Who's not very bright?

Who’s not very bright? A response to Dinesh D’Souza’s piece Why Atheists are Not Very Bright

In the blog, the Kantian argument against the objectivity of experience—‘it's only a copy of reality’—was used to counter empiricist critiques of religion and divinity. The author of the blog argues that ‘the new atheists and self-styled “brights” can do their strutting, but Kant has exposed their ignorant boast that atheism operates on a higher intellectual plane than theism. Rather, as Kant showed, reason must know its limits in order to be truly reasonable. The atheist foolishly presumes that reason is in principle capable of figuring out all that there is, while the theist at least knows that there is a reality greater than, and beyond, that which our senses and our minds can ever apprehend’

Note immediately that Dinesh is applying different criteria to science and religion. He justifies this in the blog but I will show that his justification is correct if he is saying that there is a greater reality than revealed in science—science itself shows that in its own estimation of its own limits and as revealed in the history of science. However, if Dinesh is arguing some particular version of a reality outside science, one that involves people in the flesh and blood such as Jesus Christ, then empirical criteria are essential to truth—unless, of course, the ‘truth’ in question is symbolic rather than literal but in that case the entire discussion is an exercise in futility

I’d just like to throw in there that its not really even a copy in that what’s in our brains when we see (visually for example) a mountain is nothing like the mountain although there’s some kind of correspondence between the neural state and the mountain. Put another way, for experience to be a copy requires an extended sense of ‘copy’

These thoughts regarding the nature of the ‘copy’ rather than its precision are an aspect of the question ‘What is—the nature of—knowledge?’ They spark reflection which, since it is tentative and not part of the main argument of this post, is placed in a footnote

Does that mean we don’t know reality? No, actually, by itself, it doesn’t. It just means that the naïve thought (or argument) that the copy is precise is in error or, more precisely, may be in error. It is perhaps likely to be in error, given the nature of the senses, and given some examples of the senses being misleading but it does not follow that the error is invariable. Maybe, however, we’re just lucky and, even though it sounds improbable, we might just have some precise knowledge of reality. In other words, the argument doesn’t show that precise knowledge is impossible but or that we have no cases of precise knowledge but only that thinking that we have precise knowledge through experience is naïve except when there is some means to show precision

Yes but quantum indeterminacy sets ultimate limits so you couldn’t even get lucky. Not so because it’s not clear whether the indeterminacy is truly a limit on perception or one on reality itself (may be reality in the small is itself blurry)

How then could we know reality? 1. Revelation and scripture is said to be one source. 2. Yes indeed, the senses mediate knower and known, and ‘all we have is experience,’ but perhaps the brain is wired to recreate experience in the image of the real despite the filtering of the senses. I don’t believe that argument but I put it forward just to show that the Kantian point that Dinesh makes is a practical point rather than a logical one. The error in the leap to the logical insufficiency of knowledge is motivated by the natural and security based desire to not overstate our confidence in our knowledge. We confuse not knowing that we know with either (a) not knowing or (b) knowing that we don’t know (just as absence of evidence gets famously confused with evidence of absence.) I take back what I said about not believing the argument and will just say that, without further exploration, I maintain reservations about the argument. (3) Adaptation. Here we are in the world. We are often successful in getting what we want. I know how to go to the grocery store. A lot of what I do with some success is based in perception and knowledge. Surely then, even though experience is not reality, there is some degree and kind of faithfulness to experience. I used the word ‘kind’ due to the fact that if it’s a copy, it is so in some extended meaning of ‘copy.’ Well, if adaptation allows sufficient faithfulness that permits adequate negotiation of the world, can’t faithfulness be ‘exact’ on occasion? Perhaps, sometimes, or for knowledge of some things, the brain is wired… I wouldn’t practically depend on that but that’s not the point; the point is the logical one that the Kantian absence of evidence of faithfulness is not evidence of absence of faithfulness, that from examples of sensory distortion, we cannot make the counter-Humean leap that the senses always distort, and even if the senses did always distort or filter it doesn’t follow that brain can never recreate. Or as a trivial example that doesn’t require reconstruction but that isn’t typical of the cases to be argued consider, just perhaps for fun even though there might be occasion to turn this into a serious example, going to the grocery store. I tell a friend ‘Go out of the front door, take the road to the right, walk three blocks and you will see the store.’ Isn’t that exact? Or could it perhaps be that 3.141592 blocks would, could, be more precise? (4) I will now talk about necessary objects and the discussion will show what I mean by necessary objects. We’ve seen that what’s in experience may be only an inexact copy. Let’s look at solipsism. Solipsism is the position that there is only experience but that the impression that the experience is about something is a mistake, i.e., even though we have ‘experience of a world there is no world.’ I don’t think anyone is truly a solipsist (although I seem to recall reading that it is a psychopathological condition) but the philosophical interest in it is that much can or may be learned from trying to disprove it or to ascertain whether it is even logically coherent (it has been claimed that solipsism is logically consistent.) Just for argument’s sake, let’s go with solipsism for a moment—there is experience but the things ‘experienced’ don’t exist. It now appears that nothing exists, that there is no world. Is the conclusion correct? No it is not for even though experience has no objects, there is experience itself. In other words, even in the solipsist extreme of the gap between experience and reality, there is being (experience) there is reality (experience.) We are not used to thinking of experience as something in itself but it is. In fact, we could say that experience is its own object and though it can be argued that that is true the argument would take us somewhat astray and, further, we don’t need to depend on the argument here. Now from the fact that there is being (experience) it follows that there is a world or, more, not just a world but the world or Universe (all being, i.e., all experience.) So what has happened to the solipsist contention that there is no world. First, the solipsist has no basis to make that claim and ‘his’ or ‘her’ claim should have been, ‘there is no basis in experience for the existence of a / the world.’ But now even the solipsist will agree that there is the world—the world of all experiences—and ‘he’ or ‘she,’ unless the ‘ego’ gets in the way will admit that there is a world but that there is no external world, i.e., there is no world that is the object of experience. Thus, being and Universe are necessary objects, i.e., their existence does not depend on the faithfulness of experience. There are other necessary objects but the point has been made. You may be thinking, but the consequence is very trivial. Well it’s not. We adopted the solipsist stance to show the power of the argument for the existence of necessary objects—even if experience is altogether unfaithful there is being (experience) there are objects (experiences) and there is the Universe (all experiences.) A solipsist universe is imaginable but this (and as it turns out as all being the only) Universe is not a solipsist universe (the point can actually be proven and the point to the proof is that we are here concerned with certain and not merely practical knowledge) and, now, the foregoing conclusions become, there is being and there is the Universe that exist independently of experience of them. You may still be thinking, ‘a lot of words for a relatively trivial conclusion.’ Again, the response is that it’s not trivial and for three reasons. First, the Kantian argument that ‘all we have is experience’ and therefore we don’t have any precise empirical purchase on reality has been disproved. Second, the tools of analysis that have been developed in the disproof are, though seemingly trivial, very powerful, e.g. in disproving the ‘obvious’ Kantian analysis of experience. Third, the consequences of these ‘trivial’ results are immense

What are the immense consequences? I’ve recently outlined some of them in previous posts. For the consequences much more information, though, you can go to my website http://www.horizons-2000.org; to the main essay http://www.horizons-2000.org/Journey-in-Being.html; and to my blog http://www.horizons-2000.org/weblog/weblog.html

One of the outcomes of the discussions / essays of the site and my thought is the unification of the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. It is a unification of the here-and-now empirical but also conceptual reality and what Dinesh describes as ‘a reality greater than, and beyond, that which our senses and our minds can ever apprehend.’ Of course, what is shown is that while the greater reality is profound and while there is more than mere difficulty in the apprehension, it is in error to think that the greater reality is absolutely beyond our apprehension

One of the consequences of the developments of my thought that is available on my website is that ‘Jesus Christ has arisen from the dead in countless cosmological systems.’ First, let me say that, of course, there is no intent to make fun of or slight Christians or Christianity (or any other faith.) Also, my website is not especially about religion but I cite this particular result because of the context of this post. Second, the quote may sound both absurd and whimsical. However, it is not absurd and follows in impeccable logic from the necessary objects and the kind of demonstration employed above. Finally, the purpose of the quote is to bring home the power of the thinking in terms of what is familiar to many. On the site itself I have applied the power of the thinking to an entire range of philosophical and academic disciplines and human concerns

Unfortunately, the consequences stated in the previous paragraph, give no support to the historical accuracy except that they show (and this may have been obvious anyway) that although they are improbable, they are not absurd

Regarding the articles of Christian (and other) faith, especially such articles as the resurrection and the cosmology (genesis and eschatology) where does that leave us? As many will know there is much that has been written regarding the ‘historical Jesus’ which is an attempt to infer the facts of His life (and perhaps the meaning of those facts) and on empirical / historical proof of the articles

I have never been persuaded by the empirical proofs—either from the direct examination of evidence or the indirect ones that argue ‘such and such happening was predicted by the Bible and therefore the Bible must be accurate.’ I suspect that many Christians will have already come to the position that empirical proof is beside the point

Regarding history, what is the alternative to the empirical approach? The only one I know of is revelation which has the connotations of direct bridge, intuition and so on… As far as I can tell revelation is not better than empirical proof. You may say that ‘this’ is the word but for me, I want to know how you know in a way that satisfies me (I would be satisfied with empirical proof but don’t demand it—I have a ‘belief’ in empirical proof but I am not an empiricist, i.e., I do not think / believe that experience-in-the-world is the only source of knowledge)

There is an exception to my problem with the words of the scripture. It is the case where someone says that he or she has had direct revelation whether from the core of being / God. My problem, then, is in seeing / knowing that that is true

I want to end on the following note. I’ve been following this blog for a few weeks. I was attracted to it because I’m interested in some of the issues, because it stood as a challenge in some ways, and partly because Dinesh is from India (Goa.) In the beginning I was a little irritated. I saw the arguments as somewhat subtly shifting emphasis so as to make a point that did not quite hold or to put the onus of proof where it did not belong. Obviously the blogs are intelligent regardless of whether one agrees. Lately, though, I’ve been impressed by the intelligence and the respect for those with opposing positions. I do think that the blog has in common with some of the opposing positions that both ‘camps’ are at least somewhat extreme. And, I still think that Dinesh applies criteria to the arguments of those who he calls ‘atheists’ that are different from the criteria that he applies to his own position. Of course, he argues that the realm of science and the realm of religion are different and therefore the criteria should be different. There are indeed distinct realms—the realm of the empirical and the realm of the real. However, where the distinction has been considered absolute, we’ve seen above that it is not and, as absolute, it’s based on a confusion of what is and what isn’t empirical. Further, practically, when descending from the ‘lofty’ realm of the Universe (all being) to, e.g., planet earth then the claim that there was a Jesus Christ who died on the cross some 2000 years ago for our sins is an empirical claim and must stand up to empirical criteria. If you say that the meaning of Christ’s death and resurrection is not literal but merely points to the limits of empirical knowledge then all we need to do is agree that we are talking about a story that is—found by some people to be—meaningful and beautiful. I think that many Christians and some non-Christians would agree with that. However, not a few Christians also believe in the literal truth of the Bible. The fundamentalists are literalists who insist that a Biblical day is an ordinary day and so on. The non-fundamentalist literalists may make provisions such as ‘oh a Biblical day is really an aeon’ and so on. But there’s still the resurrection; a man was dead and came back to live within three days; water was transformed into wine. It would normally be irrational to believe that water became wine and so we demand empirical proof. There are, perhaps, many reasons that people continue to have faith—it seems to be in the nature of some people; for those for whom it might not be in their nature, there is the ego motive which includes power and consistency, there is the peer motive…

I don’t want to continue posting but this is because this (the extremes) is not where my real interest lies; however, I’ve learned a lot recently. I’ve often found that you can learn, not only from those with whom you are inclined to agree, but also from those with whom you serious disagreement

Footnote on the nature of knowledge

Imagine the mountain and a three-dimensional model of the mountain. Perhaps we’re thinking that the relation between the percept of the mountain is like the relationship between the model and the mountain. Clearly, there is something right about the analogy; we know the mountain. But, from the comments about ‘some kind of correspondence between the neural state and the mountain,’ there is something misleading about it; it is almost as if it is almost but not quite the function of knowledge to know. How can that even make sense? Imagine a creature that has one sense—touch—and one reaction—recoil; otherwise it moves by floating with the wind. Whenever it hits a surface it recoils. Does the creature have an image of the mountain? If the mountain is all ice, the creature avoids freezing but, still, does it know the mountain? Yet it seems to have some kind of knowledge. However, it’s not a kind of knowledge that deserves the label ‘knowing’ but rather ‘tools for behavior.’ The idea of knowledge is receding from the idea of know-ing. Those of you who are familiar with pragmatism may be thinking that this is pragmatism. However, it is not truly pragmatism. Pragmatism says it is behavior that is the criteria of knowledge even when knowledge knows, i.e., even when the image analogy is good. What is being said here is that there is perhaps a place where whatever is going on in the organism is not about having knowledge but about acting. And its also saying that although there may be one label for what’s going on in the organisms sentient or near sentient centers—knowing—the fact that it has different criteria and sometimes perhaps no criteria suggests that knowledge is not one thing and there’s no uniform treatment of it. I’m not going anywhere in particular with these thoughts, they’re not particularly well thought out—assuming that they have some validity and there is some better thinking out, except to suggest that thinking in the beginning that we have a grip on what knowledge is and if it is something universal may lead us astray into expecting too much from it. A possible key-phrase in refining the idea is representing representation. Now let’s get back to the main line of discussion