Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time

by Chris Morrissey (c) 1997 More C Communications Inc.

From the Internet's Heidegger list (June 9-10, 1997)

Heidegger in a nutshell

The representational character of 'truth' is only a privitive and

derived formulation; self-conscious acts begin the slide away from

primodial being and into a privitive form of being. The most authentic

mode of being for Dasein is some sort of unconsicous but assured and

skillful care and concern of the environment and others.

Exactly. Heidegger sets the stage for this thesis in Sections 1-4. Let us briefly recap the truly radical movement of these sections to see how he does so. I insert my observations under the headings of "Commentary":

Section 1

"The Necessity of Explicitly Restating the Question of Being"

Thesis: In metaphysics, "a dogma has been developed" about the question of Being.

Question: Why does this dogma have to be deconstructed in _Being and Time_?

Answers:

(a) Aristotle's "unity of analogy" is the best (non-)explanation the tradition has for the "universality" of Being. But what this "unity of analogy" means is totally obscure. The tradition has not made the insight of ancient ontology (which peaked with Aristotle) any clearer.

(b) The "indefinability" of Being is not an answer to the question of Being. It only shows that Being is not a being. The tradition is oblivous to this distinction, which Heidegger will name the "ontological difference."

(c) The "self-evidence" of Being in cognition and assertoric language is, in fact, an a priori enigma. We may say, "The sky is blue" and self-evidently know what "is" means. But the very fact of this everyday self-evidence is no answer to the question of *why* this fact should in fact be the case.

Conclusion:

To deconstruct the metaphysical dogma about Being exemplified in these three doctrines ("universality," "indefinability," and "self-evidence"), the question of Being needs to assume a new form.

Commentary:

Heidegger announces his rejection of traditional ontology. At the very beginning of _Being and Time_ he announces his intent negatively, i.e. his intent is *not* to refute the traditional answers to the question of Being. That is, he does not engage the tradition here and there in order to dispute the adequacies of its arguments. Instead, he intends to ask the question of Being in a new way and, in so doing, to show indirectly that the traditional answers are in fact inadequate because the question of Being heretofore has been inadequate. Positively, he hopes to attain results from his new question; but, even if he does not (as in fact he was unable to, since he never finished _Being and Time_), the power and radicality of the new question itself will be enough positive demonstration of the tradition's shortcomings.

Heidegger's announced method is therefore oneupmanship, viz., the tradition will be shown to have the wrong answers because it will be shown to have asked the wrong questions. Heidegger's fatal error here is that he assumes in advance that, because he poses the question properly, the answer to this new questioning of Being must necessarily be, not only different from, but incompatible with the indications of traditional ontology. But cannot two different questions point to the same answer? Why must Heidegger decide in advance that his new question will yield an answer that necessarily sets him in opposition to the tradition's answers?

For, in fact, Heidegger's new questioning never yields results or answers, and only professes to open up a new realm of questioning. So why then does the overcoming of metaphysics (through this new questioning which supercedes all old questioning) necessitate the destruction of metaphysics (i.e. the rejection of all traditional answers as obstacles)? The answer here seems to be that Heidegger sees the "answers" of the tradition as stumbling blocks to thought, in that they predetermine the [allegedly] impoverished form of questioning preserved by the tradition.

His method, therefore, is to clear these stumbling blocks out of the way before setting out on a new path that asks the new question. Otherwise the wrong answers will continually invite the wrong questions. However, in so doing, he has set limits to the possible answers his new questioning may yield. This is because, in clearing the path, he has put the old stones in another, predetermined place. However this does not mean that Heidegger has made covert assumptions of which he is unaware, as if he has closed off a particular path by carelessly throwing the old stones in front of that path. Rather, he is very explicitly aware of where he has consigned the old stones. The attentive reader can track, in the subsequent sections in which the new path is charted, the way Heidegger consciously decides to displace these traditional stones. The careless reader will uncritically accept Heidegger's move beyond the tradition and remain unaware of what is questionable in Heidegger's own motion.

Section 2

"The Formal Structure of the Question of Being"

Thesis: The question of Being must be circular, because one who *is* asks about the Being in any thing which *is*.

Argument: The fact of our pre-understanding of Being has not been adequately recognized by the tradition. When this fact is forgotten, the question of Being cannot be asked properly, because the pre-understanding of Being remains unquestioned. There is no escaping the necessary circularity of the question, because we already are *in fact* within the circle. The form of the question of Being must therefore take the form of this circle. We must enter the circularity of the question and attempt to uncover our pre-understanding of Being. The question of Being takes its circular form from the structure of the a priori of Being.

Commentary:

The question of Being, according to Heidegger, must address the factual a priori pre-understanding we have of Being. This is a more radical attempt to think Being than the tradition, because it will attempt to think this factual a priori in a way the tradition [allegedly] has not, i.e. with reference to an a priori we always already possess. The radicality of the new question justifies itself, according to Heidegger; the more radical the question is, the more philosophical it is. This may be true; but what is not addressed by Heidegger is why there is nothing other than the factual a priori that is ultimately worthy of thought. He raises the factual a priori to preeminence and exhorts entry into the circle of questioning which its preeminence necessitates. But he has no inkling of anything that could outwit this circle of questioning and stand outside its circular grasp. Heidegger consciously decides from the outset that philosophy can either move along the straight line of its ontological logic, or it can, more radically, move along the circle of questioning of the a priori of Being. Heidegger consciously decides to exclude from philosophy any access outside this circle to other dimensions and figures. He sets strict limits to how the question of Being can be posed.

Objection:

I'm not sure if you are agreeing or disagreeing with this, Chris. There is

no specific disagreement listed, but you "sound" as if you are not

particularly settled with H.s approach. H. does make room for standing

outside the circle through the derivitive notion of explanation. But he also

makes sure we all know that explanation has its weaknesses. Do you have an

issue with the circularity of this hermaneutics?

Response:

Agreeing or disagreeing outright would be superficial. But there are problems with this approach.

Because if ontical phenomena are derived *only* from metaphysics, and metaphysics is derived *only* from the pre-understanding of Being, then Da-sein is indeed locked in the philosophical circle that Heidegger draws. For this entails that the question of Being circles through the ontological (i.e. the framing of the Being of beings) and the ontical (i.e. the factical ground of this framing which is open to Being Itself) for all time. The questioning of Being moves through the circle: now giving ontological priority to Being, now giving ontical priority to Being; now questioning Being in beings, now questioning Being in Da-sein.

Yet it is only because Heidegger has partitioned *in advance* the proper functions for philosophy and the ontical sciences that he can be locked in this circle. It is worth questioning whether this demarcation of realms is fatal or not. For perhaps theology is more than an ontical science (cf. _Being and Time_, section 3), with more than faith (defined solely as Da-sein's Being-toward-God) as an "object." Moreover, perhaps something more than the a priori of Being determines what is or is not derivative for Da-sein, revealing Heidegger's geometry of hermeneutics as rashly impoverished.

Section 3

"The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being"

Thesis: All ontology, although it makes all ontical science possible, has been oblivious of the pre-understanding of Being.

Argument: Ontical sciences rely upon ontology to disclose the Being of the beings they investigate. For example, a concept of life makes biology possible. This is the priority of ontological questioning to ontical science, viz., the questioning about the Being of beings. Such questioning has priority because it makes the ontical sciences investigating these beings possible. But ontology itself, while making such decisions about the Being of beings, has not yet addressed Being Itself. This is a significant omission; for, as decisions about the Being of beings make ontical sciences possible, the decision regarding Being Itself has made ontology itself possible. Heidegger claims to initiate new question of Being, i.e. the inquiry into Being Itself.

Commentary:

Notice that here Heidegger makes theology an ontical science. Here he has consciously decided to move the stumbling stones of the tradition to a spot which makes entrance to his new path possible. The inattentive reader will miss this and merely be seduced by the novelty and power of Heidegger's questioning. Yet it should never be forgotten that this novelty and power is possible only because he has consciously decided against the position of the old stones. He provides no argument for moving aside the old stones; he will only point to the novelty and power of the new path.

So what has Heidegger lost by deciding to make theology an ontical science? He loses any kind of place for faith in philosophy. Faith becomes a merely ontical phenomenon that can have nothing to say about ontology. If it does say something, it can [allegedly] only do so by fixing beforehand the Being of beings in a particular way and, in so doing, close off any possible inquiry into Being Itself. Faith is [allegedly] capable only of an ontology that identifies Being Itself with God. Thus faith can only ensnare thought in a metaphysical way of thinking about Being and has no resources to think Being Itself.

Therefore Heidegger decides in advance that philosophical questioning has ontological priority over faith when it comes to questioning Being. This is a fatal error, because, on the one hand, he assumes in advance that philosophy alone has, as its sole function, the founding of ontical sciences. Thus he has pre-decided that philosophy has nothing to say about how to live one's life. On the other hand, because theology alone (or "faith," which he has decided should be its sole object) has no jurisdiction in deciding about Being and in opening ontical and factical realms, it must be subordinate to the decisions of philosophy. "Faith" may tell you how to live, but this [allegedly] can have nothing in common with thinking Being.

So Heidegger has decided beforehand that faith must be disentangled from philosophy, otherwise there can be no progress in the question of Being. Just as Luther smashes dogma to give faith priority in its realm (i.e. ontic experience), Heidegger smashes dogma to give philosophy priority in its realm (i.e. ontological decisions). Note that the characteristic of such smashing is that reason is separated from revelation through the establishment of jurisdictions. Jerusalem has nothing to do with Athens. The Bible has nothing to do with Aristotle, says Luther. Christian philosophy is a square circle, says Heidegger. The difficulty with this decision is that, while it purports to be just, i.e. to give each its due (its rightful jurisdiction), it omits the possibility that faith is more than an ontic phenomenon ("man's being towards God") but factical manifestation of something that is beyond all facticity and beyond all a priori conditioning of that facticity. Faith which surpasses all understanding can outwit, not only beings, but Being Itself. (cf. Jean-Luc Marion, _God Without Being_)

And thus a philosophy not open to faith can only see as far as the ontological difference; and, for that matter, only that far after having carved out the jurisdictions of philosophy and science with the ontological difference. The questioning of faith is not consigned to the fate of decisions about the Being of beings or even Being Itself.

Section 4

"The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being"

Thesis: The pre-understanding of Being, which is decisive for all ontology (which in turn founds the ontical sciences), must be analyzed as the circular ontico-ontological existence (Da-Sein) that it in fact is.

Argument: Just as ontologies found ontical sciences, so too must there be a fundamental ontology that founds all ontologies. This fundamental ontology can be uncovered if the pre-understanding of Being which is characteristic of human Da-Sein can be analyzed. (Heidegger will later abandon the project of fundamental ontology - i.e. the project of _Being and Time_ - in order to enter more deeply into the path of the circular questioning of Being.) Da-Sein is the name for the being who has its own pre-understanding of Being. The existence named Da-Sein is both "existential" and "existentiell": The former term, i.e. "existential," refers to the fact that Da-Sein lives metaphysically, i.e. must construct ontologies which in turn make possible ontical fields of experience. The latter term, i.e. "existentiell," refers to the factical ground which alone is capable of exhibiting to an analysis the original pre-understanding of Being. Both terms together describe the unitary, circular ontico-ontological existence that is Da-Sein.

Commentary:

In section 3, because he established that, in questioning Being, ontology has priority over the ontical sciences (because it questions beings in their Being), Heidegger swung from ontical beings to the ontological question of Being. Now, in section 4, he swings back to the ontical; not, however, to ontical beings, but to the ontical manifestation of that peculiar being for whom Being is a question. This ontical manifestation is different from other ontical beings insofar as it is absorbed in the circular movement of both a factical (i.e. peculiarly ontical) pre-understanding of Being and an ontological founding of the Being of beings.

Having declared, in section 2, that only an entrance into the circular questioning of Being can uncover the issue of the pre-understanding of Being, Heidegger comes full circle here. He moved through the ontological priority in section 3 and now circumscribes the ontical priority in section 4. Having declared the ontological decisions of philosophy to rule over all ontical phenomena, he now moves back to factical life for the ontical-existentiell ground of all ontological-existential decisions.

Heidegger makes clear his contempt for Aristotle and Aquinas on the soul. This is strange, because nothing he cites from them is incompatible with his new questioning of Being thus far. He does not justify his charge against them of "a vapid subjectivizing of beings." He merely takes the opportunity to set himself in opposition to them in no uncertain terms. What follows in _Being and Time_ must, in its exhibition, show why he is opposed to them.

The careful reader must therefore decide whether what follows in _Being and Time_ is in fact the "genuine ontological structure" of Da-Sein by comparing it with the work of Aristotle and Aquinas. The careless reader will assume that Heidegger has merely superceded these thinkers and will shrink from the labour which Heidegger shirked. Heidegger moves on in _Being and Time_ to demonstrate the novelty and power of outquestioning the tradition. What remains for the reader, then, is to engage the tradition in questioning, instead of simply trying to outquestion it.

The price Heidegger pays for this outquestioning, viz., the separation of ethics from philosophy (because [allegedly] only the decisions of philosophy about Being can make ethics possible), may be too high. In outquestioning metaphysics, the question of Being may have closed itself off from the "genuine ontological structure" of Da-Sein, especially if Da-Sein is more than the circular ontico-ontological phenomenon adumbrated in _Being and Time_. Faith claims that Da-Sein is more than this; but Heidegger cannot think on this, since he has made a decision about faith in advance.

A preliminary exchange on Section 5

well, i am already unclear and heid. seems to be asserting things

that are not established, to my recollection. i.e., re the very

first sentence in this section: how did we "show" that we must

pinpoint and ascertain some correct access to a primary being?

i know heid's been suggesting that we must and that da-sein is

the being we must examine (in-it-self). but when did we

'show' that we 'must' do that?

Heidegger showed this in section 2.

The argument was: Because the question of Being must be circular (i.e. we

can't stand outside of Being and ask about it), we need access to a primary

being (i.e. the best one available for circular questioning). The primary

being has both an (ontological) understanding of Being and pre-ontological

(ontical) understanding of Being. That's Da-sein, a.k.a. Mr. Circular.

be-that-as-it-may, onward: if we are going to examine da-sein,

it makes sense that a) [page 14] da-sein is most closely

related to: the "world" BUT heid writes in later marginalia:

"*ie, here in terms of what is objectively present" DOES this

mean that the present-at-hand is indicated here as most

closely related to da-sein (as in the next sentence:

"ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of da-sein.")

No, "present-at-hand" is not the most closely related to Da-sein. In the

ontological moment of Da-sein's ontico-ontological structure, the answer to

your question is yes. But ontology and representation and technical

thinking, as you know, are not all there is to Da-sein. There's more to

factical Da-sein than the present-at-hand.

and it appears that heid hedges all of this with a provocative

sentence (last sent. in last full paragraph on p 14: "Only when

the fundamental structures of da-sein are adequately worked

out with explicit orientation toward the problem of being will

the previous results of the interpretation of da-sein receive

their existential justification.

How is that a hedge? Instead, Heidegger is being thorough.

The "fundamental structures" elucidate Da-sein in all his gory facticity.

Doing this in the light of the question of Being means making this an

ontico-ontological elucidation, so that the full circle of the question of

Being is moved through. Not just *ontical* facticity, but also

*ontological*, i.e. existential, Da-sein. If you move through the whole

circle, as Heidegger will in _Being and Time_, you get the

ontological-existential as well as the ontical-existentiell.