Subj: Fwd: Installment 3
Date: 7/4/2001 8:25:40 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Joanelk
To: Anilmitra

File: Installment3.doc (76288 bytes)
DL Time (26400 bps): < 1 minute


-----------------
Forwarded Message:
Subj: Installment 3
Date: 7/3/2001 7:37:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: bill@naiditch.com (Bill Naiditch)
Reply-to: bill@naiditch.com
To: Joanelk@aol.com (Joanelk@aol. com)
CC: LauraREsq@aol.com

Joan,
Pls fwd this to Anil. I lost his email address, since I used AOL and have
not set that up to retain addresses.

The attached Word file is easier to read than the text print below, if you
can open it.

Love you,

Bill

The 3rd installment: Chapter Two, How Phenomena Are Established as Being
Conceptually Designated.

SUMMARY

The Buddha asserts that everything has been brought forth by the power of
conceptual designation. Phenomena cannot exist without conceptualization,
and therefore are not real, though they may [reliably] appear to be.

Generic ideas

Conceptualization is a type of cognition that apprehends objects by way of
generic ideas.

The first two sections of this chapter discuss conceptualizations of two
nuances. The first involves the fusion of word-based ideas with
experience-based ideas, forming a generic idea. With regard to Idaho, a
generic idea is the fusion of a verbal description of Idaho with an actual
experience while in that territory. Generic ideas arise compulsively.

It is the generic idea that appears to the conceptualizing mind, while that
mind apprehends Idaho, itself. The generic idea appears representing the
object, but is not necessarily apprehended as a generic idea. While
thinking of the generic idea of Idaho, we can see that, while the generic
idea may be what appears to the mind while thinking about Idaho, what we
apprehend is Idaho. The generic idea and that which it represents should be
consciously distinguished.

We can say that Idaho appears to the mind, and the generic idea appears to
the mind, [probably two characterizations of the same appearance]. However,
only Idaho is apprehended.

The distinction between generic idea and object also applies to the “I.”

In contrast, with sensory cognitions, what is apprehended and what appears
are the same.

The next conceptualization fuses the generic idea with the object. This
fusion occurs compulsively, in effect creating a filter of generic ideas
through which sensory perceptions are distorted and made to appear less
vivid than they actually are. Just to keep track, I will call this fusion
of generic idea and object, conceptualization of the 2nd nuance.

Conceptual Designation

“The designated object and the basis of designation are of the same nature.”
They exist together simultaneously. They have an act of designation in
common. The stated designation implies an agreement or assertion.

There are two types of designation: one is the label and the other is
conceptualization of the 2nd nuance. I may point to a room in a house I
plan to move into and assert, “This will be my office.” I have the
conception of a desk by the window, perhaps, and there is the name, office,
for that room. Until then, no office exists. The basis for designating
that room as an office and the office, itself, arise simultaneously with the
designation. Even if a desk were being stored in that room, it would not be
an office until designated.

Awareness of the basis of designation enables a knowledgeable person to
recognize the designated office. When you see a desk by the window, and the
rest of the stuff that makes an office, you would recognize, office.

Three elements are involved:
1). The basis of designation: the perceived stuff.
2). The designator: (a), Conceptualizing mind, and (b) labeling conventions
and agreements.
3). The designated object: [a labeled aggregate, office].

Elements 1 and 2 lead to element 3.

Again:
1). There is a perception of a body sitting in this chair and of a mind
coordinating fingers to type these words.
2). Present is a conceptualizing mind equipped with labeling conventions
that recognize the basis of designation in element 1 as I.
3). I, Bill, am a designated object.

If any of the three elements were missing, I would not exist [to myself].
In this way, all phenomena are conceptual designations. We are invited to
notice how anything that can be identified has a basis for designation, and
how, simultaneously, we label things that have no label in themselves.

Just as we have used “office” and “I” as examples of designated objects, a
“basis of designation” is implied from its own basis of designation when a
cognizing awareness, (element 2, designator), is present and aware of the
referent object, as well. A basis of designation that is apprehended is an
object of the cognizing awareness. [The Atlas that holds up the world is of
the same nature, the same stuff, as the world].

When I am aware that I, Bill, am a designated object, then I, Bill, am also
a basis of designation. However, the office is not necessarily a basis for
designation. “If something is the referent object of oneself, the referent
object of the mind that apprehends the self is identical with the basis of
designation of the self.” But for any other referent object, this is not
necessarily the case. [I think, therefore I am?] Both elements 1 and 3 are
objects of the same nature.

(Mental afflictions are preceded by reification of objects. This is
particularly true when our priorities are self-centered).

Further, “of the same nature” means not identical, but indivisible.

1). I see my hand is growing older.
2). I am aware that my hand is growing older, and I have heard about
impermanence and believe it applies.
3). Impermanence is designated.

How a hand is established and how impermanence is established are different,
but a hand and impermanence, as an object, are of the same nature. Generic
ideas are of a different nature: they are conceptualizations of the same
nature as that aspect of mind that reifies the self. However, the
apprehension of [some] phenomena may have no more basis than the mental
appearance of a generic idea.

The difference between conceptual and non-conceptual awareness is that
conceptual awareness distinguishes and labels perceptions. Non-conceptual
awareness does not include distinctions, but does include everything of the
same nature and all of the various qualities of the perceived. The Tibetan
word for “designate” or “impute” connotes “bind” or “tie” like a dog’s
leash. Another important word in Tibetan stands for “false
superimposition.” These words indicate the process of adding something
that was not already there.

Conventional Agreement

Conventional agreement seems to refer largely to the linguistic process.
Buddha subscribes to the existence of phenomena that has been asserted. The
position of this school of Buddhism, the Madhyamaka school, is that
phenomena are merely conceptual designations. Remember that a conceptual
designation requires a basis of designation. This basis of designation is
not like a generic idea, i.e., only in the mind like a figment of the
imagination. The basis of designation of water is not the basis of
designation of fire. Both water and fire are merely conceptual
designations, but their existence, as such, is not purely in the mind.

However, the basis of designation of a hand for an English speaking person
is the same as the basis of designation for a lagpa for a Tibetan. And,
there are examples of the same word used in different contexts to designate
different things.

When one refers to a hand, it is accurate to say, “This is called a hand,”
or, “This is the basis of designation of a hand.” In this way, all
phenomena are conceptual designations.

In dependence upon the basis of designation of a hand, we can impute all
sorts of things, like skin, and so forth.

Beside the process by which a conceptualizing mind associates a conventional
label upon a basis of designation, phenomena are said to be “originally
pure” of inherent existence, “naturally liberated”, and “naturally
unestablished [emphasis added] in reality.” Such characteristics as
pleasant, or unpleasant, are added by the conceptualizing mind, like a dog’s
leash. How do phenomena exist? Phenomena are established by the power of
assertion and agreement. When phenomena are not conceptually designated is
seems it is not there, it does not exist.

Language is not necessary. Generic ideas may be non-verbal. Food is
associated with solving the pains of hunger. This is apparently true for
animals, and infants. Mother’s face seems to be an early generic idea.

Gen Lamrimpa implies that, though at one time Neptune had not yet been
identified as a planet, or even a speck of dust, that its existence may have
already been established by the presence of other, unknown sentient beings,
or by clairvoyants. Nonetheless, he agrees that the more complete statement
is, “For me, all phenomena exist merely as conceptual designations.” He is
representing the Madhyamaka school. Anything we perceive is fit to be
designated.

Conceptual designations are often learned. But they also may arise for the
first time. I am reminded of when you discovered a type of grass that had
not yet been formally named. There was a moment of utmost freedom within
the process of designation.


COMMENTARY

That chapter was 16 pages. I feel that needing 3 ½ pages to summarize it
shows I have not understood it very well, though the brevity of my
commentary should not be taken as any compensation.

Essentially, my interpretation is that the undesignated universe is like a
Rorschach’s inkblot test.

The remarkable perspective that Buddhism makes is not the truth that
phenomena depend on conceptualization, since the very definition of
“phenomena” is “something that is apprehended by the senses as opposed to an
object as it intrinsically is in itself”. The remarkable perspective is
that we generally disregard our experience as of phenomena, and instead take
it as objectively real. We see ourselves as scientists and act like rumor
mongers.

We conceptually process every perception that reaches our cortex. The
incredible reliability of this process lulls us into believing we can factor
out the subjective requirement for what is perceived. Journalistic truth is
the same story from two (count them, two) independent sources. Science is
built on repeatable, measurable observations. The scientific process
consciously attempts to minimize the idiosyncratic artifacts in the
descriptions of observations.

I was walking around thinking about these things. I looked at a garden hose
and noted, garden hose. I looked away and knew that when I would look again
toward the garden hose, I would have a similar experience. Yep! The
repeatability of this exercise really made the garden hose seem real.
Testing the hypothesis that the garden hose is not real, what else could
explain my experience?

Buddhism provides a view that does satisfy the scientific principle of
adopting the simplest description that explains all verified observation:
the infallibility of cause and effect. The coincidence of certain stuff, my
ability to perceive at these distances and my training gives rise, again, to
the result: I declare garden hose, again. This all seems compatible with
science. Science simply has the responsibility to further identify
structure and function in every increasing detail. It is as though in
Buddhism we are looking through the microscope in the opposite direction.
Let’s first consider what hits the retina, and go from there.

Some time ago, I had concluded that Belief is a detour from Truth. The view
of emptiness suggests that conceptualization infiltrates moment-to-moment
perception. I accept that conceptualization distorts perception.

Important interesting questions remain. 1. So what? 2. How does this
reflex to (con)fuse direct perception with conceptual filters, like good and
bad, work? What drives it? Why does Buddhism insist this is a supremely
difficult and worthy topic?

Installment 4, including summary and commentary on Chapter Three, How One
Grasps onto True Existence, to follow.




reify, v. [f. as reification + -ify.]
trans. To convert mentally into a thing; to materialize.
1854 Fraser’s Mag. LXIX. 75 - The gods of their final and accepted
polytheism were, in point of fact, only those sublimer portions of nature
which..they had not yet dared to reify.
reification [f. L. res a thing + -ification.]
The mental conversion of a person or abstract concept into a thing. Also,
depersonalization, esp. such as Marx thought was due to capitalist
industrialization in which the worker is considered as the quantifiable
labour factor in production or as a commodity.
1846 Grote Greece (1851) I. 467 note, - Boiocalus would have had some
trouble to make his tribe comprehend the re-ification of the god Hêlios.
1854 Fraser’s Mag. XLIX. 74 - A process of what may be called
reification, or the conscious conversion of what had hitherto been regarded
as living beings into impersonal substances.
~~~~~~~


So, basically, it is a combination of the Latin word "res" (= "a thing") +
"-[i]fy" (from facere, "to make"). Note that the earliest recorded use of
"reify" is 1854 and "reification" is 1846.
The word "res" is the basis of our word "real". It also turns up in
"republic" which literally means "the public thing" (res + publica).


.

assert
Etymology: Latin assertus, past participle of asserere, from ad- + serere
to join Date: circa 1604
1 : to state or declare positively and often forcefully or aggressively
2 a : to demonstrate the existence of b
: POSIT, POSTULATE



assert

claim: to state something as being true She asserted that she had never
seen the man before.




apprehend
2. understand something: to grasp the importance, significance, or meaning
of something
3. become aware of something: to become aware of something by use of the
senses (formal)
2 a : to become aware of : PERCEIVE
3 : to grasp with the understanding : recognize the meaning of
intransitive senses : UNDERSTAND, GRASP

cognition.
Etymology: Middle English cognicioun, from Latin cognition-, cognitio, from
cognoscere to become acquainted with, know, from co- + gnoscere to come to
know -- more at KNOW
Date: 15th century
: the act or process of knowing including both awareness and judgment; also
: a product of this act

cognition


1. ability to acquire knowledge: the mental faculty or process of
acquiring knowledge by the use of reasoning, intuition or perception
2. knowledge acquired: knowledge that is acquired through processes such as
reasoning, intuition or perception
3.
[15th century. From the Latin stem cognition- , from cognoscere "to get to
know," from (g)noscere "to know" (see notion ).]

”…for sensory cognitions, such as auditory or visual cognition, whatever is
apprehended by the cognition is the same as what appears to it.” Pg. 33




phenomenon
1. something experienced: a fact or occurrence that can be observed
4. object of perception: something perceived or experienced, especially an
object as it is apprehended by the human senses as opposed to an object as
it intrinsically is in itself

[Late 16th century. Via late Latin from Greek phainomenon "that which
appears," from the past participle of phainein "to bring to light" (source
of English fantasy), ultimately "to shine."]
phenomenon

Etymology: Late Latin phaenomenon, from Greek phainomenon, from neuter of
phainomenos, present participle of phainesthai to appear, middle voice of
phainein to show -- more at FANCY
Date: 1605
1 an observable fact or event
2 a : an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought or
intuition b : a temporal or spatiotemporal object of sensory experience as
distinguished from a noumenon c : a fact or event of scientific interest
susceptible of scientific description and explanation

noumenon

1. object of intellect: something beyond the tangible world that can only
be known or identified by the intellect, not by the senses
2. independent object in Kantian philosophy: in Kantian philosophy,
something that exists independently of intellectual or sensory perception of
it, for example, the soul in some beliefs

establish

3. prove: to investigate something and prove or confirm its truth or
validity Have we established who gave the instruction?
establish.
Etymology: Middle English establissen, from Middle French establiss-, stem
of establir, from Latin stabilire, from stabilis stable
Date: 14th century

3 a : to make firm or stable
4 a : to bring into existence : FOUND b : BRING
ABOUT, EFFECT

7 : to put beyond doubt : PROVE

conceive.

Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French conceivre, from Latin
concipere to take in, conceive, from com- + capere to take -- more at HEAVE
Date: 14th century

1b : to cause to begin :

2 a : to take into one's mind b : to form a
conception of : IMAGINE
3 : to apprehend by reason or imagination : UNDERSTAND
4 : to be of the opinion

2 : to have a conception -- usually used with of emptiness>
synonym see THINK



conception

3. broad understanding: a general understanding of something
4. formulation of idea: the process of arriving at an abstract idea or
belief or the moment at which such an idea starts to take shape or emerge
5. origin or beginnings: the beginnings or origin of something
6. something conceived in the mind: a result of thought, such as an idea,
invention, or plan

appearance

1. coming into existence: the act of emerging, arriving, or coming into
existence the appearance of the first daffodils

3. outward aspect: an outward aspect of somebody or something that creates
a particular impression (often used in the plural) The place gives the
appearance of prosperity. I know the dog looks friendly, but don't be
fooled by appearances.

appearance

Date: 14th century
1 a : external show : SEMBLANCE appearance of neutrality> b : outward aspect : LOOK appearance> c plural : outward indication
2 a : a sense impression or aspect of a thing only an appearance> b : the world of sensible phenomena


image
1. actual or mental picture: a picture or likeness of somebody or
something, produced either physically by a sculptor, painter, or
photographer, or conjured in the mind

image

Etymology: Middle English, from Old French, short for imagene, from Latin
imagin-, imago; perhaps akin to Latin imitari to imitate
Date: 13th century

2 a : the optical counterpart of an object produced by an optical device (as
a lens or mirror) or an electronic device b : a likeness of an object
produced on a photographic material
3 a : exact likeness : SEMBLANCE 1:27 (Revised Standard Version)> b : a person strikingly like another person

4 a : a tangible or visible representation : INCARNATION filial devotion> b archaic : an illusory form : APPARITION
5 a (1) : a mental picture of something not actually present : IMPRESSION
(2) : a mental conception held in common by members of a group and symbolic
of a basic attitude and orientation tarnish a community's image of justice -- Herbert Brownell> b : IDEA,
CONCEPT

idea.

Etymology: Middle English, from Latin, from Greek, from idein to see -- more
at WIT
Date: 14th century
1 a : a transcendent entity that is a real pattern of which existing things
are imperfect representations b : a standard of perfection : IDEAL c : a
plan for action : DESIGN
2 archaic : a visible representation of a conception : a replica of a
pattern
3 a obsolete : an image recalled by memory b : an indefinite or unformed
conception c : an entity (as a thought, concept, sensation, or image)
actually or potentially present to consciousness
4 : a formulated thought or opinion
5 : whatever is known or supposed about something
6 : the central meaning or chief end of a particular action or situation


synonyms IDEA, CONCEPT, CONCEPTION, THOUGHT, NOTION, IMPRESSION mean what
exists in the mind as a representation (as of something comprehended) or as
a formulation (as of a plan). IDEA may apply to a mental image or
formulation of something seen or known or imagined, to a pure abstraction,
or to something assumed or vaguely sensed paradise>. CONCEPT may apply to the idea formed by consideration of
instances of a species or genus or, more broadly, to any idea of what a
thing ought to be .
CONCEPTION is often interchangeable with CONCEPT; it may stress the process
of imagining or formulating rather than the result of what constitutes art>. THOUGHT is likely to suggest the result of
reflecting, reasoning, or meditating rather than of imagining thoughts to paper>. NOTION suggests an idea not much resolved by analysis or
reflection and may suggest the capricious or accidental notions>. IMPRESSION applies to an idea or notion resulting immediately from
some stimulation of the senses .

“…the generic idea of the Space Needle appears to that conceptual mind, but
it apprehends the Space Needle.” The generic idea is not necessarily
apprehended.

[The generic idea of the Space Needle allows one to refer to the Space
Needle as a tower. The generic idea appears with rounded modalities, and
perhaps unattached to Seattle. Yet, the generic idea arises conceptually,
and we associate it with the term Space Needle, rather than “generic idea.”]



However, when you are in Seattle and look directly at the Space Needle,
what is apprehended by the cognition is what appears.


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