Response to Dinesh D’Souza’s blog A Challenge to Believers--and Unbelievers of October 12, 2007
Anil Mitra, Copyright © October 13, 2007
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In his blog of October 12, 2007, A Challenge to Believers--and Unbelievers, Dinesh D’Souza makes a number of claims. Here is a response to some of the claims. I have labeled the claims A – L; each claim is followed by my response
Outline of D’Souza’s claims
A Either the universe is a completely closed system and miracles are impossible, or…
B Either the Big Bang was the product of supernatural creation or it had a purely natural cause
C In a larger sense, either the secular view of reality is correct or the religious view is correct
E I think that if atheists are genuine rationalists they should welcome this book
F Christianity is the main foundation of Western civilization, the root of our most cherished values
G The latest discoveries of modern science support the Christian claim that there is a divine being…
H Darwin’s theory of evolution, far from undermining the evidence for supernatural design…
I There is nothing in science that makes miracles impossible
J It is reasonable to have faith
K Atheism, not religion, is responsible for the mass murders of history
L Atheism is often motivated not by reason but by a kind of cowardly moral escapism
The claims and the responses
A. Either the universe is a completely closed system and miracles are impossible, or the universe is not a closed system and there is the possibility of divine intervention in it
If the Universe—marked by an upper case U—defined as all that there is over all time then there is nothing outside it. Therefore it is closed. The ‘universe’ as revealed in science—marked by a lower case u—is what is observed with the senses and instruments and so on and interpreted / interpolated / extrapolated by theory. The universe as defined here—lower case u—is this, our cosmological system. Scientists, physicists mainly, recognize that there are joint empirical-theoretical limits, e.g. of time, space, energy and particle size, beyond which the present science cannot be known to validly extrapolate and these limits are the limits of the universe—the ones revealed in science. The Universe and the universe are not the same—obviously—and the former contains the latter. Since the Universe is closed—there is nothing outside it—it cannot be touched by intervention of any kind. This is not the claim that there is no God but, instead, that any God is and must be part of the Universe. A part of the Universe that is outside the universe can intervene / interact with the universe; the outside part could, possibly, be God. It can be shown that the Universe is infinitely larger than the universe—click on the link at the top of this post and browse my site—and that while some ‘closed systems’ within the universe are subject to certain limitations this is not the case for the Universe. Many of the limits thought to hold for closed systems hold only for systems of finite size over finite durations. There are various ways to see this but the simplest is that the physical laws of order are statistical laws and what is improbable on the scale of the finite universe is not improbable on the scale of the infinite Universe; and these violations in the Universe may affect the universe. In other words, if a miracle is a violation of the laws of universe in the universe, miracles are possible with and without divine intervention
Thus divine intervention and miracles by or without divine intervention are possible. However, that they are possible does not make them factual or probable in the universe. The question of their actuality / probability in the universe requires us to seek explanation from outside the latest scientific, philosophical and theological thought
If I was going to concern myself, here, with a proof / disproof of God’s existence, it would be necessary to define / explain what I meant by ‘God.’ There are so many conceptions of ‘God’ and to delineate them would be an interesting project in itself. At the most general level, God could be ‘all being.’ Then, obviously, ‘God’ would exist. At a lower level of generality, God could be a power that permeates all being or, perhaps less likely, that is remote. Then, we could begin to give God attributes. God could be intelligent, perceptive, and powerful and so on and could have these in moderate, high, or superlative degree. There could be moral attributes but these might be a little more questionable because of projection. Then we might start getting into specific images or lack of images—the father, son, Holy Ghost and so on; and there would be images from other religions including the non-imaging of Buddhism. Then we might want to consider whether there is one God or many; at the higher levels there would likely be fewer and obviously ‘all being’ and ‘most powerful being’ (what does that mean?) could be satisfied by a single being. Then we could look at metaphorical and moral meanings of ‘God’ but such meanings are not ones that associate so much with the idea of ‘demonstration.’ If we regard the Universe as ‘logical space’ then, obviously there is room for many co-existing universes—lower case, and some would be identical to ours, and the spectrum would, at another extreme be altogether unlike ours—and God-like beings. The pages linked above make the case for the Universe as logical space and of course also explain what is meant by the Universe as logical space. The case made is not merely plausible or even merely reasonable; it is executed in ‘cold logic’ and indeed involves an advanced conception of logic as the one law that all conceivable—lower case u; less than absolutely infinite—universes such as ours do and must satisfy; this suggests the reason that in the development I have named this Logic with an upper case L. It is interesting that one of the conclusions from the Universe as logical space is that it, the Universe, is infinite in comparison to our universe—in extension, duration, the range of magnitudes of its elementary—elementary-like-for-some-purposes—individuals, its variety. It is also interesting that there are glimpses of the idea in the writings of Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein also in the Vedanta of Indian philosophy. Another conclusion, one that gives me pause, is that there is a universe where the Biblical story—or stories—is (are) and must be true—on the assumption, of course, that the story or stories involve no internal contradiction or contradiction of fact; and the same must be true of Islam and so on. Although that thought gives me pause, it is a pause and not a period or full stop—for there is no implication whatsoever that such stories are true in this universe that is our cosmological system. What are the implications of the necessity of the logical space Universe for God? Infinitely many—according to meaning; of course, as all being there can only be exactly One; and as highest being at most one but it should be recognized that the meanings of ‘highest being’ and similar ideas are vague—at least until it is possible to be specific. There is a universe with a personal God and with ‘divine intervention;’ what is the relevance to this universe? That relevance is only possible to estimate if given a statistical distribution of types of universes and there are arguments—see linked pages—that suggest that the population of remote personal intervening God universes are very thinly distributed and tend to be unstable relative to endogenous creation universes
Focusing on the universe—this one—and our world, there are reasons that questions of proof have lost general interest. In the first place, absolute proof does not appear to be possible. There is however a core world view that many people subscribe to—it is the secular world view. The point here does not concern the truth of the secular view but the relation of the secular view to the religious world views. Note that while we can say that there is a core secular view we cannot say that there is a core religious view. As D’Souza says, there is fundamentalist Christianity and a ‘mere’ Christianity—the common ground of Christian faith. However, there is no single Christian fundamentalism and there is much debate as to the common ground. What’s more there are so many religions. D’Souza is perhaps being polemic when he suggests that the debate is secularism versus common ground Christianity. Probably most ‘secularists’ and ‘common ground Christians’ are not particularly interested in proof or debate. The philosopher John Searle has a point when he suggests that talk of God hardly occurs, is passé, in general academic circles. He is probably right even to those involved in the debate or stirred by it, it hardly seems passé. Many people are satisfied to live out the lives under the umbrella of common assumptions—especially since absolute proof seems to be impossible regarding this universe and since there is a secular umbrella. Therefore, it is primarily the extremists that engage in the issue of proof and the concern often appears to be polemical. If you are a moderate by habit—secular or religious—you are probably content with your laissez faire attitude but, if you are also keen, there may be a place of doubt. Thus there is a non-polemical place for concern for the issue. In the pages linked above this concern becomes a ‘universe.’ My concern there is primarily being itself and not God / proof. However, there are implications for God / proof and, in the general interest regarding the nature of the Universe—which on account of a lack of detailed empirical data has resort to criticism of ideas—there is a place for the ideas of religion
One caution to those who seek and read proofs regarding such issues, God in particular. There is an illicit move that characterizes the thought on the issue from the deepest—deep does not imply correct but, rather, imaginative and reasoned and honest—to the banal. It is that the proofs of God’s existence pertain to a concept of God but it is then concluded that the God-of-a-particular-religion-which-is-usually-Christianity exists-in-this-universe. Dishonesty is not suggested rather inattention to the concern, fervor and so on
Why is Christianity so concerned with proofs regarding a discrete God? A first factor is the kind of religion. Joseph Campbell wrote that religions can be classed as religions of the desert—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—and religions of the tropics—Hinduism… He suggested that from the harshness of the desert and, perhaps common origin, the desert religions and their God tended to be austere singular figures; the profundity that is found in the one-God idea comes later. For opposite reasons, the tropical religions, from the verdance of the tropics, tend to find God in all things. It is not suggested that the survey of religions as desert / tropical is exhaustive or that the analysis is definitive but that the idea involved is reasonable. To continue the analysis, since the tropical religions tend to be more permissive with regard to their cosmologies, there is less concern with proof; which is not to say that there is no concern whatsoever. The discrete God of the desert, in contrast, almost begs for proof in its singularity, in its austerity, and, especially, in its demand for subservience the plea for proof reaches the pitch of necessity. Regarding Christianity, there is one further factor with which we are undoubtedly familiar. It is the Christian world in which modern science arose and there is, therefore, dating to the origins of science, and perhaps inherently in the collective psyche of a culture that would predispose to the development of science, a fracture between science and religion, that, given the demand of the church on faith, would predispose the believing population and not just the academic, the apologist and the intellectual to a concern with issues of proof
B. Either the Big Bang was the product of supernatural creation or it had a purely natural cause
One reason that many people are not for divine intervention or ‘intelligent design’ is that the evolutionary explanation seeks causes—explanations—that are of the world and, so, are real explanations in the sense that they are intelligible in themselves. An ‘explanation’ in terms of supernatural intervention, e.g. intelligent design, is not an explanation in that sense although it is clear that many regard it as an intelligible explanation even though it is not one that even they pretend to understand and therefore those who subscribe to it should perhaps call it ‘least unintelligible’
The search for causes appears to be an artifact of human intelligence although not a necessary one, again refer to the link above
If there was nothingness before the ‘big bang’ then, since nothingness could not have any causes whatsoever in it, the big bang could not have had any cause—natural or supernatural. Thus there is a third alternative to supernatural or natural cause which is no cause at all. This may contradict common sense and science but common sense and science are limited as well as may be the deepest religious understanding that comes from or is certified by human intelligence—cognitive and intuitive-feeling. However it does not contradict logic and its justification may be found by following the link above
C. In a larger sense, either the secular view of reality is correct or the religious view is correct
The secular view of reality, as I see it, is intended to make sense of the universe—note the lower case u—based in causes that are of the world and, again on my view, is not intended to extend beyond the universe
There is no single religious view. There is little doubt that some religious views are incorrect if they are intended to apply to the Universe or even the universe. Buddhism, since in its original form refrains from cosmological explanation, can be neither correct nor incorrect. There is nothing inherent in religion that makes it correct / incorrect; it is only specific religions, whether fundamentalist or ‘mere’ Christianity or Hinduism in one of its many manifestations that can be correct / incorrect. Some religions do not specify whether they are intended to be taken literally; for these, too, correct / incorrect does not apply to the literal sense but may apply in a moral sense to what lies behind the literal
The either or of this point is a false dichotomy in more ways than one
D. The Christianity that is defended here is not "fundamentalism" but rather traditional Christianity, what C.S. Lewis called "mere Christianity," the common ground of beliefs between Protestants and Catholics. This Christianity is the real target of the secular assault
Just as religion is multivalent so is secularism. One cannot talk of ‘the’ secular assault and if one does so it leads to the suspicion that the point is polemical rather than rational
Without a doubt there is in the common ground of Christian belief, or the ground of any belief system, a place of truth. Since religion is a communal phenomenon no individual can say what precisely is at the religious core, the core that lies in the hearts of men and women. What we can say is—‘here look at this or that doctrine… or this or that interpretation’ but hearts—and minds—are a little more complicated than that
It seems to me that religious belief becomes excessively discrete for a number of reasons that do not have to do with ‘reality’ but that require realistic interpretation to satisfy the reason
E. I think that if atheists are genuine rationalists they should welcome this book
There are many apologies for religion out there—present, recent past and scholastic. There is no particular reason to welcome this book. I’m not an atheist but when the book appears in my local bookstore / library I will certainly take a look at it. When I do look at the book, I will decide for myself whether the book is worth reading and whether the arguments are reasonable or new
F. Christianity is the main foundation of Western civilization, the root of our most cherished values
To demonstrate the claim regarding Western civilization one would have to do two things. First, one would have to correctly characterize Western civilization and second one would have to show that Christianity is the main foundation of Western civilization in the characteristic terms. The characterization of any civilization would invariably be contested by individuals of varying temperament but of integrity and intelligence. It would need to be shown that the hypothesized characteristics are formative andor the source of its power, stability, its creative sources, and its therapeutic effect upon its people. In any case the claim leaves open the possibility of circular argument since it is the same person that is deciding what Western civilization is and what is its foundation
For this reason, I hold that it is not impossible but meaningless for one man to say ‘this or that is the foundation of any civilization.’ Instead, individuals are contributors to an ongoing conversation that is both creative in its interpretive aspects and constructive in its contribution to the civilization
G. The latest discoveries of modern science support the Christian claim that there is a divine being who created the universe
The latest discoveries of modern science do not show that there is a divine being… There is an edge beyond which science provides no answers as yet and may never do so. To say that science provides support for the Christian claim is to seek support from the shaky, indeterminate edge of science. Beyond that edge, faith provides answers but neither demonstrations nor explanations
H. Darwin’s theory of evolution, far from undermining the evidence for supernatural design, actually strengthens it
Comments here would be similar to those of item G
I. There is nothing in science that makes miracles impossible
See my earlier comments
J. It is reasonable to have faith
I agree with this point. My reason is that we have to deal with issues where reason has no purchase or incomplete purchase. Yet, to face some of these issues with a blank mind is not the best response either—even though some would call that ‘honesty.’ Sometimes a situation about which we have little knowledge calls for action and it is here that faith can positively influence action
The point, however, does not prove that some particular faith is the one that is reasonable (or that it is unreasonable)
And my argument does not say that faith should ‘win’ over reason although it does suggest that there are some cases where it should
The tension involved in the imperatives of faith versus limited reason is probably why a mix of conservative and liberal attitudes is adaptive. Incidentally some researchers believe that whether an individual turns out to be conservative or liberal is influenced, among other factors such as education and upbringing, by genetic inheritance
K. Atheism, not religion, is responsible for the mass murders of history
If it is suggested that it is the absence of the corrective action of a particular religious belief that is responsible for preventing evil then that claim faces two problems. The first problem is empirical. The precise reason that something occurred is next to impossible to pin down with inexorable accuracy for it invariably involves knowing what was going on in at least one person’s mind which may be different from what he / she said and so on. That Stalin was a mass murderer and that he was a professed atheist does not prove that his professed atheism was the cause of the mass murder. The second problem is logical. If a particular religion does not speak to all men and women with sufficient power to persuade to follow its path, it may then be that the religion is at fault and therefore be responsible for atheism. I do not believe the last statement to be true. However, its logical status is similar to that of the claim ‘Atheism is responsible for the mass murders of history’
Additionally, even though the religious wars may not be counted as mass murder or genocide, it certainly seems evil—to me at least—to wage war for any ideology. Religion has been invoked in support of ‘moral’ wars. I’m not debating the morality of war in general. However, it seems that religion has a responsibility for some wars and various other ills. It might be countered ‘that wasn’t religion but a misuse of religion.’ Maybe but the same could be said about any responsibility of atheism for war
I would say that human nature is responsible for the evil in history and to seek explanation or resolution in any belief system or lack of belief system is escapism
Atheists and agnostics and other people not persuaded by faith come in many colors as do those who profess faith. Let’s not suppress the abuses in the name of faith
I’ve always questioned the ‘abuse of faith’ argument for the argument proves nothing to me. That this or that is abused does not disprove it or make it valueless. Any institution can be abused
Similarly I question many traditional arguments against religion; they apply to this or that religion or this or that form of religion but not to Religion—which is as yet undefined relative to human history
L. Atheism is often motivated not by reason but by a kind of cowardly moral escapism
Just as is theism... Although I am not an existentialist, morally or metaphysically, moral escapism is a source of the existentialist emphasis on the individual as on his or her own
A final note
D’Souza sees his faith as being in conflict with the atheistic thinking of such persons as Richard Dawkins, regarded as perhaps one of the best popularizers of evolutionary biology and the cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett. D’Souza is not at odds with the science of such men but with their attitudes to the concerns of religious faith. Drawing from their knowledge of science these men have not taken an agnostic view but the strongly atheist view that, in addition to denial of God, they generally hold the articles of the Christian cosmology to be false. Further their position is extreme—not only a disbelief in the cosmology, e.g. divine intervention, absolutely no divine intervention or any possibility of it. D’Souza himself takes a fairly extreme view among the types of Christian faith / adherence
I see both extremes as being in error. The issue is not a question concerning intelligence. All three men named in the previous paragraph are clearly intelligent. I suspect moderate Christians would take issue with D’Souza who would counter that the moderates have abandoned fundamentals. The ‘moderate’ scientists take issue with the extremists and indeed some have argued that it is the rigidity and the arrogance of the extreme positions taken in science—regarding issues upon which science cannot (yet, if ever) make absolute pronouncements—as being a cause of the ‘fundamentalist backlash.’ Although D’Souza denies that he is a fundamentalist, he is fundamentalist with regard to his faith for which there may be possible indications but no final proof in this universe—reasons for the italicized emphasis may be found in the links at the head of this post. (D’Souza would deny any fundamentalism; he would say he has had doubt and has found proof. However, it is certain that there would be no universal agreement among intelligent and honest men and women that what the extremists claim to know and prove is known and proved
There is thus a common ground to these extremists—the extreme conviction of their polar opinions (which are polar in that they stand at the poles of the continuum.) The moderates, in turn, react to the extremists and some moderates hold the extremists responsible for a number of ills of the modern world. Is there a role for the extremists? Evolutionists see the evolutionary landscape as having ‘peaks’ of success and ‘troughs’ of failure and organisms and there genetic structure as taking jumps; sometimes a large jump is necessary to straddle a trough and arrive at high evolutionary ground—but this may be risky and it is not desirable for all jumps to large or even all activity to be ‘jumping.’ This does not give positive support to the extreme views but this or this sort of explanation may explain why there are personality types that have or tend to extreme views
An explanation, e.g. of extreme personality types, is not a demonstration of the reason for their presence but may be an indication. Other explanatory factors occur: ego, social group, upbringing, deviousness, intelligence, level of education… More education tends to make individuals less extreme but this cannot an entire explanation because all the extremists noted above are intelligent and well educated… Upbringing has a number of dimensions—encouragement of independence, tolerance versus there’s one way, tenderness versus harshness, the presence versus absence of faith and, as writer Frank Sullivan has suggested, birth order (Sullivan suggests that the oldest child is disposed by childhood competition to conservatism and younger children to liberalism of views.) Note that deviousness and hidden agendas are certainly factors in some cases but, in saying so, there is no suggestion that any of the named extremists are devious
Thinking, now, of the named extremists as individual human beings rather than as players on an evolution-scape, one wonders about their inner life—not the intimate details but those inner factors that affect the positions that they hold. I am not a mind reader but as a human being I do have intuitive-insight into other human beings. But such insight has limitations. Also, my acquaintance with the named extremists is limited. Still, it is probably in my human nature, you can figure out the motives if you wish, to have and to want to have an intuition regarding others and, in this instance, the named extremists. Here it is. I wonder about Dennett because he is rather inscrutable. He has taken some extreme positions within cognitive science that are analogous to a lack of faith regarding religious cosmology. Perhaps he is persuaded by the logic of materialism. If so, despite intelligence, there may be a certain rigidity in not being able to see around what I regard to be the ‘trap’ of materialism—this point is discussed extensively in the pages linked above. I think Dawkins is more pure—he believes his views with fervor and my feeling comes from the fact that, when he writes on evolution his arguments are frank. However, when Dawkins and others suggest that society should be able to control what we teach our children—they believe that the state should disallow teaching religion to their children, I believe they—Dawkins and the others—are going ‘over the edge.’ If a society prevents the teaching of religion, I think it should also prevent the teaching of science as universal truth—recall the earlier arguments that amount to the assertion that science is ‘universal’ only in the limited domains in which it is known to apply
Regarding D’Souza, I should say that I find his position is puzzling. Does he truly believe all that he says in print? Perhaps so; after all, he was and perhaps still is a friend of Ann Coulter who is an interesting case study in the boundaries of human psychology. My own orientation is a mix of moderation and judgment; but I am also a seeker of knowledge and insight among other things (the linked pages.) My seeking encourages research and reading which enables—some—novel positions; the positions are truly novel in that they are not standard and, if others have had similar insight, their insight has often been partial and fleeting. However, I do not adhere to the novel positions until demonstration is possible and I then tend to act as though the positions are true in the intellectual / seeking side of my life while retaining a practical orientation in my day to day life. Even when I feel that I have given a proof of some fundamental position, e.g. the one regarding the Universe as logical space, doubt is entertained for various reasons which include wanting to be sure. This is related to the issue of ‘honesty’ but is not identical to it; one actual motive to doubt is that my conceptual positions are not intended as ends in themselves but as foundation for action. It is interesting that it is here that an element of faith enters just as I see an element of faith in science. Thus, it is difficult for me to empathize with extremists such as D’Souza and Coulter and the certainty with which their extreme positions are held and I can come to no univalent assessment of their motivation. That said, I must admit that my intuitive assessment lies in the continuum of ‘they actually believe what they say’ (puzzling) to ‘there is a background agenda’ (also puzzling)