of
consciousness. The point is that we need not make excessive demands on the
scientific mode of explanation 2.4.4.4.3
Cause and Effect
Like
effects imply like causes The
causal powers of the individual: Assigning too much causal power to self: the
argument against solipsism, which is similar to the brain-in-a-vat argument Like
causes imply like effects From
the similarity of the nervous systems and of the sense / perception organs
the best, though not necessary, conclusion is the similarity of experience.
That behavior and language are similar and, though communication of
experience is difficult if not impossible, groups function as though
experience had been communicated... the best conclusion from this is support
for the similarity of experience Similarity
of experience is also the simplest conclusion and, as shown below,
dissimilarity of experience would, in some cases, require complex translation
mechanisms that would, on the similarity hypothesis, be altogether
unnecessary 2.4.4.4.4
Occam’s Razor: The Principle of Economy
As
long as I am unable to distinguish additional hypotheses from
What-I-See-Is-What-I-Get, then there is absolutely nothing I can do with the
knowledge although I can do things with the thought about the possibility of
that knowledge. Thus, the natural knowledge that I have a mind and, indeed
there is an I connected to this coherent system of experiences and that there
are other minds that are like mine - all this is [or, is usually taken to
be] the epistemically economical case 2.4.4.4.5
The Similarity of Experience
The
issue being discussed is similar to the following common puzzle. How do I
know my experience of red is the same as your experience of red? The point is
familiar: your experience of blue might be like my experience of red and your
experience of red like mine of blue and there would be no difference in
behavior. So how can we know that our experience of the same “color” is the
same color experience? Consider
the following: my experience of “red” with my left eye is a little different
than with my right eye. There are many factors that affect my experience of
color that I omit from discussion in the interest of simplicity. Therefore, I
do not expect that my experience of a given pigment will be exactly the same
as yours. All I need to know that our experiences of red are more alike than
my experience of red and of blue I
think the principle of economy applies in the present case: why, lacking
reasons, should our explanations be indirect when the direct case: like
objects [causes], like experiences [effects] is neater, simpler? Consider
the following. Assume that you and I know both Arabic and English. It is
possible that your experience of English is like my experience of Arabic.
That seems unlikely because language is so intricate; but let us ignore the
empirical objection. What would it take for my experience of Arabic to be
like your experience of English? Then when you are talking and experiencing
English I am hearing and experiencing Arabic. There must be, over and above
the language mechanism, some complex English-Arabic translation going on. It
is simpler for us to be having like experiences. Perhaps your experience of
blue is like my experience of Arabic... it is a lot simpler for that to not
be the case. There is something that is the same: the vibration of the air...
and it is much simpler for our experiences to be similar when the vibrations
are the same This
discussion is somewhat an aside but the similarities with the problem of
other minds are that [1] it appears difficult to prove the obvious about
appearances, and [2] the argument for the obvious is that otherwise
underlying nature would be much more complex than it needs to be, given the
surface phenomena This
should not be taken as support for the position that the obvious is true. Rather,
I would assert that there is a tenuous relation between obviousness and
economy of explanation and that, lacking imperatives to the contrary; it is
practical to take the economical view. I agree, of course, that doubt
is one imperative as are faithfulness, adequacy, and certain aesthetic
criteria 2.4.4.4.6
The Argument from Natural Knowledge
Further,
I can ask the Kantian question: “Given that I naturally believe that, and act
as though other people have minds, what is the foundation of the belief?” The
question is improperly posed from the point of view that I use. When I say,
“believe” and “act as though” I am subscribing to the idea that epistemology
is before the world. That is not the case. The world exists before phenomenal
experience. Therefore, I should ask, “What is the real foundation of my
knowledge?” or “What is the real foundation of the psychology of knowledge?” I
am, of course, not at all questioning epistemology. I am questioning or
commenting on its relations and uses. There is something that we can call
natural knowledge. It is on the border between the very tied in knowledge of
the animal, which in some senses is not knowledge at all, and the
institutional sense of knowledge which is the sense in which knowing is taken
temporarily out of its binding to the world as part of a way of adapting
natural knowledge to a wider range of environments and situations. Therefore,
knowledge becomes an object and can be studied...and this is the process
called epistemology. Of course, the idea of epistemology and founding can be
applied to natural knowledge for the purpose of understanding it and
clarifying its nature. There may even be a role for providing a foundation to
natural knowledge and altering it; however, it needs to be remembered that
this process is hypothetical in nature, i.e., just as the concept of physical
reality does maintain balance and contact with what is being conceptualized
so the foundation of natural knowledge must maintain balance with natural
knowledge 2.4.4.4.7
Society and Evolution
Evolution
channels intelligence, subjectivity; these are the conditions of survival and
abundance: adaptation includes adaptivity and this is the process of
evolution itself taken over by the organism In
social evolution, behavior cultivates and confirms [a] consciousness as such,
and [b] the mode in which we know it. This much is known to other species
possessed of consciousness in their way and to humans in the human way. It is
known without having to have a department of knowledge over and above the
process of being, without a department presided by chairmen or priests. It is
known to primitive humankind who knows nothing of modern biology, psychology
or philosophy In
a society of organisms the instruments of mutual perception are at the same
time the instruments of adaptation. This is the confluence of organism and
society in the production of consciousness and knowledge of consciousness.
Such knowledge is perceptual and natural rather than conceptual and
explicitly fabricated A
conscious robot would likely be one that would, in addition to design and
fabrication, would co-evolve with humans and co-define the specific
environment of our mutual mental, conscious space[51]. It would be a hybrid of nature and human design 2.4.4.4.8
Mysticism
We
are part of a differentiated world and in my present differentiated state I
do not see - but may possibly infer - the unity, connection and integrity.
That the mystics and visionaries experience such unity does not count as
proof in the skeptical case 2.4.4.5 What Has Been Learned
What
other kinds of natural knowledge do we have? Reality, causality... What is
the limitation of natural knowledge? Is it as limited as we critically
believe it to be - to the domain of humankind’s adaptive niche[s]? Is
institutional knowledge - academics and so on - the natural extension? What
makes for a real world - things or other minds? Are other minds things? The
last question is not meant to be ontological in nature; it is a reminder that
“things” is more general and, therefore, a natural answer to the first
question is “things”. So, what is its point? Firstly, my mind exists in a
field of minds; the social experience reminds me that the social realm is the
“lens” through which I receive much of my information about the world. That
this does not imply that that experience is therefore diminished or
“relative” does not make the point unimportant. Secondly, that my own mind is
also a field; and, finally, it raises again the question of the ontological
status of mind for, despite the pull of the scientific worldview, it is hard
to get away from the idea that in the question of mind itself it is hard to
“get outside” and “look in.” 2.4.4.6 Relation to The Problem of
Phenomenal Experience
In
the problem of mind-body, grant that mind and consciousness arise from the
atoms as organized in the body, the nervous system and brain in particular The
analogy with other the other minds problem is as follows. We cannot have the
experience that the other mind is having - and so the problem of the other
mind. However, we can infer the presence of the other mind; in the case of
natural knowledge, no “inference” is necessary. Similarly, we cannot see mind
in atoms [if its not there then there is no mind-body problem that is being
resolved] - but we can infer its presence in the atoms and their
relationships. Can we go beyond this and say we have natural knowledge of the
presence of mind in the atom / relationship? What
are the implications for physics and biology? One
can see physicalism as a doctrine or alternatively as a statement that there
is no fundamental work to do beyond physical science 2.5 Mind, Machines
and Technology
Computers
and networks have a dual role as objects and as machines. In
Mitra [1998f,] I considered a design of software systems as an aid and as
having a degree of independence in generating concepts. I concluded that
success was most likely to be through a combination of evolution and design
and in application, initially, in tasks to which high speed information
processing is adapted. In Mitra [1997] and subsequently, I considered that
optimum development of computer applications would be through evolution and
design of both hardware and software; that co-evolution with designers and
users would be an optimal path to the possibility of machine intelligence and
consciousness 2.5.1 Nature of Machines and
Tools - Machines as Objects
Machines
have designated functions but also their own existence as objects in
co-evolution Co-evolution
of designated function, the object aspect of machines, and technology in its
political [including military], economic, and social [including education,
research[52], and mass technology[53]] aspects is the optimal source of human-machine
potential 2.5.2 Role of Machines - Machines
and Tools as Aids
Tool,
dynamics, machines that simulate and do human work Computers,
mind and consciousness 2.6 Mind, Information
and Mathematics
Includes
artificial intelligence, computer functionalism and cognitivism: the elements
of mind or surrogates for materialism? Are
the abilities of the mind disproof of [1] Strong Artificial intelligence, [2]
Weak Artificial Intelligence, or [3] Cognitivism? 2.6.1 Cognitivism and Its Critics
The
work of Bernard Baars, Ned Block, Noam Chomsky, Patricia M. Churchland, Daniel
Dennett, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ray Jackendoff, George Lakoff, William
Lycan, David Marr, Zenon W. Pylyshyn and others The
Critics: John Searle, Roger Penrose 2.7 The Larger
Context
Is
there a larger context? Being, consciousness, mind[54] ...and universe 2.7.1 Integration
Integration
of the foregoing modes: mechanisms of consciousness may integrate physical
and biological elements or psychological and social elements. See the section
2.3.5 Physics or Biology? 2.7.2 The Ultimate
For
now, some brief notes: In
the current literature, there are papers that make reference to papers on
death [Lanier, 1997] and mysticism [Foreman, 1998] Mysticism
implies the question of being: of what kinds of knowledge is the whole human
being capable Death
raises the question: what aspects of common beliefs and attitudes, including
those that may tacitly or otherwise inform the academic community as such,
are facts, what are inferential, what are conceptual, and what are extrapolations 3 Origins of
Mind and Consciousness[55]
The
sections are related; they are not watertight compartments 3.1 Immediate Origins
Immediate
“origins” are the included in Topic 2; they are a link between Topics 2 and 3 3.2 Development
Development
from cell to adult: what can be learnt about mind and consciousness? 3.3
The Evolution of Life[56]
The
evolutionary, or more generally the genetic[57] aspect, concerns origins of mind,
consciousness in the origin of life through selection and as adaptations 3.3.1 Adaptivity of Mind and
Consciousness
We
may consider mind and consciousness as adaptability of the organism; and
evolution internalized as mind, consciousness, and intensionality. A problem
is to work out an evolutionary theory of this process An
example: Intelligence - provided the term is appropriately understood… …Intelligence
as the focus of world or universal processes [dynamics, evolution] in
individuals that [1] receives and seeks [perceives] data about its world and
its processes [that includes the individual and its acts]; processes
[imagines, thinks...] the data with some degree [small, large] of delay; and
acts upon its world, [2] and applies the process [1], i.e., that process is
reflexive In
this sense intelligence is the adaptation of adaptivity - the internalization
or interiorization of the process of evolution through natural selection;
i.e., the relation to the environment, including the self[58] -environment, is internalized in the organism.
This is a strong candidate for the origin of intensionality; and, likely, the
seeds of consciousness[59]! Further this should likely point to
the origin of intensionality and consciousness in embryology and or
development 3.3.2 On the Nature of Knowledge
from Its Evolutionary Context
Knowledge
as adaptation; i.e. knowledge functions as a map of world and environment Knowledge
as an object; removed from its place as relationship... experiment with
ideas; return to use and application; and selection 3.3.3 Evolution:
Bio-psycho-social[60]
3.4
The Physical Universe
Physical
origins of universe, mind Considerations
include the relation of physics to biology. The physical “world” was established
before origin of life. Also see section “2.3.5 Physics or Biology?”
regarding roles for physics and biology in explaining mind and consciousness Ultimate Some
general issues 3.5
The Ultimate
Self-creation
of being From
nothing / no-thing 3.6
General concerns
What
are the proximate, evolutionary - or genetic - and ultimate questions
regarding mind and consciousness, life and the physical universe and their
relationships? Where in the material and biological evolutions is the origin
of mind? How
far does this line of thinking go toward the ontology of mind and
consciousness? The explanations of the structure of minds and the phenomena
of consciousness in terms of matter and nervous systems, and organisms and
their ecology including social relationships? Is
that not begging the question? That is, should we assume that mind and
consciousness have origin in matter and life...that the causal or ontological
relation is from matter to mind? Alternatively, is mind coeval with matter?
On the other hand, is there some other relationship? In addition, do mind and
matter exhaust the fundamental ontological categories? 4
Philosophical Concerns
While
earlier sections are philosophical in nature, the present section takes up a
number of philosophical issues in themselves The
purposes of this topic are to gather in one place and to emphasize the
reflective aspect of what may be partial and scattered in the previous
topics. Philosophy, here, is understood to include [1] the tradition of
philosophy as a store of ideas, corrections and worked out positions [2] the
process of reflection with a view to breadth and criticism. The latter
naturally includes of thinking about thinking 4.1 The Nature of
Problems
4.1.1 Problems in General
What
is a problem? Essential
vs. artifactual problems… The contexts of nature, society, mind, and the
universal Immediate
vs. ultimate issues… Spatial and temporal dimensions… Relations between the
immediate and practical and the ultimate… What
makes a set of problems whole or complete? Is it possible to select or derive
a complete set – and if so, how can that be done? If not, what methodology
makes a set of problems reasonably complete 4.1.2 Nature and Status of the
Problems of Mind and Consciousness
What
are the cultural features that make for a problem of consciousness?
The scientific [philosophical] problem of consciousness is artifactual in
that science and philosophy are products of culture. The problems are
essential as elements in the history of science and philosophy What
is the status of the idea of consciousness in a variety of cultures? What
is the degree to which the problems of consciousness and mind and their
relationship to matter are causal, ontological and merely artifactual and
explanatory? What
is the significance of the issue of a distinction between a philosophical and
a scientific problem for explanation of consciousness, mind and their
features? What would be the embedding of the problems if they are not
distinct? 4.2 Ontology,
Metaphysics and Being
4.2.1 General Considerations
4.2.1.1 Metaphysics and Epistemology
Ontology
and epistemology are related. Ontology informs epistemology in that
knowledge, knowers, and the objects of knowledge are part of the world.
Indeed, ontology raises the following questions [1] To what degree does the
common assumption of a division in the world – of knowledge and its relations
into knower and known – represent the actual state of affairs. Further, that
putative divide has relations to the following common distinctions: inner vs.
external experience, realms, and mind vs. world. [2] What is the status of
“established” knowledge as an institution that can stand, say, as truth or
correctness, independently of the ongoing process and interactions [history]
of knowers in a society, knowledge and objects? [The likely answer is that
there is a degree of independence.] The question of independence of knowledge
can be asked about the various levels, modes and disciplines of knowledge.
[The likely answer is that there are varying degrees of independence.] Epistemology,
in turn, since it includes analysis of claims to knowledge, sheds light on
ontological claims. Briefly, ontology begins when a claim is made about the
nature of he world; epistemology begins when an attempt is made to justify
that claim The
relationship between mind and world is ontological. From a practical point of
view, [a] much of the difficulty of ontological issues is due to reification
of inherited or otherwise posited categories. This does not minimize the
spirit of ontology but speaks to a need for a practical focus. Therefore, [b]
the bulk of the ontological concerns are considered in Section 4.3 below, on
epistemology. The epistemological interpretation of ontology gives foundation
to this approach 4.2.1.2 Metaphysics, Epistemology and
Description
Consider
the issue of materialism. Before addressing that issue, something must be
said about the nature of matter. For example: I can knock on a door - a door
seems very material to me. I see the door, and its location according to
sight agrees with the data from touch and sound; and its solidity according
to my knuckles is confirmed the sound of the knock. But, I cannot knock on a
thought or an emotion. Therefore, mental phenomena are not material. Are
atoms material in nature? I cannot knock on an atom. Now, instruments and
concepts come into play. Atoms have physical properties that result in
aggregates of atoms having solidity. Atoms have location in space and
duration in time. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that an atom is material
in nature. The idea that aggregates of atoms - in the form of organisms -
have ideas and emotions is not unreasonable even though it may turn out to be
an inadequate if not totally invalid explanation Therefore,
the issue of categorial ontology reduces, in part, to level and mode of
description In
addition to substance and property dualisms, it is reasonable to refer to a
third, practical or descriptive dualism. This form of dualism is due to
neither categoriality nor irreducibility but merely reflects an agnostic
stance that is based in current lack of knowledge 4.2.1.3 Problems in The Philosophy of
Mind
Some
standard problems in the philosophy of mind[61]: free will, mind-body, other minds, personal
identity, computationalism or cognitivism 4.2.1.4
Varieties of Metaphysics
Empirically,
metaphysics is under specified. This can be useful: Translation
among alternate metaphysics Multiple
hierarchies of successively neutral ontologies with neutral apex Parameterized
ontologies; continuous, discrete and mirror 4.2.1.5 General Comments
Experience
is objective even though it is known subjectively The
statement of a set of problems tends to define an implicit ontology - even in
the presence of a stated one Issue
of ontology and illusion 4.2.2 Specific Ontologies or
Metaphysics
Materialism What
is materialism[62]? Searle’s
extended commentary on materialism in the philosophy of mind - [Searle, 1992,
Chapters 1, 2 and 9; especially Chapter 2, “The Recent History of
Materialism”] Computer
functionalism and Strong AI Matter
causes mind. Commonsense suggests: Matter
appears to be pervasive Mind
is always associated with certain organizations of matter: brains, nervous
systems But,
are nervous systems necessary for mind or consciousness? Alternatives Dualism:
property dualism and Cartesianism Idealism Theory
of Being; this is an approach to ontology General
Concepts The
referent of the concepts of mind and matter as indeterminate[63]; history, historicity and analysis of the
concepts; mind as the broader category; mind as primal, idealism -
possibilities for the concept of the idea; the theory of being Consider
hierarchies of ontologies each with successive degrees of freedom with a
tolerant neutralism at apex. I use the word tolerant to mean that the
neutralism can be definite but also form a framework for alternative
viewpoints 4.2.3 Relationship to Special
Disciplines
What
is learnt by combining general considerations on the nature of being with the
established disciplines such as physics and biology? Specifically,
consider the following issue. Considerations from theoretical physics - the
fundamental theories, cosmology, the physics of matter - can be used, on the
assumption of the validity of the theories and of physicalism, to show very
general features about the nature of mind and consciousness. To what extent
can these general features be deduced from a theory of being that starts with
a minimal set of assumptions or conditions such as: Generation
from non-existence Structure
is possible Creativity
and generation - implied by the above Facts
and patterns - their existence but not the detailed nature is determined by
the above Selection
of self-replicating patterns Sentience
- is it necessary to stipulate this? 4.3 Epistemology,
Explanation and Theory
4.3.1 Modes of Explanation
Correlation Cause The
concept of causality may be seen as being on the border between ontology and
epistemology. There are reasons to subscribe to causality of a general form;
at least in the most general case of “something from nothing,” the something
is potential in the nothing; laws derive from this relation. Thus causality,
at least a form of it, can be seen as purely ontological in nature. However,
that a causal relationship exists is, in more specific contexts, an
epistemological judgment. Here, since I am concerned with causal explanation,
I include cause under epistemology rather than ontology The
problem of judgment may be regarded as Hume’s problem of induction. The
answers given by Kant and Schopenhauer - that mind brings its forms of
judgment to the world, and by Popper - that knowledge, science are not the
result of induction from the world but the result of hypotheses that are
tested are admirable. While Kant’s answer is idealist and Popper’s is realist,
both are transcendental arguments. Darwinian concepts close out the loop: the
world is impressed upon the [deep] character of the mind in biological
evolution and similarly upon science in the growth of knowledge. In what
follows, I entertain and elaborate a finite or real time argument regarding
the role of knowledge How
is a causal relationship distinguished from a mere correlation? Finally,
judgment is involved but what are the elements of this judgment? Suppose
that, in a certain context, a quantity x correlates with a set of factors f.
Then the relationship may be contingent upon other factors F that completely
define the context and, therefore, no other factors. In that case we may be
disposed to say, given the premise that x is dependent only on f and F...that
f and F cause x. That is, a causal relationship is not contingent. When
applied to an actual situation, there are two problems with the form of this
argument: [1] in a practical situation we want to know that there are no
further factors beyond f and F, and [2] we would like to know how or why f
and F cause x. The first problem may be tentatively resolved by experimenting
in a large variety of situations. However, resolution of the second problem
would eliminate the need to independently resolve the first. The second
problem includes the one of knowing why the relationship necessarily holds -
why it is causal. A specific relationship based on universal behavior of all
being [matter] would satisfactorily explain the necessity...but, at least in
a scientific or rational paradigm, we do not know anything that is truly
universal - how could we? There are, however, laws and theories that come
close to being universal in that they explain the behavior of what are
considered to be [a small number of] fundamental constituents [e.g. of
matter] and in that their applicability has been confirmed, to date, over an
extensive range of conditions and a wide variety of kinds of behaviors and
phenomena. There are also theoretical features that encourage us in our
confidence in the laws, concepts and theories: simplicity, elegance,
consistency, and generality. The idea of generality includes, as a structured
case, the subsumption of other theories with relatively specific ranges of
application; this is the idea of unification. Thus, our confidence in the
atomic and evolutionary theories mentioned below.
When all is said and done, there is no absolute necessity to these laws and
theories; but we have the confidence of repeated success over the variety of
conditions; we have the simplicity and unity that comes from the introduction
of concepts that over the history of science / knowledge integrate and
subsume prior concepts over greater domains of application; and: here we are,
we can only do the best that is available in the here and now. The
psychological confidence we may have in the fundamental theories is pragmatic
from a variety of critical viewpoints and uses; but it is not absolute and so
the element of judgment remains In
admitting the non-absolute character of the fundamental theories, we come
from a skeptical position partly motivated by a desire for ultimate truth and
certainty over the entire universe. I want to briefly look at an alternative.
This alternative comes from the knowledge that we are organically integrated
into the world, part of that world. The possibility of knowledge, in an
organic sense, rather than in a sense of external criteria, springs from that
organic embedding. Therefore, knowledge that beautifully captures and binds
together in dynamic integrity classes - or classes of classes - phenomena is
a likely integration into the organic structure of the world. Thus, while the
structure that is so known is a phase or a niche and therefore the knowledge
is not final, that knowledge is more than a beautiful correlation... indeed;
we find dissonance in the idea of beauty in correlation. Further, the niche
of our adaptation is embedded in the universe [think of the origin of
humankind in the story of life, of life in geology, of the earth in the
universe]. Therefore the knowledge in question, the great unifying theories
of nature, while not capturing the whole of the universe bear its signature One
strand of thought in the history of the philosophy of science is the idea
that the meaning and truth of the language and theories of science are
relative to culture and social values. It is not the intent here, even if I
were capable of it, to do justice to that idea and its alternatives. I want
to briefly draw attention to criteria of scientific truth or validity: how do
data, laws and theories gain acceptance? That, of course, is complex
involving ideas, experiment, the community of science in its various intra-
and extra-relations. What I want to focus on is one of the guiding ideas
behind acceptance. This is the idea of certainty, of absolute verifiability;
and the other side of that coin, that a single disagreement with experiment
falsifies a theory while no finite number of points of agreement with
experience ever finally validates theories. Practice is more complex and
multivalent, yet the idea has currency and has been one of the philosophies
of science of this [soon to be the previous] century, presented and
re-presented in various forms and degrees of sophistication with varying
degrees of acceptance. What is the source of the idea? There is no single
source but a matrix of interrelated factors. There is the ideal: to know the
world... and how could an idea with points of disagreement with nature count
as knowledge? There is the aesthetics of the idea: the beauty of nature will
be matched by the beauty of ideas, and one factor of beauty is the idea of
points of contact. There is power: exact knowledge is power - power over
nature, economic power, and political power. And, power over nature is not
mere control; by knowing nature’s intimate secrets, captured by ideational
structures that match the subtlety of nature’s own relations, does not finite
man, for a moment, bring himself into contact with infinity? The foregoing
complex is interactive and based in instincts that are before modern culture.
Practicing in that mode, one element of which must be tied into power and
control, science is forced to pace itself as dictated by nature on its own
terms: there is a final goal but the progress toward that goal must be as
though there were an infinite amount of time in which it is to be
accomplished. Further, the desire for complete and certain knowledge leads to
the establishment of external criteria, criteria that are outside the system
of the knower and the known; ways to verify science - with or without the
vocabulary of verification and truth in symbols [humankind’s strength and
failing] and formal relations. All this is well and good; there is a
magnificent edifice of knowledge, a vision of the future, and an intertwined
history with our technology and political economy. I am an admirer, an
occasional practitioner and a frequent beneficiary of the system. However, is
that the way of the world? We have been informed by certain priests of
knowledge of our lonely, alien, marginal status on a far outpost of the
cosmos. But, is not our being centered in the being of the universe, our
atoms forged in stars? Is it not true that we, our minds, our knowledge are
part of the world? There is also beauty in our being and the integration of
that being into the world whose order is both chaos and structure. What if
God invented herself, visited earth and, holding audience at the edge of the
waters of Lake Baikal[64], proclaimed that man did indeed have
the possibility of a magnificent destiny but that he would have to take
risks. There would be no guarantee except that there was no final insurance,
no absolute certainty of the outcome. Humankind would have to live with its
being rather than merely with its ideas. In contrast to Karl Popper’s thought
that, in science, progress is achieved through the death of old ideas rather
than the death of persons we would have to re-invent the art of dying - and
therefore of be-ing - in order have an even chance at arriving at destiny.
That fully being in the world is destiny... It is not my point that this is
some imaginary or ideal alternative to science; the reasonableness to the
fashion of progress in science is not under scrutiny. Rather, I am looking at
science in a different way: the idea is that of being in the world, of
science as a way of being in the world. What would science be like in a world
like ours in that the possibilities are great but unlike ours in that we knew
that we knew certainly that there was a finite time[65] in which, perhaps, to achieve an infinite destiny?
The idea is that the beautiful theories of science are not mere instruments,
not mere formal relations and while they are not absolute and not final they
do, in fact, bear the signature of the absolute. This is suggested by science
itself: the more that is learned, the more we discover the presence of the
distant and the remote in our immediate world and immediate being. I am not
suggesting that these attitudes are unheard of but only that they are
discounted in various “official” versions of the nature of science. More
importantly, I link this organic attitude to a sense that humankind’s
duration is finite regardless of actual duration. And, in analogy with
biological evolution where there is a variety of species occupying a variety
of niches, a connection between science and being can be seen to be true
without requiring marginalization of other modes of knowledge and culture.
Thus, the theories of natural science are both less than and much more than
formal and certain knowledge of the world We
have confidence that a relationship is causal to the degree that it is
predicted in detail on the basis of a few fundamental entities - thus
enhancing our confidence in the absence of stray influences - under the
action of a few simple, elegant, consistent laws and theories that have been
repeatedly confirmed in a range of conditions, behaviors and uses Theory
and Prediction Both
correlative and causal theories can be predictive Reduction Supervenience …see
section 2.2.1.2 4.3.2 Scientific and Evolutionary[66] Explanation: Nature and Value
There
appears to be a problem with evolutionary explanation in general and, in
particular, with evolutionary explanations of mind and consciousness. My
general position is that we should not be seeking stand-alone explanations
based on evolution or evolutionary theory. Rather, evolutionary and other
forms or modes of explanation are mutually reinforcing 4.3.2.1
What is Evolutionary Explanation?
Firstly,
evolutionary explanation appeals to the facts and theories of evolution[67] as a system of causal explanation and analogy Secondly,
it is necessary to know whether evolutionary explanation is some special kind
of explanation or an instance of causal explanation. There is a history of
thought regarding this and related issues. I want to indicate a view that
shows that evolutionary explanation is an instance of causal explanation
based on the introduction of concepts and repeatedly confirmed theory that
show patterns to the data, permit explanation and prediction. Biological [and
geological] evolution appears to present a special problem in that it refers
to the remote past. There is, of course, a body of data regarding the
operation of selection over observed periods but this does not cover all
phenomena, especially those of macroevolution. We can look at the causal
relations of the theory of evolution as follows. The facts and predictions of
evolution are facts and predictions in the present. Although the geological
data, for example, may be thought of as a record, they are also facts
observed in the present: such and such a skeletal structure with certain
characteristics is found in a certain place and bears similarities and
dissimilarities to other finds. One of the concepts introduced is that of the
record as a mapping of physical time. Naturally, it helps that the “fossils”
are arranged in a simple sequence in geological strata. Together with this
and other concepts, a theory of evolution is able to do its work. Thus,
evolutionary theory is seen as introducing order and regularity into the
facts as seen in the present. One of the concepts orders the geological data
as a record of change; the gaps in the record - not as serious as is
sometimes claimed - similar to the gaps in any set of finite data. This is
simplification, of course, and the gaps are conceptually filled out by the
other kinds of data 4.3.2.2 Evolutionary Explanations of
Mind and Consciousness
It
has been claimed that there is a problem with evolutionary explanations of
consciousness, e.g. Chalmers [1996]. A generic reply to criticisms of
evolutionary explanation refers to the previous point that evolutionary
explanation occurs together with other modes of explanation. However,
Chalmers’ specific objection is that natural selection cannot distinguish a
conscious individual from his zombie twin - this follows from Chalmers’
argument that consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical
and, therefore the presence of consciousness introduces no behavioral or
physical difference. Therefore, according to Chalmers, consciousness is not
subject to selection pressure I
argued, in section 2.2.1.2, that the concept of the physical is
under-specified. Inadequacies in our present understanding that are
consistent with consciousness freewheeling [my term] “inside” bodies have
been pointed out by Nagel, 1998. A simple argument, S, against the idea of
physically identical individuals with different conscious states: given the
hypothesis, the concept of the physical must be such that the physical
world is not causally closed. Alternatively, although there may be a planet Z
in which there is a zombie that is physically identical to an earth-man, that
is possible on the assumption that planet Z has natural laws that are
different from the laws on earth [and our universe]. However, on earth, two
altogether physically identical individuals, since they are subject to the
same natural laws, would have identical mental states. Thus, it does not
follow that the presence of consciousness introduces no behavioral difference
or that causal interactions of A and z [A] [A’s zombie twin - on the
counterfactual assumption that there could be one on earth] are identical.
Arguments against the causal efficacy of mind from conservation of energy
etc., do not at all disprove S. Further, there are many physical causes that
produce physical effects without affecting the energy of the sub-systems,
e.g., centripetal force in circular motion, motion of charged particles in
magnetic fields The
following consideration is also pertinent. The existence of a zombie twin in
any universe depends on the possibility of the separation of the state of the
universe from the laws of the universe Consider
the case that the universe is created from nothing - this possibility is
discussed in more detail in section 2.3.5. It is then reasonable to hold that
laws and the objects and phenomena described by the laws are created
together. There is a bit of a paradox in the previous statement - in that
laws are symbolic expressions while entities exist - that will be resolved.
Another way of saying that laws and entities are created together is that the
distinction between law and entity, between pattern and fact is not as
absolute as it is sometimes thought to be. As entities somewhere on an
idealized continuum between the extremes of absolute fact and absolute
pattern, sentient agents such as human beings have factual and patterned
properties. Living in a world of facts, we deduce patterns or approximations
to patterns - see, also, the discussion of laws in section 4.4.2. Thus, we
observe and express patterns as laws. This resolves a number of puzzles.
First, Laws are not symbolic; it is only our expression, law, that is
symbolic; note that humans do perceive some patterns; note also that in the
question of perceiving those patterns that have symbolic content there is the
issue of to what extent culture is responsible for educating perception in or
educating perception out. That is, human beings can perceive Law or,
at least, approximations thereof. However, it may be safe to assume that,
regardless of culture, existent beings do not directly perceive Ultimate Law.
This resolves the “paradox” just noted. Another puzzle that is being
addressed is the issue of the nature of mathematical truth: what is the role
of Platonism? The model of human beings needing to discover laws [what is created
is the symbolic expression that would match Law] leads to the idea of a
Platonic Universe of Ideas behind the world of entities and facts; the
Platonic Manifold approximates an aspect or part of the One Universe The
final puzzle concerns the possibility of zombies. From the foregoing, it is
not clear that a human could have a zombie twin in any universe 4.3.2.3 What Are the Limits to
Understanding and Explanation?
A
consequence of current paradigms, or Modes
of explanation, or Inherent
in humankind’s abilities, or Inherent
in being 4.3.3 Society and Epistemology
One
reason that a scientific-philosophical theory and explanation of mind and
consciousness is considered a problem is the confluence of factors that make
a solution seem possible. The main factors, as pointed out in the
Introduction, include new models of mind, new data on the nervous system,
and, perhaps in consequence, willingness to explore mind as mind To
what extent are the problems artifacts of our worldview, the current state of
science, and our theoretical and practical categories of thought? 4.3.4 Thoughts on Future Forms of
Explanation
Ideas
and extrapolations, e.g., 1. Progression of civilizations, 2. 19th
through 21st centuries 4.3.4.1
Explanations Based on Remote Worlds
In
the literal sense, there is one world; I am using “world” metaphorically in
the title of this section to refer to, e.g., paleo-history. All worlds,
remote and proximate, constitute the one actual world “Remote
worlds” are worlds “behind” the world - hidden worlds. Of course, I am using
“behind” and “hidden” metaphorically. Remote worlds are real but are also
useful principles of understanding and explanation Scientific
revolutions are often associated with introduction of a remote world Extrapolation
based on remote worlds may be based on the increasing penetration into remote
worlds over the history of knowledge and experience. It will be useful to
consider other forms of logic of extrapolation The
idea is that explanation from remote worlds, given adequate development, on
the model of evolutionary explanation, is not based in any literally remote
objects. Rather, the remoteness, even though it may appear perfectly natural
- especially after development, is introduced as one of the main concepts
along with the theory. As seen from the list of remote worlds, the
paleo-history of evolution is not the only example of a world introduced as
an explanatory device or paradigm A list of remote worlds Worlds
that are remote in time - paleo-history, the cosmological past and so on, the
distant past and future Worlds
that are remote in space - the New World in the time of Columbus, the
universe...especially the part of the universe whose remote light has not yet
reached earth, Microscopically
remote worlds. These are also spatially remote. The worlds of the atom, and
the cell - at least before the electron microscope; the worlds of elementary
particles and their constituents... and macroscopically remote worlds - a
“supra-organism” Worlds
that are remote to our forms of being and modes of perception. The worlds of
ultraviolet light and ultrasonic frequencies are perceptually remote but, in
the 20th century, conceptually familiar. The general concept of
being [Mitra, 1998]; a hypothetical third modality that integrates and has
access to both mental and physical phenomena [Nagel, 1998]; these are
conceptually remote in the late 20th century industrial world and
seem to be perceptually remote, The
Freudian worlds of the unconscious, and of personality - id, ego, superego 4.3.5 Explanans - A Variety of
Source Theories
Chalmers
[1996, Introduction] talks of respecting science, and Searle [1996, Chapter
4] reports we have no option but to accept the scientific worldview - it is
not optional for “reasonably well educated citizens of the present era.”
Searle refers specifically to the atomic theory of
matter and the evolutionary theory of biology that “are in large part
constitutive of the modern worldview.” The following related considerations now arise: While
these theories may well account for the immediate issues, we want to be able
to talk about ultimate issues. If one is uncomfortable with or has arguments
against the ultimate, it may be regarded as a process, a progression rather
than finality. The minimum that we require of our intellectual apparati is a
loosening of parameters and assumptions before we tighten again The
atomic and evolutionary theories are neither individually necessary nor
jointly sufficient to explain consciousness. This remains true if we include
the other modern standard theories Multiple
hierarchies of constraints on nature are provided by loosening known limiting
conditions in varying degrees along a number of dimensions. We consider these
in parallel; this provides a freedom of understanding without sacrifice of
accuracy Inversion
of the explanatory roles between mind and matter What
does the element of creativity require for the fundamental theories? This is
similar to, though simpler and more general than, the introduction by Penrose
[1989, 1994] of considerations on the non-algorithmic processes of mind The
conditions of a being facing existence - the imperatives of a finite
individual faced with the task of infinity. This task is necessary owing to
the contingent nature of and incomplete knowledge regarding limits. However,
more than being necessary, it is the response of an individual or group to
the mystery of experience The humanities 4.3.6 Explanandum: Mind and
Being?
To
what extent are the explanations for mind and consciousness also explanations
of being? The start is with definition of consciousness by example
[ostention]; then develop relations among consciousness, mind, brain /
nervous system [matter]. The approach is a bootstrap through a circle of
issues that may constitute a field. Definition, theory and use interact 4.3.7 A Variety of Positions
There
are various positions that can be taken either as a research program or as
defining the ontology of mind. I have argued above that, since these
positions essentially take the signs of mind as mind itself, the do not
properly define an ontology. Regardless, the various positions may contain
useful ideas, may organize and motivate useful research. Such positions are
the behaviorism, central state materialism - the identity theory, token-token
identity theories, functionalism, and cognitivism I
do believe that, as ontologies, these theories or positions are surrogates
for materialism; and that when they are pushed to explain the facts of mind
they must logically retreat into ordinary materialism In
terms of rounding out a variety of positions in a logical manner, Broad[68] has provided an excellent model. That work
deserves attention for its clarity, breadth, logic and openness. I plan a
review. As noted earlier, my focus is Mind and World rather than Mind and
Nature; I should review whether there is a difference between Broad’s meaning
and use of “nature” and my intentions for “world.” Searle’s position was noted above- brains cause
consciousness, i.e. consciousness is a biological feature of the brain. I
have sympathy with this viewpoint; and with the scientific worldview and
elimination of Cartesian categories that go toward making it plausible and reasonable.
However, since I do not know what the future will bring...and out of
my interest in evolutionary and, especially, ultimate issues I see an
essential need to step back. The principle was outlined above. The more
general viewpoint provides freedom to search and experiment with ideas and
possibilities but do not prevent work with the more immediate, scientific,
practical problems regarding which we may adopt that set of more specific
views that are consistent with the scientific endeavor and encourage correct
thinking in that regard Specifically,
I see a need to step back in the following ways: Regarding
mechanisms, causality and explanation: step back to correlation. Although a
correlation is not an explanation - at least it does not attain the status of
a fully satisfactory explanation - it allows for numerous directions of
development corresponding to possible inadequacies of any actual specific
view. This is not to require but to allow that relationships may be merely
correlative Regarding
necessity step back from full correlation - mind and consciousness is always
associated with brains: step back to degree of correlation; allow, for
association of mind with objects other than brains as we know them. This is
not pan-psychism for it allows for varying degrees of correlation between
mind and various material – physiological and biological – structures. We
expect the correlation to be high for nervous-endocrine systems; we allow
other possibilities to arise in future development; we do not stipulate that
correlation is mere correlation, i.e. we allow for causal explanation Regarding
ontology there are varying levels of neutrality
and starting with the highest level of neutral ontology there are various
directions in which to commit. This allows for expansion of the concepts of
mind and matter in the direction of a neutral metaphysics and subsequent
introduction of explanation in terms of real causal relationships The
determinations of history pay little respect to the necessary logic of the
past...and the present is the past of some future evolution. This is contrite
if I take it to mean that the work of today and its antecedents are
irrelevant. The approaches suggested above permit respect of and work with
the received paradigms and an embrace of the future These
various steps in the direction of generality allow for various logical
[inclusivity, reduction] and natural [on the basis of natural law] relations
between mind and matter...or, more generally, between mind and world 4.3.8 A Hierarchy of Neutral
Ontologies[69]
4.4
Method: How to Study the Problems
4.4.1 On Constructing New
Theories
Focusing
only on the theoretical side, there is a dual problem in that one is
simultaneously searching for new concepts and new explanations. The actual
problem is usually simpler in that the search is often stepwise [concepts,
then explanations, then concepts] and incremental This
lessens but does not eliminate or minimize the work of creative construction
of concepts and theory. It is necessary to keep in view a circle or field
of concepts, relationships and facts 4.4.2 What Will It Take to Develop
a Theory of Consciousness and Mind[70]?
This
is a continuation of the earlier discussions of sections 2.2.2 above [What
Will or Should a Theory of Mind and Consciousness Do?] and 2.2.3 above [What
Would It Take to Have a Theory of Consciousness?]; and notes[71], [72] FORMULATE
AS AN OUTLINE IN RELATION TO THE WHOLE WORLD:
concept, theory of; then Being: nature, society, mind, and the unknown; then
Mind – an atlas; The Character of Mind Consciousness Consciousness
as phenomenal experience ...
this idea is the starting point for consideration of consciousness in this
document. It is what is to be explained by a scientific theory. One of the
functions of reflective and analytical thought may be to round out an idea
and give support - in the form of both elucidation and careful criticism of
scientific work. Another role is to relate the prosaic and the mundane -
which is not to say trivial or not exciting - to a larger picture of what the
object of reflection may be and relations to being as a whole. The nature of
consciousness remains an open question: As
place of meaning [i.e., significance...] As
locus of the real [as opposed to what exists] The
mystery: What
are the place, source and destiny of my consciousness? What
is the relation between consciousness and the universe? What sources for this
knowledge? Sources from intuition, the traditions - western philosophy,
literature and mysticism; India and the east; primal cultures; animal world What
is the intuition sometimes dispelled by the light of science and rationality
of the sometimes-felt utter centrality and fullness of my own conscious,
aware presence? If the universe may exist without mind, what does it mean
that, without mind, there would be nothing that knows the universe and there
would be no part of the universe that is known? Through mind, the universe
knows and through consciousness, the universe is aware - of itself? That is
not fully metaphorical... what is its significance? On the interpretation of
the main scientific view, the origin of mind and consciousness was not
designed, was not necessary; the evolution of the universe is mechanistic.
Yet that same universe is sentient, is conscious through its parts - our
minds. Though the origin of those minds may have been through mechanism, the
minds themselves are capable of plans, designs, being aware of options,
making choices and changes. Through its parts - through minds - the universe,
also, is capable of making plans, designs, being aware of options, making choices
and changes. On the mechanistic view, a universe that was not capable of
design evolved to become capable of design. In a way, that is more remarkable
than if the process of the universe were teleological from its “origin.” Now
there is some difficulty in the transition from the parts to wholes being
capable of making local plans and choices; and there are various
interpretations of teleological-like processes actually being the working out
of mechanism. In view of those kinds of explanation and of the success of its
explanatory and predictive power in the physical sciences and in functional
and evolutionary biology, mechanism is a practical paradigm. However,
necessary extrapolation to the whole also has difficulties and is something
regarding which [necessity] we should remain silent. The difficulties include
extrapolation of the concept of law, in view of the idea of law as created in
creation as much or more than creating creation, to the whole - regardless
whether law be mechanistic or otherwise. Then, creation requires
indeterminism and, though determinism and mechanism are not the identical,
indeterminism can precipitate the breakdown of mechanism. This is, it seems,
the local analog of creation creating laws - which are then read by minds We
come back to the central point of the mystery. What is my consciousness? What
is our mutual sentience? What does it mean that the universe has eyes [mine]
that see, hands that do, mind that thinks and knows? On the atomistic view,
what are the properties of the smallest parts that make these things
possible? On the evolutionary view, when and how did these emerge from
potentiality? Or are the characteristics of seeing, knowing, conceiving,
choosing, and doing... most fundamental, most present from the moment of or
before creation in the womb of potentiality? We can live with paradigms
without being chained to them. For anyone who wants to know what is real,
especially about their own being and the being of the universe, these must be
pressing questions Mystery
in the sense here is related to the sense of awe and wonder noted earlier but
is different. It signifies: possibly, hints of depth, qualities, vistas,
worlds unknown - but felt as a presence like the source of the Nile in a
quiet moment of reflection at night before the day of the outset of a journey
to the source. This a is third sense of mystery - something that is intuited,
felt as larger than the existent present, but not fully conceived or
contained in the finite present Intensionality Very
briefly, intensionality is the property of mind that relates the subject to
the world. This semi-academic characterization indicates the importance of
intensionality: relationship to the world is central to the organism’s
survival and being in the world. I want to elaborate this, briefly, in a
somewhat non-academic but real way. Consider a hunter that is locating prey;
there is general awareness of the whole terrain and the presence of the
hunter itself and potential presence of prey, there is a general alertness
that immediately directs attention to even small signs and changes without
loss of the general awareness, an ongoing processing of the information that
translates into action: action in check or action initiated. The mind / brain
of the hunter is very tied in and responsive to its world in a continuum of
gross and detailed levels. Although physical objects have physical
relationships such as force and contact, physical relationships - at that
level of description - lack the detailed, multi-level, scanning, responsive,
wait-or-act aspects of the hunter that is so tied into the world. I want to
generalize, and say that in normal cases for sufficiently developed species,
the relationship of the subject to the world, i.e. intensionality, is always
very tied in at a continuum of levels of detail and attention even when the
general level of attention to the immediate present is not as high as in the
case of the hunter and the field of awareness expands from the scene of the
hunt to the global environment. In states of relaxation, as attention
attenuates, intensionality remains keyed in at the continuum of levels in
what approaches a state that may be thought of as “on idle” Consider
the following hypothetical evolutionary sequence: fundamental particles -
atoms, molecules - replicators, symbiosis - cells, animalia, symbiosis -
multicellular organisms - nervous systems, vertebrates - differentiation from
stimulus-response to emotion, cognition and so on, e.g. Maturana and Varela
[1987] ... and finally, on one branch of the phylogenetic scheme, mammals,
humankind. The intensionality at the higher levels presumably developed from
physical relations and their integration at the low levels. One theoretical
function of recalling the evolutionary sequence is the reminder that there is
much opportunity for development, by way of layering and looping, of the
singular aspects of intensionality from physical interactions and relations.
An analogy is the development of limbs, eyes and brains i.e., the evolution
of “complex” mental features such as intensionality is similar in its
incremental physiological and functional path to that of complex
physiological features. This is a possibility argument rather than a proof or
detailed explanation. Another theoretical function, and the primary point of
the present evolutionary reference, is that the very tied in nature of
intensionality is a keying in over a range of levels. In other words, the
rudiments of mental characteristics begin very early in evolution and the
properties of the features at the human level derive from the integration of
the levels. These remarks do not directly affect the concept of
intensionality as a “high” level phenomenon; rather they show how that
phenomenon may be understood in terms of the physiological levels. When
puzzling about how something physical can be “about” anything, the first step
to resolution may be through the detailing of those levels. In the present
case it is likely that questions of ontology - such as what kind of ontology
at the physical level is necessary for a given ontology at the mental level
of description - can successfully separated from questions of detail when
there is sufficient working out of detail Similar
remarks can be made about consciousness Consciousness and intensionality ...fit
together in that consciousness enhances the acuity and variety of the
intentional relationship. For example, consciousness is significant in
redirecting or reeducating intentional structures as needed. Consciousness is
significant in creating and making choices Process:
evolution, dynamics...includes action Relationship:
physical, biological; intentional [this is not meant to imply that
intensionality is not part of nature]; meaning, knowing and knowledge STUDY Sources Methods Conceptual
- on construction and creation of a system of interrelated concepts: analysis
of the concepts, formulation of a complete field, covering. Formulation of
fields of ideas or concepts through consideration of circles of connected
issues Some
approaches: clarification of ontological and epistemological issues,
cognitivism and AI, through physics, through biology and neuroscience [of
course], through psychology and psychiatry: the mental phenomena in normal
and exceptional function and in disorders, through social relations and language,
through direct experience of the global and the detailed “anatomy” of
consciousness, intensionality and the unconscious and their relations to the
world Theory:
science, computer and network science, information processing Experiment,
experience and field study in the disciplinary areas: neuroscience,
psychology, and examination of contents and processes...also see disciplines
in section 4.5 Tools:
synergistic and evolutionary experiments with computer hardware and software Simulation:
computer A Program - see section 4.6.2 Design
and derivation of a system of problems… Necessity… Practical and
philosophical - theoretical, ontological – considerations… Enumeration
of levels and elements of description… A variety of levels and their circles,
elements and interrelationships; and integration of the levels 4.4.3 A Variety of Conscious
Experience - Mind as Experienced in a Variety of Contexts
General Experience
and its varieties The
adventures of experience and transformation The
individual and the absolute A
variety of contexts Modern Individual
– what is the role of individual and of communicated and shared experience in
“inner” and “outer” worlds? Children,
development Men
vs. women Those
who hold experience as fundamental vs. those who hold properties as
fundamental - materialists, eliminativists, physicalists, behaviorists,
functionalists Sub
cultures in the modern world Other
cultures and civilizations; modern, ancient and prehistoric Primal
cultures, hunter-gatherer Other
species Relation
including pro / con, if any, to the issue of pan-psychism 4.5 Sources - the
Literature, Institutions
Modern
study of mind and consciousness A variety of modern disciplines and schools: Neuroscience,
psychology and psychiatry, anthropology and sociology, the strands of Western
philosophy such as the analytic and the various continental traditions...
What can we learn from the recorded Western tradition from its origins
through today? History of western traditions What
does the Western tradition teach us about consciousness and mind? What are
its fundamental insights and approaches? Analytic
and continental thought Literature,
mind and philosophy Myth and religion Non-western traditions What
can we learn from other world traditions throughout history? The key literature[73] Institutions 4.6 An Approach to a
Theory of Mind and Nature
The
following approach is based on various threads above: the idea of a theory of
the world, a suggestion of an analogy with the introduction of force in
physics - made for the purposes of the illuminating way in which theories and
concepts are introduced rather than for any concrete analogy from the
structure of the theories of physics; suggestions as to additional empirical,
conceptual and ontological elements needed for a theory of a relationship,
rather a dynamic and integrated system, of mind and organism including
reference to Thomas Nagel’s thoughts on requirements for a new integrating
ontological element 4.6.1 The Ontology
What
is the factor of interaction of mind and matter? Asking this question does
not imply a dualism. Rather, if it is dualistic to talk of mind and matter,
then the question asks: What factor introduces unification? The
factor may be evident in the following interactions: Mind
- matter [at the boundaries or instruments of perception and of action] Mind
- mind [force is originally a concept but appears, in modern fact, to have
“material” existence] 4.6.2 The Program[74]
Begin
simply: Unit
mental activities: with both bound and free aspects Details
of ontology and phenomenology: 1. The unconscious, 2. Simple organisms, 3.
Complex organisms as compound organisms with a single “focus”, 4. Interaction
of minds Simple
system or organism Stimulus-response…
bound [deterministic] and free response combined in structured process Build
compound systems from simple ones[75] Models Theories The
search is a dual search …in
that there is experiment with aspects of [1] Mind to explain and [2] Organism
to explain 4.6.3 The Disciplines
Select
specific topics that together form a promising connected program. Include
experiment, theory and exploration 4.6.3.1 Primary Disciplines
Of
the modern academic disciplines, I regard philosophy, neuroscience,
psychology and psychiatry to be primary to the study of mind
and consciousness 4.6.3.2 Secondary Disciplines
Supporting
disciplines are sociology, anthropology, general functional and evolutionary
biology, computer and information science, artificial intelligence and
robotics, logic, computability and proof theory 4.7
The Problems of Mind
As
I said, my original intent had been to compile a logical catalog of the
problems of consciousness and I then expanded this to cover mind. “Logical”
meant that the list would be complete; that the problems would fit together
coherently; and that the arrangement of would be derived from the structure
of the subject. This latter was taken to mean that mind would be understood
in terms of its inner relations and its relations to the world; this “first
principle” is also the basis of completeness and of coherence of fit. As
noted earlier, the outline of topics is derived from and is intended to
satisfy these conditions After
thinking on the problems and developing the list, my view on what is most
fundamental has changed. There is, in an important sense, one problem: The Problem of Mind Scientific
and philosophical issues remain important but there is no lack of work in
these areas. Regarding the known universe as broken up in to two modes of description
“matter” and “mind” - regardless of ontological status, note that knowledge
of the nature of matter at the turn of the millennium is far in advance of
its status at the first major flowering of thought in Western Civilization.
The same is not true of mind even though this is not to say that more
complete, more rational and depth knowledge has not been established.
However, this knowledge is not of mind as mind The Primary Problem: to
Understand Mind Itself, in Itself The
Main Problem as I Have Come to see it, is to Understand Mind Itself, in
Itself This
includes the main characteristics of mind especially consciousness, the
unconscious and possibly intensionality In
an immediate sense, we know what mind and consciousness are Going
beyond the immediate, there are two related questions. First: what is the
relation of mind and consciousness, to the universe extended in space and
time - generally, and for individual minds? I.e., is mind peripheral [though
not epiphenomenal] or central? This touches the question of the nature of
individual death. Second: what is the concept of mind over and above the fact
of mind? When attempting natural explanations of mind, consciousness,
intensionality, and creativity - what is it that is being explained? It is
possible that the human [or life on earth] experience of mind is very special
and slanted, that this is a main source of difficulty in explanation; and
that a general concept of mind will make explanation more direct. The issue
relates to whether the human mind as an example of mind is adequate to the
purpose of developing a theory, whether the example will need expansion as a
concept, or whether some new ontological element will best close the
explanatory or theoretical circle There
are sources of knowledge from the east, from the west in the form of mystic
experience and from science. There are also sources from tribal peoples.
These may or may not contribute It
may be that humankind is at specific stage in evolution of mind. But,
knowledge and the issues cannot be resolved without investigating mind
itself. The studies will be experimental but supported by science and concept
formation and analysis. These investigations may not resolve the scientific
issues but they should show what it is that science is to explain. The
investigations would also shed light on whether the concept of mind can be
generalized and known in a way that would permit the connection to the body
be known in a form that is causal and necessary. And, they might eliminate or
reduce the need for actual evolution to know the potential for mind. This
knowledge itself would be a form of evolution and of expansion of mind though
not of a species by natural selection The
problem includes the nature of mind itself; the depth and immersion of mind
in nature; the detailed structure; and the place of mind in the world. The
latter includes the possibility of mind as expanded generalized to include
the world; this possibility follows from expansion of the scope of what is
the nature of the mental in the direction away from ethereality toward hard
surfaces [and the modern interpretation of matter that shows hard surfaces to
be appearance] and from the fact that, whereas matter appears to be more
general in the direction of extension, mind is more general in the direction
of intention. Investigation of this possibility may show whether mind, in
appropriate abstraction, is sufficient or whether some new modality is
necessary to encompass mind and matter I
have begun studies, as alluded to in this document, on the empirical side in
to the nature of mind and its relations and on the theoretical / conceptual
side as support for the experiments and in to the conceptual and ontological
issues just described Plans
are outlined in the Introduction and detailed in the document I
think the relative significance of the Mind-Body and Nature of Mind problems
will be determined by historical development. The two problems are woven
together. I emphasize the Problem of the Nature of Mind because of its
importance and relative neglect - and because of what I think to be its
centrality to human being if not being itself Status of the Catalog of Problems Although
not as important as I had conceived it to be, a catalog remains important as
pointing to a research program The
topical outline defines the main problems or problem themes, which include
various sub-problems. The following list is not complete: 1.
Nature of mind and consciousness: character and concepts of
mind; nature and concepts of consciousness, intensionality and the
unconscious; atlas; methods of study including disorder and exceptional
performance. 2. Relations to the world: problem of phenomenal
experience vs. problem of detailed explanation; are there two problems or
one. Physical aspects: ontological elements of mind possibly requiring
fundamental physics. Biological: development, function, neuroscience
and the following important issue: depth of integration of mind, especially
of consciousness and intensionality in biology - body - and specialized
structures: brain, nervous and endocrine systems, organs of perception and
action. This question may be more significant than question of the “locus of
consciousness”. Social: elaboration of previous point, including
language, due to social needs and relations. Technology - artificial
minds: programs or hardware [or both]; and design or evolution [or both] -
and “design for evolution”. Consider the possible co-evolution with human /
society. Symbolic forms: language; the themes of cognitive science;
Turing machines; proof theory: symbolic requirements for mind and
consciousness; Strong and Weak AI; ultimate or unknown aspects. 3. Origins:
possibility and role of evolutionary explanation; evolutionary explanation of
the depth of integration of mind in biology; other levels: physical,
social... 4. Reflective considerations including philosophy:
the problem of the nature of mind; and the questions of ontology; theory of
mind and consciousness: objectives, requirements, method and program; the
problem of recognition of mind and consciousness; the problem of study and
sources of information; problems in the philosophy of mind; artifacts,
problems and mysteries; nature of [human] being in the world; role of mind
and consciousness 4.8 The Future of
Studies in Mind and Consciousness
4.8.1 On Prediction
The
intent of the section is not as presumptuous as its title may indicate. It is
not the intent of this section to predict the outcome of the philosophical,
scientific and other endeavors that are the focus of this document. I do not
see - or desire to see - myself as a futurologist. Looking at the present we
can see it contains what would be surprises to anyone living before 1900. The
future will contain surprises and we may appreciate them should we be there
to do so. However one can outline some possibilities of the lines of approach
as currently seen; and, at least within a given conceptual framework, some
logical alternatives can be listed This
starts with a consideration of the question: What is matter? To answer, start
with the “first experience” of matter - common experience or common sense
extended by the best knowledge of the day. Today, regarding matter, the best
knowledge of matter is scientific knowledge in the light of philosophy. The
“light of philosophy” may be interpreted to include conceptual clarification,
sufficient consistency, comparison against the received tradition of related
attempts, and appropriate conceptual generalization. As noted earlier,
allowing consideration of “the future of science or knowledge in general” is
does not provide any definite meaning The
mind-body problem and the related problem of the origin of phenomenal
consciousness will be resolved when mind and matter “converge.” Understanding
of matter has evolved significantly; the concept of mind has not similarly
evolved. The two may converge. If after sufficient time convergence has not
occurred will conclude that the problem is insoluble - or that there is
something inadequate about the paradigm of scientific explanation. We may
need to shift the focus of conceptual change to mind and mental phenomena 4.8.2 Value of the Study
What
are the values of the field of endeavor that may be described as mind and
consciousness research? This would include philosophy of mind, philosophy and
experiments with being, psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science including
information-theoretic and artificial intelligence approaches, the conceptual
underpinnings in biology and physics The
values could be classed as intrinsic and practical The
intrinsic values include the sheer interest, the intellectual and implied
human adventure; and - this is not separate from the interest - the knowledge
into our own nature and the nature of the universe in which we live The
practical values include theoretical implications for a variety of related
intellectual and theoretical disciplines; and the consequences for personal
and social life. The most obvious of the latter are the technological
implications and applications; there is a clear secondary potential that the
“related disciplines” will also affect personal and social life.” Although
physics, biology, psychology, philosophy, social science, mathematics have
their own research programs there is the potential that the interdisciplinary
research that brings the various disciplines into confluence will have
detailed and fundamental consequences for the shape of science and related
view of the world and for the disciplines with consequent applications. If
knowledge is adaptation, tying in to the world then knowledge of the main
instrument of knowledge is further immersion in and expansion of evolution. A
catalog of the possibilities would be entertaining and be useful in terms of
suggesting lines of development; this is frequently done in the technical and
popular literature. I am not sure that the catalogers, despite impressive
imaginative powers, allow themselves the breadth of possibility afforded. For
example, what is learned about mind might be useful in psychotherapy. And,
the development of technology might, instead of whetting our appetites for a
robotic future, re-inform us of, and perhaps educate us in, the importance
and nature of human values 4.8.3 What if all Problems of
Science and Philosophy Were Conceived and Solved
The
text of this section has been eliminated as not providing illumination Arguments
in Journey
in Being show that the idea that all problems will someday
be conceived and solved is not absurd. This might entail that some concerns
that we call problems are not actual or real problems 4.8.4 The Scientific Problems -
Physics, Biology, Psychology
I
want to repeat a point made earlier. It is that fundamental contributions may
well be made by all fundamental sciences. There are debates in the literature
about, for example, the relative primacy of physics and biology. Frequently
these are based on a mistaken reading of claims. Suppose a writer espouses a
belief that physics will be fundamental to understanding the origin of
consciousness. This has been interpreted as a claim that biology will not be
fundamental However
physics and biology may both be fundamental. Psychology may enter in a
fundamental way by showing and elaborating some fundamental characteristic of
mind and consciousness and their processes. Physics may then enter; as the
science of fundamental entities and processes, it would provide some key
element that underlies the fundamental psychological process in question.
Biology would enter by showing how this physical element is captured,
amplified, translated to the symbolic or other appropriate level; and,
perhaps, by showing the evolutionary and developmental origins of the
biological function. The example sketch that I have given of such a
development is that of creativity, which is also a key element in defining
the nature of mind, and of physical, evolutionary and perhaps developmental
processes 4.8.5 Philosophy
Philosophical
contributions include the following Support
for the scientific program Fundamental
concerns Fundamental
concerns include clarification and expansion of the nature of mind and matter
and their relationship. A related issue is disentangling ultimate
distinctions and distinctions that are dependent on current states of
knowledge, e.g. the issues of dualism vs. monism; and, since we do not know
more than we know, how can this question be approached Writers
from various fields have commented on the relative positions of philosophy
and the disciplines. As examples Rorty [1979] would limit the influence of
philosophy to “edification”; and Richard Feynman[76] was suspicious of philosophers
who would instruct physics or who drew philosophical conclusions from modern
physics. However, it seems to me that we do both science and philosophy, i.e.
we have endeavors one of which is reflection regarding the endeavors - this
is characteristic of the human enterprise - or experiment. Who undertakes
these endeavors, and whether a practitioner from one discipline may comment
on another discipline, and the laws of commentary are not as important as the
existence of dialog[77] Bibliography
I – The Literature
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Association, 1994 Baars, Bernard J. [1996]. Understanding
Subjectivity: Global Workspace Theory and the Resurrection of the Observing
Self, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, No. 3, pp. 211-16 Baars, Bernard J. [1998]. A Cognitive Theory of
Consciousness, Published by Cambridge University Press, 1988-1998, Electronic
version published by the author Block, Ned [1995]. On A Confusion About A Function
Of Consciousness Broad, C. D. [1925]. Mind and Its Place in Nature Chalmers, David [1996]. The Conscious Mind Chalmers, David [1997]. Availability: The Cognitive
Basis of Experience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences Churchland, Patricia S. [1996]. The Hornswoggle
Problem Crick, Francis [1994]. The Astonishing Hypothesis:
The Scientific Search For The Soul Dennett, Daniel [1991]. Consciousness Explained Edelman, Gerald [1992]. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire:
On the Matter of Mind Feynman, Richard [1963]. Lectures on Physics Feynman, Richard [1965]. The Character of Physical
Law Forman, Robert K. C. [1998]. What Does Mysticism
Have To Teach Us About Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies,
5, No.2., 185-201 Freeman, Walter [1995]. Societies of Brains: A
Study in the Neuroscience of Love and Hate Hall, Edward T. [1995]. West of the Thirties:
Discoveries Among the Navajo and Hopi Hundert, Edward M. [1989]. Philosophy, Psychiatry
and Neuroscience: A Synthetic Analysis of The Varieties of Human Experience Jackson, F. [1982]. Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical
Quarterly, 32, 127-136 Kuhn, Thomas [1962]. The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions Lakatos, Imre [1978]. The Methodology of Research
Programmes Lanier, Jaron [1997]. Death: The Skeleton Key Of
Consciousness Studies? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, No.2.,
181-5 Lorenz, Konrad [1973]. Behind The Mirror: A Search
for a Natural History of Human Knowledge Maturana, Humberto R. and Francisco J. Varela
[1987]. The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding McGinn, Colin [1991]. The Problem of Consciousness McGinn, Colin [1995]. “Consciousness and Space,” Journal
of Consciousness Studies 2., pp. 220-30 Moore, G. E. [1922]. Philosophical Studies Nagel, Thomas [1974]. What Is It Like to Be a Bat Nagel, Thomas [1993]. Review of John Searle’s The
Rediscovery of The Mind, 1992 in New York Review of Books, March Nagel, Thomas [1998]. Conceiving the Impossible:
The Mind-Body Problem Penrose, Roger [1989]. The Emperor’s New Mind:
Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics Penrose, Roger [1994]. Shadows of The Mind: A
Search For The Missing Science of Consciousness Rorty, Richard [1979]. Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature Rosenfield, Israel [1993]. The Strange, Familiar,
and Forgotten: An Anatomy of Consciousness Runes, Dagobert D. [1983]. Dictionary of
Philosophy, rev. ed Searle, John R. [1992]. The Rediscovery Of The Mind Searle, John R. [1997]. The Mystery of
Consciousness Searle, John R. [1998]. Mind, Language and Society:
Philosophy in The Real World Tipler, Frank J. [1994]. The Physics of
Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead Tye, Michael [online]. Knowing What It Is Like: The
Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument Whitehead, Alfred North [1929]. Process and Reality ¨ II – Works by Anil Mitra
Selections from the
following essays may be found online at http: / / www.horizons-2000.org 1987: Evolution
and Design 1995 – 2000: All previous
documents on computation / mind have been absorbed to The Variety of Being,
comments below 1997: All previous
documents on computation / mind have been absorbed to The Variety of Being,
comments below 1995-1998: Reference to
this older version of the present essay has become unnecessary 1998: [a] Being,
Mind and The Absolute: Relationships among consciousness, mind and
nature; approaches from science, from mind-in-the-world, and from the idea of
absolute being 1998: [b] Being
and The Elements Of Being: A Personal and Universal Account 1998: [c] Neuro-Psychology:
Mind and Brain, A summary of Susan A. Greenfield’s 1997, The Human Mind:
A Guided Tour 2000: Computers,
Being and Minds 2000: Kinds of
Knowledge 2001: On Mind and Metaphysics – a
new concept for the present essay 2001: The Philosophy of Mind –
Author’s website for the philosophy of mind and related topics 2001: The
Potential of Being – latest versions of Being and the Elements of Being 2003: [a] The
Variety of Being – incorporates all previous work on computation:
practical uses, simulation of and implications for study of mind and being.
this essay goes beyond consideration of computation to a consideration of the
variety of being – actual, hypothetical and potential. The significance,
here, is that evaluation of computer as mind / being becomes an issue of
analysis rather than merely one of intuition 2003: [b] Journey in Being – main
essay of the Journey in Being Website. The analysis of
consciousness and mind supersedes and is far in advance of the present essay.
The present essay is maintained because [1] It will form the basis of any
future essays that focus on the philosophy of mind / consciousness, [2] It
contains useful detailed information, and [3] out of personal interest, as a
record of the progress of my own thought. Such interest is useful to the
author since a variety of lessons emerge from a review of the progress of an
individual’s thought. Especially, I learn from the progress of my thought
where it may go next. I learn, generally, about the potential for greater
breadth and depth of the conceptual foundation. I learn, specifically, that
the relatively parochial interpretation of the concepts in the present essay
have a universal interpretation and that much can be learned about the
parochial and the universal as a result of allowing the study of both levels
to interact at intuitive and rational levels Footnotes
[1] The entire treatment of mind and
consciousness is abbreviated and incorporated in Journey
in Being where it is much improved. The treatment of here reflects my
understanding as of 1999; that understanding was marked by a number of
difficulties including a number that corresponded to the state of the
literature. These include the mind-matter problem, the problem of causal
efficacy of mind and other problems not commonly recognized such as
reification and demarcation in the study of matter and mind. The problem of
reification is that of assuming that the concepts and categories of
understanding describe a real state of affairs. The related problem of
demarcation is that there should be and is a definite boundary such that for
a category and any process or event it can be said that it does or does not
fall within the given category. It is not being said that there are no
categories with definite boundaries; however, the claim is that this is not
the case for mind or for matter. The nature of the problems, arguments that
they are problems and resolution is in Journey
in Being [2] It is generally accepted that a
precise definition, e.g. in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, is
difficult if not impossible. The purpose of this discussion of concepts is to
point out, from among various senses of the words, which sense is being used
here. Among the various difficulties of definition and meaning is the fact
that meaning is realized in a context and that advance specification is a
preliminary task - so that discussion can begin; and it is the discussion, in
combination with application and review that elaborates meaning. These
thoughts are elaborated in what follows, especially in section 1.1.1 On
Meaning, below [3] Extended talk, names, concepts,
theories come later as a second approach, a counterpoint to and elaboration
of the first [4] I do not want to limit this to “human
culture” [5] There is in all fundamental concepts,
no doubt, an inheritance from pre-human evolution. For example concepts of
space derive, in part, from vision. But the pre-human development of vision,
though it occurred in the same general environment, was successively,
adaptive in a number of different niches [6] Experience, as understood here, is
phenomenal experience. Experience is not restricted to experience of the
“external physical” world; this is implied by the statement “The first
experience of mind is as experience itself...” The objects of mental
experience include the physical [and living] world, other minds [this is not
to affirm or deny direct experience of the contents of other minds], and
things that are neither clearly physical nor clearly mental such as
propositions and their relations. Additionally, experience includes active
modes such as willing and volitional action [7] I want to emphasize that there is no
special significance to this particular reification that assigns to mind the
property of location or the property of being a container. Other aspects of
reification are extension, substantiality... Such tendencies to reification
are, likely, one of the roots of the idea of substance. I also emphasize that
a reification need not be actively expressed in words; it may be automatic
and iconic [8] Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on
Metaphysics, I, 191, quoted in Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy,
rev. ed., 1983 [9] Among the psychological “investments”
in language, concreteness is a low order phenomenon. The latent concreteness
lies in the minds of users of language [10] Before concluding that mind is not
real, observe that the same considerations apply to “matter” [11] There is an improved treatment of
meaning in Journey
in Being [12] Primitives, rules of sentence
formation, axioms, rules of derivation and the body of the system that is a
filling out of “Platonic space”: definitions, concepts and theorems. As
pointed out next, this system co-evolves as a whole [13] Is there such a thing as
awareness-of-awareness or is it really awareness of prior awareness even if
of just a fraction of a second ago? Some writers argue that awareness of
awareness is necessary for consciousness. Some issues that support
consideration of this idea have to do with reducing the subjective to the non-subjective,
with the origin of subjectivity, with the conditions for subjective
experience, and with conditions that make consciousness reportable. Another
argument is that the field of perception includes the organism which is
factored out by object constancy; or: the field of awareness includes the
aware-organism [the words are compounded to signify that awareness is a
condition of being an organism and not a mere property of organisms] which is
factored out by a psychology of reality of the environment; in questioning
this position it is easy to be misled by the discreteness of the individual
senses and modes of perception into neglecting the binding of the world into
a unit experience. The arguments have strength but are not fully persuasive.
Reflexive consciousness is not required by the concept of consciousness. I
leave the question open and, as warranted, to be taken up at a later time [14] I can imagine the following give and
take dialog: but machines will outlast humankind; and the system of universes
of which our universe is a speck will outlast machines; but Platonism lies
behind the universes; and nothingness and its potential produce the Platonic
forms and the universes [15] To have mental phenomena it is not
necessary, on this account, to be able to talk about or otherwise refer to
the phenomenon of experience. However, to have a concept of, or to be
analytical about mind, it is necessary to be able to make reference. This
phenomenon is part of the motivation to require awareness of awareness as a
criterion of the mental [16] The following considerations are
enhanced in Topic 2 [17] The evolution of mind and
consciousness may be described, here, as having two interactive modes of
phases. The first may be described as “exploration” and one aspect of this
phase is, roughly, the growth of concepts. The second phase may be described
as “growth” or “becoming” and may include transformation of being, additional
modes of perception, thought and action – here, “thought” is used in its most
general sense as including linguistic and iconic modes and feeling. In the
second phase, concepts may follow growth [18] To be described later. These include
the dynamics of the real [19] Naming has uses; it encourages
reflection about the named object. It is easy to imagine that naming mind has
a role in encouraging reflection over reaction [20] Meaning of this thesis and elaboration
are given below. See, especially, section 2.2 The concept of a theory of mind
and consciousness [21] I suggested, in Mitra 1995-1998, that
the resolution to the problems of the will include a neutral monism [22] In Mitra [1998b], I consider the
possibilities of idealism; I use idealism in the sense of a metaphysics
founded in ideas as real. As I argued, this would require a significant
expansion of the concept of the idea. The development focuses on the concept of
the idea and the distribution of consciousness in the individual and the
world. At present, I would generalize the focus on consciousness to a focus
on mind. In Mitra [1998c], I adopted a more neutral stance; I took being as
the fundamental entity. The neutrality arises in that the nature of being is
not completely specified in advance; it is to be discovered. The development
is through the idea of being and its initial specification in the form of
human being, the concept of levels of being as a continuum or series, the
transformations and dynamics of being, relationship between being and time,
relationship between concept of being and concept of mind. Obviously, these
ideas have a connection to Heidegger’s thought [23] Examples from physics can be
multiplied: space-time, the character of matter at the atomic and sub-atomic
levels [24] I understand psychology to include the
phenomenal as well as the behavioral, external, and the functional
aspects...I am not partial to a system of two meanings based on a divide
between the phenomenal and the externally observable and I do not subscribe
to the idea that the externally observable is the sole source of objectivity
or measure of ontological status [25] For approaches to the binding problem,
see Searle [1998] and Mitra [1998d]. Note that generic resolutions are given
in Journey
in Being [26] I believe that there is scope for
study variety of experience, including forms that are not usually recognized.
I am not referring to paranormal phenomena. One of my concerns has been the
details, including unconscious or near unconscious processing, that enter
into the relation of mind and body in somatic illness and in healing and
other transformations in the areas of discovery, development of abilities,
performance at levels that utterly surprise the performer - the question of
limits. The study in question also refers to non-pathological mental states
of identity or entry in to an environment, the dynamics of the relationship,
and the reality limits to the boundary of the resulting state. There is a
literature, western and other, on the relationships and dynamics [27] The following aspects of creativity are
significant: [1] What is the essential accomplishment of a creative process
as creative process, i.e. without reference to the possible functions of
creativity? Possibilities include combinations of essentially new ideas or
new recombinations of other ideas. The idea of the essentially new is that of
what is not contained in what came before. What is the significance in static
and dynamic universes? [2] What are the elementary processes...where is the
spark of a new idea or recombination and how is it scanned? It is this
element – not complex, compound, or higher creativity – that is the one of
immediate interest. The focus is on the new, especially the essentially new.
[3] A theory of creativity that includes a role for the essentially new. This
must require indeterminism but need not require an abandonment of the idea of
causality. Even in the case of something from nothing, there is causation in
the sense of the something having been potential. [4] What are the key
physical and biological processes that allow for indeterminism over and above
given structure and that provide new structure first by indeterministic
variation and then by selection of new structure that is compatible with
given structure [28] The discussion is not a commentary on
any system of diagnosis, especially that of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, currently DSM IV TR, published by the American
Psychiatric Association [1994]. In the later editions, DSM adopted an
a-theoretical approach to cover the psychiatric and economic spectrum,
because there is no complete theory or ontology of disorders, to facilitate
communication among clinicians of different theoretical orientation, and to
provide consistency and continuity of treatment [29] The mind-body problem [30] Mitra [1999] mentions Parmenides,
Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastics, Eckhart, Leibniz, Jonathan Edwards,
Avicenna, Hegel, Fichte, Brentano, Whitehead and the philosophy of organism,
Heidegger, Martin Buber, Santayana, Sartre, Jaspers, Lovejoy, Bonhoeffer,
Borges, Marcel, Maslow [31] I conceive scientism to be the
position that regards a rigid interpretation of received science to be the
only real [32] A main competitor - if not
the main competitor - is materialism in its varieties; they include
physicalism - also called centralism and the identity theory because the
assertion is that mental states are physical states of the brain,
behaviorism, and functionalism including computer functionalism [33] Therefore, here is a possible
[partial] answer to the Great Question of Being and Thomas Nagel’s [1998]
inclusive modality. If the objective were to proliferate ontologies, one could
call this Evolutionary Naturalism [34] ... within the scientific view that
embraces an, at least, implicit materialism. The following is somewhat
repetitive of comments in section 2.1.5. These arguments, though originally
arrived at independently, are not at all new. Regarding the unbridgeable
character of the gulf, my thoughts are closer to the position of Thomas Nagel
[1974] than the position of Colin McGinn [1995, for example.] Nagel’s
difficulty is the one of relating the qualitative, interior aspect of
phenomenal experience to the exterior aspect of the physical world. McGinn’s
Problem or part thereof, is the opaqueness to the human mind of the gulf
between the non-spatial character of consciousness and the physical world. A
radical resolution of McGinn’s Problem would be the introduction of a new
modality that is beyond or subsumes mind and matter and so relates the
spatial to the non-spatial modes; if McGinn’s position is correct, some kind
of radical resolution is needed. Searle [1992, Chapter 4] has produced some
arguments as a rebuttal to McGinn; these arguments focus on stating
explicitly the metaphysical assumptions made by McGinn. Here are some further
details: Searle’s Criticism of Nagel Nagel according to Searle. Nagel says causal
explanation in natural science, e.g. the liquidity of water under certain
conditions of temperature and pressure from the molecular structure has
causal necessity - it follows from the properties of the molecules including
physical laws and the conditions: given the data, non-liquidity is not
possible and inconceivable Nagel argues, in contrast, that we can conceive of
how, for an individual in pain, there could be another individual in an
identical neurophysiological state who would not be in pain. Therefore, given
the difficulty if not impossibility of experiencing someone else’s
experience, the limitation is one of the powers of conception within the
modern worldview and using the modern scientific conceptual apparatus Some observations: The causal explanation from molecules to liquidity
is an entailment - logically necessary - if the conditions, the molecules,
and the laws are assumed. Non-liquidity is not possible given these
assumptions As I observed above, with adequate powers of
computation, future physics and biology might similarly entail phenomenal
experience. This might even be true for the present biology and physics in
that we may be unable to recognize the shape of the mental at the physical
level including that current quantum mechanics - including measurement - is
probabilistic in an indeterministic sense Searle argues in the following vein: that the big
question is a sum of little questions, some of which have already been
answered; and that resolution of a sufficient number and variety of little
questions is anticipated. It seems that interpretation of physical and
biological signals as mental would be required Note the similarity between Nagel on the necessity
of explanation with natural science and Kant on the synthetic a priori that
we currently regard as synthetic [empirical, causal] but not a priori
[constitutive, necessary] Nagel [1993] on Searle In a mostly appreciative review, Thomas Nagel has
the following criticism of Searle’s position that brains cause consciousness.
According to Nagel, there is a problem a physical explanation of subjectivity
that has to be imagined from the inside. On this point Nagel agrees with
Searle though, unlike Searle, Nagel has argued that the problem is more one
of limits to powers of concept formation. Nagel believes that the problem
implies that “we really do not understand the claim that mental states are
states of the brain” On comments on others’ works In reading others’ works my understanding may be
mistaken; apologies, if due, are tendered. I may have commented on positions
that writers may no longer hold. I do not want to hold others to views that
they may have modified or abandoned. There is something to be said for the
flexibility as well as the ability to defend a position. My purposes in
reference are to present a development - if only fragmented - and to credit
some of my main sources [35] The following aspects of creativity
are significant: [1] What is the essential accomplishment of a creative
process as creative process, i.e. without reference to the possible functions
of creativity? Possibilities include combinations of essentially new ideas or
new recombinations of other ideas. The idea of the essentially new is that of
what is not contained in what came before. What is the significance in static
and dynamic universes? [2] What are the elementary processes...where is the
spark of a new idea or recombination and how is it scanned? It is this
element – not complex, compound, or higher creativity – that is the one of
immediate interest. The focus is on the new, especially the essentially new.
[3] A theory of creativity that includes a role for the essentially new. This
must require indeterminism but need not require an abandonment of the idea of
causality. Even in the case of something from nothing, there is causation in
the sense of the something having been potential. [4] What are the key
physical and biological processes that allow for indeterminism over and above
given structure and that provide new structure first by indeterministic
variation and then by selection of new structure that is compatible with
given structure [36] David Chalmers [1996, Introduction]:
“Ultimately one would like a theory of consciousness should do at least the
following: it should give the conditions under which physical process give
rise to consciousness, and for those processes that give rise to
consciousness, it should specify just what sort of experience is associated.
And, we would like the theory to explain how it arises, so that the emergence
of consciousness seems intelligible rather than magical. In the end we would
like the theory to enable us to see consciousness as an integral part of the
natural world” [37] A reading of some of the main writers
in the field confirms this. What I mean is that they are materialists of the
methodological and practical kind - or of some stricter kind. The majority
falls in to one of the following classes: [1] Espouse the modern scientific
worldview whose elements are essentially material, [2] Are sympathetic to the
materialist viewpoint, or [3] Are not necessarily sympathetic to the
materialist view, but find it so persuasive that they are drawn into some
kind of dualism. The dualists usually accept that mental phenomena are
determined by the state of the physical level but it is either beyond human
powers or impossible in principle to determine the relationship. A seeming
exception may be ideas like those in Chalmers [1996] who espouses a property
dualism. Chalmers finds that mental facts are determined by physical facts
together, in the case of consciousness, with additional laws that are not
physical laws and that “bridge” the gap between mind and matter. The facts
regarding consciousness might be different, according to Chalmers, in a
different universe that is physically identical laws but has different
bridging laws. In our universe, however, conscious and all other mental
phenomena are determined by the physics [38] The point to metaphysics is as much to
illuminate and structure our ignorance as much as to quiet our doubts [39] Mind is found to be associated only
with very specific forms of matter that is arranged in a hierarchy that is a
result of evolution [40] Late night musings [41] Thomas Kuhn [1962]. Reference to this
classic work does is not at all a subscription to its theses. The purpose of
the reference is, in addition to acknowledgement, a specification of meaning [43] Gerald Edelman [1992] presents a
multi-layer theory involving neurons, groups of neurons, and maps that are
sheets of neurons for which the points on the sheets are systematically
related to points on a sheet of receptor cells or another map. On this kind
of theory input-output is not a simple 1-1 correspondence. Explanation of the
qualitative aspect of experience is still a problem [45] Alex Bentley [46] In Mitra [1998b], I consider the
possibilities of idealism; I use idealism in the sense of a metaphysics
founded in ideas as real. As I argued, this would require a significant
expansion of the concept of the idea. The development focuses on the concept
of the idea and the distribution of consciousness in the individual and the
world. At present, I would generalize the focus on consciousness to a focus
on mind. In Mitra [1998c], I adopted a more neutral stance; I took being as
the fundamental entity. The neutrality arises in that the nature of being is
not completely specified in advance; it is to be discovered. The development
is through the idea of being and its initial specification in the form of
human being, the concept of levels of being as a continuum or series, the
transformations and dynamics of being, relationship between being and time,
relationship between concept of being and concept of mind. Obviously, these
ideas have a connection to Heidegger’s thought [47] See Mitra [1998b, c] for approaches to
consciousness through idealism and through being [48] The project to explain mental
processes and their variety in physical and biological terms does not eliminate
the need for psychology. First psychology provides a catalog of the variety.
Second, psychology provides through mechanisms and theory the fundamental
features of mind as mind and their dynamics. These are, of course, of
intrinsic interest. Additionally explanation from physics, biology or
neuroscience to psychology may be made more efficient, perhaps possible, when
cast in the form of an explanation of the theoretical structure of mind as
seen in psychology [49] What is the status of Penrose’s [1989,
1994] search for new physical elements to explain consciousness? What is the
status of Penrose’s claim that the current pre-gravitational quantum
mechanics is computable? Does this imply determinism? Will the new element be
truly indeterministic as needed by the requirement of creativity? What are
the key levels of explanation according to Penrose [1994], Crick [1994],
Edelman [1992], Strong AI...and their synergies? Is psychology causally
dependent - this does not mean explanatory reduction - on these levels? What
is the role of the brain regarded as a whole a la Rosenfield [1993], Freeman
[1995]? Relative to mental phenomena, are there important elements of
physiology in addition to the neural - central and autonomous -, the
endocrine and the immune systems? What are the other systems that show traces
of mind - for example learning in skeletal and muscular development? What can
we say about mind in organisms without what we recognize as a neural system? [50] These are mentioned as possible signs
of shared experience rather than proof. The simple explanation is that the
sharing is empathetic [51] More late night musing. This suggests
the following metaphor: God did not rest on Sunday. If there is a God, she is
not resting; we are her process [52] An example is the education and
research functions of universities [53] Mass technology includes commercial,
consumer, and grass roots aspects. Consumer technology is a source of
innovation and robust function. The grass-roots function includes the
explicit contribution of users-as-developers and the implicit contribution of
use as test and experiment [54] These are bound together and complete
and therefore form the parent essay, problem set, and Website [55] I have been interested in the
following topics for a long time: evolution with focus on mechanistic,
Darwinian evolution; design as the goal directed thought and behavior
[action] of conscious agents; knowledge as a case of design; relations
between conscious and mechanistic evolution; role of deterministic and
non-deterministic processes in evolution in nature and in human creative
processes; evolutionary explanation; use of evolutionary models in design and
planning. These topics came together in Evolution and Design, Mitra, 1987 [56] See section 4.3.2.1 What Is
Evolutionary Explanation? [57] This is not a reference to molecular
or Mendelian genetics...or to the Biblical sense of Genesis. As used here, on
the assumption of origins, life and consciousness originated and evolved over
time; this is the domain of the genetic. As used here, “genetic” is more
general and neutral than “evolutionary.” The idea of evolution includes that
of series that exhibits continuities; for this series to satisfy the
requirements of a causal explanation, it must follow some theory of evolution [58] Because self is not not-environment...
It would be better to call the external environment the external environment
rather than the environment; there is an unnecessary tendency to polarization
of words, of which there seem to be examples without end, that heaps, because
of a desire to make distinctions without wholes and an occasional utility,
unnecessary confusion on to the users of words [59] Therefore, here is a possible
[partial] answer to the Great Question of Being and Thomas Nagel’s [1998]
inclusive modality. If I wanted to proliferate ontologies, I could call this
Evolutionary Naturalism [60] Includes diachronic approach to study
of mind, society and language [61] The mind-body problem is the focus of
the present document; the problem of other minds and its significance is
discussed in section 2.4 Mind, Society and Language; the discussion on
creativity in section 1.3.1.8 A Special Role for Creativity and some
subsequent sections has implications for free will [62] Some concepts of materialism and other
ontologies are developed throughout the document [63] See: What Is A Mental Event? [64] Lake Baikal is in Eastern Siberia. It
is the deepest continental body of water on Earth, with a greatest depth of
5,314 feet, an area of 12,200 square miles [31,500 square km] and a length of
395 miles. Baikal contains one-fifth of Earth’s surface fresh water - 5,500
cubic miles. The lake and surrounding mountains support a range of animal
life including the sturgeon, the Baikal seal, pika, Siberian chipmunk,
reindeer, elk, fox, brown bear, stoat, weasel, wolverine, moose, otter,
Baikal hair seal [abundant along the lake shore], and musk and red deer. Bird
species include white-tailed eagle, rock ptarmigan, grouse, oriental cuckoo,
warbler, and tit. Some plants are rhododendron, cedar, poplar, spruce, fir,
larch, and lichens that cover rocks and cliffs at higher elevations. The
region is subject to pressure of economic development I chose Lake Baikal as a place of beauty and myth.
The lake features in the mythology of the native Buryats. It is a place in
the natural world and in conscious “space”. While teacups and thermostats
are, no doubt partly due to their simplicity, worthwhile objects for
philosophical reflection, it is also good to have in mind, lest we
unintentionally trivialize the nature of being, places that have power in the
space of the human mind [65] We do not know that we have an
infinite amount of time but such scenarios can be imagined. Approaching a
science fiction-like account is the Robots ‘R’ Us kind of view from Frank
Tipler [1994]; and there is the multi-cultural eternal return theme that, to
have meaning, requires an integration of the returning consciousness over
time. The moral to the Goddess on the edge of the lake story is that investment
of belief in science is proper; the moral to the infinite time scenario is
that incremental progress is not improper This is indicative of an emerging theme: that while
we lean much from formal and “flat” reflections there is no need to live
exclusively in a flat world [66] Also, see Topic 3, especially 3.3 The
Evolution of Life, above [67] The data include the geological
record, geographic distribution, comparative biochemistry and various other
measures of similarity and difference. The theoretical aspects include, of
course, natural selection and the theories of variation and inheritance; and
various mechanisms and concepts such as selection of adapted offspring from
excess, gradual evolution of complexity through adaptive intermediate stages,
punctuated equilibrium, occurrence of singular events and filling of
ecological niches, mechanisms of speciation [68] Broad, 1925, Chapter XIV, Status and
Prospects of Mind in Nature, contains an analysis of seventeen types of
theory including the rational formulation of the types and the reduction by
analysis to a smaller number of reasonable types and Broad’s own preferred
“Compound Theory.” [69] The concept, motivation and use are
implicitly developed in this document. Actual comments are scattered. Actual
working out may be useful. See Broad [1925] [70] Writers such as John Searle, David
Chalmers, Francis Crick, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, Bernard Baars [1996,
1998] are among many who have defined programs of research. These writers
cover a range of philosophical positions and research programs. Some of the
main works are listed in the bibliography [71] I believe that there is scope for
study variety of experience, including forms that are not usually recognized.
I am not referring to paranormal phenomena. One of my concerns has been the
details, including unconscious or near unconscious processing, that enter
into the relation of mind and body in somatic illness and in healing and
other transformations in the areas of discovery, development of abilities,
performance at levels that utterly surprise the performer - the question of
limits. The study in question also refers to non-pathological mental states
of identity or entry in to an environment, the dynamics of the relationship,
and the reality limits to the boundary of the resulting state. There is a
literature, western and other, on the relationships and dynamics [72] David Chalmers [1996, Introduction]:
“Ultimately one would like a theory of consciousness should do at least the
following: it should give the conditions under which physical process give
rise to consciousness, and for those processes that give rise to
consciousness, it should specify just what sort of experience is associated.
And, we would like the theory to explain how it arises, so that the emergence
of consciousness seems intelligible rather than magical. In the end we would
like the theory to enable us to see consciousness as an integral part of the
natural world” [73] Various resources: bibliographic,
online; personal collection; literature on the philosophy of mind [74] Also see comments in The Website and
Plans for Future Development and An In-Process Document in the Introduction;
and sections 1.3 An Atlas of Mind and Consciousness: Structure, Functions and
Dynamics, and 2.2 The Concept of a Theory of Mind and Consciousness [75] Edelman 1992 [76] Many writings including The Character
of Physical Law, 1965 and Lectures on Physics, 1963 [77] This problem may be addressed by
making some changes of emphasis in education which need not be extensive but
might require changes in general values and bureaucracy in order to be
effective |
