The development of the way begins dually with imagination and criticism. In reading the literature, in imagination, in attempting to understand the world, imagination and criticism have stood in balance, neither dominating the other.

Though arbitrary or ad hoc certainty is generally rejected (i) it would be dogma to reject certainty where it may be found (ii) we do find directions of both certainty and uncertainty (iii), yet we maintain doubt (in balance with doubt about doubt).

Readers are encouraged to read and understand the way. No reader is expected or encouraged to ‘believe’. Some readers will have absolute doubt. They may go their way with encouragement, without opposition. Some readers will agree with the arguments that the way is consistent with experience yet doubt the demonstration—the later discussion of doubt may address such concern.

Pathways are suggested, not prescribed; as suggested, the pathways are generic, which enables adaptation to specific situations and interests. Above all, the way is not prescriptive—it is designed as shared negotiation of pathways and their discovery.

1.1.2.3 An evolving document

1.1.2.3.1 The evolution

1.1.2.3.2 Design

Comment 1. The section is not temporary but some of its content may be.

Comment 2. A telescoped document.

Eliminate repetition between this chapter and the others.

All problems should be listed in the problems of metaphysics.

Sub-documents?

Comment 3. Phrases “it is seen”, “we see”, “we are seeing”, … , are to refer to discussions that may not yet have been developed and will be linked later.

Edit phrases such as “it is seen” vs “we have seen” and “I have shown” vs “we have shown” for consistency.

Use single and double quotes consistently. Eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate quotes.

Edit for brevity, poetry, precision.

Introduce pictures / graphics?

1.1.2.4 A self-contained system and document

1.2 Origins

1.2.1 Seeking, the world, experience, study, and imagination

1.2.2 History of ideas

1.2.3 Criticism

1.2.4 Paradox

1.3 Content

1.3.1 Preview

The following will be shown.

1.3.1.1 An ultimate universe

The universe is ultimate in that it is the realization of the greatest possibility (naïvely, the possibility of coherence, or, formally, logical possibility—which guarantees consistency of the view).

The universe has identity; the universe and its identity are limitless in extension, duration, variety, peak and dissolution of being; all beings inherit limitlessness and merge in the peaks.

We do not see all possibilities in our cosmos, which is but one possibility; the other possibilities are realized beyond our cosmos, i.e., in other cosmoses, the void, and more. Realization of the ultimate—of the limitless—begins in our world but is realized beyond, trans-cosmologically.

1.3.1.2 Paths to the ultimate

Though it is given that all beings realize the ultimate, if enjoyment is a value, there is an imperative to develop, share, and negotiate intelligent (effective) pathways to the ultimate for, beginning in, and from our world. While there are received ways (philosophy, religion), shared development and negotiation are essential to effective realization; and they are realization-in-process while in our world.

Pleasure and pain are unavoidable; there is pleasure in being on a pathway (this is not a rejection of simple joy); the best resolution of pain is use of the best available of therapy while, as far as possible, being on a path on which the fortunate give aid and assistance to the less fortunate.

1.3.2 The main ideas and their significance

1.3.2.1 Primary

The primary ideas begin with being, beings, experience, agency, concepts, and objects.

1.3.2.2 Metaconcepts

Knowledge of the world and so knowledge of knowledge, nature and problems of knowledge, narrative, action, method, and reflexivity.

Representation, abstraction, and pragmatism.

Metaphysics as the overarching discipline, which includes meta-metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and theory of value.

1.3.2.3 Concept template

Nature, definition, and significance, of the concept.

Relation to received meanings and reasons for differences.

Place in the hierarchical structure of the concepts.

1.3.3 Logic of the outline

1.3.3.1 On the choice of the ordering

The order of the chapters is plain enough. Into the way of being paves the way in. The formal development is in the world, which develops a foundation, and realization, which is about action based on the foundation. The concluding chapter, return, is about living in the world on the way to the ultimate from a new perspective.

Of the four chapters, the structure of the second, ‘The world’, is in especial need of explanation. The following account touches on the key issues of the chapter.

The world is really metaphysics; however, it is informative to begin it with metaphysics as such, followed by development of the metaphysics. The section, worldviews and personal metaphysics is a way into the metaphysics. What metaphysics is defines metaphysics, explains how and why the present conception differs from the received, and reiterates the fundamental significance of metaphysics. Meaning and knowledge, a topic critical to clear thinking generally, is an essential preliminary to the main development of metaphysics.

The development of metaphysics, proper, begins with being, beings, and agency, which is on the essential subject and foundation of metaphysics. But why should we begin with foundation? Would it not be better to begin with the immediate—where we are and from there, to develop foundation and its application? That is—ought we to begin with ‘ground’ or axiomatically with being? It is possible to do both. This is because the immediate, our experience of things, is already but implicitly built into the previous section, meaning and knowledge. We could have begun explicitly with experience, but that would have made the development cumbersome as we would have to rework it to account for the implications of the study of being for experience. Though experience is essential to the development, it is effective to defer its explicit treatment till after a basic metaphysical framework is in hand—and the foundation for the framework is in being, beings, and agency, while the framework itself is developed in ultimate metaphysics. The ultimate metaphysics is where we show the universe to be the realization of the greatest possibility, which is far greater than received views, secular and transsecular. Then, experience develops the concept of experience, its importance, the experiential nature of the ultimate, and instruments for and ways to the ultimate.

The remaining sections of the world are now discussed briefly.

Is the truth of the real metaphysics certain? The question is raised and addressed in doubt.

Logic, method, and content has the following functions. It extends the concept of logic to (i) fact and inference (ii) the certain and the less than certain cases (in a manner that is a definite enhancement over what is sometimes called ‘argument’). It fills in the range of metaphysics. It shows logic and metaphysics to be the same. It shows metaphysics (and logic) to be self-contained (as far as possible and in what sense).

Epistemology, ethics (value), and cosmology are treated and developed as part of metaphysics. Epistemology is part of metaphysics because knowledge is part of the world, and it is important in metaphysics as founding. Ethics is part of metaphysics as agency is part of the world, and it is important to agency, choice, particularly the question “what should we do”, generally, and in relation to realization. Cosmology is a working out of the metaphysics, especially in relation to the question “what is in the world and what is its nature?” Here, cosmology includes but far exceeds classical philosophical cosmology and modern physical cosmology—which is a consequence of the demonstrated real or ultimate metaphysics.

Many classical and modern problems have been treated to this point—but the treatment is not for its own sake – the problems are significant to the purpose of the way of being. To catalog and treat the problems of metaphysics would be useful as (i) a contribution (ii) potential utility in the way and in life (iii) showing the power of the real metaphysics. This is done in the problems of being, where the problems are extended, rationally arranged, and addressed in light of the real or ultimate metaphysics (emphasis is on those problems not addressed in the main development).

1.3.3.2 Dynamic reorderings

1.3.3.2.1 Introduction

Before the state of the evolving narrative arrived at understanding the world in its own terms (being) rather than in terms of something else (e.g., substance, process, and so on), it (the narrative) experimented with the physical (matter) as fundamental and then with experientiality (e.g., consciousness) as fundamental.

Questions arose—“Which is fundamental, matter or experience? Are they equivalent?” To help answer these questions I constructed two databases of the system of concepts, in one of them matter was the highest-level concept, mind was highest in the other. Comparison of the two databases suggested what may be expected—with sufficient flexibility in the concepts of mind and matter, the two are equivalent.

That is, there is something more fundamental than mind or matter. What is that something? At the highest-level it would be property free.

It would be being itself—i.e., the world as the world, not as something else or something within it (and, further, this will be found to be significant rather than trivial).

But being is not property free, comes a response for it distinguishes between existing and non-existing things. And a counterpoint is, but is not the concept of ‘non-existing thing’ a contradiction? It turns out that a proper understanding (theory of) meaning is the key to resolution and that the idea of a non-existing thing is not self-contradictory (see dialethic logics).

1.3.3.2.2 Foundation vs pragmatic beginning

Axiomatic systems begin with what may be called foundational to the subject matter (they may of course have further foundation).

In seeking foundation for metaphysics, which is about the world, it may be better to begin with ‘where we are now’, e.g., with (our) experience.

This is addressed in the previous section, on the choice of the ordering, and we find (i) that dynamic reordering suggests being as fundamental (a little bit of artificial intelligence, which suggests that what is fundamental is a higher order category than mind or matter) (ii) with being, foundation and pragmatic beginning are both possible.

1.4 Understanding and living the way

1.4.1 Reading the way

1.4.2 Shared pathways

2 The world

As metaphysics is ‘the overarching discipline’, the title of this chapter may well have been ‘Metaphysics’. However, it is convenient to unpack the entire discipline as ‘metaphysics proper’ and other topics.

Except for the last section on the problems of metaphysics, the chapter is part of the main development of the way. The section on the problems is placed at the end of the chapter because (i) it is not part of the main development (ii) it treats only those problems not addressed in the main development.

2.1 Metaphysics

Comment 4. See the resource, metaphysics. Use it to improve structure and content of this chapter, especially the development of the real metaphysis and the section, problems of metaphysics.

2.1.1 Worldviews and personal metaphysics

Comment 5. Has some discussion in the first chapter.

2.1.1.1 Worldviews

Persons may ask themselves—what do I want to do in my life, what is the best or greatest thing I can and ought to do.

Comment 6. See Kant’s three questions in Kant’s Account of Reason—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/).

Whatever their answer, it will be framed, at least in part, in a view of what the world is like—what kind of world is it, what is in it, what kinds of processes are there, what is the future of the world, what kind of person am I.

The framework may of course be implicit, based on personal experience, absorbed from culture (which may provide more than one framework, e.g., secular vs transsecular).

Such frameworks are worldviews.

2.1.1.2 Personal metaphysics

As the question of worldview has relevance to individual choice, the person may, seeing its importance, seek to make their worldview explicit. And in making it implicit they may question it and seek to improve it.

That is, they may seek to formulate a personal metaphysics. And they may turn to the history of thought as a resource.

2.1.2 What metaphysics is

2.1.2.1 The concept of metaphysics

2.1.2.2 The importance of metaphysics

All knowledge is metaphysical in some way (this is brought out later).

Most fundamental issues in life and to many pragmatic concerns are vague in their formulation and resolution without metaphysics (worldview). This is true of action issues “what shall I do”, “what is our social endeavor about”, as well as knowledge questions such as “what is knowledge”, “how is knowledge acquired and justified”, “what is meaning”, and “how are knowledge and action interactive”.

We are seeing that metaphysics is the overarching discipline.

2.1.3 Meaning and knowledge

2.1.3.1 Concepts, language, and meaning

2.1.3.2 Knowledge

2.1.3.2.1 The concept

2.1.3.2.2 Kinds

Knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge-that, knowledge-how.

2.1.3.3 Problems of knowledge

2.1.3.3.1 Abstraction and perfect representation

2.1.3.3.2 Pragmatic knowledge

2.1.3.3.3 Union

2.1.4 Being, beings, and agency

A being (beings), being, universe (all being), the void, cosmos, pattern, possibility (logical, real), agency

2.1.5 Ultimate metaphysics

2.1.5.1 The fundamental principle

2.1.5.2 The real metaphysics

2.1.6 Experience

2.1.6.1 What experience is

2.1.6.2 We are experiential beings

2.1.6.3 The universe as experiential and agentive

2.1.6.4 The nature and form of the ultimate

2.1.6.5 Dimensions of being

2.1.6.6 Paths to the ultimate

2.1.7 A vocabulary for metaphysics

Comment 7. Placement?

Comment 8. See vocabulary for metaphysics.

2.2 Doubt

2.3 Logic, method, and content

2.3.1 Received conceptions of logic

2.3.1.1 Deductive logic and its kinds

2.3.1.2 Standard and non-standard logics

2.3.1.2.1 Standard

The standard logics are usually taken to be (i) standard two-valued propositional calculus (with principle of non-contradiction) (ii) first order predicate calculus built on a scaffold of propositional calculus (with identity theory).

2.3.1.2.2 Non-standard

2.3.1.2.2.1 Extended logics—logics that fit into the standard schemes

Modal logics, second order predicate calculus (sometimes seen as standard), and more

2.3.1.2.2.2 Deviant logics—logics that extend the standard schemes

Many-valued, intuitionist, quantum, free

2.3.1.2.2.3 Logics that do not fit into the standard or extended schemes, e.g., dialethic logics

Dialetheic logics are logics in which the principle of non-contradiction does not hold.

In standard logic, a contradiction leads to explosion—i.e., that every statement is true (and false).

To avoid explosion, some change from the standard machinery is necessary and one possibility is a three-valued logic—see the little manual (Dialetheia).

A first question is—are there dialetheia, i.e., are there true contradictions? An example is that to say being is ineffable is to state an effability of being; the resolution is that being is highly but not entirely ineffable—the example is not literally dialethic. Many examples of dialetheia in the literature are non-literal in some sense. However, there are literal examples—two will be mentioned below.

Questions arise—(i) are dialethic logics possible (i.e., are there logics with contradiction that are non-explosive) (ii) do they make sense (are there true contradictions) (iii) are they necessary (can they be replaced by more discriminating standard logic) (iv) are they useful.

Responses are—(i) the three-valued logic mentioned above is not explosive (ii) there are true contradictions (a trivial example is that the sun is shining and not shining) (iii) they do not seem to be necessary (the sun is shining in San Fransisco but not shining in Mumbai) (iv) they may be useful when we wish to ignore the greater detail that makes them unnecessary.

Note—though the example above is trivial, non-trivial examples can be given (see the link above) of which one is the Thomson Lamp Paradox (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ), and consideration of a range of examples suggests that while dialethic logics may be useful, they are not necessary).

2.3.1.3 Logics in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises with certainty

2.3.2 A comprehensive conception of logic or argument

2.3.2.1 Direct establishment of fact

2.3.2.1.1 Observation

2.3.2.1.2 Necessity

Are all necessary ‘facts’ analytic?

2.3.2.2 Inference

2.3.2.2.1 Certain

2.3.2.2.2 Less than certain

2.3.2.2.3 Inference, necessary or likely, from the null premise

2.3.3 Self-sufficiency and completeness—open and closed aspects of the metaphysics

2.4 Epistemology

2.5 Ethics (value)

2.6 Cosmology

2.7 Our world

2.7.1 The evolving situation, challenges, opportunities

2.7.2 Application of the system of the way of being

2.8 Problems of metaphysics

This section attempts a comprehensive listing and treatment of the problems of classical through recent metaphysics.

The list will be (i) informed by the history of metaphysics (ii) completed by metaphysics and its logic—generally, and (iii) enhanced by the real metaphysics.

The treatment (i) will be selected from those problems not addressed in the main developments so far (ii) enhanced in light of the real metaphysics.

Comment 9. The list of problems is informed by Metaphysics – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/).

Comment 10. The system of problems needs simplification to essentials and elimination of unnecessary repetition.

2.8.1 Writing metaphysics

2.8.1.1 Introduction

Metaphysics as knowledge of the real has been introduced and given justification. An ultimate metaphysics, the real metaphysics has been developed. This metaphysics (i) is ultimate in foundation but (for limited beings) open with regard to breadth or variety of being (ii) shows the universe to be ultimate in the sense that it is the realization of the greatest possibility—logical possibility.

2.8.1.2 Knowledge and metaknowledge

Whatever is—effectively—in the universe is known (at least knowable) to some knower (not necessarily human). This follows from the real metaphysics which allows and implies that there are far greater knowers in the universe than humans in their limited being (of course the same metaphysics also implies that in frames of understanding above extension and duration, we are one with the greatest knower).

How shall we develop and write metaphysics? We do not know more than we know, therefore, to write metaphysics, ~~to elaborate categories, dimensions, and paradigms,~~ we must turn to (i) our knowledge or knowing with metaknowledge or metaknowing (ii) with the understanding that our knowledge is in-process.

2.8.1.3 Logic

A concept of logic (argument) as the most inclusive account of knowledge (not just of inference, which, too, is knowledge of relation among facts or truths) has been developed. This concept structures all knowledge as a unity. Therefore, it is the organizing principle that shall be used in writing metaphysics.

We can now see why it efficient to have first developed the real metaphysics before writing an account of the problems of metaphysics. It now emerges that metaphysics needs to be rewritten as derived—perhaps by abstraction—from all our knowledge, i.e. logic as argument, which includes metaknowledge and epistemology understood to include concern with how to make developing knowledge efficient; this is at least implicit in the history of metaphysics. We shall do this explicitly.

Comment 11. Do this.

2.8.1.4 Writing metaphysics—experience, logic, writing, sharing, learning…

Still, metaphysics must remain open and therefore the process of experience, logic, writing, sharing, learning…

2.8.2 A received catalog of problems

The following is a formalization and enhancement of the problems from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on metaphysics. It is intended to be suggestive rather than definitive.

2.8.2.1 Classical metaphysics

The object of metaphysics—Being, First Causes, Unchanging Things

Divisions of metaphysics—Categories, Universals, Particulars

Ground and Foundation—Substance (vs Groundlessness vs grounding in Groundlessness)

2.8.2.2 Recent Metaphysics

Modality—i.e., metaphysical modality (if we see necessity and possibility as a kind of cause, modality will may fall under causation, below)

Identity; Persistence and Constitution; Space and Time; Causation, Freedom, and Determinism

Mind and Body (The Mental and Physical)

Metaphysics of the dimensions of being—nature (physical, biological, of psyche), society (institutions, persons, culture), the universal (world, the ultimate, logic, experience)

2.8.3 What is metaphysics?

2.8.3.1 The idea of metaphysics

2.8.3.2 How ought it to be conceived and defined?

2.8.3.2.1 On the question

Why this question arises and how any ultimate conception of metaphysics ought to have some continuity with received conceptions but ought not to be too moored to them.

2.8.3.2.2 On what metaphysics is and ought to be

Comment 12. Though metaphysics as knowledge of the real has been justified in what metaphysics is, here the issue is revisited and reexamined.

2.8.3.3 Why knowledge of the real and how it is possible?

2.8.3.4 Adequacy and potency of the conception

2.8.3.5 To what extent the conception is ultimate

2.8.3.6 Relation to received conceptions

2.8.3.7 Why metaphysics is ‘the overarching discipline’

With especial consideration of philosophy, epistemology, logic, ethics, metaphysics as science, science, the abstract and concrete sciences, metaphilosophy, meta-metaphysics and other ‘meta’ disciplines and porosity of the ‘meta’ distinction.

2.8.4 Metaphysics’ fundamental object

2.8.4.1 Some possibilities

World like kinds (substance, process, relationship…) and idea like kinds (concept, word, trope…) may be considered but the essential object is found to be being in the sense of (i) that which is (exists) or, perhaps better, (ii) that which can be known to be.

2.8.4.2 Why being?

It has been seen that being is (i) most inclusive (ii) not presumptive (iii) yet empowering of knowledge of things.

2.8.4.3 The nature of being

Being itself has no further fundamental nature, except knowability, but beings and aspects of being do and are treated in later sections (an aspect of being is found to be a being and, with sufficient abstraction, being itself is a being).

The real and true metaphysics as a well-founded and non-substance ontology—of course, being-as-existence may be taken as its own substance; however, being-as-substance (i) is trivial (ii) does not fall under classical notions of substance.

2.8.5 Problems of being

2.8.5.1 What is the ground of being?

2.8.5.1.1 The concept of ground

The ground of being is that from which it springs but itself is its own source.

2.8.5.1.2 The ground

The possibilities include the kinds above, but being is found to be its own foundation and ground.

2.8.5.2 What is the nature of being?

Comment 13. This section should be improved with reference to the discussions of categories, dimensions, and paradigms in the little manual and dimensions of being, experience, and the world

2.8.5.2.1 The nature of being

Being was defined as that which is; being-as-being has no further nature except that it is knowable.

2.8.5.2.2 The status of experience in relation to being

2.8.5.2.2.1 What experience is

The concept and its aspects—‘experience of’ and ‘the experienced’ and their relation, which constitute experience.

2.8.5.2.2.2 Pure experience—whether there is pure experience and what it is

2.8.5.2.2.3 Mind and matter as labels for the two sides of experience

2.8.5.2.2.4 Are there further ‘kinds’ beyond mind and matter?

2.8.5.2.2.5 Experience is the essence of our being

Without experience we are as if dead. We live in experience.

2.8.5.2.2.6 Experience as the essence of all being—the universe as experiential

If the universe were strictly material, there would be no experience. Therefore, it is not strictly material. Experience has as if material and mental sides, therefore, to say the universe is experiential does not rule out mind or matter. At the same time, mind and matter, real or as if, are modes within experience. The case of zero experientiality is not null experientiality. Therefore, the root of being can be seen as primitive experience, and all being can be seen as constituted of experientiality.

2.8.5.2.3 Identity

The concept.

Identity of objects, its nature.

Identity, difference (as precursor to change and extension), change, and extension (space and time); questions of whether change and extension are (i) essential to being—i.e., whether there is being that has no change and no extension, or whether apparent cases of such being is a matter of level of description (ii) are complete relative to difference in identity.

Identity of selves, its nature.

Persistence over change (time).

2.8.5.2.4 Modality

Here, ‘modality’ is metaphysical modality.

Is being necessary? I.e., must there be beings (‘sometimes’ or ‘eternally’)?

More generally, necessity and possibility (metaphysical or physical) fall under modality.

Are there necessary beings?

Are there possible beings?

‘Necessity’ and ‘possibility’ in this context are modal because they are not just about being (existence) but conditional existence—necessary or possible.

Duality of necessity and possibility.

Other kinds of modality.

Does existence imply existence in and of space and time? If not, should spatial and temporal existence be considered modes of existence?

2.8.5.3 What are the high-level aspects of being?

A more complete title for this section is— “What are the high-level aspects of being—categories, dimensions, and paradigms of being and experience?

2.8.5.3.1 The concepts of category and dimension

Comment 14. I have been using ‘dimension’ in a sense similar to ‘category’ in metaphysics. I will continue to use ‘dimension for the present.

The idea of ‘category’ is a metaphysical concept—that of a kind or class of being that falls just under being in its level of generality. We extend the idea of category (i) in that it should be more than descriptive—e.g., predictive as in the concrete sciences (ii) not limit it to the high-level. The narrative will use ‘category’ for the high-level classes and ‘dimension’ for the low-level classes. The terms will be used interchangeably with ‘high- or highest-level dimension’ being equivalent to ‘category’ (so as to be terminologically consistent with work on the website https://www.horizons-2000.org).

The ‘pure dimensions’ will be any set of related dimensions that are, together, equivalent to being. The low-level will be called ‘low-level’, ‘world-level’ or pragmatic dimensions. When there is a need for an intermediate level or levels, one term will be ‘metaphysical dimension’ where the metaphysical considerations are more or less specialized. Modalities of being (existence) are examples of metaphysical dimensions in this sense.

2.8.5.3.2 The concept of paradigm

We seem to lack acquaintance with the highest level of being but that is not quite true—we have experience of entire universe (i) in that there is a whole (ii) as a thus far unending series of expanding boundaries. Can we know more?

Paradigms are ways of thought or being that make dimensions more than descriptive. We have seen that logic in the most inclusive sense introduced earlier as critical and generative of imaginative thought is paradigmatic for being and the universe. Can we know more?

An example of a seemingly low-level paradigm from biology is that of random or indeterministic variation and selection. The idea may be generalized to all origins and evolutions and has been applied to the cosmos.

Consider the state of the world. Given logic, it may well have been created five minutes ago (the thought is apparently due to Bertrand Russell), and we would have been created complete with our memories and knowledge that make it seem that we have lived full lives and that the cosmos started at least as far back as the cosmic singularity.

How can we know that this is not the case? We cannot, for indeed the real metaphysics requires that there will be worlds that came into being ad hoc and even bizarre worlds such as a world that is content of an individual’s experience (but without the objects to which the experience may seem to refer). What the evolutionary (variation and selection) paradigm suggests is that incrementally formed semi-stable worlds such as ours dominate the population of the universe and, further, known worlds of that kind are effectively the only known worlds

2.8.5.3.3 Significance of the categories, dimensions, and paradigms

Dimensions and categories are of high-level understanding (‘science’) relative to which particular knowledge (e.g., the concrete and abstract sciences) is detailed and specialized.

2.8.5.3.4 About experience

We have seen that the universe is experiential. Thus, experientiality is a dimension that is effectively as high as being itself—is coextensive with being.

What we find is that experientiality and its aspects are fundamental (i) receptive-neutral-agentive (ii) identity-extensional-durational (iii) as if mind-as if matter-cause-necessity-determinism-freedom-indeterminism (iv) the unity of object kinds, the concrete-abstract distinction as pragmatic (mode of distinction) rather than real (particularly, the ‘abstract’ is not a category but the result of abstraction from particulars and collections, of which the concrete is a particular case… and the abstract do not fail to exist in space and time but may have had space and time abstracted out to full or lesser degree).

2.8.5.3.5 Metatheory

We are concerned with categories, dimensions, and paradigms. A theory of categories will (i) enumerate these aspects (ii) explain the choice (iii) desirably explain the reasons for the choice, e.g., whether it is necessary (iv) explain or show to what extent it is complete and unique (at the appropriate level).

Comment 15. Project: study the different theories and metatheories of categories with a view to improving the logic of the present treatment and completing it with regard to a system of categories, dimensions, and paradigms.

Since categories are just below being with regard to genera, being is not a category. However, there is no good reason to consider broadening the idea of category to include the highest level—being. As it is functional, necessary, and complete at its level, it will be included as a category. Is it complete? Yes, in that we are seeing that if being is that which is knowable it includes existing, possible, necessary, non-, and impossible being.

In developing a theory of identity and objects we find that sameness and difference are fundamental.

2.8.5.3.6 Being as a category

Category—being.

Sub-category—difference (which presumes sameness). Beginning with sameness and difference, we find fact and inference, which is treated in the little manual.

Paradigm—argument, which includes fact and inference. Two kinds of fact are recognized (i) contingently true (ii) necessarily true. Inference is reasoning in which conclusions follow from premises. In metaphysics as certain knowledge of the real, ‘true’ means ‘certainly true’, and the kind of inference must be that in which conclusions necessarily follow from premises (we see that there are cases of zero premise, in which case the conclusions are necessarily true facts). Sometimes ‘argument’ is reserved for the case of certainly true fact and inference—thus the paradigm of this ideal kind of metaphysics is argument. In pragmatic metaphysics, which includes science, ‘certainty’ is replaced by ‘practically certain’ or ‘certain enough’. The real metaphysics fuses the ideal and the pragmatic, which is justified in terms of its efficiency in realization of the ultimate.

Equivalent category—experientiality which is epistemically implicit in that the being that is never known is effectively nonexistent and metaphysically manifest in the treatment of experience in the narrative.

Equivalent categories—the universe (all being) and the void (the being that contains no beings) are seen metaphysically to be equivalent to one another and to being.

2.8.5.3.7 Metatheory—how may we elaborate the categories, dimensions, and paradigms?

Let us begin by quoting writing metaphysics—

“Whatever is—effectively—in the universe is known (at least knowable) to some knower (not necessarily human). This follows from the real metaphysics which allows and implies that there are far greater knowers in the universe than humans in their limited being (of course the same metaphysics also implies that in frames of understanding above extension and duration, we are one with the greatest knower).

We do not know more than we know, therefore, to elaborate categories, dimensions, and paradigms, we must turn to (i) our knowledge or knowing with metaknowledge or metaknowing (ii) with the understanding that our knowledge is in-process.”

Our logic—in its most general sense seen in this narrative—harbors all categories, dimensions, and paradigms. If we examine Aristotle’s categories we find that they correspond to basic ways in which we perceive, act in, feel about, and conceive our world.

Turning to logic, perhaps the most basic is propositional calculus. Here ‘atomic fact’ and ‘laws of identity and inference’ are categories. Moving to the predicate calculus, predication and quantification are categories. There is a range of modal categories. These categories are derived from our formal logics, but, undoubtedly our formal logics are incomplete (i) more will be discovered (ii) our forms of expression are limited. Now move to science. From science, we derive general categories, e.g., (i) indeterminism with selection, which overlap (ii) mechanism with and without indeterminism. Our sciences are specialized within these categories derived from it and (i) there is a great variety of sub-categories (the sciences of other cosmoses) (ii) there may be other categories of science. If emotion is to be a category, how would it mesh with logic? Perhaps as part of a logic of survival for individuals and species.

2.8.5.3.8 What are the further categories, dimensions, and paradigms of being and experience and what are their metaphysics?

Comment 16. To be improved, with elaboration, from meta-theory the little manual and dimensions of being, experience, and the world.

Examples of dimensions of being (i) high-level or ‘pure’ universal—experientiality (ii) pragmatic—nature (with as if mind, as if matter, and the simple or physical, and the complex which includes life) and society.

Examples of paradigms (i) universal—abstract logic (ii) general—indeterminism with adaptive selection (iii) physical—mechanism and cause (with and without partial indeterminism) (iv) of psyche—bound and free experientiality and action (v) social—economic constraints and possibilities on political action, particularly liberal vs conservative action.

Examples of how the paradigms are predictive (a) abstract logic constrains and promotes imagination for realism (b) adaptation suggests that bizarre and randomly formed worlds are improbable.

Dimensions of experience, examples, and paradigms—(i) since experience is coextensive with being, it is as much a category as is being itself (ii) it therefore contains the paradigms regarding being (iii) experience can be classed external—objective (i.e., of objects, but without a connotation of perfection); and subjective (experience of); but since experience is experience the distinction is not ultimate (iv) the dimensions of experience over and above those of being pertains to distinctions within experience, e.g., inner-outer (a porous distinction), intense-neutral, form-not pertaining to form (e.g., emotion), free-bound (e.g., high level conception vs perception, relatively neutral feeling vs intense emotion). Some writers on the philosophy of mind, class the mental into intentionality, experience, and action; however, intentionality and action can be seen as modes of experience—(i) practically, as the layered experience associated with intentional and action states (ii) metaphysically, since experience is coextensive with being.

2.8.5.4 What is the extent and variety of being?

This question is rather of quantity and complements the questions of aspects, natures, and kinds, which are rather of quality. But both are asking—of the possible, what obtains? And, of course, what is possibility, what are its kinds, and of the kinds, which obtains here? Is it the most inclusive kind?

2.8.5.4.1 Principles—logic conceived broadly

2.8.5.4.2 Extent and enumeration—cosmology

Comment 17. See, especially, ‘a catalog of beings’ in little manual.

2.8.5.5 The nature of our being—beings, agency, and action

Note that agency is an aspect of experientiality.

What is the possible and productive interaction? How complete is it relative to all being and what is the sense of the completeness?

Is the connection forced, posited, or natural (or combinations thereof)? Is being – knowledge – agency – action seamless?

2.8.6 What falls under metaphysics?

This problem was mentioned earlier but deserves a fuller treatment.

2.8.6.1 How are epistemology, logic, and value subsumable under metaphysics?

2.8.6.2 What else is subsumable under metaphysics?

2.8.6.3 Metaphysics as ‘the all-inclusive discipline’

2.8.6.4 What are the kinds and methods of metaphysics?

This question currently falls under metaphysics as the overarching discipline. However, its level of detail may later warrant its assignment as a separate section.

2.8.6.4.1 What are the kinds of metaphysics relative to the real?

2.8.6.4.1.1 Real

2.8.6.4.1.1.1 Direct

In which the elementary empirical and rational are one.

2.8.6.4.1.1.2 Speculative

Scientific or hypothetico-deductive.

2.8.6.4.1.2 Purportedly real

2.8.6.4.1.2.1 Posit

Early and experimental metaphysics

2.8.6.4.1.2.2 Dogma

Though we reject arbitrary dogma on rational grounds, philosophical and theological dogma generate useful ideas and action—directly and by reaction

Dogma has a spirit which suggests the capacity for truth and is thus a generator of truth by inspiration

2.8.6.4.1.3 Imaginative and exploratory

Essential precursor to rational metaphysics

Existential generator of ideas and action

2.8.6.4.2 What is the method—or methods—of metaphysics and are they subsumed under metaphysics?

Comment 18. See Metaphysics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

2.8.6.4.2.1 Abstraction, concretion, and the problems of abstract and concrete objects

See discussion in What are the high-level aspects or natures of being?

2.8.6.4.2.2 Reflexivity and revaluation at all levels of content and method (including content and method as one)

2.8.6.4.2.3 Metaphysics as science

Speculative metaphysics as described by A.N. Whitehead makes hypotheses, derives conclusions, compares them with the real, and improves upon the hypotheses (Whitehead’s Process and Reality does not quite do this, at least explicitly).

The real metaphysics flows rationally from primitive truth and, with science as hypothesis – deduction – re-hypothesis, is supra-science.

2.8.7 Other problems from the history of metaphysics

These are (i) problems made inessential by later considerations, especially the real metaphysics—i.e., they are footnotes to history and (ii) subsumed under more general topics.

2.8.7.1 Inessential problems

The problems are seen as inessential from the perspective of the real metaphysics.

2.8.7.1.1 Substance

2.8.7.1.2 Categories—older systems and older limited meanings of the term

2.8.7.1.3 First causes, unchanging things

2.8.7.1.4 Essence of being – of beings as such

2.8.7.1.5 The possibility of metaphysics

This problem had to do with older conceptions of metaphysics and received criteria of knowledge that ought to be archaic (but still deserving of consideration).